Kosygin's economic reform causes its incomplete presentation. 'Kosygin reform' - historical reference. Action of economic reform

Economic reform of 1965 in the USSR- reform of planning and management of the national economy of the Soviet Union, carried out in the -1970s. Known in the USSR as Kosygin reform, in the West as Lieberman's reform.

The reform was characterized by the introduction of economic management methods, the expansion of the economic independence of enterprises, associations and organizations, and the widespread use of material incentives. It is associated with the name of the Chairman Council Ministers of the USSR A. N. Kosygin.

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Traditionally, the implementation of the reform was associated with the complication of economic ties, which reduced the effectiveness of directive planning (in 1966, the industry of the USSR included more than three hundred industries, 47 thousand enterprises, 12.8 thousand primary construction organizations), and with the desire to more fully use the intensive factors of economic growth . The latter was achievable by increasing labor productivity through improving its culture, intensity and organization, as well as the efficient use of available resources. It was recognized that the existing planning system does not sufficiently interest enterprises in accepting high planning targets, in introducing organizational and technical innovations.

For the first time, the main ideas of the reform were made public in the article “Plan, Profit, Prize” by Professor E. G. Lieberman of Kharkov State University in the newspaper Pravda and his report “On Improving Planning and Material Incentives for the Work of Industrial Enterprises” sent to the Central Committee of the CPSU [ ] . Lieberman's proposals were supported by economists V. S. Nemchinov, S. G. Strumilin, experts from the State Planning Committee of the USSR, heads of enterprises, etc.

The article marked the beginning of an all-Union economic discussion in the press and a series of economic experiments that confirmed the effectiveness of the proposed measures. In the Western press and Sovietology, the concept of reforms was called liberalism.

As an alternative to reform among the intelligentsia of the "technocratic" direction, the ideas of academician V. M. Glushkov were considered, since 1962 he had been developing a program of total informatization of economic processes using the OGAS system, which was supposed to be based on the Unified State Network of Computing Centers (EGS CC) that was being created.

The decisive argument was that Lieberman estimated the costs of carrying out his reform at the cost of the paper on which the relevant decrees would be printed, and promised the first results in a matter of months. Kosygin - the most "stingy" member of the Politburo, who knew how to count the people's penny - chose Lieberman's reform [ ] .

The main provisions of the reform

The reform implemented after the removal of N. S. Khrushchev from power was presented as a break with the manifestations of the “subjectivism” and “projectionism” inherent in Soviet economic policy of the second half of the 1950s and early 1960s, the practice of administrative and volitional decisions. An increase in the scientific level of economic management based on the laws of political economy of socialism was declared. The reform was carried out under the leadership of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR A. N. Kosygin.

The reform was put into effect by a group of resolutions of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR, extending its provisions to certain industries and sectors of the national economy:

The reform was a complex of five groups of the following measures.

Bodies of territorial economic management and planning were liquidated - councils of the national economy, created in 1957, enterprises became the main economic unit. The system of sectoral management of industry, all-Union, Union-Republican and Republican ministries and departments were restored.
The number of directive planned indicators was reduced (from 30 to 9). The indicators remained valid for: the total volume of production in current wholesale prices; the most important products in physical terms; the general payroll; the total amount of profit and profitability, expressed as the ratio of profit to the amount of fixed assets and normalized working capital; payments to the budget and appropriations from the budget; the total volume of capital investments; assignments for the introduction of new technology; volume of deliveries of raw materials, materials and equipment.
The economic independence of enterprises expanded. Enterprises were obliged to independently determine the detailed range and range of products, to invest in production at their own expense, to establish long-term contractual relationships with suppliers and consumers, to determine the number of personnel, the amount of their material incentives. For non-fulfillment of contractual obligations, enterprises were subject to financial sanctions, and the importance of economic arbitration increased.
Key importance was attached to the integral indicators of the economic efficiency of production - profit and profitability. At the expense of profits, enterprises were able to form a number of funds - funds for the development of production, material incentives, socio-cultural purposes, housing construction, etc. Enterprises could use the funds at their discretion (of course, within the framework of existing legislation).
Pricing policy: the wholesale selling price was supposed to provide the enterprise with a given profitability of production. Long-term standards were introduced - the norms of the planned cost of production that were not subject to revision for a certain period.

In agriculture, purchase prices for products increased by 1.5-2 times, preferential payment for excess harvest was introduced, prices for spare parts and equipment were reduced, and income tax rates for peasants were reduced.

The new system of national economic planning was enshrined in Article 16 of the Constitution USSR 1977 :

The economy of the USSR constitutes a single national economic complex embracing all links of social production, distribution and exchange on the territory of the country. Management of the economy is carried out on the basis of state plans for economic and social development, taking into account sectoral and territorial principles, with a combination of centralized management with economic independence and the initiative of enterprises, associations and other organizations. At the same time, economic calculation, profit, cost, and other economic levers and incentives are actively used.

Implementation of the reform. "Golden Five Year Plan"

The main measures of the reform were introduced during the 8th Five-Year Plan (1966-1970). By the autumn of 1967, 5.5 thousand enterprises (1/3 of industrial output, 45% of profits) were operating under the new system, by April 1969 - 32 thousand enterprises (77% of output).

During the five-year period, record rates of economic growth were recorded. In 1966-1979, the average annual growth rate of national income in the USSR was 6.1%. A number of major economic projects were implemented (the creation of the Unified Energy System, the introduction of automated control systems at enterprises, the development of civil automotive industry, etc.). The growth rates of housing construction, development of the social sphere, financed at the expense of enterprises, were high. The volume of industrial production increased by 50%. About 1,900 large enterprises were built, including the Volzhsky Automobile Plant in Tolyatti.

The reform had a pronounced effect of a one-time attraction of growth reserves: the velocity of circulation in the “goods-money” phase increased, “storming” decreased, the rhythm of deliveries and settlements increased, and the use of fixed assets improved. Enterprises developed individual flexible incentive systems.

