The Historical Significance of the Caribbean Crisis. Two steps away from the new world. Obama's Dreams and the "Dead Hand"

CUBA CRISIS. The "Cuban" (or "Caribbean") crisis is a sharp aggravation of relations between the USSR and the USA in the second half of 1962, which put the world before the threat of nuclear war. The immediate reason for it was the secret deployment of Soviet missiles with nuclear warheads on the territory of Cuba.

Relations between the two rival superpowers deteriorated rapidly after the Berlin Crisis of 1961 ( cm. also BERLIN WALL). Soviet leaders were also irritated by the deployment of American nuclear missiles in Turkey and also by the US-supported attempt in April 1961 by opponents of Cuban Prime Minister Fidel Castro to invade the island and overthrow his government. Tensions around Cuba increased in early 1962, after in January, under US pressure, this country was expelled from the Organization of American States, and in February a complete ban was imposed on American trade with Cuba. Cuba's complaints about "aggressive US actions" to the UN Security Council in February and March were dismissed.

As the then head of the Soviet government Nikita Khrushchev recalled, the idea of ​​secretly deploying Soviet missiles in Cuba came to his mind during a visit to Bulgaria in May 1962. He feared that the loss of Cuba would damage the international prestige of the USSR. In addition, he sought to have a means of powerful pressure on the United States in order to maintain the "balance of fear." Khrushchev was convinced that the American side, having discovered Soviet missiles secretly brought and installed in Cuba, would not risk aggravating the situation. In his memoirs, he claimed that then, in Bulgaria, "I did not express my thoughts to anyone," considering them to be my personal opinion, which still needs to be discussed. However, Fyodor Burlatsky, who then held the post of leading consultant in the department of socialist countries of the Central Committee of the CPSU, claimed that already in Bulgaria, Khrushchev asked the Minister of Defense of the USSR Marshal Roman Malinovsky whether it was possible to organize a missile base near US territory, “for example, in Cuba,” and the minister answered him that this should be negotiated with Castro.

Upon returning to the USSR, Khrushchev discussed the issue with members of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU. He motivated the idea of ​​deploying missiles by the need to save Cuba from the imminent American invasion, but suggested not making decisions immediately, realizing its risk: “We need to do so in order to save our country, prevent war, but also prevent Cuba from being defeated by US troops. ". The discussion took place at the next meeting of the Presidium, a week later. As Khrushchev recalled, the first to speak was O. Kuusinen, who spoke out in support of the installation of missiles. A. Mikoyan "spoke with reservations", stating that "we decide on a dangerous step." Khrushchev did not deny the riskiness of the operation and the threat of a nuclear war, but insisted: “... If we live only under the pressure of fear ... that any of our actions in defense of ourselves or in defense of our friends will cause a nuclear missile war, this ... means to paralyze oneself with fear. Excessive pliability will “desire” the enemy, he will “lose all caution and will no longer feel the line beyond which war will become inevitable ... We must not wish for war and do everything to prevent war, but not be afraid of war.” According to Khrushchev, the issue was discussed two or three times, and in the end all members of the Presidium decided that the United States would not risk starting a war. The decision to place the missiles was taken unanimously.

According to Burlatsky's memoirs, the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU made the main decision on this issue on May 24. It was signed by all members of the Presidium: the first - Khrushchev, the second - A. Kosygin. The specific plan and details of the operation were developed by the General Staff under the leadership of Defense Minister Malinovsky. Army and navy logistics workers in the ministries of defense and navy were instructed to calculate exactly how many ships would be needed to send missiles and everything necessary to protect them to Cuba.

It remained to agree with the leadership of Cuba. Castro, as Burlatsky later claimed, hesitated "whether it is necessary to give consent to the deployment of missiles", fearing to provoke a strike from the United States. He demanded that a formal open treaty be concluded between the USSR and Cuba, but the Soviet side preferred to act in secret.

A special delegation was sent to Cuba, which, under an assumed name, included Marshal S.S. Biryuzov, commander-in-chief of the strategic missile forces. She had to finally persuade the Cuban leader and determine specific points for the deployment of missiles, forms of camouflage, etc.

In July, a Cuban military delegation headed by Minister of the Armed Forces Raul Castro arrived in Moscow. She discussed with the leaders of the USSR (including Khrushchev) the provision of military assistance to Cuba. The participants agreed on the deployment of medium-range missiles with nuclear warheads and Il-28 bombers capable of carrying atomic bombs. In late August - early September, a Cuban delegation headed by E. Che Guevara and E. Aragones arrived in the USSR. She brought an official request to the Soviet government to supply weapons and send military and technical specialists to Cuba. Che Guevara and Malinovsky signed a corresponding agreement. Not a word was said about rockets.

Missiles with nuclear charges were sent to Cuba, and most of them could hit targets at a distance of up to 2 thousand km, and 4–5 at a distance of up to 4 thousand km. They were placed in such points from where they could cause maximum damage to the United States. To protect the missiles, approx. 40 thousand Soviet soldiers, the latest models of anti-aircraft guns, tanks and artillery, outdated Il-28 bombers, missile boats, as well as operational-tactical nuclear projectiles with a range of up to 60 km (in case of American landings). Army General I.A. Pliev, who had previously held the post of commander of the North Caucasian Military District, was placed at the head of the Soviet forces in Cuba. According to Burlatsky, the command of these forces received the right to launch a retaliatory nuclear strike if the Americans launched the first nuclear strike.

In his memoirs, Khrushchev claimed that the Cubans were not allowed to service the missiles "because they were not yet prepared for operation" and also to avoid "leakage of information."

The transfer of missiles and troops was carried out by sea on Soviet ships. The mobilization of the fleet to solve this problem was entrusted to the Minister of the Navy V.G. Bakaev. The ships sailed without naval escort and were unloaded by the Soviet troops in special closed ports.

The United States did not know about the Soviet plans, but the very fact of increased military assistance to Cuba from the USSR worried the American leadership, and American intelligence increased its surveillance of Cuba. It was discovered that launch sites for anti-aircraft guided missiles and coastal facilities (as the Americans believed, a shipyard and a base for Soviet submarines) were being built on the island. The US administration conveyed its “concern” to Moscow through the USSR ambassador in Washington A. Dobrynin, organized large-scale maneuvers near Cuba with the participation of 45 warships and 10,000 marines, and also increased the number of U-2 reconnaissance aircraft flights. US President John F. Kennedy requested Congress to call up 150,000 reservists, and on September 4 announced that his country would not tolerate ground-to-ground missiles or other offensive weapons in Cuba. The American leadership clearly considered the island as a zone of their direct interests.

The Soviet side denied that it was taking any action in this direction. Ambassador Dobrynin told President Kennedy that there was no question of any installation of ground-to-ground missiles. On September 12, the government of the USSR authorized TASS to declare that "the Soviet Union does not need to transfer to any other country, for example, to Cuba, the means it has to repel aggression, to retaliate," since they are already able to reach US territory. Khrushchev personally sent a similar message to Kennedy.

