Economist Vladislav Inozemtsev on why reforms should not be expected. Vladislav foreigners - dreams do not come true. Our trade turnover with China exceeded that with Germany. So, the east turn really happened
A. Venediktov- Good evening. Alexey Venediktov is on the air and today we will talk with Vladislav Leonidovich Inozemtsev. About what happened to the Soviet Union and how much it really is the catastrophe of the century. The greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century. Good afternoon, Vladislav Leonidovich.
V. Inozemtsev- Good afternoon.
A. Venediktov- Please tell me why you think that calling the collapse of the Soviet Union the biggest geopolitical catastrophe of the century, I quote you "this approach seems extremely dangerous." What is dangerous here?
V. Inozemtsev- I proceeded in my theses, first of all, from the fact that when we perceive something as a catastrophe, as something terrible, terrible, which caused a purely negative reaction, we naturally objectively want to fix something. And whenever we address something as a disaster, we always call for a fix for that situation. And if there is no way to fix it, then at least to rethink the glorification of the past, and so on. It seems to me that the glorification of the Soviet past, its glorification, the attempt to return to the Soviet past, which we are actively undertaking today, is an extremely dangerous thing, because we are going against the flow of history. None of the modern successful countries aims to return back, and in our country this is more and more traced in the political line, unfortunately.
A. Venediktov- Still, the Soviet Union, as you write, by the end of its existence was one of the largest world powers. And after the collapse, defeat, collapse of the Soviet Union, on its ruins, as I understand it, much less influential states arose, starting with our country from Russia.
V. Inozemtsev- Naturally. The fact is that, in my opinion, it is necessary to understand that dozens of states have changed in world history, I would say states that, based on their imperial position, found themselves in the forefront or, at least, among the leaders of the world political process. And they became one of the largest powers. These were all known empires. Roman Empire, Spanish, British. The Soviet Union was in many ways approximately the same entity. That is, we combined colonization within ourselves practically, as was the case with the British in North America, Canada and Australia. We have in Siberia to the Far East. We combined military conquests, the holding of territory, as it was with those French in West Africa, we have in Central Asia. And many other processes. In this respect, they did not differ too much from Europe. But all colonial empires, all complex composite formations, collapsed. As the need arose for nation-states, they became the driving force behind the historical process. We are delayed in development.
A. Venediktov“So we collapsed as an empire too late, didn’t we?”
Inozemtsev: When we refer to something as a disaster, we always call for the correction of this situation
V. Inozemtsev“We were the last to collapse. What happened in the European empire. The first phase of their destruction was the 18th, early 19th century. When the United States was formed, the independent states of Latin America. This was the first phase when the settler colonies left. Siberia and the Far East remain, and I hope, will remain with us forever. In this respect, Russia did not survive this period at all. We have never rethought our attitude towards our settlement colonies. The second stage of the 60-50s was the collapse of that part of the colonial empires where the European nations were not in the majority as a population. They were, in principle, subjects of military control. We, too, Russians have never been the majority of the population in Tajikistan, Armenia. In Turkmenistan. It was, in principle, the same military colonized territory captured in the 19th century, not annexed, not happily merged, but simply occupied militarily. And didn't last long. What happened in Africa and Southeast Asia in the 60s and 70s happened to us in the 90s. We've gone 20 years on. So what? The collapse of the British Empire was no more geopolitical catastrophe for Britain. One hundred percent was. Why is it not restored. Simply because they probably have a realistic idea of their own strengths. Unlike us.
A. Venediktov- But in this regard, it is not very clear, I know that many people say that Russia has never been an empire, it has never had colonies in the truest sense of the word. And that is why the collapse of the Russian empire, with the possible exception of Poland, Finland, and then in the Soviet Union of the Baltic states, this was the collapse of the Russian land.
V. Inozemtsev- I do not really understand exactly who we are appealing to now. Who are these people who don't think so? But on the other hand, it is not entirely clear how, relatively speaking, our Central Asian republics differ, for example, from French Algeria. French Algeria is an extreme example because it was... France, but look at the population, the Russian population in the republics of Central Asia. There were several cases enough (inaudible), and let's say in the same Armenia. It was a complex state. There were no colonies, exactly colonies, equal in status to the main state. But the same Algeria was a purely French territory, deputies of the national assembly were elected from it on an equal footing. And, despite this, this territory left during the civil war, thank God, we did not have anything like that. Why didn't we have colonies? That's what the assertion is based on.
A. Venediktov- Based, probably, especially on the latest all sorts of gestures that we are looking for such an identity as the Russian people and are going to even enshrine this by law. Then what's the difference, there are Bashkirs or Armenians.
V. Inozemtsev- The Russian people are the Russian people. There is an American nation, an American people, in which everything and everything is mixed. There is a French civil nation, in which there is a huge number of inclusions. But in this case, we are not talking about the people. We're talking about a colonial empire. I emphasize two things. First. Explain to me or let the historians explain, I don’t see much difference, of course, we were probably more favorable to the Aleuts and Chukchi than the Americans were to their Indians. But if you read the memories of the colonization of the same Kamchatka in the middle of the 19th century, then the number of atrocities there also went off scale. And the population of the ethnic territory of Siberia and the Far East did not increase, excuse me, after the Russian colonization. These are classical colonizations in the sense that Russian people left the center of Russia and actually developed new lands. It was exactly the same thing that the British colonists did in New England. Absolutely the same. Just as the Russians settled in Siberia and the Far East, just as the British settled in that colony. Any specialist in colonial affairs will tell you the same thing. There is nothing shameful in this. Why are we afraid of the word "colonial". Why in America, colonialism is considered a memory of the great times, while in our country it seems like a curse. No, it was ok. Successful nations squeezed less successful ones out of their territory. And as for, excuse me, the war for Central Asia ... so the British borders in Afghanistan in the same year that the congress on the partition of Africa was held in Berlin. But listen, let's remember Lenin's works on the imperial policy of tsarism. It is not out of date, forgive me.
A. Venediktov- Vladislav Leonidovich, then what happened in the economic sense, when I now clarify, the Soviet Union was disintegrating. Remember the history of who fed whom. Rough.
V. Inozemtsev- This is a difficult question. In fact, I will not undertake to answer it, because this is a topic of huge speculation. But I can tell you something else. The thing is, any colonial empire that collapsed, if we look at any example, is precisely non-settler colonies, because when the settler colonies left, they tried to copy the same model that was in the mother country. The American colonies were more democratic than the democratic England of the 18th century. They were more enlightened than the French enlighteners were trying to make France at the same time. The Declaration of Independence and the Bill of Rights preceded the Declaration of the Rights of Man in France. And in this respect, when a settler colony leaves, it leaves in order to develop faster than the country. When the military leaves, territories that were under military control, they are never more successful. Look at Africa after England, at Africa after France, at Indo-China before the 70s and 80s, these are countries that, leaving empires, failed in their development. Approximately the same as, excuse me, dear comrades from Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. Military colonies, controlled colonies have never developed better than the mother country. Same Algeria. Whoever feeds anyone, we know how people live in Algeria and for some reason not the French run back, but the Algerians take to France. Just like we Tajiks come to Russia. These are the objective consequences of the fact that the periphery, separated from the metropolis, rarely fails in its development. This happened.
A. Venediktov- In this regard, since you called your article “Half-life”, I correctly understand that from your point of view, that same empire has not yet collapsed. To end. This is a process.
V. Inozemtsev- I meant the following. There are two circumstances here. First, as it turns out now, and it became clear already in the 1990s to some of the most astute observers, the empire itself was an empire without an empire. In the sense that, let's say, if we see the entire territory that was ruled from a single center and in which there were essentially these colonies that were not developed by the population. Now, if we recall, for example, the work of such a well-known economic historian, Agnus Madison, a Dutchman, he called Australia, the USA, Canada, New Zealand by the term - (inaudible). That is, these were territories in which the population that moved from the metropolises was the majority. In our country, those states that seceded from the Soviet Union and where the Russians did not become the majority were often complex states themselves. We can remember the same Georgia with Abkhazia and South Ossetia and Adzharia, we can remember the conflicts in Karabakh, Transnistria. And these states that broke away from the empire themselves behaved very imperially. The same is true for the 2008 war. It was an absolutely insane war from Mr. Saakashvili's point of view. Which is hard to justify. I think that the reintegration of South Ossetia into Georgia could have taken place in 20-30 years if this conflict had not happened. But he went for it himself. Showing exactly the same logic that Russia is showing in the Donbass. In fact. This is the logic of the outgoing empire and the desire to grab it. Therefore, when I speak about the half-life period, I mean that both in Russia and in the new states there were and are territories that in fact are in relation to these states in the same state in which the departed republics were in relation to the Soviet Union.
A. Venediktov- And how this process affects the main metropolis now. What are our challenges now? Or rather, challenges to us, Russia.