Shchekin experiment

Main article: Shchekin experiment

Reform development

In the 1970s, the Council of Ministers and the State Planning Committee of the USSR adopted decisions designed to correct the negative aspects of the reformed economic system that had emerged - a tendency to increase prices, the desire to use the most costly schemes of economic relations (including sacrificing innovative development), providing the highest performance according to the so-called “gross revenue”, since it was this indicator that was present in the state plan.

By the Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR “On certain measures to improve planning and economic stimulation of industrial production” dated June 21, 1971, starting from the 9th five-year plan, 1971-1975, directive tasks for increasing labor productivity were restored; products.

In the 1970s, the multi-stage industrial management system was replaced by a two- and three-stage system (ministry - association - enterprise; ministry - self-supporting plant - mine management). Accordingly, the management and planning functions were redistributed and decentralized.

In 1970, there were 608 associations (6.2% of employed personnel, 6.7% of sales), in 1977 - 3670 associations (45% of personnel, 44.3% of sales), for example: ZIL, AZLK, Voskresenskcement, Electrosila , AvtoGAZ, AvtoVAZ, KamAZ, Uralmash, Positron, Bolshevik.

The newly formed associations and combines acted on the basis of self-financing, carried out the main investment activity, and cooperated with the economic ties of enterprises. The ministries were assigned the role of a conductor of a common scientific and technical policy. The number of forms of documentation and reporting indicators was sharply reduced. The reorganization was accompanied by a significant release of management personnel.

The Decree of the Central Committee of the CPSU "On the Further Improvement of the Economic Mechanism and Tasks of Party and State Bodies" dated July 12, 1979 introduced a new target indicator of net (normative) production, taking into account the newly created value - wages plus average profit. His task was to stop the upward trend in prices and costs. Incentive surcharges were introduced on the price of new and high-quality products and stable long-term standards for economic incentive funds. The practice of compiling targeted comprehensive scientific, technical, economic and social programs for the development of regions and industrial-territorial complexes was expanding, the principle of long-term standards was being developed.

In the post-reform period, there was a pronounced shift in the economy of the USSR towards intensive factors of economic growth. The main growth factor was the increase in the productivity of social labor and the economy of living labor, that is, the role of the main extensive factor, the increase in the number of employees, decreased, which was typical of the 1930s-1950s.

Ratio of economic growth factors, %

	1961-1965	1966-1970	1971-1975	1976-1979
Growth in national income	37	45	32	19
Average annual growth rate	6,5	7,7	5,7	4,4
Productivity of social labor	31	39	25	14
Average annual growth rate	5,6	6,8	4,6	3,3
Employed in material production (growth)	10,2	6,0	6,4	3,9
Average annual growth rate	2,00	1,20	1,25	0,95
Dynamics of return on assets (the ratio of the growth of national income to the growth of fixed assets)	0,86	0,98	0,87	0,89
Dynamics of material intensity (the ratio of the social product to the national income) for the period	1,00	0,99	1,03	1,00

In the second half of the 1960s - 1970s, the reform was criticized "from the left" by a group of scientists, authors of the so-called. system of optimal functioning of the economy (SOFE). These included the director of the Central Economics and Mathematics Institute of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR N. P. Fedorenko, A. I. Katsenelinboigen, S. S. Shatalin, I. Ya. Birman, supported by Academician G. A. Arbatov. As an alternative to reform, the SOFE authors proposed the creation of a "constructive" economic and mathematical model of the socialist economy. As an alternative to "descriptive" political economy, SOFE was supposed to completely replace commodity production, replacing it with a system of economic-cybernetic operations. SOFE was first presented at the scientific-theoretical conference of the Institute of Economics of the USSR Academy of Sciences in 1967. SOFE found support in CEMI, the Institute of the USA and Canada, the apparatus of the Central Committee of the CPSU. The opponents were the Council of Ministers, the State Planning Commission, the Institute of Economics of the USSR Academy of Sciences (professors Ya. A. Kronrod and N. A. Tsagolov, L. I. Abalkin).

The failure of SOFE was recognized by an expanded meeting of the State Planning Committee of the USSR with the participation of leading economists in 1970. Politicizing the issue, supporters of SOFE blamed Kosygin for flirting with the West, unforgivable concessions to him, "betrayal" of socialism, "dragging" onto Soviet soil ideas alien to the people than contributed to the slowdown and a certain attenuation of reform efforts.

Curtailment of the reform, results and assessments

Modern historiography is dominated by the point of view of curtailing the reform or its complete failure [ ] :

If in 1967 (at the height of the Kosygin reforms) 50.2 tons of gold were spent on the purchase of grain, then in 1972 - 458.2 tons (!) (historians A. Korotkov and A. Stepanov found these data in the archives of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU ). These were not reforms, but a road to nowhere ...

Among the reasons for the "flooding" of the reform, the resistance of the conservative part of the Politburo of the Central Committee is usually cited (the chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR N.V. Podgorny took a negative position in relation to the reform), as well as the tightening of the internal political course under the influence of the Prague Spring of 1968. According to the memoirs of Kosygin's deputy N. K. Baibakov, the inner-apparatus rivalry between A. N. Kosygin and his deputy N. A. Tikhonov played a particularly negative role. Disagreements between the Council of Ministers, the State Planning Committee of the USSR, on the one hand, and the Ministry of Defense, on the other, were counterproductive. Marshal D. F. Ustinov advocated a constant increase in military spending, which was opposed by Kosygin and Baibakov.

An unfavorable factor for the development of reforms could also be an increase in oil export revenues (for example, the Samotlor oil field discovered in 1965 was put into operation four years later, and the 1973 oil crisis raised oil prices many times), which allowed the conservative wing of the Soviet leadership to mask the economic problems of the USSR, in particular, to cover the food shortage through imports: purchases of feed grains in Canada and frozen beef and whale meat in Australia.

A. N. Kosygin is credited with the words spoken in a conversation with the head of the government of Czechoslovakia Lubomir Strougal in 1971: “Nothing is left. Everything collapsed. All work has been stopped, and the reforms have fallen into the hands of people who do not want them at all... The reform is being torpedoed. The people with whom I developed the materials of the congress have already been removed, and completely different people have been called. And I don't expect anything anymore"

The Kosygin reform (the Lieberman reform) is an economic reform aimed at improving the system of planning and managing the national economy in the USSR.