The head of the government of Cuba, F. Castro, called on the Soviet leader to openly tell the Americans that the USSR was deploying nuclear weapons in Cuba, believing that this would have a deterrent effect. Speaking in 2002 on the 40th anniversary of the crisis, Castro stated: “He (Kennedy) believed what Khrushchev told him, and so he was misled. This was a very big mistake on the part of Khrushchev, which we resolutely opposed.

The Soviet leadership hoped to complete work on the creation of launchers before US intelligence discovered what weapons were being deployed in Cuba. Khrushchev, according to his recollections, relied on the conclusions of experts sent along with Marshal Biryuzov and reported that the palm trees would mask the ongoing work from the air. Bad weather over the island in early October favored keeping the secret. The USSR began the last stage of the operation - the transfer of nuclear charges. The Soviet prime minister himself returned to Moscow after a long trip around the country only on December 10th.

Moscow's reassuring assurances have not stopped the US from stepping up its campaign against Cuba. On September 20, the US Senate passed a resolution calling for the use of the Organization of American States (OAS) against Cuba, and the House of Representatives voted to ban aid from any country that provides ships to deliver goods to Cuba. In early October, at an informal meeting of the OAS in Washington, the possibility of military action against Cuba was discussed, but this idea met with objections from Mexico, Brazil and Chile. On October 4, President Kennedy signed a bill to draft 150,000 reservists into the army.

On October 10, the United States resumed photo reconnaissance over Cuba and discovered that urgent road construction was underway on the island. President Kennedy ordered the expansion of intelligence operations. Initially, this was prevented by a typhoon, but already on October 14, American planes took thousands of pictures - both from high and low altitudes, detecting ground-to-ground missiles. On October 17, they counted from 16 to 32 missiles capable of carrying nuclear weapons.

Panic broke out in the US. The press and politicians demanded decisive action from the government to prevent the deployment of Soviet nuclear missile weapons in Cuba, declaring the actions of the USSR a direct threat to America. Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, who was in the US to attend the UN General Assembly, met with US leaders on October 18. US Secretary of State Dean Rusk, judging by Khrushchev's memoirs, urged the Soviet Union to withdraw from Cuba. “That was not a vicious warning, but to some extent a request not to create such an acute situation,” the “fatal clash” that could arise if it turned out that missiles were installed on the island. At the same time, the American side made it clear that in this case "it is ready for anything." The Soviet minister again denied the presence of missiles in Cuba. Such a secret position only increased the suspicion of the American side, which now believed that the Soviet Union was planning to really strike at the United States.

The Executive Committee of the US National Security Council met to discuss the response. John F. Kennedy and his brother Robert (Minister of Justice) advocated a complete naval blockade of Cuba, but military leaders sought the immediate bombing of missile launchers on the island. The President rejected calls from the military circles, which, in essence, would mean the beginning of the war. However, speaking on television on October 22, he announced a complete naval blockade of Cuba. The American leader accused the USSR of "preparing a nuclear strike on the Western Hemisphere" in order to "change the course of history." The President hinted that, in addition to the blockade, other, subsequent measures are possible, without specifying, however, what they might consist of. An American squadron of 180 warships was concentrated in the Caribbean. US military forces around the world were put on high alert, 6 divisions were stationed on the Florida peninsula, and additional troops were deployed to the US base at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba. The United States mobilized its nuclear arsenal: Polaris nuclear submarines were ordered to change course, and strategic aircraft were ordered to constantly be in the air with a nuclear cargo on board. US Secretary of War Robert McNamara was developing plans to bombard and occupy Cuba, which, according to his calculations, would require 250,000 soldiers, 90,000 marines and over 100 landing craft. Kennedy instructed White House staff to either leave Washington or be on the phone with their families. Meetings of the American leadership were held continuously.

The world was waiting for the inevitable war. US NATO allies have also brought their military forces to a state of readiness. The Soviet political and military leadership was not going to give in. The Soviet government condemned the US actions as aggressive. It instructed the Soviet representative in the UN to demand the immediate convening of the Security Council to discuss the issue of "violation of the UN Charter and the threat to peace on the part of the United States of America." Cuba also requested the Council to convene. The US also pushed for the convening of the Security Council. Discussion in this body began on 23 October. The Soviet representative denied the presence of missiles with nuclear weapons on the island. He demanded that the US government lift the blockade of Cuba and stop interfering in the internal affairs of that country. The USSR called for trilateral talks to normalize the situation. The counter American project required the withdrawal of Soviet forces from the island. The situation has reached an impasse. On October 23 and 24, the USSR declared a strong protest against the United States against the blockade of Cuba and other military measures. The Soviet Foreign Ministry refused to accept the note from the American embassy.

The Soviet leadership responded to the American preparations with their own measures. On October 23, First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR V. Kuznetsov received the ambassadors of the Warsaw Pact countries and informed them about the steps taken by the Soviet government. On the same day, Defense Minister Malinovsky spoke at a meeting of the Council of Ministers and reported on actions to bring the country's armed forces to a state of high alert. The government gave instructions to the minister, and he issued an appropriate order; holidays were canceled and the demobilization of older military personnel was delayed. The Soviet side recognized the presence in Cuba of only weapons necessary for self-defense: "no state that values ​​\u200b\u200bits independence can agree with the demand for the removal of this equipment." A general mobilization was announced in Cuba.

As Khrushchev later recalled, the Soviet measures were demonstrative. “We have prepared our troops as far as possible... we have even made... statements regarding the strengthening of our combat readiness. I must now frankly say that this was only a demonstration in the press to influence the minds of the American aggressors. In practice, we did nothing serious, because we believed that the war would not break out ... ". On the evening of October 23, the Soviet leader defiantly went to the Bolshoi Theater. F. Burlatsky confirmed 40 years later that the Soviet leadership was much calmer than the American, not believing that the United States would go to a nuclear war. “It was all top game. I don't remember a single person who believed that it was the eve of a nuclear war." No measures were taken to prepare for the evacuation of the population. However, the Soviet population was much less informed about the details of the crisis.

More than 20 Soviet ships with equipment continued to move towards Cuba. The first of them approached the line of the American blockade, and the danger of a direct armed conflict was created. “... We were afraid that the US Navy would be insolent, would it be able to stop our ships and expose us? Khrushchev later recalled. “We even thought about escorting ships carrying nuclear weapons with submarines, but in the end we decided against it: we thought that the ships would sail under our flag, and this flag guarantees their inviolability.” He admitted that "on the day when the atmosphere was extremely heated", he "expected every hour that they (the Americans) would take the ships." On the morning of October 24, two Soviet ships approached the blockade line, which ran 500 miles around Cuba, under the cover of a submarine. There was a risk of their collision with the American aircraft carrier Essex, which had helicopters to fight submarines. The US Secretary of War gave the order, if necessary, to attack the Soviet submarine with depth charges.

But President Kennedy did not succumb to pressure from the military. He contacted Khrushchev and urged the Soviet leader not to violate the blockade line, emphasizing that the US had no intention of opening fire on Soviet ships. Kennedy suggested that both sides "keep prudent and not allow events to complicate the situation and make it even more difficult to control it." And about. UN Secretary-General U Thant called for a halt to the transfer of weapons to Cuba. The well-known public figure and philosopher Bertrand Russell sent telegrams to Khrushchev, Kennedy, British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan and U Thant, persuading them to do everything to prevent war.

