What to expect after the elections. Focus: the most interesting things await Russia after the elections . The pre-revolutionary situation and the new GKChP: what awaits the country after the presidential election

Photo: dp.ru

The president's name will not change after March 18. But many other things will change. Moreover, regardless of how many voters and how they vote and what, real or extremely fantastic, the results will be announced. The change will happen simply because the day of March 18 will pass and the morning of the nineteenth will come.

If some mystical power tells us the date of our death, then even if this day is far away, this knowledge will change both ourselves and our relationship with the world and people. It is not knowing our due date that allows us to act as if we will live forever.

March 18 is not the end of the election campaign - something that never happened cannot end. This is the beginning. Start of deadline. This is the first day of those more than two thousand days, after which a new life, unknown to anyone yet, will come. The feeling of the end of an era has arisen for a long time and for many. But now the dates have been set.

After these two and a half thousand days, fifty thousand hours, something will have to be changed.

To stay, the current Supreme Ruler will have to change the Constitution. Well, not to introduce a monarchy - this is quite exotic, but somehow noticeably change the structure of power. And it won't be easy - it's not 2008, when you could do anything. Falling living standards, foreign policy failures, difficult relations with their own elites, centrifugal tendencies in the regions - all this does not contribute to the desire of the boyars to violate the law and common sense in order to continue to live the way they have long disliked living. If they liked it, they would not have real estate in the countries of a potential enemy and passports of these countries. Of course, the personal qualities of most of them are negative selection, you can’t get anywhere! - do not allow their dissatisfaction to be expressed in any political action, but they will not fight for the extension of the regime.

Falling living standards, foreign policy failures, complex relations with their own elites, centrifugal tendencies in the regions - all this does not contribute to the desire of the boyars to violate the law and common sense

It will not work to appoint a locum tenens in order to return later. In 2024, the president will be 72, in 2030 - 78. Even for the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU, he is no longer a boy. What is important here is not even the physical condition in itself, but people's idea that this is already too much.

Spit on everything and allow real elections? It does not fit into the logic of character, and to answer, after all, will have to do a lot. Even if the president personally receives reliable guarantees of immunity (ask Jaruzelski and Pinochet, do they exist, reliable ones?), then there is still his entourage. No one will give them guarantees, they will defend themselves and try to ensure that the authorities do not go beyond their circle.

So, we need to look for a successor. And they will not be able to become, say, a beloved Labrador. The successor will not have enough trust from the outgoing boss, he will have to become a real president, so he will have to go through a casting with governors, generals, oligarchs. They will evaluate which of the applicants is capable of performing the main job of the President of Russia - to be a mediator between conflicting subjects. And it should also be a person who is able to collect, if not half, then at least a third of the votes in order to draw not everything - it will no longer be possible, but only a part. And how many among the current inner circle of those who are capable not only of intrigue, but also of open discussion?

The battles for “their” successor or for their own version of changing the Constitution will begin on the morning of March 19 (before this date, hardly anyone will dare to bother the Sovereign with these problems). This will lead to a sharp increase in turbulence at the very top, to a decrease in the loyalty of many members of the elite, which will inevitably spill out "down" into society.

But the society itself is clearly not going to sleep. For politically active citizens, the departure of the president, even in the case of the Operation Successor variant, and the preparation of this operation itself, means not only a chance for transformations that are desirable from their point of view, but also a sharp increase in the value of prizes for participating in political struggle. For the same actions that in previous years were given at best an honorary diploma - popularity in the networks and respect of associates, and sometimes a prison - now it will be possible to get real power. By the way, the elections to the State Duma are already in three years. They will be anything, but not boring.

For the same actions that in previous years were given at best a certificate of honor - popularity in networks and respect from associates, and sometimes prison - now it will be possible to get real power

Immediately after March 18, the reformatting of the opposition field will begin - all its segments, of course, not only the liberal one. Some will try to consolidate their positions by appealing to the successes in resisting the regime and the sacrifices made, others will prove the inefficiency of the leaders and structures of the Putin era, nominate new people and create new parties. In fact, these processes have already begun. A mass of people who have hitherto preferred the position of observers will join the game. After all, the awards will no longer be virtual - real.

New times will require new people in the apparatus of power. Those who are only able to sit on rent and share it with higher comrades will be taken out from there. Inevitably, people prone to active struggle and capable of responding to new challenges will become stronger.