The Kosygin reform was launched in 1965, but due to a number of problems, its implementation lasted until 1970, after which it was curtailed. The economic reform got its name in honor of A.N. Kosygin, chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, who was entrusted with the development and implementation of economic reforms. In addition, it is known as the Lieberman Reform - in honor of the second author and developer of the project, the Soviet economist E.G. Lieberman.

The essence of the reform was the introduction of a completely new economic management system for enterprises, which would be based on performance indicators and prepare the economy for a new round of development.

Brief biography of Kosygin

Aleksey Nikolayevich Kosygin was born on February 21, 1904 in St. Petersburg and received a good education. From 1919 to 1921, he served in the army on the military field construction of a section of the road between Petrograd and Murmansk, after which he returned to the city and became a student of the All-Russian food courses of the People's Commissariat of Industry. In the same year, he entered the Leningrad Cooperative College, after which he went to Novosibirsk. In 1927, Kosygin became a member of the CPSU (b), and in 1930 he returned to Leningrad and entered the Leningrad Textile Institute.

After graduating from the institute, Kosygin's career developed quite quickly. From 1936 to 1937, he worked first as a simple foreman, then as a shift supervisor, and then as the director of the Oktyabrskaya factory. In 1938, he was appointed to the post of head of the industrial and transport department of the Leningrad Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, and a year later he was elected a member of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. From that moment began the political career of Kosygin, who rapidly climbed the career ladder in the party.

At the beginning of the war, he was appointed head of the group of commissars of the Civil Defense Committee. The committee was engaged in the evacuation and supply of food for civilians in besieged Leningrad. In the course of his work, Kosygin became one of the members of the group that created and planned the famous "Road of Life", which in many ways contributed to his further success in political activity.

After the war, Kosygin was appointed chairman of the Operational Bureau of the Council of People's Commissars, and in 1946 he became Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and a member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee. It was in these positions that he spent his main political and economic activities, one of the most prominent places in which is the economic reform of 1965.

Kosygin economic reform

After N.S. left the post of head of state in October 1964. Khrushchev, the famous Khrushchev thaw also ended, during which various reforms were actively carried out in the USSR, sometimes very bold and quite often ill-conceived. They were replaced by more moderate and conservative transformations of the new government.

Despite fears, with the advent of L. Brezhnev, the country did not return to Stalinism, a series of moderate transformations began with the aim of improving socialism. At the same time, a sharp scientific and technological leap is taking place in the world, which leads to the need to transform the existing economic system. The development of economic reform was entrusted to Kosygin.

The essence of the Kosygin reform

The essence of the reform is to make enterprises more independent, increase their degree of economic and economic freedom and choose new economic incentives to replace the old ones.

The reform included:

liquidation of bodies of territorial management of the economy, restoration of the system of sectoral management;
reducing the number of planned indicators in order to reduce the bureaucratization of the production process;
transition to economic incentives;
profitability and profit became key performance indicators;
new pricing policy.

Unfortunately, already at the first stage, the implementation of the reform faced certain difficulties: the agricultural sector was not ready for the new economic system, so the reforms dragged on for five years. By 1970, it became clear that it was impossible to fully implement the plan, and the reforms gradually came to naught.

The results of Kosygin's reform and the reasons for the failure

The main goal of the economic reform was to spur the economy to move to an intensive quality of growth and create a foundation for its further development, but with new foundations. Unfortunately, the Kosygin reform can be called a failure, since it was not possible to fully implement it.

Historians name a number of reasons why the reform failed, but the main place in them is occupied by inconsistencies and a large number of contradictions in the administrative and managerial corps (far from the entire ruling part of the party wanted the reform). In addition, the banal lack of money for the implementation of transformations has affected. Despite the failure, the reforms formed the basis of economic transformation in 1987-1988.

In 1980, Kosygin was relieved of all posts due to deteriorating health, and later, on December 18, 1980, he died. During the period of his political career, Kosygin was not only engaged in the development of economic reforms, but also made a significant contribution to the foreign policy of the USSR.

What did this Kosygin come up with? What reforms? What are they needed for? Who needs it? Who understands this? You need to work better, that's the whole problem.
Brezhnev L.I.

Immediately after Brezhnev came to power, an acute question arose before him - an economic reform was needed, since the last 5 years of Khrushchev's activity led to horrific consequences. Therefore, literally everyone, from ordinary citizens to the leaders of the Central Committee, understood that reforms were needed. But why did the economic reform of 1965 not produce the expected results? To answer this question, it is necessary to consider all the nuances of the ongoing changes in agriculture and industry.

The economic reform of 1965 made the main bet on the modernization of agriculture and industry. Kosygin took care of it, who was removed after the first positive results, after which the fall of the USSR economy began.

Agrarian reform of 1965 and its results

In March 1965, the leadership of the USSR announced the beginning of the reform in the agrarian sector. The main ideas of this reform were as follows:

The state raised purchase prices for state and collective farms.
For overfulfillment of the plan for growing agricultural products, the state established a surcharge on the purchase price of + 50%.
Purchase prices were approved for 10 years, which gave guarantees to farmers.
Collective farmers were now paid guaranteed salaries, and not workdays, as was the case before.
The state sent large sums of money to equip collective farms and state farms with a material and technical base.
Removal of all restrictions on farming.

The reform ideas themselves were sound, the party leadership wanted not only to improve the situation of agriculture, but also to strengthen control over it by the ministries. The result was a little different from what Brezhnev originally spoke about. It is enough to look at the list above to understand that there are both positive and negative sides, which later manifested themselves in full.

Positive aspects of agrarian reform

Of course, an increase in the purchase price, an additional payment for overfulfillment of the plan and long-term guarantees for the purchase - this is what the collective farms needed. Little is said about this, but the fact is that all state and collective farms were unprofitable. Everyone was in debt. It is no coincidence that both Khrushchev's reforms and Brezhnev's reforms put at the forefront the fact that debts from collective farms should be written off. Where did these debts come from? The main reason is that for many years the state actually robbed the peasants, buying their products for next to nothing. Beginning in 1965, this trend broke.