Khrushchev recalled spending a sleepless night in the Council of Ministers building in the Kremlin, waiting for breaking news. Initially, he was outraged by the actions of the United States, considering them a violation of international law. But, on reflection, he ordered to stop the ships going to Cuba. As Kennedy adviser Theodore Sorensen later claimed, this news caused a sigh of relief in the American crisis group.

The President of the United States replied to U Thant that he was ready to take the measures necessary to exclude contact between Soviet and American ships and thereby avoid the fatal consequences of a collision. Khrushchev, in response to the head of the UN, announced his agreement with his proposals.

The Soviet leader confirmed that he still did not recognize the American blockade, but suggested that Kennedy hold an urgent summit meeting. He agreed, but only after the removal of Soviet missiles. However, the USSR continued to install missiles and assemble bombers. Soviet ships stopped at the blockade line, some of them, at the direction of Khrushchev, were sent back. The Soviet leadership sent Deputy Prime Minister Anastas Mikoyan to Cuba; he was also to coordinate with the Cuban leaders. American planes continued to fly over Cuba and over the ocean, tracking Soviet submarines.

At the insistence of F. Castro, Soviet missilemen shot down an American U-2 reconnaissance aircraft; its pilot was killed. In Moscow, this news was met with disapproval, fearing that Kennedy "might not digest it." Khrushchev instructed the Soviet commander in Cuba to follow only instructions from the Kremlin and coordinate military measures with the Cuban army only in the event of an American invasion of the island.

In the US leadership, the message about the downed plane caused an outburst of indignation. On October 26, the President ordered preparations for the invasion of Cuba to begin. The number of American aircraft was increased several times. Public opinion and the US population were preparing for an imminent war. The bomb shelters were put on alert.

On October 26, the Soviet leadership showed the first signs of a desire for a compromise. In the evening, the head of the Soviet government sent a secret message to Kennedy. The main thing, he wrote, is to prevent escalation and uncontrolled development of events that could lead to war. Khrushchev emphasized that the blockade was pointless, all the missiles were already on the island, but would not be used to attack the United States. He called for the blockade of Cuba to be lifted and a commitment not to invade the island, promising in exchange to remove the missiles from Cuba. On the morning of October 27, he informed the American side of his additional condition: to withdraw US missiles from Turkey. He proposed that negotiations be held within two or three weeks on the entire range of problems.

The brother of the President of the United States, Attorney General Robert Kennedy, unofficially visited Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin. According to the memoirs of Khrushchev, who referred to the ambassador's report, the American minister "looked very tired, his eyes were red-red, it was clear that he had not slept at night, and he himself later said so. Robert Kennedy told Dobrynin that he had not been at home for six days, had not seen his children and wife, that he and the president were sitting in the White House and fighting over the issue of our missiles. He informed that John Kennedy was preparing a confidential appeal and asked the Soviet leader to accept his proposals. The situation is threatening, he added, the president will not be able to resist the pressure of the military and other supporters of the military solution to the conflict for a long time.

In a message to the Soviet leadership, John F. Kennedy said that his country was ready to lift the blockade and would not attack Cuba if the USSR took offensive missiles from the island under UN supervision. Unofficially, the US president informed the head of the Soviet government that later, after the missiles were withdrawn from Cuba, the Americans would dismantle their missiles in Turkey.

On October 27, the missile crisis came to a head. McNamara, then Secretary of Defense, later confessed to Burlatsky that he doubted that evening whether he would see the sun rise tomorrow. Former Soviet submariner Vadim Orlov admitted at a conference on the 40th anniversary of the events of 1962 that one of the four Soviet submarines off the coast of Cuba had nuclear torpedoes, and that on October 27 the boat was bombed by an American anti-submarine ship, and crew leaders discussed the possibility torpedo it. In the end, the idea was rejected by two of the three officers.

The leadership of the USSR weighed possible responses in the event of an American bombing of a base in Cuba. According to Burlatsky, they discussed such measures as striking an American base in Turkey, and actions against West Berlin. "But none of those options were seriously considered." It was clear that such a development of events could not be allowed, but it was necessary to "save face". The issue was discussed at a meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU. On behalf of Khrushchev, Burlatsky prepared a response that was supposed to prevent an American bombing attack. On its basis, the Soviet leader drew up the text of a statement on the readiness of the USSR to withdraw missiles and other weapons from Cuba, which the United States considered offensive. The application was to be approved by the Presidium of the Central Committee.

But at this time, F. Castro demanded decisive action from the USSR. He met with Soviet Ambassador Alekseev and said that, according to reports, on the morning of October 28, the Americans intended to bomb a missile base in Cuba. He suggested that the Soviet Union launch a preventive nuclear strike on the United States. The head of the department of socialist countries in the Central Committee of the CPSU, Yuri Andropov, reported this to Khrushchev.

“When they read this to us,” Khrushchev recalled, “we sat in silence and looked at each other for a long time. Then it became clear that Fidel completely misunderstood our goal, that the USSR did not plan to launch a nuclear strike on the United States from Cuban territory and deployed missiles only as a pressure factor. Finally, Khrushchev, according to Burlatsky, "calmly said that comrade Fidel Castro had lost his nerve, that we were having successful negotiations with the Americans and we were close to an agreement." The call of the Cuban leader was rejected. Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU Leonid Ilyichev hastily delivered Khrushchev's statement to the Radio Committee of the USSR, and it was broadcast by radio to the whole world. He was also sent personally to President Kennedy and U Thant.

It was a turning point in the history of the crisis. The readiness of the USSR to make concessions was confirmed by Khrushchev in a letter to Kennedy on October 28. He acknowledged that "a formidable weapon" was stationed in Cuba, but that deployment becomes unnecessary if the US says it has no intention of attacking Cuba. In other words, it was about the fact that the Soviet Union would withdraw missiles and other weapons (with the exception of conventional ones) if the American side assumed obligations not to invade the island. First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs V. Kuznetsov was sent to New York for negotiations at the UN.

The exchange of messages between Khrushchev and Kennedy and their agreement on the terms of the compromise were carried out in addition to F. Castro, who was informed about Soviet actions by Mikoyan. The Cuban leader met the decision of the USSR to withdraw the missiles with indignation. He considered the compromise reached a humiliation of the "socialist camp" and demanded additional guarantees from the United States. On October 28, Castro announced his conditions: the cessation of any subversive activities against Cuba by the United States and its allies, the cessation of attacks on Cuban territory from the territory of the United States and Puerto Rico, as well as incursions into the sea and airspace of the island, the cessation of American flights over Cuba, the evacuation the US base at Guantanamo Bay and the lifting of the US trade embargo. The Cuban leader stopped receiving the Soviet ambassador. China declared support for the Cuban position, sharply condemning the concessions of the USSR and calling them "betrayal." Mikoyan, sent back to Cuba in November, had difficulty persuading Castro not to obstruct the implementation of the agreement. Relations between the USSR and Cuba deteriorated for many months. They began to improve only after Castro's visit to the USSR and his meetings with Khrushchev in the spring of 1963.