V. Inozemtsev: Praising the Soviet is an extremely dangerous thing
V. Inozemtsev“We have several challenges. First, we have purely internal challenges. Our peripheral territories, primarily in the North Caucasus, they, of course, are now governed solely by appeasing and, in fact, appealing ... to what is happening there. At some point it will explode. In a completely obvious way. And I think that we will experience a lot of disappointments and problems there. Maybe not even in the too distant future. This is our direct problem. I do not really assume that our serious problems are connected, for example, with the republics of the Volga region. Or let's say Siberia and the Far East. Because not a single state, except in my opinion Lesotho, can exist successfully, being completely surrounded ... No Tatarstan can become independent from the Russian Federation. This is nonsense. One side. On the other hand, for example, everyone who talks about separatism in the Far East and Siberia, it seems to me, also comes up with some non-existent reality, because in peacetime not a single mono-ethnic country fell apart. I, at least, do not see such examples. Russia is a mono-ethnic country, especially in the situation beyond the Urals. Where Russians make up about 80% of the population. Simply dividing the country, where there are no borders invented in advance, ... national elites, in my opinion, is impossible. Therefore, I think that for Russia this problem is only physically one - it is the North Caucasus. This is a real problem that is with us and will not go anywhere. Our second very serious problem is our crazy ideas of reintegration.
A. Venediktov- So, here's more about it if possible.
V. Inozemtsev- I do not know a single French or British politician responsible who would say that we need to reintegrate with Senegal or Algeria into a single economic zone, and subsequently into a union state. No one in Western Europe has such nonsense. Because people understand the course of history. Here we really do not want to understand it. We want to reintegrate again with the economically failed colonies that sent us away in 25 years. Give me at least one example of such madness in history. I do not know this, but we have it akin to a national idea lately. And this will be a big problem for us, because we will pump in colossal funds, for the sake of this we will create some mythical doctrines of the Russian world, a single economic space, and so on. This will cost us dearly, just like the maintenance of the well-known socialist system in its time, and will bring absolutely nothing but disappointments.
A. Venediktov- Vladislav Leonidovich, but there are some projects that are quite amorphous, as you and I understand, but still this is the reintegration project of Eurasia, where, without forceful efforts, there are attempts to purely economically recreate a model, probably the EU.
V. Inozemtsev- You see, if the EU model were economically recreated in our country, then how to say, then we should have had a completely different economic organization ... with these republics. We should not have unilateral sanctions, we should not, because there are no cases in the EU when, for example, the transit of Turkish goods from Greece to England ... on the German border in France. Ukrainian goods cannot be brought to Kazakhstan through Russian territory. If this is the EU, then I do not understand something. This is a big demagogy, in fact. Our integration project has a huge number of high-level summits, meetings and personal agreements on what we are doing and with whom, but there are no serious supranational institutions that could put national governments in their place. What is being done in the EU all the time. Maybe, of course, when Putin wrote his famous article on integration in October 11, he directly wrote that we want to follow the example of the EU.
A. Venediktov- Yes.
V. Inozemtsev It's one thing to say, another thing to do. I don't see now where we are following the example of the EU. Even in the union state with Belarus there are milk wars. I want to remind you that in the EU there is a principle that the origin of goods in any country automatically means the possibility of sale in any other. The principle has been confirmed by the European Court of Justice. More 70s odes. And where are we here, sorry.
A. Venediktov- If possible, then, using the example of the crisis with Ukraine that began in 2013. This is about the reintegration of Ukraine into the space of the Customs Union, the Eurasian Union, and what was wrong here. Why didn't it work. This is not only because their mentality is to the West. I economically do not take into account the mentality. Or am I wrong?
V. Inozemtsev- I think that it failed with Ukraine for a reason, I may be wrong, and maybe our Ukrainian friends will condemn me, but it seems to me that the failure with Ukraine was more a failure of methods than sense. And intention.
A. Venediktov- Could you be more specific?
V. Inozemtsev: Why in America colonialism is considered a memory of great times, while in our country it is a curse
V. Inozemtsev- We had a clear position: we wanted to keep Ukraine in the orbit of our influence. We saw that the Ukrainian elite aspired for its own internal reasons and motives for integration into Europe. Why did they need this integration? - First of all, in order, in my opinion, I may be wrong, to legalize the acquired wealth, to create a single economy with the Europeans. Legalize the same property they had. And to pass on to future generations of the Ukrainian oligarchy more or less understandable assets that they accumulated during privatization and the beginning of this wild capitalism. We are trying to drag them to us on the basis of some cultural myths and so on and geopolitical necessity. Our idea was that we saw the supposed difference between Eastern Ukraine along the Dnieper and Western Ukraine, it is believed that Western Ukraine can be mentally closer to Europe. Eastern - closer all the same to us. And this is what Putin did as a result, by splitting the country, annexing Crimea, invading Donbass, and so on. On the other hand, it seems to me that it was necessary to apply a different logic. Because there has never been unity in Ukrainian society... There was a Ukrainian elite that wanted to go to the West, and there was a Ukrainian society, which, in principle, I think could well be associated with Russian society. Therefore, if I were in charge of Kremlin politics in 2013, I would give Yanukovych the opportunity to sign the agreement. ...It would bring Ukraine many problems, including economic ones. Against this background, I would go the other way. I would go not in terms of territory, but in terms of population. For example, I would announce the same measures for Ukrainians as for Belarusians. Unilaterally. Entry without visas, the same rights to work, the possibility of citizenship, pensions and so on. A huge number of closing enterprises would come to us. And thus created a very strong bond. I would open 100-150 thousand state-funded places in Russian universities for Ukrainian students. Instead of Slava Nikonov distributing his Russkiy Mir Foundation in Ukraine. It would be much better, people would come to us, understand that this country is not hostile to them, take a closer look at Russian culture, and integrate. And the best forces from Ukraine in terms of youth, in terms of efficiency, I would pump to Russia.
A. Venediktov- That is, you saw the possibility of integration, reintegration, or rather, which you are against.
V. Inozemtsev“Not countries, but societies. That is, the integration of the country would hardly be possible. But by integrating society, it was possible to make a country, to put a situation in which it would not go further to the West. Or let's say, relatively speaking, European standards will come, and half of Ukrainian enterprises will be unable to sell their products. Russia could announce that we will buy everything that Ukrainian enterprises produce in accordance with GOSTs of the USSR or the Russian Federation. Bring us. Yes, it could be associated with serious financial expenses. But at least we would have a positive attitude towards us society. Which is now just in shock from the fact that we are at war with him. What is an absolute crime according to all human laws. That is, such a fratricidal war, it should not have happened at all. But we allowed it. Therefore, it seems to me that the problem of Ukraine was by no means a foregone conclusion. If only, look at the difference between Ukraine and, for example, Poland. Poland is a country that has always been a European country. And when the Poles wanted to return to Europe in 1989 and applied to the EU, naturally they were immediately accepted simply because Poland was perceived as part of Europe. That is, you come back, friends, we will take you. Sooner or later we will take you. Ukraine was not perceived that way. Therefore, I think that the path of Ukraine and Europe, if it ever ends in success, will be incredibly long and difficult. And they would understand it themselves, if during this time we had not become their mortal enemies, which we have become, I think that it would be quite possible to keep the Ukrainian people in friendship and cooperation with the Russian people.
A. Venediktov- I remind you that Vyacheslav Inozemtsev and Alexei Venediktov are in the Scanner program. Let's scan another important thesis of yours. That on the flanks of the current Eurasia and the Russian Federation in the first place, very disturbing processes are going on for Russia and Eurasia, China is consolidating itself with a part of the former Soviet Union, and the EU is consolidating itself with a part of the former Soviet Union. That is, we have such weights on our shoulders. These are not fantasies, Vladislav Leonidovich?
V. Inozemtsev - I cannot say today that China is clearly consolidating itself with the former countries of the Soviet Union. China is being very cautious. And his behavior in the international arena is, on the whole, very cautious and, to some extent, it can be a wrong word - tactful. But there is the economy, and in fact what I tried to convey to readers on Gazeta.ru was a banal fact. The fact is that during the period when Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev came to power in the Soviet Union, the Soviet economy was approximately 70% larger than the West German one. And about 3.5 times more than Chinese. It was, respectively, a country that really had a plus to this the status of a superpower and influence in the world. In this situation, she really could be the center of attraction. And to some extent was in the same Eastern Europe. Today the situation has changed a lot. Russia has shrunk in size, in fact it has seriously failed economically in terms of comparison with Europe. Because Europe is united. Then she was divided. Europe has become approximately six times larger than us in terms of economic parameters. Approximately the same number of times China has become larger than us. Any integration with Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, with the Transcaucasian republics, with Armenia and Belarus, they will not increase the total Russian economic potential by more than 15 percent, maximum 20. 15% is two years of rapid economic growth. That is, it is probably better to ensure rapid economic growth than to try to integrate Kazakhstan. But I mean, in view of the fact that Russia has become a space of economic emptiness, between China and Europe, processes are quite obvious ... When countries that are closer to the center of gravity began to be attracted to them. If today in Kazakhstan Russian investments are 9 times less than Chinese ones, then it is clear that the country will focus on China. Not even politically... There are also demonstrations that are organized by those who are afraid, for example, of leasing land to China on a long-term lease. They can be understood, there were serious wars between the historically Kazakh people and the Chinese. It's just that the question is that economic things mean a lot in the world today. And of course, when the same Ukraine sees how much Poland has lost, which in the late 80s was almost less than the Ukrainian SSR per capita in terms of GDP, it is clear where they are looking. And this is not a question of the expansion of Europe or China. The problem in this case, at least on the western flank, is not that someone wants to come and take away our ancestral territories, as it is presented in the Kremlin, but that people are simply trying to escape from here. There. And, of course, the Ukrainian desire for Europe, which since 2004, it is connected to a lesser extent, I think, with democracy and human rights than with purely economic issues.