And these people will act. We can expect the creation of new Kremlin parties (the Sobchak and Grudinin projects are only the first signs), attempts to outbid people with political potential, and at the same time, an increase in the practice of intimidation and repression. It will also need new propagandists. Television will not get better, it will become different. Or maybe a new war is needed. Here I would like to be wrong!

In fifty, approximately, thousand hours, the life to which the country has been accustomed for more than eighteen years will end. It is hardly possible to predict everything that will happen. It is clear only what will happen - will be!

* Psychologist, political scientist, President of the Union of Right Forces

In many countries, elections are preceded by a sharp increase in public spending and a surge in inflation. Russians should rather fear what will happen to the economy after the presidential election

I want to thank the readers of Forbes magazine for the large number of responses to my first column, which pleasantly surprised me. I will be waiting for your further comments. Almost everyone commented that you liked the style of presenting the problems of the Russian economy, devoid of technical details and professional jargon. Many of you have also asked me to explain how the situation in the Russian economy will develop in 2018, namely, what impact the presidential elections in March and the holding of the World Cup in June-July will have on it.

Let's start with the presidential election. In many countries, elections are preceded by a surge in generally wasteful government spending and a surge in inflation. This does not apply to Russia (the budget deficit is still below 2% of GDP, and annual inflation is at a historically low level of about 4%). Therefore, the elections will have virtually no impact on macroeconomics and the budget. More relevant is the question of what will happen after the elections in March. If the new reform agenda removes structural constraints on competition, innovation, and the skills of the workforce, that would be a big plus. But even in this case, one should not expect noticeable results in 2018. Such reforms bring important long-term benefits, but they do not happen immediately.

Second, the World Cup. The benefits for the Russian economy associated with increased investment in building and upgrading infrastructure for the World Cup were largely exhausted in 2017. Of course, the economy will benefit in 2018 due to the growth in consumption and services in the coming summer. However, unfortunately, as history teaches us, these benefits are as temporary as crowds of fans.

In 2016, The Journal of Economic Perspectives published an article "Chasing Gold: The Economics of the Olympic Games" by Robert Baade and Victor Matheson. The authors came to a sobering conclusion: “In most cases, the Olympics turn out to be financial losses for the cities in which they are held; a net benefit is only possible under very specific and unusual conditions.” So in a purely economic sense, one should not expect too much from the World Cup.

But there is a third event, if you can call it that, which has, in a sense, escaped public attention. We are talking about the gradual return of Russian capital to their homeland. In 2017, adjusted for Rosneft’s exceptional privatization deal, foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows into Russia increased by about 25% year-on-year to a total of about $25 billion. There are several reasons for this, such as economic growth and improving the business climate.

However, in the first half of 2017, most FDI came from offshore zones, which are usually associated with capital outflows and a phenomenon called “capital circulation”, a process in which Russian funds disguised as foreign capital are returned to homeland in the form of FDI. This is an important issue for Russia (my colleagues and I published a discussion about what to do when FDI is neither foreign nor direct). Be that as it may, the money is returned to Russia.

The question is whether they will be put to good use. The answer is yes, but only if there are enough worthy projects. However, they don't seem to be. Thus, one of the criteria is the share of investment expenditures in GDP. In Russia, investments account for approximately 21% of GDP (compared to 43% in China). In 2018, the imbalance between supply and demand for capital may increase. To eliminate this imbalance, Russia will have to make serious efforts to improve the investment climate. The country has made impressive strides, climbing to 35th out of 190 economies in the world in this year's World Bank Doing Business rankings. This should be recognized and welcomed. However, Doing Business assesses only part of the overall investment climate. Other relevant aspects of the investment climate include competition and scrutiny policy, where reform currently under way could improve the situation by balancing the supply and demand for capital.

So what can we expect in 2018? In general, it can be expected that the situation will not change. Thus, the World Bank predicts that in 2018 economic growth will remain approximately at the level of 2017 and will be 1.7%. While there may be slight up and down swings in growth, along with upside and downside risks (as outlined in our recent Russia Economic Report), overall 2018 will be the same as 2017.

However, it is more important to think not about whether the economy will grow by 1.5% or 2%, but rather about whether Russia will be able to approach the world average in terms of economic growth (about 3%).

How important is narrowing the gap with global average growth, you may ask? If the Russian economy grows by 1.7%, it will take 42 years to double its GDP. However, if it grows at the world average rate of 3%, then, as simple calculations show, Russia will be able to double its GDP in just 24 years, that is, 18 years faster. That is why it is so important to close the gap with the performance of the global economy.