At the end of October 1962, negotiations were held at the UN with the participation of representatives of the USSR, the USA, Cuba, and U Thant. The American side demanded that its observers be allowed into Cuban territory in order to control the withdrawal of missiles, but the Cuban leadership categorically refused.

Ultimately, as a result of the negotiations, the resolution of the crisis was officially announced. The United States abandoned any attempt to forcefully remove the Castro government, and Soviet missiles and Il-28 aircraft were withdrawn from Cuba during November (and American observers could inspect Soviet ships carrying military equipment). American warships also began to withdraw from the area around the island. On November 20, the United States announced the lifting of the blockade against Cuba. In addition, US missiles have been removed from Turkey and Italy. To this end, President Kennedy made an informal commitment and kept it.

The resolution of the 1962 missile crisis, during which humanity, as never before, came close to the threshold of nuclear war, contributed to a noticeable improvement in the international situation and a reduction in tension between the USSR and the USA. The prestige of Kennedy and Khrushchev in the world has grown, since they are now considered statesmen who proved capable of a reasonable compromise and did not allow a nuclear war. In 1963, they agreed to establish a direct "hot" telephone line for personal negotiations between the leaders of the two countries. The USSR and the USA signed an agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapons testing on earth, in space and under water, which laid the foundation for limiting the arms race. Plans to reduce the number of nuclear warheads on both sides began to be developed and discussed.

With the last salvos of the Second World War, the world turned out to be imaginary. Yes, from that moment guns did not rumble, clouds of planes did not roar in the sky, and tank columns did not roll along the streets of cities. It seemed that after such a destructive and devastating war as the Second World War became, in all countries and on all continents they would finally understand how dangerous political games could become. However, this did not happen. The world plunged into a new confrontation, even more dangerous and large-scale, which was later given a very subtle and capacious name - the Cold War.

The confrontation between the main political centers of influence in the world has moved from battlefields to a confrontation between ideologies and economics. An unprecedented arms race began, which gave rise to a nuclear confrontation between the warring parties. The foreign political situation has again heated up to the limit, each time threatening to escalate into an armed conflict on a planetary scale. The first sign was the Korean War, which broke out five years after the end of World War II. Even then, the US and the USSR began to measure their strength behind the scenes and unofficially, participating in the conflict to varying degrees. The next peak of the confrontation between the two superpowers was the Caribbean crisis of 1962 - the aggravation of the international political situation, which threatened to plunge the planet into a nuclear apocalypse.

The events that took place during this period clearly showed mankind how shaky and fragile the world can be. The atomic monopoly of the United States ended in 1949 when the USSR tested its own atomic bomb. The military-political confrontation between the two countries has reached a qualitatively new level. Nuclear bombs, strategic aircraft and missiles leveled the chances of both sides, making them equally vulnerable to a retaliatory nuclear strike. Realizing the full danger and consequences of the use of nuclear weapons, the opposing sides switched to outright nuclear blackmail.

Now both the US and the USSR tried to use their own nuclear arsenals as an instrument of pressure, seeking to achieve big dividends for themselves in the political arena. An indirect cause of the Caribbean crisis can be considered attempts at nuclear blackmail, which was resorted to by the leadership of both the United States and the Soviet Union. The Americans, having installed their medium-range nuclear missiles in Italy and Turkey, sought to put pressure on the USSR. The Soviet leadership, in response to these aggressive steps, tried to transfer the game to the field of their opponent by placing their own nuclear missiles at the side of the Americans. Cuba was chosen as the place for such a dangerous experiment, which in those days was in the center of attention of the whole world, becoming the key to Pandora's box.

The true causes of the crisis

Considering superficially the history of the most acute and bright period in the confrontation between the two world powers, various conclusions can be drawn. On the one hand, the events of 1962 showed how vulnerable human civilization is in the face of the threat of nuclear war. On the other hand, the whole world was shown how peaceful coexistence depends on the ambitions of a certain group of people, one or two people who make fatal decisions. Who did the right thing, who did not in this situation, time judged. The real confirmation of this is that we are now writing materials on this topic, analyzing the chronology of events, and studying the true causes of the Caribbean crisis.

The presence or coincidence of various factors brought the world in 1962 to the brink of disaster. Here it would be appropriate to focus on the following aspects:

• the presence of objective factors;
• the action of subjective factors;
• time frame;
• planned results and goals.

Each of the proposed points reveals not only the presence of certain physical and psychological factors, but also sheds light on the very essence of the conflict. A thorough analysis of the current situation in the world in October 1962 is necessary, since for the first time humanity really felt the threat of complete annihilation. Neither before nor after, not a single armed conflict or military-political confrontation had such high stakes.

The objective reasons that explain the main essence of the crisis that has arisen are the attempts of the leadership of the Soviet Union, headed by N.S. Khrushchev to find ways out of the dense ring of encirclement in which the entire Soviet bloc found itself in the early 1960s. By this time, the United States and its NATO allies had managed to concentrate powerful strike groups along the entire perimeter of the USSR. In addition to the strategic missiles stationed at missile bases in North America, the Americans had a rather large air fleet of strategic bombers.

In addition to all this, the US deployed in Western Europe and on the southern borders of the Soviet Union, a whole armada of intermediate and shorter range missiles. And this despite the fact that the United States, Great Britain and France taken together, in terms of the number of warheads and carriers, were many times superior to the USSR. It was the deployment of Jupiter medium-range missiles in Italy and Turkey that was the last straw for the Soviet leadership, which decided to make a similar attack on the enemy.

The nuclear missile power of the USSR at that time could not be called a real counterbalance to American nuclear power. The flight range of Soviet missiles was limited, and submarines capable of carrying only three R-13 ballistic missiles did not differ in high tactical and technical data. There was only one way to make the Americans feel that they, too, were under a nuclear sight, by placing Soviet ground-based nuclear missiles at their side. Even if the Soviet missiles were not distinguished by high flight characteristics and the relative small number of warheads, such a threat could have a sobering effect on the Americans.

In other words, the essence of the Caribbean crisis lies in the natural desire of the USSR to equalize the chances of a mutual nuclear threat with its potential adversaries. How this was done is another question. We can say that the result exceeded the expectations of both one and the other side.

Prerequisites for the conflict and the goals of the parties

The subjective factor that played the main role in this conflict is post-revolutionary Cuba. After the victory of the Cuban Revolution in 1959, Fidel Castro's regime followed in the wake of Soviet foreign policy, which greatly annoyed its mighty northern neighbor. After the failure to overthrow the revolutionary government in Cuba by force of arms, the Americans switched to a policy of economic and military pressure on the young regime. The US trade blockade against Cuba only accelerated the development of events that played into the hands of the Soviet leadership. Khrushchev, echoed by the military, gladly accepts Fidel Castro's proposal to send a Soviet military contingent to Liberty Island. In the strictest secrecy at the highest level, on May 21, 1962, a decision was made to send Soviet troops to Cuba, including missiles with nuclear warheads.