V. Inozemtsev: I think that for Russia there is only one physical problem - the North Caucasus
A. Venediktov- That is, I understand correctly that the former Soviet republics, the Baltic countries, of course, but I mean Belarus, Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia, Moldova, are they attracted to Europe by prosperity?
V. Inozemtsev- I think that first of all welfare. And in the second arrangement. Europe, pay attention, is a kind of model, which, no matter how any Euroskeptics say, it, in general, proves its popularity. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, 16 states have come to Europe. Maybe one will come out. But, one way or another, 16 states came there. Over these 25 years, simply because they saw that within the framework of one territorial structure, within the territories where there is a single judicial practice, a single legal system, it is easier to organize business, life, communications, and movement than separately. This is a very strong attraction. Therefore, I fully understand that Georgians not only want to go to Europe because their wine will be sold better there and they will receive more subsidies for economic development, but also because it is more familiar and pleasant for them to live in a more or less law-abiding Europe than next to neighbor. To put it mildly, not too calm in geopolitical terms. And of course, Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine also want to join NATO, because they all became subjects, perhaps not of aggression by Russia, in this case I am against such an approach towards Georgia. It was some sort of response. But, at least, far from friendly steps and sanctions. Therefore, it seems to me that there are two moments: the economic moment and the moment of identity. These states consider themselves European, not Eurasian. They do not understand what they have in common with the Uzbeks, with whom they are being drawn into an alliance.
A. Venediktov- Interesting.
V. Inozemtsev“I don't really understand it either.
A. Venediktov- Let's compare this Western weight you described and why, from your point of view, part of the former Soviet republics wants to move there. Then what drives the countries of Central Asia, which on the one hand are sandwiched between their large northern neighbor us, with their own interests, and on the left China, and below, excuse me, the Taliban. Roughly speaking. Radical Islam is moving in different forms. They are squeezed there, why are they moving towards China?
V. Inozemtsev- These countries have a completely different political culture and organization than the countries of the western flank. This is an obvious autocracy. Managed by hereditary methods. Who really value their independence, sovereignty, because it is an asset of their ruling clans. And they don't want to sell themselves to anyone. They really want to maintain their independence and use it and their natural resources on the largest scale and in an adequate form for themselves. The problem is that these states do not see, even now, especially under Russia, any serious drivers of economic growth and development. China is next to them, next to Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan there were deserts, and now these are territories that will soon be comparable to the entire Russian Federation in terms of the volume of regional product. They see what has passed in 15 or 20 years. They understand perfectly well, but in Orenburg everything remains as it was. Therefore, naturally, this model is clearly more attractive to them. The Chinese are building new transit routes there through Central Asia and the Caucasus. And I know perfectly well the opinion of the Chinese that it is useless to build through Russia. Because you can come to Ulyanovsk, where they will be told about what route will pass here, and sent back. And the track will not pass in a year, or in three, or in five. And naturally, when you are offered certain investment projects, you respond to it. Because these are your jobs, your income, your future confidence in the future. Therefore, China is taking Central Asia not in terms of wanting to colonize it, not in terms of seeing these states as its provinces, I think these are very poor geopolitical ideas. He takes it simply because it is the only serious source of powerful investments. Including infrastructure. And I didn’t even talk about it, but in fact we shouldn’t forget that the main investments in the same Kazakhstan are not Chinese, not Russian. And Western. European and American. It is these countries: the Netherlands, the USA, the UK that spend huge amounts of money on new deposits that the country lives on. The same as in Azerbaijan, the main investments are also not Chinese or even Turkish, but European and American. Therefore, Central Asia is a field of a much more complex game, but we are not the main players there, because this game needs a lot of money, and not just sighing about historical destinies.
A. Venediktov- That is, Vladislav Leonidovich, "historical destinies", let's put it in quotation marks, this sigh is definitely without quotation marks, from your point of view, they play an insignificant role in the 21st century. Unlike money. in such projects.
V. Inozemtsev: The failure with Ukraine was more a failure of methods than of meaning and design
V. Inozemtsev You know, I would say so. Not a big role. Because you understand, let's go back a little, and in my opinion I may be wrong, but still, the Transcaucasus and Central Asia were quite colonial projects for Russia. In the colonial classical style, not the 19th, not the 18th century, namely the 19th, early 20th. So my feeling is that, within colonial structures, historical memory certainly doesn't matter as much as economic circumstances. This is a completely obvious fact.
A. Venediktov- In this regard, you touched on one country, returning to your theory of two weights, Azerbaijan falls out of them. You singled it out separately as a country oriented towards Turkey, which, on the one hand, is a European power with all the attributes, including the desire to join the EU and being a full member of NATO, and on the other hand, it is an Eastern despotism. We see the growth of religious interference in the affairs of the state. Loss of secularity. This is how Azerbaijan, which is next to Georgia and Armenia, and this is how it all can develop. And with the North Caucasus, by the way.
V. Inozemtsev Yes, I highlighted it...
A. Venediktov- You picked it out, not me. So you don't turn away.
V. Inozemtsev- I singled out this state simply because it does not fit into this model in an obvious way. I cannot somehow clearly imagine what the future will be for Azerbaijan, but, of course, this country is by far the closest to Turkey, to Iran. Considering the number of Azeri population in Iran. This country is more involved in the specific policy of, let's say, the enlarged Middle East to some extent than Armenia and Georgia. I strongly doubt that Azerbaijan has any prospects of moving towards the EU and NATO. Honestly. Therefore, it seems to me that this territory, which, of course, is again Russian influence there, despite the fact that there are allied relations and a normal good-neighborly foreign policy, but for all that, it is clear that Russia has a more strategic ally in the person of Armenia, it is clear what conflicts exist between Azerbaijan and Armenia. And how it throws us towards Turkey, then there, then back. Therefore, it seems to me that some kind of very tough (inaudible) is also unacceptable for Azerbaijan. This is a very difficult position for this country. What will be its development, I do not know. But I can say for sure that these two forces, the EU and China, are largely powerless here, or even lie on the far periphery of the problems of Transcaucasia. Especially Azerbaijan.
A. Venediktov- Another your thesis that needs clarification. Anyway, I understood the thesis, but did not find an explanation. I read: “Meanwhile, nationalism has been and remains the driving force behind the development of post-Soviet states. And in the coming years, the demand for nationalism in these post-Soviet states will increase.” Why?
V. Inozemtsev- Look, I proceeded in this statement from quite obvious things. When a large complex country collapses, there were few economic motives for the collapse of the Soviet Union. The main motive for the collapse was the desire of the newly-minted elites of the then communist republics to seize power on their territory and it is better to become the first guy in the village than the tenth in the city. This motivation was very clear. It was traced everywhere, starting from the Russian Federation, and ending with any ... republic. Therefore, if you do this, in this case you cannot declare that the ideology of your state is just feeding your clan. Naturally, there is also a certain amount of myth-making and mythology. You have a lot of economic problems. In order to solve them, you cannot solve them more precisely. In order to smooth them out, you start looking for enemies. And this leads to the fact that the former colonialists are enemies, and our history, which was belittled in every possible way, is the basis of our nation. The construction of national ideologies is taking place everywhere in the post-Soviet space. If this were not the case, if these countries were an example of the observance of human rights and European principles of civil nations, we would not see a mass exodus of Russians from Central Asia. But it is massive. In reality, the share of the Russian population, Belarusians, Ukrainians has collapsed from 2 to 5 times over the post-Soviet years. In Kazakhstan, there were 44%, now there are 21. In Kyrgyzstan, there were about 27%, now there are 4. And these are the processes that are underway. Why are they going? Just because the governments of the respective states assert the national language, the national history of their cultural paradigm, their national myths, naturally, the representatives of the former metropolis become uncomfortable. And this further strengthens the national moment. I think that, in principle, no idea other than creating your own state, despite all the economic hardships, all the possible political problems, it does not legitimize any new regime in the post-Soviet states.
V. Inozemtsev: The path of Ukraine and Europe, if it ever ends in success, will be incredibly long and difficult
A. Venediktov- In this regard, does what you said also apply to such large states as Ukraine?
V. Inozemtsev- Of course it does. Ukraine in this regard has been the least nationalistic state for many years. In my opinion, you have Mr. Muzhdabaev, who was always on Ekho Moskvy, a former journalist of Moskovsky Komsomolets, now living in Kyiv. He wrote a wonderful post. That the only chance to speak Ukrainian with a person in Kyiv is to address him in Ukrainian himself. Because if you address him in Russian, even if he speaks Ukrainian to someone else, he still switches to Russian. But if you talk to him in Ukrainian, he will answer you in Ukrainian. It is immediately clear that it is a fascist state,” Ayder added. This is a correct remark. That is, people there were not initially carriers of this nationalist idea in quotation marks ... And there, Russian people will speak Ukrainian according to their passports, if it goes like that. These are elements of national identity. This is not so much a culture as to really prove to yourself who you are. And this is a natural process. Because when you see such a degree of alienation of the former metropolis from the rest of the territories, it naturally happens, including in such forms.