Negative aspects of agrarian reform

But there was also something in the agrarian reform that led to "stagnation" - a fixed wage for collective farmers. Previously, the collective farmer received money for workdays, and also had additional payments for fulfilling the production (growing) plan. For example, a person had to work for 20 days, collect 250 kilograms of potatoes, and the state paid him 50 rubles for this (figures are given only for example). Now the picture has changed. A person received his 50 rubles, regardless of how many potatoes he collected in 20 days of work. Even if he collects not 250 kilograms, but 10, he will receive his 50 rubles in any case. On the one hand, this gave guarantees and social security to collective farmers, but on the other hand, it completely killed the motivation to work and achieve results.

Results of economic reform in the agricultural sector

The main stake in the economic development of agriculture, the country's leadership made on the full provision of their country with grain and food. But it was not possible to do this, moreover, the rest of the indicators were no less “impressive”:

It was possible to hang the profitability of the agricultural sector. For state farms it became 22%, and for collective farms - 34%.
Reduction of arable land. Since 1965 and since the collapse of the USSR, arable land has decreased by 22 million hectares.
The economy was extremely inefficient. In some areas, production losses were up to 40%. The minimum threshold is 20%. That is, 1/5 of all products simply disappeared.
Mistakes in leadership led to the aggravation of environmental problems within the country.

As a result, the USSR, which had the most black earth for arable land among all countries in the world, began to buy grain and food products abroad! These elements began under Khrushchev, but under Brezhnev they could not reverse the negative trend.

Reforms in industry: intentions and results

Previous generations of communists have always chosen one of the following directions for reform:

Production improvement.
Stimulation of employees.

The Brezhnev government decided to do otherwise, choosing not one of the points, but both. The very reform of the industry of the USSR began in 1965 and was due to the fact that Khrushchev brought this sector of the economy to a deplorable state. The economic reform of 1965 in the industrial sector had much more positive results than the reform of agriculture.

Key aspects of the reform:

Encouragement of enterprises. For this, part of the profit was left for the development of the enterprise itself. At the same time, the money was divided into 3 funds: material incentives (payment of bonuses), socio-cultural development (work permits, tickets, and so on) and domestic development (construction of housing, leisure facilities).
Economic Councils have been replaced by Ministries. Decisions in the economy were to be made by sectoral ministries. They created plans that enterprises could adjust to suit their capabilities.
Change in the production planning system. First, the number of planned indicators was significantly reduced. Secondly, the result of the work was now measured not by the products produced, but by the products sold. That is, quantity was replaced by quality.
Enterprises were endowed with elements of independence. In addition to the fact that they were left with part of the income, enterprises received the right to make self-financing among themselves.
Increase in employee benefits. Enterprises financially motivated employees to increase results.

These are the key aspects of the reform. Even looking at them, it is clear that the economic reform of 1965 was quite limited. Nevertheless, she very soon gave a positive result. Already by 1970, the level of industrial production increased by 50%, about 1900 new enterprises were built. But at the same time, it became obvious that the USSR could not improve these indicators any further. Moreover, the country's economy has moved into decline, which is best demonstrated by the following graph.

The question arises - why did all the key indicators of economic development decline after 1970? Everything is simple here - the number of able-bodied population decreased every year, mining became more and more expensive, equipment became obsolete physically and morally, defense spending increased.

The main reason that the economic reform of 1965 did not give the expected results is that the economic model of the USSR has become obsolete. The basis of this model was the denial of everything new. Therefore, local results were not bad, but on a long time interval they were negative.
Historical reference

Why did the economic reforms of 1965 not produce the expected results?

There are a number of reasons why this happened:

The economic fundamentals have not been changed. Brezhnev tried to solve global problems with superficial changes, but, alas, this is impossible.
Contradictions in the party. To solve global problems, there must be unity, but there was none, and everyone was pulling the blanket in their own direction.
The economy for the Central Committee of the CPSU was less important than ideology. Even when it became obvious that the economy of the USSR was in a very deplorable state, anyway, the speech was something like this - we’ll live somehow, the main thing is not to touch the postulates of socialism and party hegemony.
Contradictions. Enterprises were endowed with elements of independence, but often their independent decisions were in conflict with the opinion of the Ministries.

One of the reasons was that in the USSR there were (under construction) a large number of gigantic factories. As a result, they had a monopoly position in the country. As a result of the fact that enterprises were given economic concessions, the quality of products suffered due to the lack of competition. In response, the government tightened product quality control standards. At first glance, this step is absolutely correct, but in practice it has led to the fact that products have risen in price, and there has also been a shortage. As a result, the reform developed, but there were no positive results. Moreover, every year an increasing number of goods were brought from abroad, since the industry of the USSR could not provide citizens with everything they needed. After all, one of the main problems was not solved - the lack of mass consumption products. Here is what A.A. wrote about this. Gromyko.

Many members of the Politburo are sincerely convinced that monopoly enterprises, gigantic construction projects and heavy industry require unjustified costs, while enterprises working for mass consumption find themselves isolated.
A.A. Gromyko

Reasons for the increasing gap between the economy of the USSR and the economy of Western countries in the 1970s - early 1980s

The reasons for this gap are understandable - everything was done in the USSR for heavy industry and military equipment, according to the development indicators of which the country was ahead of its Western "partners". But this was done at the expense of savings on the needs of citizens, because in the USSR there was a shortage of almost everything. Everyone who lived in that era says that there were queues for goods from Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Poland and other countries. There were also own goods, but they were extremely lacking. This is a clear sign that the economy is skewed towards heavy industry. The Western countries did not have this bias, so they began to gradually lag behind the USSR in this respect.

In addition, there was another moment that slowed down the development of the USSR economy and led to the resignation of Kosygin - an increase in the price of oil and gas. Brezhnev and his entourage decided that the economic reform of 1965 had already outlived its usefulness, and then the country would live off the sale of fuel. Kosygin was removed, the crisis intensified. Therefore, the reasons that the economic reform of 1965 did not give the expected results should be sought in the decisions of the Central Committee, where people were sincerely convinced that reforms were not needed, that it was possible to get by not with reforms, but with minor cosmetic repairs. But they were very wrong...

