Finnish USSR. Soviet-Finnish (Winter) War: "unknown" conflict

The Soviet-Finnish war and Finland's participation in World War II are extremely mythologized. A special place in this mythology is occupied by the losses of the parties. Very small in Finland and huge in the USSR. Mannerheim wrote that the Russians walked through the minefields, in tight ranks and holding hands. Any Russian person who has recognized the incommensurability of losses, it turns out, must simultaneously admit that our grandfathers were idiots.

Again I will quote the Finnish commander-in-chief Mannerheim:
« It happened that the Russians in the battles of early December marched with songs in dense rows - and even holding hands - into the minefields of the Finns, not paying attention to the explosions and the accurate fire of the defenders.

Do you represent these cretins?

After such statements, the loss figures named by Mannerheim are not surprising. He counted 24923 people killed and died from wounds of the Finns. Russian, in his opinion, killed 200 thousand people.

Why pity these Russes?

Engle, E. Paanenen L. in the book "Soviet-Finnish War. Breakthrough of the Mannerheim Line 1939 - 1940". with reference to Nikita Khrushchev, they give the following data:

"Out of a total of 1.5 million people sent to fight in Finland, the USSR's losses in killed (according to Khrushchev) amounted to 1 million people. The Russians lost about 1,000 aircraft, 2,300 tanks and armored vehicles, as well as a huge amount of various military equipment ... "

Thus, the Russians won, filling the Finns with "meat".
About the reasons for the defeat, Mannerheim writes as follows:
"At the final stage of the war, the weakest point was not the lack of materials, but the lack of manpower."

Stop!

Why?
According to Mannerheim, the Finns lost only 24 thousand killed and 43 thousand wounded. And after such meager losses, Finland began to lack manpower?

Something doesn't add up!

But let's see what other researchers write and write about the losses of the parties.

For example, Pykhalov in The Great Slandered War claims:
« Of course, during the hostilities, the Soviet Armed Forces suffered significantly greater losses than the enemy. According to the name lists, in the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940. 126,875 soldiers of the Red Army were killed, died or went missing. The losses of the Finnish troops amounted, according to official figures, to 21,396 killed and 1,434 missing. However, another figure of Finnish losses is often found in Russian literature - 48,243 killed, 43,000 wounded. The primary source of this figure is the translation of an article by Lieutenant Colonel of the Finnish General Staff Helge Seppälä, published in the newspaper “Za rubezhom” No. 48 for 1989, originally published in the Finnish edition “Maailma ya me”. Regarding the Finnish losses, Seppälä writes the following:
“Finland lost in the “winter war” more than 23,000 people killed; over 43,000 people were wounded. During the bombing, including of merchant ships, 25,243 people were killed.

The last figure - 25,243 killed in the bombing - is in doubt. Perhaps there is a newspaper typo here. Unfortunately, I did not have the opportunity to read the Finnish original of Seppälä's article.

Mannerheim, as you know, estimated the losses from the bombing:
"More than seven hundred civilians were killed and twice as many were injured."

The largest numbers of Finnish losses are given by the Military History Journal No. 4, 1993:
“So, according to far from complete data, the losses of the Red Army in it amounted to 285,510 people (72,408 killed, 17,520 missing, 13,213 frostbitten and 240 shell-shocked). The losses of the Finnish side, according to official figures, amounted to 95 thousand killed and 45 thousand wounded.

And finally, Finnish losses on Wikipedia:
Finnish data:
25,904 killed
43,557 wounded
1000 prisoners
According to Russian sources:
up to 95 thousand soldiers killed
45 thousand wounded
806 captured

As for the calculation of Soviet losses, the mechanism of these calculations is given in detail in the book Russia in the Wars of the 20th Century. The Book of Losses. In the number of irretrievable losses of the Red Army and the fleet, even those with whom relatives cut off contact in 1939-1940 are taken into account.
That is, there is no evidence that they died in the Soviet-Finnish war. And our researchers ranked these among the losses of more than 25 thousand people.
Who and how considered the Finnish losses is absolutely incomprehensible. It is known that by the end of the Soviet-Finnish war, the total number of Finnish armed forces reached 300 thousand people. The loss of 25 thousand fighters is less than 10% of the strength of the Armed Forces.
But Mannerheim writes that by the end of the war, Finland experienced a shortage of manpower. However, there is another version. There are few Finns in general, and even insignificant losses for such a small country are a threat to the gene pool.
However, in the book “Results of the Second World War. Conclusions of the vanquished ”Professor Helmut Aritz estimates the population of Finland in 1938 at 3 million 697 thousand people.
The irretrievable loss of 25 thousand people does not pose any threat to the gene pool of the nation.
According to the calculation of Aritz, the Finns lost in 1941 - 1945. more than 84 thousand people. And after that, the population of Finland by 1947 increased by 238 thousand people!!!