A. Venediktov- In this regard, talking about the growth of nationalism in Russia, returning to the idea of the Russian people, I don’t know if you saw the last transcript, which was three days ago, the meeting of the president with the council for interethnic relations. The Russian language, Russian identity, spreading throughout Russia, these are the right steps, the wrong steps. They need to be done, they don't.
V. Inozemtsev“I think these are the wrong steps. And that's why. I heard a lot, even when I was in Europe, America, that the Russian leadership is pursuing a policy of promoting some kind of nationalism. I think this is a misconception about the policy of the Russian leadership. The fact is that in the Western political science tradition the idea of a nation is less politicized and has such a nationalist connotation than ours. Nation is actually the same as state. People, based on Russia's aggressive actions against Ukraine, for example, say that Russia professes nationalism. This is not true. Russia professes imperialism. Russian politics is a policy of reviving imperial approaches. This is obviously so. This is a situation in which the minimum increment of territories, Crimea is 14 hundredths of a percent of Russian territory. Already sends the president's rating to heaven. This is a disease of imperial heritage. Territory, grandeur and so on. But nationalism in Russia, in my opinion, has never been a particularly strong element in the policy of the authorities. And what's more, the same Putin quite reasonably, in my opinion, absolutely quite toughly fought against the manifestation of nationalism, fascism and all kinds of extremism on national grounds. Including the Great Russian. Which is absolutely true. Because Russia, even in the form in which it has remained, is definitely not Ukraine. Where there is an accumulation of the Russian population in the Donbass and in the Crimea, and now there is actually none. This is, in general, a very multinational country. A country that has national autonomy. Practically states. There are official national languages recognized. In this situation, to engage in (inaudible) in this place of the Russian nation is suicidal in my opinion. Because you will bring to life all those contradictions and national conflicts, which now, thank God, have more or less subsided.
A. Venediktov- In this regard, the question is, but these two wonderful monuments of St. Vladimir near the Kremlin and Ivan the Terrible in Orel, are they a symbol of nationalism or imperialism?
V. Inozemtsev“It's a symbol of stupidity, really. In this case, the monument to the Russian prince on the main square of Moscow, I do not understand in the current situation, what can be explained. Yes, the baptizer of another state in the capital of a completely different state, which, according to the Constitution, is secular. I can't imagine more bullshit. As for Ivan the Terrible, it seems to me that this is also a manifestation of obvious political short-sightedness, because the greatest memory of Ivan the Terrible is, after all, I’m not even talking about the fact that he was the executioner of the Russian people, but this is a memory as a conqueror for those cities of regions and republics that are now as full-fledged in the Russian Federation. Why is it necessary to erect a monument to the one who captured and burned Kazan or cleared Novgorod. Not to mention Yermak's campaigns in Siberia with the victims that were. In fact, if Ivan the Terrible had captured the Hindu Kush or fought in Iran, maybe that would have been normal. But in this case, it was a person who is talked about in one way or another by people whose descendants are full-fledged citizens of the Russian Federation. Why create this kind of conflict I do not understand.
A. Venediktov- And the last question. We have one minute left before the end of the broadcast. In that sense, in the half-life sense, you are more of an optimist or a pessimist. And why?
V. Inozemtsev- Listen, there is no optimism and pessimism here. I believe that the decay will continue. I believe that the former post-Soviet republics will continue to destructure. The question is whether the political wisdom of their leaders will be enough for them to carry it out in a peaceful way and subsequently someday may meet their parts again as part of something more united. Like the same one... well, it doesn't matter. In general, we are talking about the fact that it seems to me that there are no emotions here, there should not be. We just have to be prepared for the fact that the process has not stopped and has not ended.
A. Venediktov- Thanks a lot. I remind you that Vladislav Inozemtsev was on the air of Ekho Moskvy in the Scanner program. I think that we have just started this conversation and will continue it in the future. Everyone is happy.
https://www.site/2016-09-22/vladislav_inozemcev_sostoyanie_bolota_nadolgo_adekvatnye_gotovyatsya_k_emigracii
“The end of the current government will come only when the first ten demonstrators are shot”
Vladislav Inozemtsev: the state of the swamp is for a long time, adequate ones are preparing for emigration
www.thanhniennews.com
The "President's Party" won a triumphant victory in the parliamentary elections, despite the obvious deterioration of the economy and the impoverishment of the vast majority of Russians. The opposition suffered an equally impressive fiasco. Will this success of Vladimir Putin last? What risks threaten him? We asked Vladislav Inozemtsev, a well-known economist, publicist, director of the Center for Post-Industrial Society Research, member of the Russian Council on International Affairs, the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, about this.
"Clinton won't start a war"
Vladislav Leonidovich, Vladimir Vladimirovich has, perhaps, far more important elections ahead of him than those just held in Russia - the election of the American president. Let's say Hillary Clinton becomes it. In your opinion, what should be expected in Russian-American relations in this case - "reset" or "overload"?
Clinton, unlike Trump, does not have warm feelings for Putin, she, a man who has already lived in the White House for eight years as first lady, a former secretary of state, understands the unprecedented weight of the United States on the world stage, and Russia is not an equal partner for her. For her, Russia is one of many countries, and far from being the most normal. From Clinton, of course, one should not expect any bowing, and for the Kremlin, of course, she is obviously worse. But that's all, a catastrophe will not happen, just some of Moscow's antics will not get away with it, no more.
Clinton is critical of Russia, but she is quite a reasonable, adequate person and will not unleash a war, supply Kyiv with lethal weapons, as many of our political scientists describe. The degree of Clinton's conflict will depend on how Moscow behaves. Specifically, in Syria, there are so many participants in the conflict that, in my opinion, it is generally impossible to reach any agreement and truce there. And the arrival of Clinton will not solve anything, it will not be a "new beginning" or a "complete end."
deduhova.ru
As for Ukraine, in the West, interest in it has largely faded. Moreover, Ukraine itself is in the top ten arms exporters. I do not think that Kyiv really lacks him. At the same time, I know quite a few people in Kyiv who are fleeing mobilization and conscription, and I am not at all convinced that even if the Ukrainian army receives a dozen American tanks (the United States will not offer aircraft carriers and bombers to Ukraine), it will immediately go to assault on Donetsk. Moreover, on the side of the DPR, not only the militias are fighting, to put it mildly, and not with pitchforks or shovels.
It's good, but the shale boom is resuming in America, our competitors - the USA, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Qatar - are advancing on the traditional European markets for Russia. Vladislav Leonidovich, what survival resources do Putinomics have? How long are they enough to change nothing fundamentally?
Prices on the world oil market have stabilized. Shale production in America is profitable at about today's price levels, but it will not stop even if prices go down. At one time, when oil cost $100 a barrel, shale companies borrowed and invested a lot of money in production, and even if oil costs $40, they will not be able to stop producing it, because loans must be paid. Therefore, the banks do not want to stop such companies, it is better to soften the conditions on loans so that they are paid at least something, otherwise the banks will simply get a non-performing asset. Another thing is that at $40, production will just not be curtailed, and at $50, new wells can be commissioned. So for several years, prices will fluctuate around current levels: either go slightly below $40, or rise to $55.
Producing countries, of course, want more expensive oil. But for this it is necessary to drastically reduce production, and this is not included in anyone's plans. A reduction in production may occur, for example, due to bankruptcy and further civil war in Venezuela. Others expect it would be great if the Americans hit Iraq again. But neither of these is likely to happen. Delegations from producing countries will meet, hug, slap each other on the back and promise to cut production, but will continue pumping oil when they return home. And what is left for them?
prokazan.ru
In a single Russia, at such prices, production on the shelf stops, it makes no sense to go to Eastern Siberia, in 5-7 years the real depletion of deposits will begin. But the fact is that our politicians, in principle, do not look that far. Now they need to go through 2018 (when the presidential elections in the Russian Federation will take place - editor's note), and until that time I don't see any particular risks.
"Their approach: the time will come - then we'll see what to fuss about"
Is it a personal quality of our leaders not to look far, or has the world become so volatile that it makes no sense to plan for many years ahead?
I guess it's their own approach to life. These people were formed in the 90s, when it was hard to make any long-term plans. It was then that the habit of short vision developed. You see, the point is not even that they do not make distant plans, they have strategies until 2030, projects for the construction of high-speed highways almost to Beijing. The fact is that they do not look at future challenges. To hold the Olympics in Sochi or a football championship, to build a high-speed railway to Kazan - all these decisions were made 6-10 years ago, and without taking into account future risks, bluff, to put it simply. Their approach: the time will come - then we'll see what to fuss about. They not only do not know how, but do not see the point in planning for a long time. If you, like China, need to feed one and a half billion people, and you understand that there is no other way out than to become a major industrial power, then you will make five-year plans, invite investors and crawl on your stomach in front of them. And if you have oil flowing, what is the motive?
- But German Gref warned that the hydrocarbon era was ten years away.
First, it is not necessary to listen to Gref. People no more stupid than German Oskarovich, for example, Garry Kimovich Kasparov, once predicted that the regime would not survive until 2010. Nikolai Petrov of the Carnegie Center wrote in a Viennese magazine back in 2012 that Putin's regime would come to an end before 2014. If you put all these outstanding statements in a heap and put them on the table for Putin, you will only give him an extra reason to make sure that he is doing everything right.