However, it must be recognized that, in the absence of measures to ease the serious structural constraints discussed above, it will not be easy to compensate for such a difference of more than one percentage point. If something unexpected does not happen in Russia, then, as in Ivan Andreevich Krylov's fable about the swan, cancer and pike, in 2018 the Russian economy will remain in the same place.

On Wednesday, December 6, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced that he was going to nominate his candidacy for the post of head of state in 2018 as well. "Dialogue" found out from political scientists what awaits the Russians in the elections and after them.

What will change in the political course of Russia?

Andrey Manoilo: After the elections, if Vladimir Vladimirovich wins (and I have no doubt about this), there will be a serious restructuring of the state apparatus and the economy. That is, all those things that are not done on the eve of the elections will happen after Putin's victory. First of all, this will affect the personnel apparatus. There will be a very serious, as it is now called, personnel rotation. We saw the elements of this rotation in the example of governors and in the example of the resignations of generals from law enforcement agencies.

After the victory, the restructuring of the economy will begin. And it will most likely be carried out in two main directions. First, the leaders will be put in their place, they are the owners of some large state corporations, who have decided that they can even dictate their own rules to the president. There were several such stories, and they will definitely not be left without attention. Secondly, it should be expected that the country will begin to apply a large set of anti-crisis measures, because the economic crisis continues to deepen.

Dmitry Oreshkin: There will be no changes, everything is already formed. Autarky will be ( Separation of the national economy with the assignment of the domestic market to monopolies — Dialog news agency). Accordingly, there will be a continuation of the not very hasty tightening of the screws, because you need to protect yourself from enemy foreign agents who tell the truth and thus destroy virtual reality. There will be a retreat to the East, and not geographically, because China is not very interested in a political alliance with Putin - Putin is rather weak for him - and such an East, more "mental" - like Iran, Uzbekistan. What does he have now? Iran, Syria. This is third world level. But, of course, this cannot be said. We will say that we are rising from our knees, doubling the GDP. Given that the real share of Russia in the world economy is about 2%, and the real share of the Russian population in the world population is less than 2%. This is a despicable reality. It's just a third world country. But it will exist, nothing will happen. Iran exists in the position of a regional power. And Nigeria is even better - it sells its oil, and 200 million people live there. In Russia, there will be slowdown, stagnation, depopulation, but, of course, this will not happen in 3 months.

Fedor Krasheninnikov: Basically, of course, nothing will change. Putin has been in power for 19 years, and everything that he could change for the better, he has already tried to change. It is naive to believe that after so many years a person will open up from some unexpected side and suddenly do something that no one expected. I think you can talk about replacing some people with others, but even new people will not turn out to be incredible, super talented, made from a different test. It will be all the same boring Putin apparatchiks that he has placed everywhere. It is hardly worth waiting for miracles, in short. This is his course, it was he who invented it, it was he who conducted it. Why do you think it will suddenly change? In the 2012 elections, he did not promise us that there would be Crimea, sanctions, a fall in the economy, a fall in the ruble. None of us know what he's really going to do when he becomes president.

Why did Putin announce his nomination just yesterday?

Andrey Manoilo: There were two main reasons. The pause was technical. First, he staged a stress test for his associates. When he remains silent, the date of the election approaches, and the environment is faced with a choice. Not knowing what decision the president would make - whether to go to the polls or not, to nominate a successor or not to nominate anyone at all - the elite began to waver. It is clear that after the elections, the one who supports the right candidate will be closer to the authorities and the president. If Vladimir Vladimirovich is going to go to the polls, then, of course, then he must be supported and positioned as a supporter of Vladimir Vladimirovich. But if suddenly he decides to put forward some kind of tandem instead of himself, as was the case with Medvedev, then in this case it is necessary to break away in time and join the candidate whom the president indicates. And how to make this choice? If indeed the situation had developed in such a way that a successor would have been nominated, then those who would have joined the successor in the first minutes, even before Vladimir Vladimirovich pointed him out, would have received the best places. And those who would have rushed to express their loyalty afterward would have ended up in a hat analysis and might not have received anything at all. Officials and associates hung on a thread and waited for someone to show firmness, loyalty and endurance.