From that moment on, events begin to unfold at a rapid pace. Time limits are in effect. After the return of the Soviet military-diplomatic mission headed by Rashidov from the island of Freedom, the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU meets in the Kremlin on June 10. At this meeting, the Minister of Defense of the USSR for the first time announced and submitted for consideration a draft plan for the transfer of Soviet troops and nuclear ICBMs to Cuba. The operation was codenamed Anadyr.

Rashidov, the head of the Soviet delegation, and Rashidov, who had returned from a trip to Liberty Island, decided that the faster and more imperceptibly the entire operation to transfer Soviet missile units to Cuba was carried out, the more unexpected this step would be for the United States. On the other hand, the current situation will force both sides to look for a way out of the current situation. Beginning in June 1962, the military-political situation took a menacing turn, pushing both sides towards an inevitable military-political clash.

The last aspect to be taken into account when considering the cause of the Cuban crisis of 1962 is a realistic assessment of the goals and objectives pursued by each of the parties. The United States, under President Kennedy, was at the height of its economic and military power. The appearance of a state of socialist orientation at the side of the world hegemon caused tangible damage to America's reputation as a world leader, therefore, in this context, the desire of the Americans to destroy the first socialist state in the Western Hemisphere by force of military, economic and political pressure is quite understandable. The American President and most of the American establishment were extremely determined in achieving their goals. And this despite the fact that the risk of a direct military clash with the USSR in the White House was estimated very highly.

The Soviet Union, led by the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev, tried not to miss his chance by supporting the Castro regime in Cuba. The situation in which the young state found itself required the adoption of decisive measures and steps. The mosaic of world politics took shape in favor of the USSR. Using socialist Cuba, the USSR could create a threat to the territory of the United States, which, being overseas, considered themselves completely safe from Soviet missiles.

The Soviet leadership tried to squeeze the maximum out of the current situation. In addition, the Cuban government played in unison with the plans of the Soviets. You can not discount and personal factors. In the context of the intensified confrontation between the USSR and the USA over Cuba, the personal ambitions and charisma of the Soviet leader were clearly manifested. Khrushchev could go down in world history as a leader who dared to directly challenge a nuclear power. We should give credit to Khrushchev, he succeeded. Despite the fact that the world literally hung in the balance for two weeks, the parties managed to some extent achieve what they wanted.

The military component of the Caribbean crisis

The transfer of Soviet troops to Cuba, called Operation Anadyr, began at the end of June. Such an uncharacteristic name of the operation, which is associated with the delivery of secret cargo by sea to the southern latitudes, is explained by military-strategic plans. Loaded with troops, equipment and personnel, Soviet ships were to be sent to the North. The purpose of such a large-scale operation for the general public and foreign intelligence was banal and prosaic, providing economic cargo and personnel for settlements along the route of the Northern Sea Route.

Soviet ships left the ports of the Baltic, from Severomorsk and from the Black Sea, following their usual course to the north. Further, lost in high latitudes, they sharply changed course in the direction to the south, following the coast of Cuba. Such maneuvers were supposed to mislead not only the American fleet, which patrolled the entire North Atlantic, but also the American intelligence channels. It is important to note that the secrecy with which the operation was carried out gave a stunning effect. Careful camouflage of preparatory operations, transportation of missiles on ships and placement were carried out in complete secrecy from the Americans. In the same perspective, the equipment of launch positions and the deployment of missile divisions on the island took place.

Neither in the Soviet Union, nor in the United States, nor in any other country in the world, could anyone even imagine that in such a short time an entire missile army would be deployed under the noses of the Americans. The flights of American spy planes did not provide accurate information about what was really going on in Cuba. In total, until October 14, when Soviet ballistic missiles were photographed during the flight of the American U-2 reconnaissance aircraft, the Soviet Union transferred and deployed 40 R-12 and R-14 medium and intermediate range missiles on the island. In addition to everything, Soviet cruise missiles with nuclear warheads were deployed near the American naval base of Guantanamo Bay.

The photographs, which clearly showed the positions of Soviet missiles in Cuba, produced the effect of a bombshell. The news that the entire territory of the United States is now within the reach of Soviet nuclear missiles, the total equivalent of which was 70 megatons of TNT, shocked not only the highest echelons of the United States government, but also the bulk of the country's civilian population.

In total, 85 Soviet cargo ships took part in the Anadyr operation, which managed to covertly deliver not only missiles and launchers, but also a lot of other military and service equipment, service personnel and combatant army units. By October 1962, 40 thousand military contingents of the USSR Armed Forces were stationed in Cuba.

A game of nerves and a swift denouement

The reaction of the Americans to the situation was instantaneous. An Executive Committee was urgently created in the White House, headed by President John F. Kennedy. A variety of retaliatory options were considered, starting with a pinpoint strike on missile positions and ending with an armed invasion of American troops on the island. The most acceptable option was chosen - a complete naval blockade of Cuba and an ultimatum presented to the Soviet leadership. It should be noted that as early as September 27, 1962, Kennedy received carte blanche from Congress to use the armed forces to correct the situation in Cuba. The US President pursued a different strategy, tending to solve the problem through military-diplomatic means.

An open intervention could result in serious casualties among the personnel, and besides, no one denied the possible use by the Soviet Union of larger countermeasures. An interesting fact is that in none of the official conversations at the highest level, the USSR did not admit that there were Soviet offensive missile weapons in Cuba. In this light, the United States had no choice but to act on its own, thinking less about world prestige and more concerned about its own national security.

You can talk and discuss all the vicissitudes of negotiations, meetings and meetings of the UN Security Council for a long time, but today it becomes clear that the political games of the leadership of the USA and the USSR in October 1962 led humanity to a dead end. No one could guarantee that each next day of global confrontation would not be the last day of peace. The results of the Caribbean crisis were acceptable to both sides. In the course of the agreements reached, the Soviet Union removed the missiles from the island of Freedom. Three weeks later, the last Soviet missile left Cuba. Literally the next day, November 20, the United States lifted the naval blockade of the island. The following year, Jupiter missile systems were phased out in Turkey.

In this context, the personalities of Khrushchev and Kennedy deserve special attention. Both leaders were under constant pressure from their own advisers and the military, who were already ready to unleash the Third World War. However, both were smart enough not to follow the hawks of world politics. Here, the speed of reaction of both leaders in making important decisions, as well as the presence of common sense, played an important role. Within two weeks, the whole world clearly saw how quickly the world's established order can be turned into chaos.

Caribbean crisis- an extremely tense confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States regarding the deployment of nuclear missiles by the Soviet Union in Cuba in October 1962. The Cubans call it "October Crisis"(Spanish) Crisis de Octubre), in the United States the name is common "Cuban Missile Crisis"(English) Cubanmissilecrisis).

The crisis was preceded by the 1961 deployment by the United States in Turkey of medium-range Jupiter missiles that directly threatened cities in the western part of the Soviet Union, reaching as far as Moscow and major industrial centers.