Secondly, in this system, besides German Gref, there are still quite a few smart people, but each of them thinks: what do I need most of all? If at the very top, in a narrow circle, they believe that the main thing is to hold out “from dusk to dawn,” why should I show off that I am smarter than my boss? If the first person in the monarchy is enough for everyone, why say that we are going to the bottom? If you show off, you will get a real deterioration in career opportunities and position. There is no motive - that's the most important thing.
German Oskarovich, Garry Kimovich and others like them are right in one thing: if nothing is done, then every year the likelihood increases that after some short historical period, Russia will turn into an absolute economic “dinosaur” and collapse under its own weight. Unlike China, we really do nothing. Since 2001, the amount of funds for road construction has increased 6 times, while the commissioning of roads has halved. Someday the roads will completely collapse, and it will be possible to drive from Novosibirsk to Barnaul only on an all-terrain vehicle. But who cares what will happen in decades? No one. Even noteworthy liberals who promise: now we will come to the polls! And they come, as always. What are the motives for reform? None.
RIA Novosti / Alexander Kozhokhin
Therefore, from the hackneyed phrase "innovation policy" already, frankly, sickens: just words. Do you know any examples of the success of Russian products abroad?
So far I don't see any examples. There are individual companies that produce innovative products, cooperate with large international firms, supplying them with units and components. There are teams of programmers who work directly with Western partners. But what is the difference between Russia and China? The fact that on half of the products that are sold in the US and Europe, you will see the inscription "Made in China". But you won’t see the inscriptions “Made in Russia” on any product, except perhaps in stores like Pinocchio, where they go to buy our buckwheat and Georgian wine. Because there are so many obstacles in the way of creating and promoting our products that, in principle, they cannot be overcome. You can create a portal, a computer program, a game, a smartphone application, but at the same time you will be integrated into large production and distribution chains, and no one will understand that these products are “Made in Russia”.
But this was not and is not a headache for our leadership. Even when during the times of modernization they talked about the need to develop new industries, it all came down to energy, space and pharmaceuticals for themselves. Where is the connection with the promotion of Russian goods to foreign markets? No.
“Everything is wonderful, forget about any changes whatsoever”
You say there is no motive for change. But even the Ministry of Finance admits that the Reserve Fund will dry up next year at the current pace, and the National Welfare Fund will shrink by 40% or even more by the end of 2019. That is, we will stay, sorry, with a bare ass. Isn't that a motive?
About 2 trillion rubles have already been spent from the Reserve Fund this year. This means that the budget is in deficit by about 2.8% of GDP, by all world standards this is a small deficit, with such a deficit Russia would look normal even in the euro area. And in the arsenal there are a few more elementary tricks. The first is to increase external borrowing, and borrowing 10-12 billion dollars a year from the Arab countries or China is not so impossible.
The second resource for increasing budget revenues is the depreciation of the ruble. When in 2011 in Belarus, after the rather controversial re-election of Lukashenka, there was a devaluation of the “bunny” by about 60%, the next year inflation jumped to 87%. And in our country, with the same devaluation, inflation was 7%. This means that the exchange rate of the ruble can be brought up to 100 per dollar, and this is a completely deficit-free budget without any reserve funds, because you get much more rubles from foreign exchange earnings and export duties. In addition, devaluation is better than raising taxes, because it creates additional opportunities for domestic producers, increases the profits of exporters and, consequently, their investment opportunities, and wages rise. If inflation stays at 10%, nothing catastrophic will happen.
Daniil Silantiev
And the third way is the privatization, for example, of small plots of land, of which there are plenty in Russia. Borrowings, devaluation of the ruble by 20 percent a year and a small privatization - this is quite enough for the reserve funds to be extended until 2020.
Naryshkin recently called for the rejection of a flat income tax. So, the resource of raising taxes, most likely, will also be used?
There are high chances that they will raise VAT and insurance payments, the Ministry of Finance has already come up with such an initiative. But if the personal income tax is also changed, then nothing will happen with our social inequality. If for those who earn more than 100 thousand rubles, the personal income tax rate is increased, for example, to 21%, they will not become fanatical opponents of the regime. And if, at the same time, salaries are exempted from income tax, say, up to 15 thousand rubles, then the poorest segments of the population will receive a monthly increase of a thousand or one and a half, and they will also say thank you. All this can be presented in a nice “package”: in 2001 we introduced a flat scale to bring the economy out of the “shadow”, we have achieved great success, and now our priority is not legalization of income, but social justice, and therefore we are introducing progressive taxation. But not up to 76%, as in America under Carter, and thank God.
You are proposing "small privatization", but a big one is announced. Can you be sure that the privatization of Alrosa, Bashneft, Rosneft, Sovcomflot, VTB will be in the interests of the budget and the population, and not in the interests of a narrow group of people, certain clans, as we regularly used to do?
There is no privatization as such, with the exception of a small stake in Alrosa. The announced privatization is an attempt to “discard”, to pretend that the problems are somehow solved. In principle, privatization is a good measure to replenish the budget, open and transparent. But an understanding is coming, in my opinion, the right one, that now it is not necessary to sell pieces of state property: it is wrong to sell for a pittance, it is impossible to find anyone who wants to buy at a good price now. The buyer expects either to participate in the management of the company, or to profitably resell these shares in the future, but investors do not expect either, respectively, the privatization will not solve the problem of the budget deficit. I think that the current "wave of privatization" is a passing moment: they started the game - it didn't work out, but that's fine.
To make ends meet, it is easier to freeze pensions or reduce military spending, or devalue the ruble.
RIA Novosti/Alexey Nikolsky
You know, I would generally recommend not paying attention to talk about privatization or to the discussion between Kudrin and Glazyev. All these things are invented solely so that the people, the expert community have something to talk about. There is no fundamental content behind this. The economy will not become less state-controlled, no recipes, either by Kudrin or Glazyev, will be accepted, and Medvedev will remain prime minister, because in general everything is wonderful, forget about any changes whatsoever.
- How much?
I believe that in 2024 Putin will leave the presidency: he respects legislative formalities. And I think that it is unlikely to return: by this time, the dead end of Putin's economic model will become obvious to everyone, there will be a request for renewal, for a new leader figure. I do not exclude that Vyacheslav Volodin will become one. As Vladimir Vladimirovich recently put it, he is “young but mature”, has vast experience in organizing elections and really leads United Russia, he is well known by the regional nomenklatura. Volodin is an experienced administrator, while not a security official, he is intelligent, sociable, for some time he was engaged in entrepreneurship and will find a common language with businessmen. And most importantly, he is absolutely loyal to Putin. Here, in 2024, we will talk about the prospects for change.
“Their children will find better jobs in less problematic countries”
Someday the situation will change anyway, the same privatization will become profitable. Or maybe this is how, through privatization, the Russian hereditary aristocracy is being formed? Or is it “even a flood after us”?
In business - yes, it is being formed. Of course, certain capital has been withdrawn abroad, assets have been bought there in case of various unforeseen situations like the one that developed a hundred years ago, or more local ones. But in general, business can be considered a growing aristocracy, because it values its property, is going to develop it and, if not live in Russia, then feed itself from here.
Officials are more difficult. The Western version - when business is separate, officials separately, civil society, the press and law enforcement agencies stand guard over the rule of law, all together ensures a high degree of efficiency and economic development. The second option is when the Arab sheikhs actually own their country as property and therefore develop it in order to pass on an even greater fortune to their children. We have the most insane and dead-end option: when informally you live like a sheikh, having painted the acquired wealth for relatives, but formally you look like a minister who, like in Denmark, receives 15 thousand euros a month and is encouraged only by a company car, no more. Since enrichment occurs at the expense of the budget, this causes huge costs. And a lot of tension in the form of a "war of compromising evidence" and so on. Therefore, the maximum amount of funds is withdrawn abroad. It would be right to allow officials to legalize their property, this would give an impetus to the economy, and officials - the opportunity to join the aristocracy. But so far this is not happening.
According to media reports, Putin's son-in-law is a major shareholder of Sibur, the sons of Ivanov and Patrushev are top managers of systemically important banks, Kolokoltsev's child has a joint business with Chaika's offspring, etc. inforos.ru
- And what is the attitude of the West to the export of illegal bureaucratic capital?
How to great happiness, and welcomes them very much. In recent years, the main financial centers of the West, primarily London, Luxembourg, Zurich, and some American offshore companies such as Delaware, annually receive about a trillion dollars in net capital inflows from developing countries. Banks, lawyers, real estate sellers and so on sleep and see more of this money coming in. In London alone, those who ruined a dozen of the largest Russian banks gathered.
- And this is despite all the political rhetoric about the confrontation between the West and Russia?
Yes, regardless. Political quarrels are one thing, and serving the interests of national business is another. Who wants Russian oligarchs to stop buying houses in London? In London, no one wants.
- That is, the children of our current rulers will not have to clear up future Russian rubble?
Yes, their children will find better jobs in less problematic countries.
“Are they ready to fire on the crowd? They don't even know what they're up to."
Vladislav Leonidovich, lately we have seen a whole stream of resignations: Sergei Ivanov, high-ranking security officials. Do the "touchables" - government officials, governors, mayors, security officials who are dismissed, businessmen who are deprived of their property - pose any danger to the untouchable ruling elite?