Second, as long as the president did not declare that he would be nominated as a candidate, he could not become an object of criticism from the opposition and the collective West, because if there is no candidate, there is no object for criticism. It would be strange if the West began to criticize that Putin has ambitions to become president for a new term even before he announced it. Therefore, there was silence. That is, the opponents, of course, would like to launch a broad information campaign, but there was no informational occasion. Now he announced this, but he announced it at a time when, in fact, a few months remained, and during this time all the oppositionists could begin to attack and attack him. But there will be no time to launch a powerful campaign against him as president, given that the New Year holidays are ahead, when the entire Russian population falls into a state of political apathy. And in the West before that - Christmas. The West also falls out. In this regard, no matter how well thought out the information attack against our president is, it most likely will not reach its audiences. This is pretty accurate and well thought out.

There is a certain probability that the collective West was preparing for this scenario, and it has some kind of candidate (and this is not Navalny or Sobchak, but an unknown person, with a clean biography and a clean slate, sufficiently resourced), which the collective West can now start unwind according to the Macron scenario, is still different from zero, but not large.

Dmitry Oreshkin: Why doesn't he run in September? Because the dramaturgy must be kept. We had to worry about whether it would advance or not advance. Although I do not know people who were nervous about this, but the servants and the environment built just such a model. Pay attention: in a day or two, Peskov says - get ready. The people started up, ran to buy soap to wash their necks - now, it will happen. But first you need to go to the Bishops' Council, take communion, receive a blessing, as it were. In the morning, a volunteer is sent to ask: “Well, are you ready?” "No, it's still early, wait." Everything is Brezhnev-style - not in Moscow, because they do not like Moscow, and among the working people, in a large industrial complex. There are three options to choose from: a production complex, a collective farm (but we don’t have one and the picture is bad - fields. Let Alexander Grigoryevich Lukashenko pick potatoes) or the third option - a spaceship. But the spaceship may not take off, as you know, so the choice is our industrial giant. The people all relaxed: “Thank God, come on, bro, pour, Vladimir Vladimirovich did not abandon us, we will continue to rise from our knees and double GDP.”

This style is dangerous not only because it resembles the Soviet Union, but also because those who invent it do not understand that it is ridiculous. They think that this is really important - this bishops' cathedral, this greatness and other rubbish. This fundamentally contradicts the Putin who was at the beginning - such a simple kid in a T-shirt who speaks a simple human language. And [now] it is already almost the anointed of God - but this is not terrible, but the fact that they do not understand that they look ridiculous, like Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev.

Fedor Krasheninnikov: I am absolutely sure that the announcement was made yesterday out of necessity. They clearly wanted to drag out this so-called intrigue for a long time, but yesterday was a gloomy day due to the exclusion of the Russian team from the Olympics in Korea and, obviously, in order to overcome this failure of the entire foreign policy, to cover up the inability to negotiate with anyone (because they are used to Russia should not negotiate with anyone, and in foreign policy - too, including in sports), it was necessary to put on a good face, divert people's attention. Obviously, Putin had to draw his only trump card.

Will the "new faces" be allowed before the elections?

Andrey Manoilo: They are already admitted. There are no obstacles preventing the same Sobchak from participating in the elections. Sobchak has only one problem - the presence of her own electoral support. She needs to collect a certain number of signatures. This is a rather difficult task for a person who is known in Moscow clubs and in Dom-2. If Sobchak manages to comply with the requirements of the Russian electoral law, then, in general, there are no problems. And if it doesn't work, it's entirely her fault. The same applies to other candidates from the systemic or non-systemic opposition who have been nominated or who, perhaps, will be nominated. But I think that no one will nominate.

Dmitry Oreshkin: Navalny will definitely not be allowed in, this was clear a year ago. And Sobchak will definitely be allowed, otherwise why would they pull her out? It seems obvious to me. At the same time, it is clear that there are some political agreements. She is a smart woman, she indicated her right to say whatever she wanted, and she was agreed on this. Otherwise, it will not be Sobchak, but a wooden cabinet - therefore, of course, they allowed it, they gave the go-ahead. In the Kremlin, thank God, they are not fools: they understand that it is impossible to completely dry up the situation. Of course, she will stigmatize, criticize, talk about mistakes with Crimea, and so on. After all, if she does not stigmatize, who will listen to her? But her fundamental difference from Navalny is that he really wants to become president, but she does not. Everyone will be pleased because she will secure her political status as a young rising star. And the Kremlin will be pleased, as it will ensure the turnout. As always in Russian politics, one cannot say that she is a spoiler and only a spoiler, that she is a project of the Kremlin - and at the same time, one cannot say that she is not a project of the Kremlin and not a spoiler.