At the same time, Mannerheim, describing the year 1944, again cries in his memoirs about the lack of people:
“Finland was gradually forced to mobilize its trained reserves up to the age of 45, which did not happen in any of the countries, even in Germany.”

What kind of cunning manipulations the Finns are doing with their losses - I don’t know. In Wikipedia, Finnish losses in the period 1941 - 1945 are indicated as 58 thousand 715 people. Losses in the war of 1939 - 1940 - 25 thousand 904 people.
In total, 84 thousand 619 people.
But the Finnish site http://kronos.narc.fi/menehtyneet/ contains data on 95 thousand Finns who died in the period 1939-1945. Even if we add here the victims of the “Lapland War” (according to Wikipedia, about 1000 people), the numbers still do not converge.

Vladimir Medinsky in his book “War. Myths of the USSR claims that hot Finnish historians pulled off a simple trick: they counted only army casualties. And the losses of numerous paramilitary formations, such as shutskor, were not included in the general statistics of losses. And they had a lot of paramilitaries.
How much - Medinsky does not explain.

Whatever the case, two explanations arise:
The first - if the Finnish data on their losses are correct, then the Finns are the most cowardly people in the world, because they "raised their paws" almost without suffering losses.
The second - if we consider that the Finns are a brave and courageous people, then Finnish historians simply underestimated their own losses on a large scale.

On the eve of the World War, both Europe and Asia were already blazing with many local conflicts. International tension was due to the high probability of a new big war, and all the most powerful political players on the world map before it began tried to secure favorable starting positions for themselves, while not neglecting any means. The USSR was no exception. In 1939-1940. the Soviet-Finnish war began. The reasons for the inevitable military conflict lay in the same impending threat of a major European war. The USSR, more and more aware of its inevitability, was forced to look for an opportunity to move the state border as far as possible from one of the most strategically important cities - Leningrad. With this in mind, the Soviet leadership entered into negotiations with the Finns, offering their neighbors an exchange of territories. At the same time, the Finns were offered a territory almost twice as large as the USSR planned to receive in return. One of the demands that the Finns did not want to accept in any case was the request of the USSR to deploy military bases in Finland. Even the admonitions of Germany (Helsinki's ally), including Hermann Goering, who hinted to the Finns that Berlin's help could not be counted on, did not force Finland to move away from its positions. Thus, the parties that did not come to a compromise came to the beginning of the conflict.

The course of hostilities

The Soviet-Finnish war began on November 30, 1939. Obviously, the Soviet command was counting on a quick and victorious war with minimal losses. However, the Finns themselves were also not going to surrender to the mercy of their big neighbor. The President of the country, the military Mannerheim, who, by the way, was educated in the Russian Empire, planned to delay the Soviet troops with a massive defense for as long as possible, until the start of assistance from Europe. The complete quantitative advantage of the country of the Soviets was obvious both in human resources and in equipment. The war for the USSR began with heavy fighting. Its first stage in historiography is usually dated from 11/30/1939 to 02/10/1940 - the time that became the most bloody for the advancing Soviet troops. The line of defense, called the Mannerheim Line, became an insurmountable obstacle for the soldiers of the Red Army. Fortified pillboxes and bunkers, Molotov cocktails, later called "Molotov cocktails", severe frosts, reaching up to 40 degrees - all this is considered to be the main reasons for the failures of the USSR in the Finnish campaign.

Turning point in the war and its end

The second stage of the war begins on February 11, the moment of the general offensive of the Red Army. At that time, a significant amount of manpower and equipment was concentrated on the Karelian Isthmus. For several days before the attack, the Soviet army carried out artillery preparation, subjecting the entire surrounding area to heavy bombardment.

As a result of the successful preparation of the operation and the further assault, the first line of defense was broken through within three days, and by February 17, the Finns completely switched to the second line. During February 21-28, the second line was also broken. On March 13, the Soviet-Finnish war ended. On this day, the USSR stormed Vyborg. The leaders of Suomi realized that there was no longer any chance to defend themselves after breaking through the defense, and the Soviet-Finnish war itself was doomed to remain a local conflict, without outside support, which Mannerheim counted on so much. Given this, the request for negotiations was the logical end.