I don't think. They say Ivanov wanted to leave himself for a long time, and most of the resignations were made in a form that does not involve protest and loosening the system, or against people who cannot destabilize it. These people have been in the system for a long time, they received from it all the various benefits due to them. Apart from individual cases, such as Khoroshavin and Gaiser, the resignations were not humiliating, shameful or dangerous, bearing negative consequences.
www.volfoto.ru
- What is the purpose of the resignations then? Arrange a generational change, surround yourself with even more loyal ones?
I admit that rational considerations lie behind these resignations, not in terms of settling scores, but in terms of improving personnel, because in some places the system stops working. I would say that, rather, the previous policy was surprising. Putin positioned himself as a strong leader, making clear decisions, in the style of Stalin-light. But in Stalin's time there were many new appointees, and under the "second Putin" for the fifth year there were the same people in the same posts. Putin cannot take and seize Northern Kazakhstan, and some kind of movement, some kind of activity must take place constantly. Therefore, I think that these resignations are, to a certain extent, an outlet for his energy. True, those who come will not be better. The only political actor in the country is Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin, and the fact that some new minister or head of administration appears will not change anything. What matters is how, say, conservative or liberal, Vladimir Vladimirovich will be, and the people around him, it seems to me, have neither principles nor convictions and are not going to acquire them.
- To listen to you, there are no risks for Putin.
None. We saw a triumphant result in the State Duma elections, Putin got what he wanted: the dissatisfied sit at home, some are preparing to emigrate, the less adequate - to the fact that once everything will be better, the rest actively support him. Inside the system, everything is under the hood, compromising evidence can be found on anyone, it has already been collected and lies for the time being. From the outside, no one is going to attack Russia. The state of the swamp in all spheres does not imply a revolutionary way out, it will drag on for a very long time.
But according to pre-election sociological measurements, 60% of the residents of single-industry towns (and there are 14 million of them in total) call their situation intolerable. Well, how will the link between the single-industry city and the village happen - that's the vanguard of the protest.
First, our people are very patient. And secondly, if any problems begin in single-industry towns, they will be quickly financially calmed, as was the case in Pikalevo. As for the villagers: well, they went on a tractor march to Moscow, and where are they now? This is not what the inhabitants of the Kremlin are most interested in.
More from pre-election sociology: according to the Levada Center, 11% of Russians are ready to participate in economic, and 8% - in political protest. But is this amount enough to influence the system, move it towards change?
Quite. Eight percent in Moscow alone is 500-600 thousand adults. Such a "maidan" will demolish any government, no police will help. Strictly speaking, the current government will cease to exist only when the first ten demonstrators are shot. After all, Russia is not Zaire, and such a precedent will nullify the popularity of any government, it will be the end.
RIA Novosti/Pavel Lisitsyn
There is an obvious purge of power structures, the strengthening of the FSB, the other day a decision was made to transfer 163 thousand people from the Ministry of Internal Affairs to the Russian Guard. Do you think, if necessary, they will be ready to shoot at the demonstrators?
Are they ready to fire on the crowd? Complex issue. They give signals that they are ready: the law allowed the National Guard to use weapons against demonstrators. On the other hand, they issue a law that in the case of extremist statements, the interrogating investigator issues a warning, and you cannot fly abroad, but there are no such warnings so far. Remember the law on the promotion of non-traditional sexual relations: it is already three years old, and there is not a single case on it. But people should remember that if something happens, all these laws can apply. The number of such dormant measures is multiplying and the trend will continue.
The question is whether they are really ready, or just frightening signals. I don't think anyone can answer this question for you. They themselves do not know what they are ready for. If we imagine that according to the results of the elections somewhere in Derbent, the obvious favorite gets 4%, and the criminal authority wins, unrest begins, the National Guard comes in and kills dozens of people, then the country will survive this: they will say that they were all Islamists and went to one bad mullah. But if there are mass protests in St. Petersburg or Yekaterinburg, then the bloody measures will most likely turn out to be inapplicable, they are dangerous for the stability of the system.
On the other hand, we understand that, apparently, Yanukovych did not order the execution of the Maidan. Hence the question: then at what level are such decisions made, who manages them? Accordingly, who will make such a decision if the National Guard is sent to disperse a protest in some large city?
- Yanukovych was framed in Kyiv - in Moscow, voluntarily or involuntarily, Putin can be framed?
Easily. This in world history happens always, everywhere and with anyone.
“We need a mass of people united by the idea, and not by the bright image of Yavlinsky”
God forbid, of course. Indeed, one cannot say that the Putin regime is in danger based on the results of the parliamentary elections. Vladislav Leonidovich, why, in your opinion, did the democratic opposition fail with such a bang?
By itself, the Democrats' current attempt to go to the polls and win a certain number of seats was initially hopeless. First, even in such authoritarian societies as Venezuela and Argentina, there are two levels of politics - national and local. An attempt to reach the national, presidential level is being made from the bottom floor. In Venezuela, the opposition is led to rallies by the governor of one of the most successful provinces; in Argentina, a man who was twice elected mayor of Buenos Aires comes to the supreme power. But what kind of national leadership can we talk about if Yavlinsky, the first person in the national party, not in the mayors and not in the governors, but has been sitting as a deputy of the St. Petersburg Legislative Assembly for five years already? The late Boris Nemtsov worked in the same way in the Yaroslavl Regional Duma.
mosmonitor.ru
Secondly, why did the Liberal Democratic Party take so many mandates (although I thought it would take more)? Because they have a very clear message: friends, in 2001 United Russia promised that by 2008 Russia should have a visa-free regime with the EU, and by 2015 it should become an associated member of the European Union. And Zhirinovsky said from the very beginning that we need to annex the Crimea, Northern Kazakhstan and wash our feet in the Indian Ocean. And now the Liberal Democratic Party keeps repeating: the authorities are fulfilling our agenda, not their own, fulfilling what we talked about 20 years ago.
Yes, opposition leaders like Yavlinsky are given to understand: the regional parliament is your ceiling, sit down and don't twitch. But you never know what they say, in our history there are examples when rebels moved from political "dirt" to political "princes". What do you think, Vladislav Leonidovich, with the help of what technologies can the democratic opposition become parliamentary?
I'm not a political strategist, but I'll venture a guess. There is an outstanding politician Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin, who at one time was very seriously and viciously underestimated by Berezovsky and his team. He understands that powerful charisma is very important in this country, and he honed his charisma to perfection, adding to it all the power of the state propaganda machine: he is blood from the blood of the people, he behaves like ordinary people, while he is the ruler of the world and multiple "person of the year" by the leading international media, whom even the president of America is afraid of. OK then. What can be opposed to him?
Playing against such a charismatic as Putin, looking for another charismatic, is pointless. But for some reason no one in the Russian opposition understands this. I would contrast some completely decentralized movement. Remember the Maidan - it happened not because the people were led by Yatsenyuk, he appeared there just a couple of days before the denouement. Maidan was an absolutely spontaneous protest movement, a network of many people united around the European idea, which the authorities tried to wipe out. This happened in Tahrir Square in Cairo, in Taksim Square in Istanbul. And we need a mass of people united by an idea, and not by the bright image of Grigory Alekseevich, who has long since faded.
omskregion.info
It seems to me that in order to create a broad electoral base by 2021, our Democrats must create a movement on two or three clear ideas. Not about democracy and the fight against corruption, we have already heard all this, thank you. The first idea: we do not touch upon the backbone industries, but single out a certain level of economic ties, which we make absolutely free. To do this, it is necessary to fully return the law on freedom of trade, abolish most taxes and half of the instructions and rules that hinder the development of small and medium-sized businesses, liberate people's energy; completely remove taxes from agriculture, they still give no more than 1% of federal budget revenues, while the village is 8% of the workforce. That is, the tax inspector does not visit the village at all, but we will feed the whole world.
The second idea: we do not want to be a province of China, we are Europeans and we are going to Europe. Now, with the departure of Britain from the European Union, a unique situation will arise, a new architecture will arise: you do not participate in the work of the European Parliament, but you comply with European laws and standards. You refer controversial cases to the European Court, where it takes not years of meetings, but one court session to solve the problem of investment protection. You don't receive subsidies for poverty or agriculture, but you pay the European Union almost a billion pounds a year for access to the European market, but investments come to you, and in the third year your contributions begin to pay off. Listen, this is a great option for Russia, try to offer it to them! We will come to Europe to save them, so that Russians go there, not Arabs. And by creating a single army, we will create the world's largest geopolitical entity.
The third idea: in order to attract a more or less intelligent population, put in place the ROC, which has overwhelmed us with priesthood, hatred for it in society, with the exception of villages, which not a single agitator will reach, is prohibitive.
- I will share my doubt: even the decisions of the ECtHR are not binding on us, what kind of united army is there?
You can talk about anything. United Russia does not shackle itself in promises, and you interact with the population, think about "packaging", these are purely marketing issues. I am not saying that all means are good. I'm talking about the fact that the possibilities of campaigning are very wide, that the opposition needs to go beyond fixing toilets and housing and communal services problems. The three topics listed will provide 20% of the votes without any leader. And when you change the mood of the voters, when they vote for you, you get a mandate from them to work in a certain direction. Mandate received - work started. Will we be able to fully join the EU? Hardly. Will we be able to integrate on Norway's terms? Quite possible. Along the way, the attitude of Europeans towards us will also change.