The search for a new economic model has been carried out by Soviet economists (L. Kantorovich, V. Nemchinov, V. Novozhilov) since the late 1950s. The essence of the intentions was to make the rigid system of unified state planning more flexible by including elements of market incentives in it. The main tasks were to increase the material interest of producers in the results of their work and change the principle of evaluating the effectiveness of work.

In 1962, a debate began on the pages of the Soviet press on an article by the economist E. Lieberman, which had a very characteristic title - "Plan, profit, bonus." A professor from Kharkov suggested drawing up plans directly at enterprises within the framework of an agreed program, expanding the rights of enterprises to provide material incentives to their employees, and linking bonus payments to the profitability of production. During the discussion that unfolded, statements in favor of economic reform, profit as the leading economic indicator, for the rejection of gross estimates, overcoming the "storm" and other negative phenomena of the Soviet economy prevailed. In the spring of 1965, Nemchinov published an article in which the author proposed introducing a "self-supporting planning system." In his opinion, the plan was to become not so much a task as a state order.

N.S. Khrushchev could, but never decided on a full-scale reform, the implementation of which began only in the mid-1960s.

In October 1964, N. Khrushchev was dismissed from all posts for health reasons. Khrushchev's successor as First Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU was L.I. Brezhnev. The October Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU in 1964 decided to divide the top party and state positions previously occupied by Khrushchev, A.N. Kosygin.

A. Kosygin was given the task of carrying out broad reforms in the economy, which would then be called the "Kosygin reform", by the top party leadership.

The main goal of the reform was to increase the efficiency of the national economy, increase its growth rates and, on this basis, improve the living standards of the population.

The main principles of the reform were to give greater autonomy to individual enterprises; transfer of enterprises to self-financing; assessment of the work of enterprises not in terms of gross output, but in terms of realized and profit received; creation of economic incentive funds from a part of the profit (10-12% of the total profit); introduction of elements of wholesale trade between manufacturers, bypassing intermediaries, i.e. state structures, accustomed to planning and distributing everything according to “limits”; increasing the role of profit in assessing the economic efficiency of their activities.

The fixed assets of the enterprise remained in state ownership, and enterprises had to pay rent to the state for them. The enterprises had to buy fuel, energy and raw materials. This was to encourage directors to conserve resources and raw materials. It was assumed that the enterprises would be freed from the petty tutelage of the governing bodies, only the most general parameters of development would descend from above. Mandatory targets have been reduced from 30 to 9.

Thus, the enterprise received the right to relatively independently conduct its economic activities and dispose of a part of the profits received.

The profit received by the enterprise was divided into three funds: the production development fund, the material incentive fund and the social, cultural and domestic development fund. Workers and employees very quickly felt that the implementation of the plan had a tangible effect on the receipt of cash bonuses. A characteristic phenomenon for that period of time was the bonus at the end of the year or the so-called “13th salary”. A serious incentive for workers in the face of a shortage of housing in cities was the rapid receipt of apartments at enterprises that overfulfilled the plan.

In addition, sectoral management was restored in industry through ministries (introduced by N. Khrushchev in 1957, the councils of the national economy were abolished), but the main link in production, according to the plan of the reformers, was to become a self-supporting enterprise (independent, self-sustaining, self-financed).

In 1966, 243 highly profitable enterprises switched to self-financing, in the next - 7 thousand, and in total they produced about 40% of the country's industrial output. In the late 1960s already the vast majority of industrial enterprises have switched to new conditions of financial and economic activity.

The transformation also affected agriculture. In March 1965, the plenum of the Central Committee raised the problem of reforming the agricultural sector. For collective farms and state farms, planned indicators were reduced. Purchase prices increased 1.5-2 times, and above-plan deliveries had to be carried out at higher prices. In particular, a 50% surcharge was introduced to the basic price for the above-planned sale of agricultural products to the state. In addition, debts were written off from collective farms and state farms, and prices for equipment and spare parts were reduced. In order to increase the material interest of the collective farmers, the workday was replaced by a monthly guaranteed payment in money and products according to the norms that were in force on state farms. On the whole, it was envisaged to change the proportions of the distribution of national income in favor of agriculture through economic measures.

The state policy was also changing in relation to personal subsidiary plots (LPS). From the restrictive period of Khrushchev, it became permissive, private household plots began to be considered an important channel for the receipt of agricultural products for public consumption.

As a result, already in 1966 the incomes of collective farms and state farms increased by 15%. The volume of agricultural production during the years of the Eighth Five-Year Plan increased by 21% (in the previous five-year period, this figure was 12%). For 1966-1970 the state purchased almost a third more grain than in the previous five years.

The technical park of agriculture has increased. Thus, by 1970 the number of tractors increased from 1,613 thousand units (1965) to 1,997 thousand units, grain harvesters - from 520 thousand to 623 thousand units, trucks - from 945 thousand to 1,136 thousand pieces.

As a result of economic transformations, it was possible to improve all the most important economic indicators. During the years of the Eighth Five-Year Plan (1966-1970), the volume of industrial production grew one and a half times. About 1900 large enterprises were put into operation. In general, the volume of national income by the end of the 1960s. increased by 41%, and labor productivity - by 37%. The effect of the reform in the first years of its implementation exceeded all expectations. The Eighth Five-Year Plan was called "golden" because of the fulfillment and overfulfillment of planned targets.

However, in the course of the "Kosygin reform", as in the years of the NEP, the economic transformations that had begun met with dull discontent from the bureaucracy that had grown after the end of Stalin's repressions. As an example, we can cite an experiment that began in 1967 at the Shchekino chemical plant: it was allowed to reduce excess staff, and distribute part of the wages of those laid off among those who remained. As a result, the number of employees of the plant decreased from 6 to 5 thousand people in two years, while output, on the contrary, increased by 80%. Also known was the so-called "Zlobin method" in construction named after foreman N.A. Zlobina from Zelenograd near Moscow: a team of builders took a contract for the entire cycle of work, which she undertook to complete on time and with high quality. At the same time, the members of the brigade themselves determined the volume of daily output, the distribution of duties and the amount of wages. As a result, the number of workers was reduced, labor productivity increased, and construction time was reduced. It would seem that all the advantages were there.