Fedor Krasheninnikov: I would not put Sobchak and Navalny in the same row, because Sobchak is obviously a candidate quite suitable for Putin, otherwise she would not have been invited to the federal channel and not allowed to speak there. As we know, Navalny has never been invited to any federal channel. Even if she is allowed to participate - which I highly doubt - she will be one of the voices in the choir of people whose task is to add intrigue to an event in which there is no intrigue. But I think that, most likely, it will not be allowed, because against the background of other old people, Putin should seem young, energetic, and in general, nothing should distract attention from Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin. This is his holiday, his carnival, he will be a prima donna there, he is in the title role. Why does he need any unnecessary worries?

Navalny differs from Sobchak in that he says things personally unpleasant to Putin. If he is released on the screen, he will personally scold Putin. He will say that Putin should resign, because sitting in power for so many years is too much. That is, to say something about which it is impossible to speak in any case. In our country, you can scold, criticize, demand anything, but you can’t hit Putin with direct fire. Navalny is an uncontrollable person in this sense. Putin wants everything to be like during his speech at the forum of volunteers or at this plant in Nizhny Novgorod. So that the overtaken enthusiastic crowd joyfully shouted: “We support you, we are for you!” And there should be no opponents.

What is the real support for Putin in Russia?

Andrey Manoilo: Putin has a huge rating. They give different figures, but we can confidently say that he now has more than 50% real rating, if you approach, discarding all factors. This corresponds to reality. None of his rivals has such a rating.

Dmitry Oreshkin: Ask about Leonid Brezhnev in 1977, everyone will say: “Yes, of course we support it,” and then they go home and scoff in the kitchen. Now it is precisely the situation when people, thank God, not stupid, answer all questions with “well, yes.” That's the trouble. And who, apart from Brezhnev, could be supported in 1978 or 1981? We also support Vladimir Putin. And sociologists do not lie, people answer like that. But this support is out of desperation, because there is no one else. And the rating is desperate. And they will not go to the polls, because it is impossible to vote for him.

The turnout will not be as high as we would like. It will not be very low, because there are electoral sultanates that 90% will draw - there are about 15 regions of them. There are governors who understand that their career depends on what numbers they show. There will be no overwhelming turnout. Everything will take place in an atmosphere of high labor enthusiasm and general enthusiasm, but they are not real. The most dangerous thing is this detachment from reality in which he [Putin] seems to live. Leonid Ilyich [Brezhnev] also believed, and Nikita Sergeyevich [Khrushchev] believed, I'm not talking about Joseph Vissarionovich [Stalin].

Fedor Krasheninnikov: Naturally, supporters are gathered at election events. This is a normal pre-election technology that is used in all countries. Crowds also gather at Navalny's, shouting "yes!" Does this mean that all of Russia supports Navalny? Probably not. And it is absolutely certain that those people who are gathered on the principle of loyalty so that they shout “yes, Putin!”, “Yes, we support you!” represent only themselves and no one else. Support is not comprehensive at all. I have no doubt that Putin has quite a lot of support, because in any society there is a fairly large percentage of people who tend to support any incumbent government, whatever it may be. And there are such people in Russia; Of course, Putin also has devoted admirers... But, according to my feelings, these people are not eighty percent. I think around fifty percent. And if there was a really bright campaign, where Putin was opposed by someone convinced and ready to go to the end, then it is not known how it would have ended, the percentage could have fallen.

Therefore, the only way for Putin to win with an impressive percentage is simply to prevent those people who are ready to seriously fight him and who will interfere with him. This is a colossal administrative mobilization. All state employees who can be driven to the polling stations and forced to vote for Putin. And in this way, of course, he will receive the percentage he wants. I see no other reason to form a turnout, I do not understand why people will go to the polls. Because if people are for Putin, then what's the point of going there? Everyone knows that Putin will win. He cannot lose this election. It is his birthday and it will be strange if it is not him who congratulates him. Accordingly, those who are for him can decide - why go, he will still win. And those who are against him... All the more, I don't understand why they should go to these elections. Because it is known that he will win. They [the authorities] themselves killed all intrigue in these elections, and the only thing left for them is administrative mobilization under pressure, on kicks, and so on. Well, all sorts of lotteries and other dirty tricks.