RIA Novosti / Alexander Astafiev
- So, we chose three clear, understandable ideas. What then?
Opposition leaders on a federal scale gather and sign a memorandum stating that they will make every effort to develop this movement - they will travel around the regions, support its representatives, publish newspapers, create Internet resources, organize actions, whatever. But none of them will ever run anywhere, their mission is to convey to the mass voter that the country has several very important tasks, to educate and give a start in life to a new generation of politicians, who are very numerous in the regions, but who are not allowed to rise .
Take the 90s: who knew the now deceased Professor Valery Zubov? And he became the governor of the vast Krasnoyarsk Territory, and there were plenty of such governors. (Subsequently, Valery Zubov was elected to the State Duma, one of the few parliamentarians refused to support the “Dima Yakovlev law” and the annexation of Crimea to Russia, together with Vladislav Inozemtsev published the book “Siberian Blessing”, died in April 2016 - ed.). And now the same thing: after ten years of cleansing, down there, everything is probably seething. Show these people to the people by standing aside and plugging your "I" where you need to plug after so many years of defeat. You have been political pensioners for a long time, nothing will shine for you, forget it. And when Putin leaves with his charisma for a jousting tournament against not one, but thousands, what will he do with them?
But not a single democratic party has raised, for example, the topic of obscurantism, they do not see these opportunities. Yavlinsky, it seems to me, is generally fulfilling his promise to Vladimir Vladimirovich: Putin sends a dozen Yabloko voters to the polls to show off in front of television cameras, and Grigory Alekseevich goes to the presidential election as a spoiler and again gets his 2%. Because even I will not go to vote for people who call for abstract democracy and a liberal economy. In the early 90s, these comrades were already organizing a liberal economy, and I would not say that I am a fan of what they organized then. And we also saw and remember the democracy of the 1996 presidential election. And the 1993 Constitution, in terms of the scope of presidential powers, generally looks like Nazi laws.
And yet, I personally get the impression that, be that as it may, there is a gradual process of folding a normal party system: here is the state-conservative United Russia, here is the moderately nationalist Liberal Democratic Party, perhaps someday the communists and the Socialist-Revolutionaries form a social-democratic wing, a representative liberal party will appear. It even seems to me that Putin would like such a system and is educating the opposition in his own way so that it becomes mature and influential.
I am convinced that the communists will survive without Zyuganov. With new, young leaders, the Liberal Democratic Party will also remain. Yabloko will only get better without Yavlinsky. "Parnassus" without Kasyanov, probably, will finally go to Navalny. Yes, there will be some changes. I am also not inclined to dramatize the results of the elections, I do not see anything terrible. Everything is going well.
Russian economist, sociologist and politician. Doctor of Economic Sciences. Author of over 300 publications published in Russia, France, UK and USA, including 15 monographs (one co-authored with Daniel Bell), four of which have been translated into English, French, Japanese and Chinese. Member of the Scientific Council of the Russian International Affairs Council (2011-present), Chairman of the Supreme Council of the Civil Force Party (2012-2014). Laureate of the publicist award "PolitProsvet".
Graduated from the Faculty of Economics of Moscow State University, Doctor of Economics. He is a consistent supporter of liberal democracy and a staunch atheist.
In March 2010, Vladislav Inozemtsev signed the appeal of the Russian opposition "Putin must go." In June 2011, he spoke at the congress of the Just Cause party and proposed "to put at the center of the election campaign topics that no one else would dare to raise and would allow to consolidate the target audience." Inozemtsev suggested four topics that, in his opinion, could become the main ones, although the list should not be considered closed:
1) “Power and civil service have become one of the types of business in Russia - and this business is now crowding out all the others. There is practically no minister, governor or prosecutor left around whom entrepreneurial groups have not formed. It is becoming a practice to appoint children and relatives of the country's leaders to the most important positions in the bureaucratic hierarchy and management of state-owned companies... Separation of politics and economics is the key to the progressive development of the country.”
2) “We need an educated working and engineering class, and not “office plankton” and not sellers of imported goods. Therefore, the party must warn citizens against “Skolkovo” illusions and call for new industrialization, the development of engineering education, -dictative planning, the revival of large regional production centers.
3) “Russia should become a member of the European Union, adopt its norms and laws, and in the future participate in the development of new ones. Accession to the EU is the key to the survival of our country in the era of global integration associations.”
4) “Priests have no place in schools, in the army, in government institutions. Ships and planes should float and fly because they were assembled by skilled and skilled workers, not because they were sprinkled with holy water by owners of watches worth tens of thousands of dollars. Religion should become a private matter of citizens.”
On September 15, Vladislav Inozemtsev was elected to the Federal Political Council of the party at the congress of the Just Cause party, and at the subsequent meeting of the congress, on September 20, he became part of the federal part of the party’s electoral list in the elections to the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation of the VI convocation. In February 2012, he left the party after Right Cause supported Vladimir Putin's candidacy in the presidential election.
In January 2015, in an article, "The European House of Russia" expresses his opinion on what needs to be done in order for the sanctions imposed by the US and the EU against Russian individuals and companies to become an effective tool to counter the ambitions of Vladimir Putin.
Following the elections, Vladislav Inozemtsev, head of the Center for Post-Industrial Society Studies, published two articles assessing the election campaign and proposing a strategy for the opposition. These articles are so different that it is worth considering both.
The Kennan Institute is a division of the Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars, which was established in 1974 and was first engaged in Sovietology, and now in studies of Russia and countries in the post-Soviet space. In May of this year, the Russian representative office of the Kennan Institute in Moscow was closed. Scientific director of ROO Kennan, ethnographer Emil Pain, commenting on the closing of the Moscow office of the Washington center, said: “ the work of the Kennan Institute in Russia was more important than even the work of the official US embassy».
In an article published by the Kennan Institute, Inozemtsev writes about the resounding victory of the ruling party and the blatant weakness of the opposition. Offering not to listen to stories of fraud and fraud, he argues that such a "bad" result of the opposition is due to its exhaustion and lack of ideas that would provide them with support. It is this exhaustion that caused the failure of Kasyanov (Parnassus) and Yavlinsky (Yabloko).
Based on this, Inozemtsev offers the opposition to change tactics. He recommends creating a new party that will rely on new fundamental ideas and will not rely on individuals. That is, ideology comes to the fore. And new leaders who will grow the movement without thinking about a career.
1. Reduction of taxes and complete exemption of certain sectors of the economy from the tax burden. He refers agriculture, food processing, including food chains (cafes and restaurants) to such sectors in order to attract medium-sized businesses to his side.
2. The transformation of Russia into the world's largest offshore like the Persian Gulf countries, in which 95% of the state's revenues will be generated through the sale of raw materials, and only 5% - through taxes collected.
3. The opposition should challenge the main asset of Putin's Russia - SOVEREIGNTY - by defending the idea of a reverse turn to the West and even some kind of EU subordination along the Swiss or Norwegian model. The ideal option for Russia, according to Inozemtsev, is the “British” scenario, according to which it will pay the EU 2-3 billion euros annually for the right to enter its market, not participate in decision-making, but comply with the law and not ask for help from the EU. This, writes Inozemtsev, may be the best way to exchange part of Russia's excess national sovereignty" for guarantees for investors and citizens, as well as accelerating economic growth through deepening integration with the economies of European states ».
The opposition must remember, continues Inozemtsev, that “ not the fight against corruption, but the European choice brought Ukrainians to the streets. But no one in Russia took up the use of force scenario».
4. Russia must be a secular state, and "Orthodox fundamentalism" must be wrested from public life. The announcement of a course to reduce the religiosity of society, Inozemtsev believes, would unite about a quarter of the Russian population, however, the opposition did not take advantage of this niche.
Another important aspect that the opposition ideologist draws attention to is the need to move away from talking about democratic freedoms and moving on to talking about solving housing and communal services problems, and this is exactly the field in which young politicians should be brought out.
Here it must be said that something similar is already happening, and everywhere. If you read the programs of “young leaders”, for example, the Libertarian Party, whose representatives went to the polls with the support of Khodorkovsky, then their tilt towards solving the problems of housing and communal services and buildup on this topic frankly in defiance of the Communist Party is already striking.
In other words, what Mr. Inozemtsev did not publish in Russian, he published in English. The program is more than substantive and represents a strategy for turning Russia into a colony. If this is the ideology with which the new party will come out, then such a party will have little chance, even if at the first stage it will speak its teeth on the topic of communal problems. But if two more camps collide at the same time - conditionally Christian-democratic (promised in the Russian-language article) and liberal-atheistic (promised in the English-language article), and there, you see, still red-atheistic, and all this under one control center, then everything is more serious here. Considering that Khodorkovsky's main tactical goal is the dismantling of the state, Inozemtsev is not removed from the agenda.
The simplest example is the recent summer confrontation between "young communists" and "orthodox nationalists" over the construction of a church on Torfyanka in Moscow. Uncompromisingly atheistic “communists”, who during the clashes promised a revolution already in 2017, and the zigging “Orthodox” who stood against them, may well converge on the Russian Maidan. Such a Maidan under the slogan of "connecting with Europe as a colony" promises to be with a strong red tint. And the White Guard will oppose him. Fascist. And there is nothing in this scheme that contradicts what Mr. Inozemtsev wrote.