However, the progressive experience of the Shchekino chemical plant and N. Zlobin's team was not widely used, since, according to party functionaries, the introduction of such a practice at other enterprises could lead to unemployment, which was unacceptable within the framework of the concept of "developed" socialism and the further building of communism. There was also a question about the payment of administrative and managerial personnel, which was very difficult to reduce. As a result, things did not go further than experiments.

The indicators of the Eighth Five-Year Plan confirm that the reform intensified labor activity, but at the same time, according to many business executives, the revival of labor activity was determined then by a kind of “interregnum”: there were no economic councils, and the ministries had not yet gained strength and power.

Modern economists believe that in the conditions of a one-party system and a centrally planned economy, even the effective indicators of the Kosygin reform could not outweigh the contradictions that arose as a result of its implementation, which were expressed in the impossibility of a long-term combination of market and directive control levers in the USSR.

In their opinion, the reform was initially doomed to failure, and this was facilitated by a whole range of reasons:

– inconsistency and half-heartedness is already in the very idea of the reform. The assumption of market principles in a rigidly centralized planned economy, as world and domestic experience shows, gives only a short-term effect, and then the dominance of administrative principles and the suppression of economic ones again occur. Already in 1971, the Council of Ministers of the USSR adopted a resolution "On certain measures to improve planning and economic stimulation of industrial production." The state again began to set targets for labor productivity, while in the second half of the 1960s. no such rule was in effect;

- the non-complex nature of the reform. Changes in the national economy were conceived, first of all, as a sum of organizational and technical measures not directly related to the change in social institutions on which the former economic mechanism was based. There was no talk of any democratization of production relations, a change in the form of ownership, or a restructuring of the political system;

- Weak personnel preparedness and security of the reform. The inertia of thinking of the leading economic cadres, the pressure on them of the old stereotypes, the lack of creative courage and initiative on the part of the direct executors of the transformations led to the half-heartedness of the plan of the reform and ultimately doomed it to failure;

- opposition to the reform on the part of the party apparatus and its leaders (L.I. Brezhnev, N.V. Podgorny, Yu.V. Andropov), who were afraid that the economy might get out of control of the party, and the reform would cast doubt on the essence of socialist building. In the process of confrontation between reformist and conservative forces, the latter received support in the person of the head of the CPSU, L. Brezhnev. According to V.A. Kryuchkov, former head of the KGB and a close associate of Yu.V. Andropov, Kosygin and Andropov also shared fundamental differences. Andropov was afraid that the pace of reform proposed by Kosygin could lead not only to dangerous consequences, but also to the erosion of the Soviet socio-political system.

The reform also had negative side effects. First, those enterprises flourished, for whose products the prices were high (instrument making, the defense industry), and the coal and food industries obviously became unprofitable. The second side effect of the reform was the desire of enterprises not to invest in the development of production, but to spend profits on wage increases. At the same time, enterprises still received state assistance and used centralized supply.

Another reason for curtailing the reform was the entrenched tactic of partial amendments. The old methods of petty control and guardianship of economic structures began to return to practice, and the intervention of party and Soviet bodies in the daily life of enterprises.

The British historian Geoffrey Hosking names his own reasons for the collapse of the Kosygin reform: firstly, in order to take full advantage of the opportunities that it opened up, enterprises themselves had to set prices for their products, but they did not receive this right; secondly, for the successful implementation of the reform, it was necessary to introduce new technologies into production, but in an economy where success is measured by the annual fulfillment of planned indicators, this was generally difficult to achieve.

The political crises of 1968 in Czechoslovakia and a number of other countries of the socialist bloc, where a real threat to the very existence of the socialist system arose against the backdrop of market reforms, became an external reason for the actual refusal to continue the economic reform. In 1969, the "Kosygin reform" was actually put on the brakes. At the December plenum of the Central Committee, decisions were made in which the usual “clip” of administrative methods of management was recorded: calls for the rational use of production resources, a stricter austerity regime in the national economy, strengthening labor and state discipline, etc. Although formally the reform has not been canceled.

As in the late 1920s Despite the undoubted successes of the NEP, the party leadership, in order to maintain its monopoly on all spheres of life in Soviet society, refused to introduce elements of the market, since independent subjects of economic relations showed that the paternal guardianship of the party does not help, but only hinders their further development.

Thus, the "Kosygin reform" could not reverse the unfavorable trends in the country's economic development, and the efforts of the party apparatus brought it to naught. The reform of 1965 ultimately showed the limitations of socialist reformism. The last nail in the reform was driven by the golden rain of “petrodollars” that fell on our country in the 1970s, and the aging Soviet party nomenklatura, under such favorable conditions, subsequently abandoned attempts to restructure the Soviet economic system.

Alexei Nikolaevich Kosygin is considered by many to be the most intelligent and strong-willed leader of the Soviet government in the post-war period. Very often in discussions, the Kosygin reform is mentioned, which was supposed to rid the country of the "charms" of the planned economy, which even then showed itself from the worst side.

Not only communists, but even democrats and liberals of the modern government are almost ready to sing odes to this minister, forgetting about the simple fact that it was his failed reform that largely predetermined both the death of the Soviet economy and the collapse of the entire state as a whole. By the way, the real creator of the reform plan was Yevsey Grigoryevich Lieberman, who later settled down very well in the United States. You can draw your own conclusions.

So what characterizes the Kosygin reform? We will describe the idea, essence, results of this grandiose project on the pages of this material.

Start of reforms

In 1962, the famous newspaper Pravda published the article “Plan, Profit, Prize”, which at that time made a lot of noise. It proposed things unthinkable for a Soviet person: to make the main criterion for the efficiency of all enterprises in the country their real indicators of profitability and profit! At the same time, Khrushchev gave the go-ahead to start the experiment at several large enterprises in the country at once.