The crisis began on October 14, 1962, when a U-2 reconnaissance aircraft of the US Air Force, during one of the regular overflights of Cuba, discovered Soviet R-12 medium-range missiles in the vicinity of the village of San Cristobal. By decision of US President John F. Kennedy, a special Executive Committee was created to discuss possible solutions to the problem. For some time, the meetings of the executive committee were secret, but on October 22, Kennedy addressed the people, announcing the presence of Soviet "offensive weapons" in Cuba, which immediately began to panic in the United States. A "quarantine" (blockade) of Cuba was introduced.

At first, the Soviet side denied the presence of Soviet nuclear weapons on the island, then assured the Americans of the deterrent nature of the deployment of missiles in Cuba. On October 25, photographs of the missiles were shown at a meeting of the UN Security Council. The executive committee seriously discussed the use of force to solve the problem, and his supporters convinced Kennedy to start a massive bombardment of Cuba as soon as possible. However, another overflight of U-2 showed that several missiles were already installed and ready for launch, and that such actions would inevitably lead to war.

US President John F. Kennedy offered the Soviet Union to dismantle the installed missiles and deploy ships still heading towards Cuba in exchange for US guarantees not to attack Cuba and overthrow the Fidel Castro regime (it is sometimes stated that Kennedy also offered to withdraw American missiles from Turkey, but this demand came from the Soviet leadership). Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and First Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU Nikita Khrushchev agreed, and on October 28, the dismantling of missiles began. The last Soviet missile left Cuba a few weeks later, and on November 20 the blockade of Cuba was lifted.

The Cuban Missile Crisis lasted 13 days. It had an extremely important psychological and historical significance. Humanity for the first time in its history was on the verge of self-destruction. The resolution of the crisis marked a turning point in the Cold War and the beginning of international détente.

background

Cuban Revolution

During the Cold War, the confrontation between the two superpowers, the USSR and the USA, was expressed not only in a direct military threat and an arms race, but also in a desire to expand their zones of influence. The Soviet Union sought to organize and support liberation socialist revolutions in different parts of the world. In pro-Western countries, support was provided for the "people's liberation movement", sometimes even with weapons and people. In the event of the victory of the revolution, the country became a member of the socialist camp, military bases were built there, and significant resources were invested there. Aid from the Soviet Union was often gratuitous, which caused additional sympathy for him on the part of the poorest countries in Africa and Latin America.

The United States, in turn, followed a similar tactic, staging revolutions to establish democracy and supporting pro-American regimes. Initially, the preponderance of forces was on the side of the United States - they were supported by Western Europe, Turkey, some Asian and African countries, such as South Africa.

Immediately after the revolution in Cuba in 1959, its leader Fidel Castro did not have close relations with the Soviet Union. During his fight against the regime of Fulgencio Batista in the 1950s, Castro approached Moscow several times for military assistance, but was refused. Moscow was skeptical about the leader of the Cuban revolutionaries and about the very prospects of a revolution in Cuba, believing that the influence of the United States was too great there. Fidel made his first foreign visit after the victory of the revolution to the United States, but President Eisenhower refused to meet him, citing his busy schedule. After this demonstration of an arrogant attitude towards Cuba, F. Castro carried out measures directed against the dominance of the Americans. Thus, the telephone and electric companies, oil refineries, 36 largest sugar factories owned by US citizens were nationalized; the former owners were offered the corresponding packages of securities. All branches of North American banks owned by US citizens were also nationalized. In response, the United States stopped supplying oil to Cuba and buying its sugar, although a long-term purchase agreement was in effect. Such steps put Cuba in a very difficult position. By that time, the Cuban government had already established diplomatic relations with the USSR, and it turned to Moscow for help. In response to a request, the USSR sent tankers with oil and organized the purchase of Cuban sugar.

It can be considered that Cuba was the first country to choose the communist path without significant military or political interference from the USSR. In this capacity, she was deeply symbolic to Soviet leaders, especially to Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev, who considered the defense of the island critical to the international reputation of the USSR and communist ideology.

Khrushchev probably believed that deploying missiles in Cuba would protect the island from another American invasion, which he considered inevitable after the failed landing attempt in the Bay of Pigs. The militarily significant deployment of a critical weapon in Cuba would also demonstrate the importance of the Soviet-Cuban alliance to Fidel Castro, who demanded material confirmation of Soviet support for the island.

US missile positions in Turkey

By 1960, the US had a significant advantage in strategic nuclear forces. For comparison: the Americans were armed with about 6,000 warheads, while the USSR had only about 300. By 1962, the United States was armed with more than 1,300 bombers capable of delivering about 3,000 nuclear charges to the USSR. In addition, the US was armed with 183 Atlas and Titan ICBMs and 144 Polaris missiles on nine George Washington and Ethen Allen nuclear submarines. The Soviet Union was able to deliver about 300 warheads to the United States, mainly with the help of strategic aviation and R-7 and R-16 ICBMs, which had a low degree of combat readiness and the high cost of creating launch complexes, which did not allow for large-scale deployment of these systems.

In 1961, the United States began deploying 15 PGM-19 Jupiter medium-range missiles with a range of 2,400 km near Izmir in Turkey, which directly threatened the European part of the Soviet Union, reaching Moscow. President Kennedy considered the strategic value of these missiles to be limited, since submarines armed with ballistic missiles could cover the same area with the advantage of stealth and firepower. Nevertheless, in the late 1950s, intermediate-range missiles were technologically superior to intercontinental ballistic missiles, which at that time could not be constantly on alert. Another advantage of medium-range missiles is their short flight time - less than 10 minutes.

Soviet strategists realized that some nuclear parity could be effectively achieved by deploying missiles in Cuba. Soviet medium-range missiles on Cuban territory, with a range of up to 4,000 km (P-14), could keep Washington and about half of the air bases of strategic nuclear bombers of the US Strategic Air Force at gunpoint, with a flight time of less than 20 minutes. In addition, the radars of the US early warning system were directed towards the USSR and were little adapted to detecting launches from Cuba.

The head of the Soviet Union, Khrushchev, publicly expressed his indignation at the fact of the deployment of missiles in Turkey. He considered these rockets a personal affront. The deployment of missiles in Cuba - the first time that Soviet missiles left the territory of the USSR - is considered Khrushchev's direct response to American missiles in Turkey. In his memoirs, Khrushchev writes that the first time the idea to deploy missiles in Cuba came to him in 1962, when he led a delegation of the Soviet Union visiting Bulgaria at the invitation of the Bulgarian Central Committee of the Communist Party and the government. There, one of his associates, pointing towards the Black Sea, said that on the opposite coast, in Turkey, there were missiles capable of striking the main industrial centers of the USSR within 15 minutes.

Placement of missiles

Khrushchev's proposal

On May 20, 1962, Nikita Khrushchev, immediately after returning from Bulgaria, had a conversation in the Kremlin with Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, Anastas Mikoyan and Defense Minister Rodion Malinovsky, during which he outlined his idea to them: in response to Fidel Castro's constant requests to increase Soviet military presence in Cuba to place nuclear weapons on the island. On May 21, at a meeting of the Defense Council, he raised this issue for discussion. Most of all Mikoyan was against such a decision, however, in the end, members of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU, who were members of the Defense Council, supported Khrushchev. The ministries of defense and foreign affairs were instructed to organize the covert movement of troops and military equipment by sea to Cuba. Due to the special haste, the plan was adopted without approval - implementation began immediately after obtaining Castro's consent.