Russia as an independent state is already a quarter of a century old. This is a long period in which dramatic historical events often fit. The entire French Revolution and the Napoleonic era fit into this period of time, in the same period Europe ended the First World War and began the Second, China turned from a global backwater into the world's largest exporter, and Apple and Microsoft from small groups of enthusiasts to the most expensive corporations in the world. .
Russia, although it has changed quite a lot, still remains on the whole the same country as we knew it a quarter of a century ago. What have we wanted to accomplish over the years and what have we failed to achieve? This editorial question seemed very interesting to me, and I will try to answer it in several directions.
First of all, it should be noted that
Russia failed to realize any of the economic “dreams” it aspired to.
In the 1990s, the formation of a “normal” market and competitive economy was proclaimed as a goal (in 2005, the American professor A. Shleifer even published the book “A Normal Country: Russia After Communism”). Today, when monopolies multiply every day, and representatives of law enforcement agencies act as the main economic newsmakers, no one remembers “normality” anymore.
In 2003, President Putin announced the next economic slogan - the famous "doubling of GDP" by 2013. The peak was noted only in 2014, and then at the level of not 200%, but 163% of the level of 2003. In 2006, he proclaimed the slogan of an "energy superpower", but this goal is remembered today with a smile: if in 1990 the RSFSR provided 16.2% of world oil production and 29.7% of gas, then as a result of the unprecedented efforts of recent years, now its share is 12.6% and 16.7%, respectively.
In 2008, as we remember, modernization and the transition to a high-tech economy were announced; Now, when Russia is completely dependent on the import of not only computers and office equipment, but even consumables for them, and there are not enough flu vaccines in cities, modernization (as well as leadership in the production of software and pharmaceutical products as part of it) has long been forgotten. Tellingly, no more ambitious economic goals have been put forward since then (the authorities have become, if not more skillful and experienced, then at least more adequate).
Having failed in everything planned, we logically fell into economic stagnation, which could drag on for years.
With more specific tasks, it turned out not much better. In most rapidly developing countries, the engine of economic growth is industry - first less, and then more high-tech. Russia turned out to be the only country that “dropped out” of this trend. Over the years, almost no new enterprises have been built in the country (except perhaps for automobile plants of foreign companies).
We are now producing less industrial products than in the times of the RSFSR, for individual items by a factor of 2.5-200 (!) times.
The branches of industry that determine the face of the modern economy (development and production of computers and office equipment, means of communication and communication, medicines and medical equipment, and even competitive engineering) are almost completely absent in our country - the country does not even produce its own insulin, only bottling imported insulin at the plant in Orlovskaya areas. As a result, Russia not only failed to overcome dependence on oil and gas, but also deepened it: energy resources, which accounted for 26.2% of exports in 1989, expanded their share to 39.7% in 1999 and 69.5% in 2014 .
Talking about "the revival of sovereignty" and "getting up off your knees," Russia has largely painted itself into a corner, ceasing to be a major industrial power. In terms of exports of final industrial products in 2015, we seriously lagged behind… Slovakia. The structure of our economy, sectoral and regional, leaves no doubt: Russia is a third world country, dependent on the export of resources and developing only the capital region.
Another "big project" has long been considered the development of infrastructure and the use of the country's transit potential. Who among us has not heard about plans to become a bridge between Europe and Asia? In fact, we see something else: the volume of transit traffic along the Trans-Siberian now does not exceed 7 million tons per year, while 823 million tons of cargo passed through the Suez Canal last year. Not a single new seaport has been built in the country (in China over 15 ports in the same time), and all Russian ports handle 20-25% less cargo than the port of Shanghai.
The project of the Northern Sea Route is also, in fact, forgotten: in 2015, transit cargo through it amounted to 39 thousand tons against 460 thousand tons in 1999, which is 21 thousand (!) times less than transit through Suez. The promised railway-road "Silk Road" through Russia and Kazakhstan from China to Europe is stalling: roads for it are promised to be built "after 2020", and therefore trains are now making their way through Aktau, Baku and Tbilisi, and roads were built in 2014-2015 1.2 thousand km per year - four times less than in 2000.
Russia is the only country in the world where high-speed trains have managed to be put on a railway track built back in the 1970s, while normal new lines for them remain “in the pipeline”.
The unique opportunities for creating aviation hubs have not been used: not a single new airport has appeared in the country, while the largest aviation hub in the world was built in Dubai to serve passengers traveling from Europe to Asia, through which 75 million people passed in 2015. Emirates, Etihad, Qatar, Turkish are just a few of the airlines that actually created the Euro-Asian bridge we talked about.
In the mid-2000s, another idea flashed among the Russian elite: Russia should become the most, if not the richest, then the “luxurious” country. “Luxury as a national idea of Russia” was the title of one of the sections of the long-defunct Russian Economic Forum in London at that time. The process went well:
by 2008, Moscow had become one of the global cities of billionaires, and Russia ranked second in the world in terms of their number.
The capitalization of domestic companies has reached 145% of the country's GDP, with one "Gazprom" was estimated at 22% of GDP (in the US today, Apple pulls only 3.2%). In 2008, the head of Gazprom (recently reappointed to this post until 2021) promised to increase the capitalization of his company from the then $ 365 billion to $ 1 trillion in seven to eight years (today it is ... $ 41 billion). The bubble that was inflated by the whole country burst: Rosneft, believing in it, bought TNK-BP for $55 billion in 2013, although now the entire consolidated company is worth less than $40 billion.
Now the entire Russian stock market is valued at $ 276 billion - if it were one company, it would take 12th place among the world's largest corporations (being fifteen percent cheaper than Facebook). The nouveau riche was over before it had even really begun.
Moscow looks set to become, in the foreseeable future, the largest junkyard for the world's most expensive cars and a museum of unused and unfinished ostentatious offices and boutiques.
However, we dreamed not only about economic achievements. One of the most important goals of the Kremlin has always been the reintegration of the post-Soviet space. During the post-Soviet period, Russia, however, managed to create a relatively developed alliance only with Belarus, while all other projects at least fell short of expectations.
The Customs Union and the EAEU now unite, in addition to Russia, only four countries - Kazakhstan, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan and Armenia, while between 1994 and 2013, the "dying" and "degrading" European Union was admitted to ... 16 new members. I don't even remember that the Schengen zone (1995) and the single currency (1999) were introduced there.
At the same time, the “hard struggle” for reintegration led to the most dramatic conflict in the post-Soviet space between Russia and Ukraine, which actually deprived the Eurasian Union of a chance to acquire a European component, making it predominantly turned to Asia.
Today, no matter how you feel about this project, there is a strange sense of dead end: in an era when 61% of the world's production of goods and services is concentrated in regions less than 100 miles from the ocean coast, and the Transatlantic and Trans-Pacific trade will set the face of the 21st century. partnership, Russia has managed to gather around itself only those CIS countries that do not have access to the ocean at all.
Finally, the rise of the country is inconceivable without a real national revival - and, I would say, our authorities have done everything to prevent it from taking place. Back in the 1990s, we allowed the now “reintegrating” countries to squeeze out (sometimes brutally) Russians and Russian speakers from their territory (in Kazakhstan, the share of our compatriots in the total population decreased from 1989 to 2010 from 44.4 to 26.2%, in Kyrgyzstan - from 24.3 to 6.9%, in Tajikistan - from 8.5 to 1.1%).
We, in fact, failed the program adopted in 2006 for the return of compatriots, showing that even at the peak of its prosperity, Russia was not ready to offer them anything comparable to what Germany or Israel promised their repatriates.
But the most severe blow to the "Russian world" was the discrimination against people with dual citizenship and even with a residence permit abroad. Instead of simply handing out Russian passports to everyone who has Russian roots (in Italy, the acquisition of citizenship by those who had Italians in the family since the 17th century has been almost automatic), without caring about their other passports, we seem to consider everyone "foreigners" potential traitors.
But a country that clearly does not believe that its passport is the main identity for a person is, by definition, an insecure state. The whole world is going in a different direction: since 1999, the United States has lifted all prohibitions on holding positions in government structures for American citizens who also have a foreign passport, and in the EU a citizen of any of the countries of the union has the right to hold any position in another.
Schwarzenegger was twice elected to the post of governor of the largest American state - California, being an Austrian citizen, but we need only "exclusively our own", "pure" Russians.
And to an even greater extent - not people, but the territories in which they live (as the examples of Crimea or Eastern Ukraine show). This is the reason for the failure to consolidate the creative forces of our people.
Being limited by the volume of the article, I cannot describe everything that we did not succeed in: we failed to create a normal law enforcement system and court, defeat corruption, make the ruble a convertible currency, lay the foundations for the sustainable development of Russian regions, radically improve the quality of education and healthcare (I I list here only those tasks that in different years President Putin set in his messages to the Federal Assembly).
At the same time, Russia seems to have succeeded in the main thing: it managed to educate new people - economically motivated, extremely individualistic, aimed at personal success, and not ready to sacrifice themselves for the sake of power. These people will change the country in the future and make it truly normal and therefore successful. But it will take the next quarter century of our history...