This is what the Kosygin reform consisted of. In short, it was an attempt to transfer the socialist economy to capitalist lines. It all didn't end well.

government cooperator

In general, Kosygin's career began with a successful study at a cooperative technical school. In those years, the opinion was very popular that it was cooperation that could save a country that had weakened from the hardships of the Civil War. He worked in one of the Siberian production cooperatives, where he showed himself from the best side. Contemporaries recall that Alexei Nikolaevich would certainly have felt ideal during the NEP.

Alas, his dreams collapsed at the moment of the completion of the cooperative program (which the future minister greatly regretted). In 1930, Kosygin had to return to Leningrad. There he entered the textile institute, after which his meteoric career began. In just four years, he rose high up the career ladder, and after the Great Patriotic War he became a member of the Politburo.

Iosif Vissarionovich highly valued Kosygin as a civilian specialist, but did not allow him to participate in government. Eyewitnesses report that the main epithet that Stalin used in relation to him was the word "Legkovik". Most likely, he meant the fact that the Minister of Light Industry had not yet “grown up” to serious matters.

In principle, the Kosygin reform itself showed the same thing. In short, the minister did not take into account too many factors, and therefore the changes he proposed turned out to be extremely harmful.

After Stalin

Khrushchev's arrival changed the situation. Under him, Kosygin became chairman of the State Planning Committee of the USSR. Under Brezhnev, his career took off even faster: a former member of the cooperative headed the USSR Government. In principle, you should not consider him a kind of unprincipled careerist. Contemporaries just remembered that the minister constantly communicated with representatives of the creative and technical intelligentsia, and other members of the Politburo openly disliked him. However, this was explained by banal envy and recognition of Kosygin's superiority.

In many ways, the hostility of his colleagues was due to the fact that he openly advocated the liberalization of social processes in the country, supported all ideas about the Western way of life. In the company of his comrades from the Politburo and other party organizations, he was almost always extremely strict and serious, although in fact he was the kindest person, in many cases acting as the "soul of the company."

This contradiction was explained quite simply. Kosygin was convinced that the old economic system, which had developed under Stalin, was a monolithic rock, heavy and clumsy, which practically did not succumb to any efforts to modernize it. Working a lot on the latter, Alexei Nikolayevich understood more and more clearly that his efforts were wasted. It is not surprising that he had absolutely no time for fun in a working environment.

The minister clearly saw that under Brezhnev the development of the country was proceeding exclusively on paper. Everything was calculated in the "gross output" of the national economy, and these figures were very far from reality. This very production was calculated according to a certain “factory principle”, and in its calculation it was intentionally possible to make a lot of additions and errors, so it was absolutely no difficulty to overestimate the figures.

It was not uncommon for both finished product and intermediate products to be counted five (!) times, resulting in ever-improving charts in official reports, but dragging the real economy to the bottom.

More and more deep became the gap between the "shaft" and objective reality. For example, in order to increase paper figures, the company could well produce cheap shoes, and then use some expensive materials in their decoration. The price of the product has increased several times. Since no one bought such shoes, they were destroyed in a planned manner. The same situation developed in agriculture, where real surpluses of products (hello to the planned economy!) in quantities of tens and hundreds of thousands of tons mediocrely rotted in warehouses.

The labor of thousands and millions of people went down the drain, the country suffered huge financial costs due to flagrant mismanagement. "Gross output" was constantly growing, victorious reports were heard at the congresses of the Central Committee of the CPSU, but the real supply of people with the necessary goods fell from year to year. All this theoretically made it possible to overcome Kosygin's economic reform.

Problems of the national economy

In fact, there was no normal national economy in the country, since each department existed in complete isolation from one another, and their leadership often put a spoke in the wheels of their opponents. Often there were cases when one enterprise produced building materials in one city and transported it almost to the other end of the country, while another plant located in the same region really needed this material, but it was served by another department.

The industry was not interested in the interests of consumers at all. So, there was a case when at one tire factory they were able to reduce the cost of one car tire by exactly five rubles. That's just it began to pass 10 thousand kilometers less, and the buyer remained at a loss of about 25 rubles. It's a paradox, but the employees of the enterprise were rewarded for "savings", while no one thought about the losses of buyers.

Then the Kosygin "reform of 1965" was conceived. In short, all these shortcomings should be eliminated as soon as possible.

But the most ridiculous thing was that the factories were absolutely not interested in a banal study of the demand for their products, since other departments dealt with this issue. Stocks of manufactured, but completely unclaimed products, were constantly expanding in warehouses.

The situation was especially wild in the construction industry. Contractors increasingly began to take on exclusively digging pits and pouring massive foundations, since reporting on these works was the most profitable and “pleasant”. But no one was in a hurry to finish the decoration and even the real construction of the “boxes” of buildings. The number of unfinished construction grew, gigantic resources were simply thrown to the wind.

Kosygin concept

Kosygin, using the theses developed by Lieberman, proposed to completely abandon the indicators of the mythical "gross output". He believed that the manufacturer must bear strict responsibility for the entire cycle of work performed by him, comply with all terms and conditions of production.

It was proposed to shift the formation of the number of workers to the personnel services of the enterprises themselves, so as not to produce idlers, to establish the average wages and labor productivity indicators, to enable factories to attract state loans if they need to develop production lines. It was also proposed to establish state incentives for the real quality of work. In September 1965, the plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU decided that the Kosygin reform should be introduced at enterprises.

Action of economic reform

Kosygin reasonably hoped that with the introduction of the indicator of actual sales of products, enterprises would stop producing junk that no one needed, but would focus on the production of high-quality, sought-after goods. It must be said that the beginning of the reform of A. N. Kosygin was quite encouraging and promising.

In particular, at the Shchekino Chemical Plant, half of the unnecessary employees were fired, their wages were divided among those remaining at the enterprise, as a result of which labor productivity and product quality doubled. In one of the state farms, the size of wages as a result of normal economic activity increased several times. In almost a couple of months, each of the workers received enough money to buy any car that was produced at that time without any problems.

It would seem that Kosygin's economic reform is proceeding with brilliant results.