The results of the war

As a result of protracted bloody battles, the USSR achieved the satisfaction of all its claims. In particular, the country has become the sole owner of the waters of Lake Ladoga. In total, the Soviet-Finnish war guaranteed the USSR an increase in territory by 40 thousand square meters. km. As for losses, this war cost the country of the Soviets dearly. According to some estimates, about 150 thousand people left their lives in the snows of Finland. Was this company necessary? Given the fact that Leningrad was the target of the German troops almost from the very beginning of the attack, it is worth recognizing that yes. However, heavy losses seriously called into question the combat capability of the Soviet army. By the way, the end of hostilities was not the end of the conflict. Soviet-Finnish war 1941-1944 became a continuation of the epic, during which the Finns, trying to return the lost, again failed.

"WINTER WAR"

Having signed agreements on mutual assistance with the Baltic states, the USSR turned to Finland with a proposal to conclude a similar agreement. Finland refused. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of this country, E. Erkko, said that "Finland will never make a decision similar to those taken by the Baltic states. If this happens, it will only be in the worst case." The origins of the Soviet-Finnish confrontation are largely due to the extremely hostile, aggressive position of the ruling circles of Finland towards the USSR. Former Finnish President P. Svinhufvud, under whom Soviet Russia voluntarily recognized the independence of its northern neighbor, said that "any enemy of Russia must always be a friend of Finland." In the mid 30s. M. M. Litvinov, in a conversation with the Finnish envoy, stated that "in no neighboring country is there such open propaganda for attacking the USSR and seizing its territory as in Finland."

After the Munich agreement of the Western countries, the Soviet leadership began to show particular perseverance towards Finland. During 1938-1939. negotiations were held, during which Moscow sought to ensure the security of Leningrad by moving the border on the Karelian Isthmus. Instead of Finland, the territories of Karelia were offered, and much larger in size than the lands that were supposed to be transferred to the USSR. In addition, the Soviet government promised to allocate a certain amount for the resettlement of residents. However, the Finnish side stated that the territory ceded to the USSR was insufficient compensation. There was a well-developed infrastructure on the Karelian Isthmus: a network of railways and highways, buildings, warehouses and other structures. The territory transferred by the Soviet Union to Finland was an area covered with forests and swamps. In order to turn this territory into a region suitable for life and economic needs, it was necessary to invest considerable funds.

Moscow did not give up hope for a peaceful resolution of the conflict and offered various options for concluding an agreement. At the same time, he firmly stated: "Since we cannot move Leningrad, we will move the border in order to secure it." At the same time, he referred to Ribbentrop, who explained the German attack on Poland by the need to secure Berlin. On both sides of the border, large-scale military construction was deployed. The Soviet Union was preparing for offensive operations, and Finland - for defensive ones. Finnish Foreign Minister Erkko, expressing the mood of the government, confirmed: "Everything has its limits. Finland cannot accept the offer of the Soviet Union and will defend its territory, its inviolability and independence by any means."

The Soviet Union and Finland did not follow the path of finding a compromise acceptable to them. Stalin's imperial ambitions made themselves felt this time as well. In the second half of November 1939, the methods of diplomacy gave way to threats and saber-rattling. The Red Army hastily prepared for combat operations. On November 27, 1939, V. M. Molotov issued a statement in which he said that “yesterday, November 26, the Finnish White Guard undertook a new heinous provocation by firing artillery fire at a military unit of the Red Army located in the village of Mainila on the Karelian Isthmus.” Disputes over the question of whose side these shots were fired are still ongoing. The Finns already in 1939 tried to prove that the shelling could not have been carried out from their territory, and the whole story with the "Mainil incident" was nothing more than a provocation by Moscow.

November 29, taking advantage of the shelling of their border positions, the USSR terminated the non-aggression pact with Finland. On November 30 hostilities began. On December 1, on Finnish territory, in the city of Terioki (Zelenogorsk), where Soviet troops entered, on the initiative of Moscow, a new "people's government" of Finland was formed, headed by the Finnish communist O. Kuusinen. The next day, an agreement on mutual assistance and friendship was concluded between the USSR and the government of Kuusinen, called the government of the Finnish Democratic Republic.