On May 28, a Soviet delegation flew from Moscow to Havana, consisting of the USSR Ambassador Alekseev, Commander-in-Chief of the Strategic Missile Forces Marshal Sergei Biryuzov, Colonel General Semyon Pavlovich Ivanov, and Sharaf Rashidov. On May 29, they met with Raul and Fidel Castro and presented to them the proposal of the Central Committee of the CPSU. Fidel asked for a day to negotiate with his closest associates. It is known that on May 30 he had a conversation with Ernesto Che Guevara, but nothing is known about the essence of this conversation. On the same day, Castro gave a positive answer to the Soviet delegates. It was decided that Raul Castro would visit Moscow in July to clarify all the details.

The composition of the contingent

On June 10, at a meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee, the results of the trip of the Soviet delegation to Cuba were discussed. After Rashidov's report, Malinovsky presented to everyone a preliminary draft of the missile transfer operation prepared at the General Staff. The plan envisaged the deployment of two types of ballistic missiles in Cuba - R-12 with a range of about 2000 km and R-14 with a range twice that. Both types of missiles were equipped with 1 Mt nuclear warheads. Malinovsky also specified that the armed forces will deploy 24 R-12 medium-range missiles and 16 R-14 intermediate-range missiles and leave half of the number of missiles of each type in reserve. It was supposed to remove 40 missiles from positions in Ukraine and in the European part of Russia. After the installation of these missiles in Cuba, the number of Soviet nuclear missiles capable of reaching US territory doubled.

It was supposed to send a group of Soviet troops to Liberty Island, which should concentrate around five divisions of nuclear missiles (three R-12s and two R-14s). In addition to missiles, the group also included 1 Mi-4 helicopter regiment, 4 motorized rifle regiments, two tank battalions, a MiG-21 squadron, 42 Il-28 light bombers, 2 units of cruise missiles with 12 Kt nuclear warheads with a range of 160 km, several batteries of anti-aircraft guns, as well as 12 S-75 installations (144 missiles). Each motorized rifle regiment consisted of 2,500 men, and the tank battalions were equipped with the latest T-55 tanks. It is worth noting that the Group of Soviet Forces in Cuba (GSVK) became the first army group in the history of the USSR, which included ballistic missiles.

In addition, an impressive grouping of the Navy was sent to Cuba: 2 cruisers, 4 destroyers, 12 Komar missile boats, 11 submarines (7 of them with nuclear missiles). In total, 50,874 military personnel were planned to be sent to the island. Later, on July 7, Khrushchev decided to appoint Issa Pliev as commander of the group.

After listening to Malinovsky's report, the Presidium of the Central Committee voted unanimously in favor of carrying out the operation.

"Anadyr"

By June 1962, the General Staff had already developed a cover operation, codenamed Anadyr. Marshal of the USSR Ovane's Khachaturovich Bagramyan planned and directed the operation. According to the drafters of the plan, this was to mislead the Americans about the destination of the cargo. All Soviet servicemen, technical personnel and others accompanying the "cargo" were also told that they were heading for Chukotka. For greater reliability, whole wagons of fur coats and sheepskin coats came to the ports. But despite such a large-scale cover, the operation had one significant flaw: it was impossible to hide the missiles from the American U-2 reconnaissance aircraft regularly flying around Cuba. Thus, the plan was developed in advance, taking into account the fact that the Americans would detect Soviet missiles before they were all mounted. The only way out that the military managed to find was to place several anti-aircraft batteries already in Cuba at the places of unloading.

Missiles and other equipment, as well as personnel, were delivered to six different ports from Severomorsk to Sevastopol. 85 ships were allocated for the transfer of troops. Not a single captain knew about the contents of the holds before sailing, as well as about the destination. Each captain was given a sealed package, which was to be opened at sea in the presence of the political officer. The envelopes contained instructions to go to Cuba and avoid contact with NATO ships.

In early August, the first ships arrived in Cuba. On the night of September 8, the first batch of medium-range ballistic missiles was unloaded in Havana, the second batch arrived on September 16. The headquarters of the GSVK is located in Havana. Battalions of ballistic missiles deployed in the west of the island - near the village of San Cristobal and in the center of Cuba - near the port of Casilda. The main troops were concentrated around the missiles in the western part of the island, but several cruise missiles and a motorized rifle regiment were transferred to the east of Cuba - a hundred kilometers from Guantanamo Bay and the US naval base in Guantanamo Bay. By October 14, 1962, all 40 missiles and most of the equipment had been delivered to Cuba.

U-2 flights

A U-2 flying out in late August photographed a number of anti-aircraft missile sites under construction, but on September 4, 1962, Kennedy told Congress that there were no "offensive" missiles in Cuba. In fact, at that time, Soviet specialists were already building nine positions - six for the R-12 and three for the R-14 with a range of 4,000 km. Until September 1962, US Air Force planes flew over Cuba twice a month. Flights were suspended from September 5 to October 14. On the one hand, because of bad weather, on the other hand, Kennedy banned them for fear of escalating the conflict if an American plane was shot down by a Soviet anti-aircraft missile.

It is worth noting that until September 5, the flights were carried out with the knowledge of the CIA. Now such flights have come under the control of the Air Force. The first flight took place on October 14, 1962. A Lockheed U-2 reconnaissance aircraft of the 4080th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing, piloted by Major Richard Heizer, took off at about 3 am from Edwards Air Force Base in California. An hour after sunrise, Heizer reached Cuba. The flight to the Gulf of Mexico took him 5 hours. Heizer circled Cuba from the west and crossed the coastline from the south at 7:31 am. The plane crossed the whole of Cuba almost exactly from south to north, flying over the cities of Taco-Taco, San Cristobal, Bahia Honda. Heizer covered these 52 kilometers in 12 minutes.

Landing at an air base in south Florida, Heizer handed the film to the CIA. On October 15, CIA analysts determined that the photographs were of Soviet R-12 medium-range ballistic missiles ("SS-4" according to NATO classification). In the evening of the same day, this information was brought to the attention of the top military leadership of the United States. On the morning of October 16 at 8:45 a.m., the photographs were shown to the President. After that, on the orders of Kennedy, flights over Cuba became 90 times more frequent: from two times a month to six times a day.

US reaction

Developing a response

After receiving photographs showing Soviet missile bases in Cuba, President Kennedy called a special group of advisers to a secret meeting at the White House. This 14-member group, later known as the "Executive Committee" (EXCOMM), consisted of members of the US National Security Council and several specially invited advisers. Soon, the committee offered the president three possible options for resolving the situation: destroy the missiles with pinpoint strikes, conduct a full-scale military operation in Cuba, or impose a naval blockade of the island.