Unfortunately, it was still "window dressing", since such indicators were achieved solely due to the created "greenhouse" conditions, which is impossible in a normal economy. Taking advantage of the position of "forerunners", many enterprises simply brazenly milked out appropriations from the state, some of which (despite the legendary KGB) ended up in the pockets of interested parties.

The Hidden Essence of Reform

The Kosygin reform itself was met in the USSR in completely different ways. Talented business executives saw in it a real opportunity to earn money. Others said the economy was about to collapse. It turned out “everything is as always”, that is, badly. As we have already said, the "leaders" immediately rushed to look for all conceivable and unthinkable pretexts for increasing state appropriations. The leadership of the State Planning Commission faced a lot of problems. As profits theoretically increased, so did inflation rates.

Shortcomings of the reform

This was due to the fact that enterprises could use surplus income only to increase wages. It was impossible to allocate money for the development of production itself, for the production of new products or the construction of housing for employees, since nothing of the kind was included in the plan. In addition, demand studies were still not conducted, and therefore it was simply impossible to determine whether a new product would find its buyer.

As a result of all this, labor productivity has partially increased, but wages have increased several times. Simply put, the people had a lot of free money in their hands, but it was impossible to buy anything with them, since there were simply no goods of everyday and increased demand. So the Kosygin economic reform theoretically solved a lot of problems, but it added a lot of new ones.

Boost drunkenness

As a result (no matter how paradoxical it may seem at first glance), the real revenues of the state soon fell. I had to resort to a time-tested tool, significantly increasing the production of vodka. The number of drunkards has risen sharply. In addition, many free workers appeared in the country, which had nowhere to attach. The specter of unemployment loomed more and more clearly before the Soviet citizens, which in former times could not even be imagined.

As we have already said, everything turned out badly: the management of enterprises received huge profits, but all their whims had to be covered by the state. But at that time, no one had the guts to say that the capitalist method of managing the economy (and the Kosygin reform was just that) requires appropriate measures ...

Comparison of old and new economy models

It is important to know how exactly, in detail, the new economic model differed from the old one. The fact is that one of the most important mechanisms of social development in the USSR was the guarantee of an annual reduction (!) in prices. The profits of enterprises often had nothing to do with the cost of their products.

Moreover, the management and employees focused precisely on the constant reduction in the cost of manufactured goods, and all other indicators worried them little, or did not care at all. The beginning of the Kosygin reforms changed everything, but until that time it was just that.

Imagine a certain factory of that era that produces, say, cars. The usual cost of a car at that time was about 5,000 rubles. Suppose that the state has determined a profit of 20% of this amount. Thus, in monetary terms, it is equal to 1,000 rubles. The price of the car in the store is 6,000 rubles. Simply put, if you reduce the cost by half, then theoretically you can achieve a profit of as much as 3,500 rubles from each car! A considerable temptation for "kosygingev".

The mechanism of the Stalinist model of the economy

Under the Stalinist economic model, profits were increased in two ways: they increased the output of goods and reduced the cost of the latter. At the end of each reporting year, a new, reduced value of the cost price was fixed without fail. This value was added to the amount of profit, after which a new price was formed. For example, if the cost of some equipment was 2,500 rubles, and, for example, the same 20% of the profit was added to it, then in the end it turned out to be three thousand rubles.

Thus, the consumer and the national economy as a whole received a good profit when buying this product. Simply put, the simplest, basic economic law was in effect, which said: "The lower the cost, the lower the price." But Kosygin destroyed this norm, which had existed for decades.

The brutal blow of capitalism, the collapse of the system

In fact, the Kosygin reform was supposed to turn everything “upside down”. What became the main thing? Profit. It was expressed as a percentage of the cost. The dependence is simple: the more the product costs, the more income the manufacturer has. Thus, it became more profitable to strive to increase the cost of production than our "businessmen" are busy to this day ...

It soon became clear that cost reduction was financially punished, and therefore the point in the annual race to improve production disappeared. Prices began to rise rapidly. As a result, everyone lost: the manufacturer, employees, and customers. And this strategy did not give anything good to the state. Thus, the Kosygin reform (the results of which are briefly described in the article) must be recognized as an extremely unsuccessful experiment.

Alas, it was she who did another "dirty deed". In the old days, the whole team was really interested in the development of production. When, in order to make a profit, it was necessary, in fact, to organize sabotage in production, the management of many enterprises quickly took their bearings and began to remove workers from the processes of improving and developing plants and factories. All the money received was first divided among the "main minds", and only their remnants reached the collectives.

Simply put, the results of Kosygin's reform were reduced to the formation of small capitalism in its worst form, when everything, including the health and life of consumers, is put on the "altar of profit".

In fact, this is how the process of privatization of enterprises was started. In the 90s, many of the former party bosses who led them happily seized on the old dream of taking them into their own hands. The process of the collapse of the economy and the state was begun, which was especially pronounced in the Union republics. In principle, the Kosygin reform of 1965 exactly recreated the times of the NEP.

Negative consequences

The whole planned economy, which, although not shining with perfection, but still fulfilling its function, went out of business. The leaders have finally lost the desire to engage in a real analysis of production, the study of demand and other "unnecessary" things, preferring to increase profits in all possible ways and line their pockets. Workers also turned out to be not interested in improving labor productivity and the quality of goods - after all, the Kosygin reform was characterized by a tremendous increase in wages, and few paid real attention to the quality of products!

Kosygin should not be considered a traitor: he himself stalled his reform when he saw its results. But he did not see the true scale of what had happened, and other party leaders preferred not to notice the emerging collapse of the economic system. What were the reasons for the failure of Kosygin's reforms? Oh, it was all very banal.

The problem was that no one created an economic model, no one tried to implement this system in a single production in conditions of “free floating”, and the industry was completely unprepared for such changes. In addition, everything was spoiled by catastrophic corruption and bureaucracy.

In fact, in this regard, the USSR collapsed already in the 80s, when many Central Asian republics were already openly controlled by local "kings", who pumped out everything possible from the center. The Kosygin reform of 1965 directly contributed to all this.