Prepared by Masha Vse-Taki and Maria Osina / IA Dialog

MOSCOW, March 13 — PRIME, Anna Podlinova. Presidential elections are an important stage in the life of the country: leadership changes, old tasks, new directions of thought, and always reforms, transformations, as is commonly believed, aimed not only at strengthening the current government, but also at improving the lives of citizens and society. However, the word "reform" for Russians is rather something negative, almost cursed, which is often associated with cutbacks, or, better, with the optimization of social benefits for the sake of efficiency that is not entirely clear to the population and not always tangible.

Nevertheless, transformations cannot be avoided, economists and political scientists believe, although they assess the coming changes and directions of economic policy in a new presidential cycle in different ways.

According to a survey conducted by the All-Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VTsIOM), 69% of respondents are ready to vote for the incumbent Russian President Vladimir Putin. The next place is taken by the candidate from the Communist Party of the Russian Federation Pavel Grudinin with a gap of 62 percentage points. (7%), followed by LDPR candidate Vladimir Zhirinovsky with 5%. Therefore, experts believe, most likely, it is necessary to focus on the existing system and build on the established paradigm, which, by the way, often harms the development of the economy due to rigidity and bureaucracy.

During the eighteen-year term of the current leadership headed by Putin, a number of problems remain unresolved, in particular, the growing bureaucracy, the hardening vertical of power, the economic inequality of both the population and entire regions, and the lack of qualified personnel. And most importantly, attitude. The perception by the population of the economy, in particular, business, capital, investment, as something negative and alien.

Therefore, experts believe, Russia and its citizens need not only structural changes, but also an explanation of their necessity, a transformation of perception. Otherwise, total dependence on the oil needle cannot be overcome, inequality cannot be overcome, and a strong economy cannot be built.

New is well forgotten old

According to the head of the analytical department of the Minchenko Consulting communications holding, Kirill Petrov, after the presidential elections, the trends that were observed in 2016-2017 will continue on the economic agenda - this is dirigisme, maintaining a high share of the public sector, and reducing the share of free markets.

The program director of the Valdai Discussion Club, Yaroslav Lissovolik, on the contrary, believes that a key event will take place in economic policy this year - a long-term strategy for economic development will be formulated. "The current year may become a turning point in terms of development horizons, that is, there will be a shift in economic policy from relatively tactical and short-term towards a longer-term and strategic policy. Many people are waiting for this, these expectations are based on the fact that a number of centers are preparing their own vision of the strategy economic policy," he explains.

It is assumed that this year a synthesis of the discussed strategies will be formulated from the Center for Strategic Research (CSR) under the leadership of ex-Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin and the Stolypin Club, headed by business ombudsman Boris Titov, on the basis of which long-term priorities and directions will be developed in the future. economic policy.

According to Lisovolik, after the development of a consolidated position, human capital and high technologies will become the priorities of the new economic policy. "These are areas whose development requires longer planning horizons, strategy development," he says, noting that macroeconomic stability was achieved last year, on the basis of which it is now possible to build an economy aimed at accelerated development. "This year, probably, the key guidelines for such a strategy will be formulated," he believes.

Andrey Movchan, director of the Economic Policy Program at the Carnegie Moscow Center, is more skeptical about the future development of Russia's economic policy. "She won't change, why should anything change?" he says. Now there has been a local increase in the salaries of state employees before the elections. "After the elections, there will be no need for this, a repetition of the increase is unlikely to happen. After the elections, it will be possible to relax for six years," he said.

After the elections, a number of steps will be taken to reduce social support from the state, Movchan believes. “Everything that is quite unpopular, but necessary, has been postponed until“ after the elections ”, and everything will be done. For example, raising tariffs, income tax, retirement age,” he lists, specifying that in general, these steps cannot be called sudden, they've been planning for a long time. "Otherwise, I don't think anything will change," he said.

The problem of the last 18 years

Director General of the Center for Political Information Alexei Mukhin, speaking about the main problem in politics over the past 18 years, calls the lack of qualified personnel. "This is the most important, pressing problem. Large foreign investors say that we have no other problems, in general," he notes. "We have resources, we have infrastructure, even good legislation, but there are not enough personnel."

According to Lisovolik, the president himself formulated the problem in his recent interviews - it is a reduction in the high level of inequality, further measures to reduce poverty. Work in this direction is formulated as one of the key priorities.

He recalls that the level of inequality in Russia, in terms of income distribution, as well as the inequality of the welfare of the regions and the poverty of the population, are quite high, but there are opportunities and reserves for further reduction.