Events, however, did not develop as well as the Kremlin had hoped. The first stage of the war (November 30, 1939 – February 10, 1940) was especially unfortunate for the Red Army. To a large extent, this was due to the underestimation of the combat capability of the Finnish troops. Break through the Mannerheim Line on the move - a complex of defensive fortifications built in 1927-1939. and stretched along the front for 135 km, and in depth up to 95 km - failed. During the fighting, the Red Army suffered huge losses.

In December 1939, the command stopped unsuccessful attempts to advance deep into Finnish territory. A thorough preparation of a breakthrough began. The North-Western Front was formed, headed by S. K. Timoshenko and a member of the Military Council A. A. Zhdanov. The front included two armies, headed by K. A. Meretskov and V. D. Grendal (replaced in early March 1940 by F. A. Parusinov). The total number of Soviet troops was increased by 1.4 times and brought up to 760 thousand people.

Finland also strengthened its army, receiving military equipment and equipment from abroad. 11,500 volunteers arrived from Scandinavia, the USA and other countries to fight the Soviets. England and France developed their plans for military operations, intending to enter the war on the side of Finland. London and Paris made no secret of their hostile plans towards the USSR.

On February 11, 1940, the final stage of the war began. Soviet troops went on the offensive and broke through the Mannerheim Line. The main forces of the Karelian Army of Finland were defeated. On March 12, after short negotiations, a peace treaty was concluded in the Kremlin. Military operations along the entire front ceased from 12 o'clock on March 13. In accordance with the signed agreement, the Karelian Isthmus, the western and northern shores of Lake Ladoga, and a number of islands in the Gulf of Finland were included in the USSR. The Soviet Union received a 30-year lease on the Hanko peninsula to create a naval base on it, "capable of defending the entrance to the Gulf of Finland from aggression."

The price of victory in the "winter war" was extremely high. In addition to the fact that the Soviet Union as an "aggressor state" was expelled from the League of Nations, during the 105 days of the war, the Red Army lost at least 127 thousand people killed, died of wounds and missing. About 250,000 servicemen were wounded, frostbite, shell-shocked.

The "Winter War" demonstrated major miscalculations in the organization and training of the Red Army troops. Hitler, who closely followed the course of events in Finland, formulated the conclusion that the Red Army was a "colossus with feet of clay" that the Wehrmacht could easily cope with. Certain conclusions from the military campaign of 1939-1940. made in the Kremlin. So, K. E. Voroshilov was replaced by S. M. Timoshenko as People's Commissar of Defense. The implementation of a set of measures aimed at strengthening the defense capability of the USSR began.

However, during the "winter war" and after its end, no significant strengthening of security was achieved in the northwest. Although the border was moved away from Leningrad and the Murmansk railway, this did not prevent Leningrad from being blockaded during the Great Patriotic War. In addition, Finland did not become a friendly or at least neutral country to the USSR - revanchist elements prevailed in its leadership, which relied on the support of Nazi Germany.

I.S. Ratkovsky, M.V. Khodyakov. History of Soviet Russia

LOOK POET

From a shabby notebook

Two lines about a boy fighter

What was in the fortieth year

Killed in Finland on the ice.

Lying somehow clumsily

Childishly small body.

Frost pressed the overcoat to the ice,

The hat flew off.

It seemed that the boy was not lying,

And still running

Yes, the ice held the floor ...

In the midst of a great war cruel,

From what - I will not apply my mind,

I feel sorry for that distant fate,

As if dead, alone

Like I'm lying

Frozen, small, dead

In that war, not famous,

Forgotten, small, lying.

A.T. Tvardovsky. Two lines.

NO MOLOTOV!

With a cheerful song, Ivan goes to war,

but, resting against the Mannerheim line,

he starts to sing a sad song,

How do we hear it now?

Finland, Finland,

Ivan is on his way there again.

Since Molotov promised that everything would be fine

and tomorrow they will be eating ice cream in Helsinki.

No, Molotov! No, Molotov!

Finland, Finland,

the Mannerheim line is a serious obstacle,

and when a terrible artillery fire began from Karelia

he silenced many Ivans.

No, Molotov! No, Molotov!

You lie even more than Bobrikov!

Finland, Finland,

feared by the invincible Red Army.

Molotov already said to look after a dacha,

otherwise the Chukhons are threatening to capture us.

No, Molotov! No, Molotov!

You lie even more than Bobrikov!

Go for the Urals, go for the Urals

there is plenty of room for a Molotov dacha.

We will send the Stalins and their henchmen there,

political officers, commissars and Petrozavodsk swindlers.

No, Molotov! No, Molotov!

You lie even more than Bobrikov!