According to Movchan, "these are all slogans, this has been said for 18 years, all previous statements are about this." "The first 8 years, while the price of oil was growing, these statements successfully coincided with reality, after the eighth year the reality changed, but the statements remained the same," he points out. According to him, over the past 20 years, Russia has been growing more slowly than all resource countries, except for Venezuela. "Starting from 2012, there has been no growth at all," the expert believes.

In his opinion, due to the fact that the government has set itself the main task of its irremovability, ensuring its own stability and finding a certain group of elites in power, the economic component suffers. "For the sake of solving this problem, serious actions had to be taken, in particular, to limit the possibility of competition, to limit the access of private and foreign capital, to limit private initiative, and to expand the bureaucracy," he argues.

In his opinion, the existing system is not conducive to reforms. "She is absolutely rigid, accepts only one mode of action - the increase and expansion of her powers," he believes. Under such conditions, it is impossible to openly interact with the outside world, even if you want to create something new without breaking the system, Movchan is sure.

Reforms and the attitude of the people

According to Mukhin, at the moment in Russia there is a need for economic reform, and society is ready for it. "Vladimir Putin to some extent announced economic reform, but since Russians traditionally have a very bad attitude to the word" reform ", he talked about radical changes that are being developed by entire teams of economists, including Alexei Kudrin, Andrey Belousov," says Mukhin. Apparently, it is they who will have to put these initiatives into practice, he adds.

"The need for economic changes, for bringing the economic system to perfection, exists permanently. Society hopes for Putin with every fiber of its social needs. The contours of this reform will most likely be liberal," he notes. According to Mukhin, in order to improve the state of the economy, it is necessary to increase the level of labor productivity, as well as the professionalism of personnel.

At the same time, the political scientist explains, the reform is not a cost cut, but a structural optimization for the economy, which has both costs and benefits. "I don't think that Vladimir Putin will allow himself, after all the election promises he made, to lower the social status of a citizen of the Russian Federation. Most likely, he will be raised," Mukhin said.

In turn, Movchan notes that the economy needs a complete change in the management system. "It is necessary to completely change the management system, move away from the vertical, bureaucracy, transform the system into an institutional, competitive one. There is no need for a special program, because private initiative, internal processes, foreign initiative will do their job. After all, the market in the country is large," he says.

At the same time, the economist notes, Russia does not need an influx of money, "we have a lot of it." The Russian economy needs space for development - reducing risks, costs, social change in attitudes towards reform, development, entrepreneurship, and business.

According to him, the Russian economy needs space for development - reducing risks, costs, changing attitudes towards reforms, entrepreneurship, and business. "After all, everything I have listed here is considered socially abusive words. 'Reform', 'change', 'development', 'entrepreneurship', 'capital', 'business' are all socially cursed words for Russia," he believes. he.

Until the situation changes, building a strong economy in Russia will continue to be difficult, the economist says. "The basic principle will be this: came to the state, stole and ran away. There will never be real work if you don't change your attitude," he said.

Future direction of the economy

According to Lisovolik, the problems voiced are likely to become directions for the work of the authorities in the new presidential cycle, which will be taken into account when developing strategic guidelines for economic policy for the next few years. Within 3-5 years, it is possible to lay the foundations for a serious improvement in the situation. "Examples from other countries show that often breakthroughs, serious improvements in the situation, do not have to last for decades," he says.

At the same time, significant breakthroughs should not be expected in the short term, rather, this is a matter of the medium and long term. "We still have serious structural limitations: inequality, demographic problems," he recalls, noting that it is impossible to finally solve all the problems in 3-5 years, but it is possible to lay the foundations, the vectors of economic policy. “Of course, if we are talking about the problems of inequality, then these are long-term, structural factors that require long-term work,” he explains.

According to Lisovolik, now the Russian economy should focus on reaching a level of economic growth above the world average. In the medium term, this is achievable if the conditions for economic growth are improved, that is, there will be investment growth, the development of human capital, and an improvement in the investment climate. "If investments become a real driver of economic growth, we can expect not only a quantitative but also a qualitative improvement in the growth parameters of the Russian economy," he says.

According to Movchan, the prospect of growth of the Russian economy even at 1.3-1.5% can be considered very positive. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) predicts the growth of Russian GDP by 0.7% in the next 12 years, he recalls. "In general, everything depends on the price of oil. If it falls, say, by 30%, then there will be no growth, and maybe there will be a reduction in real terms, because the economic dependence on oil has been total, and remains" he notes.

In his opinion, it is even more than in the early 2000s. "Because then the price was low, it was just difficult to completely depend on it. Now prices have risen. In fact, we are an oil company, everything else is done as an additional product," he said. According to him, in all aspects of economic activity, there is a clear pattern that directly repeats the oil price curve.

In turn, Petrov believes that GDP growth does not reflect the improvement in the welfare of individual households. “Therefore, setting goals in terms of GDP in 2018 is a bit wrong. This macro indicator is actively criticized, since its formal growth does not always lead to an increase in the well-being of citizens and households. This is the opinion of a large number of economists,” he says.

In order to increase the efficiency of the Russian economy in the context of the policy of dirigisme, according to Petrov, the new presidential term in Russia will be marked by the digitalization of society. "The emphasis will be placed on the development of information technologies, including in public administration, in medicine," he believes.

What will happen after the presidential elections in Russia in 2018? What kind of wars and upheavals will Russians expect in the next 6 years. Analytics and forecast of Putin's re-election.

So, Putin's election ended with a quite expected result. The discrepancy between and , a huge difference between the real turnout and voiced, ballot stuffing showed that the elections were . What awaits us after this?

Will there be protests against electoral fraud?

The opposition, participating in the elections, has very clearly shown its "pocketing". Grudinin and Sobchak were generally satisfied with the results, and the journalist Shevchenko even sang a latent ode to the leader, only very mildly criticizing the organizers of the elections. Many voters are very disappointed after such statements, so this "opposition" can be safely buried.

After such statements, it became finally clear why Alexei Navalny did not cooperate with any of the official candidates. And his support will certainly increase now. In fact, Navalny remains the only independent politician who will denounce thieves, liars and corrupt officials. The rest depends only on him - whether he will be able to protect himself from the Chechen bullet, another criminal case and maintain his reputation.

Will there be protests? It must be understood that most of the population in these elections voted for Grudinin. Shevchenko clearly outlined their next steps - "non-violent resistance".

Grudinin is Putin's man, and he won't lead people to the square. Therefore, mass protests and clashes, of course, will not happen.

Navalny does not yet have a strong enough audience, the police and the FSB have beaten up the activists. But with the intensification of the economic crisis, as well as with the increase in the pocket opposition’s “skinning” in ties with the Kremlin, protest moods will grow.

Domestic politics and economics

Putin will continue to isolate Russia, which means that significant economic growth, the lifting of sanctions and the revival of foreign trade are not expected. Moreover, problems are expected even with the sale of hydrocarbons - the West has already "slaughtered" South Stream, and the threat of sanctions hangs over Nord Stream 2, which was again talked about after Putin's re-election.

What awaits Russians after the 2018 presidential election? Several pompous social programs will be deployed, widely advertised, but in fact, against the backdrop of falling living standards, do not bring any benefit. The ruble will strengthen, but not significantly, so the general crisis will increase the progression of the budget deficit. Mortality, unemployment, liquidation of enterprises will show a small but stable growth. There can be no positive shifts, this can be seen from the dynamics of recent years.

In general, it's okay, but by the end of the mandate, Putin's long-term stagnation will begin to give way to a rather dull life sediment.

Putin will continue to invest in the military machine. There will be no growth in civil technologies, business, agriculture, infrastructure improvements. For 18 years, he finally showed that he was not capable of this, and he had no other choice.

Since now Putin is in dire need of revenues to the budget, the tax burden will definitely increase, otherwise he will not survive. So the price of gasoline, fuel, road tax, excise and taxes will rise little by little. A few days after the election, they started talking about raising personal income tax to 15%, and introducing an increased fee on cars older than 5 years.

At the same time, pressure on citizens and military propaganda will increase. Without this, it will not be possible to consolidate the society. The search for “enemies of the people” will increase, the demonization of the West and the United States in the media will grow.

Foreign policy

Dozens of cadet schools have opened in Russia in recent years. Every day, the Kremlin media write about new weapons and advances in military technology.

The last two stages of the Putin government have always been in conflict, so after the 2018 elections, another war should also be expected.

The mop shoots once a year, Putin works 5 times slower.

Since Putin and his pro-Western oligarchs will not dare to enter into a direct confrontation with the Americans, the war will naturally be local. This is either another attack on Ukraine with the penetration of a corridor in Transnistria, or increased intervention in the Middle East. On the territory of the former Soviet Union, a conflict is, of course, more likely, given the growing budget deficit.