MANNERHEIM LINE: MYTH OR REALITY?

Good form for supporters of the theory of a strong Red Army that broke into an impregnable line of defense has always been to quote General Badu, who was building the "Mannerheim Line". He wrote: “Nowhere in the world were natural conditions so favorable for the construction of fortified lines as in Karelia. In this narrow place between two bodies of water - Lake Ladoga and the Gulf of Finland - there are impenetrable forests and huge rocks. From wood and granite, and where necessary - from concrete, the famous "Mannerheim Line" was built. The greatest fortress of the "Mannerheim Line" is given by anti-tank obstacles made in granite. Even twenty-five-ton tanks cannot overcome them. In granite, the Finns, with the help of explosions, equipped machine-gun and gun nests, which are not afraid of the most powerful bombs. Where there was not enough granite, the Finns did not spare concrete.”

In general, reading these lines, a person who imagines the real "Mannerheim line" will be terribly surprised. In the description of Badu, some gloomy granite cliffs with gun emplacements carved into them at a dizzying height, over which vultures circle in anticipation of mountains of corpses of the attackers, rise before their eyes. The description of Badu actually fits rather to the Czech fortifications on the border with Germany. The Karelian Isthmus is a relatively flat area, and there is no need to cut into the rocks, simply due to the absence of the rocks themselves. But one way or another, the image of an impregnable castle was created in the mass consciousness and entrenched in it quite firmly.

In fact, the "Mannerheim Line" was far from the best examples of European fortification. The vast majority of the long-term structures of the Finns were one-story, partially buried reinforced concrete buildings in the form of a bunker, divided into several rooms by internal partitions with armored doors. Three pillboxes of the “millionth” type had two levels, three more pillboxes had three levels. Let me emphasize, exactly the level. That is, their combat casemates and shelters were located at different levels relative to the surface, casemates slightly buried in the ground with embrasures and completely buried galleries connecting them with barracks. Structures with what can be called floors were negligible. One under the other - such an arrangement - small casemates directly above the premises of the lower tier were only in two pillboxes (Sk-10 and Sj-5) and a gun casemate in Patoniemi. This is, to put it mildly, unimpressive. Even if we do not take into account the impressive structures of the "Maginot Line", you can find many examples of much more advanced bunkers ...

The survivability of the gouge was designed for tanks of the Renault type, which were in service with Finland, and did not meet modern requirements. Contrary to Badu's claims, Finnish anti-tank gouges showed during the war their low resistance to attacks by T-28 medium tanks. But it was not even about the quality of the Mannerheim Line structures. Any defensive line is characterized by the number of long-term firing structures (DOS) per kilometer. In total, there were 214 long-term structures on the Mannerheim Line for 140 km, of which 134 were machine-gun or artillery DOS. Directly on the front line in the zone of combat contact in the period from mid-December 1939 to mid-February 1940 there were 55 pillboxes, 14 shelters and 3 infantry positions, of which about half were obsolete structures of the first period of construction. For comparison, the "Maginot Line" had about 5,800 DOS in 300 defense nodes and a length of 400 km (density 14 DOS / km), the "Siegfried Line" - 16,000 fortifications (weaker than French ones) on a front of 500 km (density - 32 structures on km) ... And the “Mannerheim Line” is 214 DOS (of which only 8 artillery) on a front of 140 km (average density 1.5 DOS / km, in some areas - up to 3-6 DOS / km).

The official reason for the start of the war is the so-called Mainil incident. On November 26, 1939, the government of the USSR sent a note of protest to the government of Finland about the artillery shelling, which was carried out from Finnish territory. Responsibility for the outbreak of hostilities was assigned entirely to Finland.

The beginning of the Soviet-Finnish war took place at 8 am on November 30, 1939. The goal of the Soviet Union was to ensure the security of Leningrad. The city was only 30 km from the border. Previously, the Soviet government had asked Finland to move its borders around Leningrad, offering territorial compensation in Karelia. But Finland categorically refused.

Soviet-Finnish war 1939-1940 caused real hysteria among the world community. On December 14, the USSR was expelled from the League of Nations with serious violations of procedure (by a minority of votes).

The troops of the Finnish army at the time of the outbreak of hostilities consisted of 130 aircraft, 30 tanks, 250 thousand soldiers. However, the Western powers pledged their support. In many ways, it was this promise that led to the refusal to change the line of the border. By the time the war began, the Red Army had 3,900 aircraft, 6,500 tanks and 1 million soldiers.

The Russian-Finnish war of 1939 is divided by historians into two stages. Initially, it was planned by the Soviet command as a short operation, which was supposed to last about three weeks. But the situation turned out differently.

First period of the war

It lasted from November 30, 1939 to February 10, 1940 (until the Mannerheim Line was broken). The fortifications of the Mannerheim Line were able to stop the Russian army for a long time. The better equipment of the Finnish soldiers and the harsher winter conditions than in Russia also played an important role.

The Finnish command was able to perfectly use the features of the terrain. Pine forests, lakes, swamps slowed down the movement of Russian troops. The supply of ammunition was difficult. Finnish snipers also caused serious problems.

Second period of the war

It lasted from February 11 to March 12, 1940. By the end of 1939, the General Staff developed a new plan of action. Under the leadership of Marshal Timoshenko, the Mannerheim Line was broken through on 11 February. A serious superiority in manpower, aviation, tanks allowed the Soviet troops to move forward, while suffering heavy losses.

The Finnish army experienced a severe shortage of ammunition and people. The Finnish government, which did not receive Western assistance, was forced to conclude a peace treaty on March 12, 1940. Despite the disappointing results of the military campaign for the USSR, a new border was established.

After Finland enters the war on the side of the Nazis.

The return of prisoners - the Finns to their homeland.

March 13, 1940 the Finns signed a peace treaty, Finland decided surrender and not go to the end, especially since the USSR refused to take over this country.

USSR losses:

data on the outcome of the treatment of the wounded, shell-shocked, burned, frostbite and sick as of March 1, 1941, amounting to 248,090 people, of which:

Returned to service 172,203 people. (69.4%);

46,925 people were dismissed with an exception from military registration and sick leave. (18.9%);

Killed and died of wounds during sanitary evacuation stages 65 384 ;

Declared dead from among the missing 14,043;

Died from wounds, contusions and illness in hospitals (as of March 1, 1941) 15,921. (6.4%)

The number of wounded, shell-shocked, sick, the outcome of whose treatment was not determined by the specified date 13,041 people. (5.3%)

The total number of irretrievable losses amounted to 95348 people

Killed on the battlefield according to published data 48,475 people.

( RUSSIA AND THE USSR IN THE WARS OF THE XX CENTURY LOSSES OF ARMED FORCES Statistical study Under the general editorship of Candidate of Military Sciences, Professor of the Academy of Medical Sciences, Colonel-General G. F. Krivosheev).

Finland's losses remain a mystery behind seven seals: 25,904 killed, 43,557 wounded, 1,000 prisoners. According to the wiki.

But earlier, the Finns acknowledged the loss in the "Winter War" of 48.3 thousand soldiers killed, 45 thousand wounded and 806 people captured.

And in 1940, the Finnish government in the Blue White Book announced that 24,912 people had died in the regular army.

And in the USSR they were talking about the Finnish losses of 85 thousand people killed and 250 thousand wounded.

By the way, only 26,000 military personnel of the country are included in the official irretrievable losses of Finland, excluding the dead from numerous paramilitary formations, such as shutskor, Lotta Svärd and many others, they were not included in the general statistics of losses.

In general, the exact number of Finns who died is unknown, but ...

We examine the enemy tank.

The death of only 23.5 - 26 thousand soldiers looks unconvincing. It turns out that with such modest losses, Finland was on the verge of defeat, and the army, because of such meager losses, abandoned its fortifications on the Karelian Isthmus?
It is unlikely that such small losses would have forced the Finns to retreat. Most likely, the number of deaths was much higher.

Mannerheim announced large losses in manpower in the troops ...

In addition, the author of Mannerheim's memoirs underestimated the size of the Finnish army below any limit, claiming that it had only 175 thousand military personnel and only later the army increased to 200 thousand people. Sokolov writes that after the pre-war mobilization, the Finnish army had 265,000 servicemen (of which 180 were in combat units). (ibid. p. 380) And that's not counting the forces of the shutskor. Other researchers of the Soviet-Finnish war give much higher figures. Petrov: "After the mobilization in October 1939, the land (in the text with a capital letter) Finnish troops, together with reserve formations and rear units, already numbered 286 thousand soldiers and officers (according to other sources - 295 thousand people)." (Petrov P. V. "Soviet-Finnish war 1939-1940" Volume I p123)

In general, we are not talking about any filling up with corpses!

Approximately 2 - 2.5 to 1 in terms of Soviet total losses to the total Finnish, or even more parity.