An immediate bombing attack was rejected out of the blue, as was an appeal to the UN that promised a long delay. The real options considered by the committee were only military measures. Diplomatic, barely touched upon on the first day of the work, were immediately rejected - even before the main discussion began. As a result, the choice was reduced to a naval blockade and an ultimatum, or to a full-scale invasion.

Chief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) General Maxwell Taylor and head of the Air Force Strategic Command (SAC) General Curtis LeMay. CurtisLeMay) proposed to launch an invasion. In their opinion, the Soviet Union would not have dared to take serious countermeasures. In preparation for the invasion, the transfer of troops to Florida began. The military urged the president to order the invasion because they feared that by the time the USSR had installed all the missiles, it would be too late. It is worth noting, however, that the CIA intelligence data on the number of Soviet troops in Cuba by that time were already significantly lower than the real ones. The Americans were also unaware of the twelve Luna tactical nuclear missile systems already on the island, which could have been activated by order of General Pliev, commander of the Soviet forces on the island. An invasion could result in a nuclear attack on the American landing force, with catastrophic consequences.

Either way, the idea of ​​an invasion was criticized by the president. Kennedy feared that "even if Soviet troops did not take active action in Cuba, the answer would follow in Berlin", which would escalate the conflict. Therefore, at the suggestion of Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, it was decided to consider the possibility of a naval blockade of Cuba.

On October 18, the US President was visited by USSR Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, along with the USSR Ambassador to the United States, Anatoly Dobrynin, who knew nothing about Khrushchev's plans. Gromyko categorically denied the existence of any offensive weapons in Cuba. But the next day, another U-2 flight revealed more mounted missile sites, a squadron of Ilyushin Il-28s off the northern coast of Cuba, and a battalion of cruise missiles aimed at Florida.

The decision to impose a blockade was made at the final vote on the evening of October 20: President Kennedy himself, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, and US Ambassador to the UN Adlai Stevenson, who was specially summoned from New York for this purpose, voted for the blockade.

However, under international law, a blockade is an act of war. In this regard, when discussing this option, concerns arose about the reaction not only of the Soviet Union, but of the world community. Therefore, the decision to impose a blockade was submitted for discussion by the Organization of American States (OAS). Based on the Rio Pact, the OAS unanimously supported the imposition of sanctions against Cuba. The action was called not a "blockade", but a "quarantine", which meant not a complete cessation of maritime traffic, but only an obstacle to the supply of weapons. It was decided to introduce quarantine on October 24 from 10 am local time.

Meanwhile, by 19 October, U-2 survey data showed four completed launch positions. Therefore, in addition to the blockade, the US military command began preparations for a possible invasion on the first signal. The 1st Panzer Division was transferred to the south of the country, in the state of Georgia, and five combined arms divisions were put on high alert.

Air Force Strategic Command has relocated B-47 Stratojet medium-range bombers to civilian airports and put the fleet of B-52 Stratofortress strategic bombers on permanent patrol.

Quarantine

There were many problems with the naval blockade. There was a question of legality - as Fidel Castro noted, there was nothing illegal in the installation of rockets. They were, of course, a threat to the US, but similar missiles were stationed in Europe aimed at the USSR: sixty Thor missiles in four squadrons near Nottingham in the UK; thirty medium-range Jupiter rockets in two squadrons near Gioia del Colle in Italy; and fifteen Jupiter missiles in one squadron near Izmir in Turkey. Then there was the problem of the Soviet reaction to the blockade - would an armed conflict begin with an escalation of response?

President Kennedy addressed the American public (and the Soviet government) in a televised speech on October 22. He confirmed the presence of missiles in Cuba and declared a naval blockade of 500 nautical miles (926 km) of quarantine around the coast of Cuba, warning that the armed forces were "ready for any eventuality" and condemning the Soviet Union for "secrecy and misleading". Kennedy noted that any missile launch from Cuban territory against any of the American allies in the Western Hemisphere would be regarded as an act of war against the United States.

The Americans were surprised by the firm support from their European allies, although British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, speaking for much of the international community, expressed bewilderment that no attempt had been made to resolve the conflict diplomatically. The Organization of American States also voted unanimously in favor of a resolution in support of the lockdown. Nikita Khrushchev declared that the blockade was illegal and that any ship under the Soviet flag would ignore it. He threatened that if the Soviet ships were attacked by the Americans, a retaliatory strike would follow immediately.

However, the blockade went into effect on 24 October at 10:00 am. 180 ships of the US Navy surrounded Cuba with clear orders not to open fire on Soviet ships in any case without a personal order from the president. By this time, 30 ships and vessels were going to Cuba, including Aleksandrovsk with a cargo of nuclear warheads and 4 ships carrying missiles for two IRBM divisions. In addition, 4 diesel submarines were approaching the Island of Freedom, accompanying the ships. On board the "Alexandrovsk" were 24 warheads for the IRBM and 44 for cruise missiles. Khrushchev decided that the submarines and four ships with R-14 missiles - Artemyevsk, Nikolaev, Dubna and Divnogorsk - should continue on their previous course. In an effort to minimize the possibility of a collision of Soviet ships with American ones, the Soviet leadership decided to deploy the rest of the ships that did not have time to reach Cuba home.

At the same time, the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU decided to put the armed forces of the USSR and the Warsaw Pact countries on high alert. All layoffs have been cancelled. Conscripts preparing for demobilization are ordered to remain at their duty stations until further notice. Khrushchev sent an encouraging letter to Castro, assuring him of the unshakable position of the USSR under any circumstances. However, he did not mention that a significant part of the Soviet weapons would no longer reach Cuba.

Aggravation of the crisis

On the evening of October 23, Robert Kennedy went to the Soviet embassy in Washington. At a meeting with Dobrynin, Kennedy found out that he had no idea about the military preparations of the USSR in Cuba. However, Dobrynin informed him that he knew about the instructions received by the captains of the Soviet ships - not to comply with illegal requirements on the high seas. Before leaving, Kennedy said, "I don't know how this will all end, but we intend to stop your ships."

On October 24, Khrushchev learned that Aleksandrovsk had reached Cuba safely. At the same time, he received a short telegram from Kennedy, in which he called on Khrushchev to "show prudence" and "observe the conditions of the blockade." The Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU gathered for a meeting to discuss the official response to the introduction of the blockade. On the same day, Khrushchev sent a letter to the US President, in which he accused him of setting "ultimatum conditions." Khrushchev called the blockade "an act of aggression pushing humanity towards the abyss of a world nuclear missile war." In a letter, the First Secretary warned Kennedy that "the captains of Soviet ships will not comply with the orders of the American Navy" and that "if the United States does not stop its piracy, the government of the USSR will take any measures to ensure the safety of the ships."

On October 25, one of the most memorable scenes in the history of the UN played out at an emergency meeting of the UN Security Council. U.S. Ambassador Adlai Stevenson attempted to get Soviet Ambassador Valerian Zorin (who, like most Soviet diplomats, was unaware of Operation Anadyr) to respond regarding the presence of missiles in Cuba, with the famous demand: "Don't wait to be transferred!" Refused by Zorin, Stevenson showed photographs taken by US reconnaissance aircraft showing missile positions in Cuba.

At the same time, Kennedy gave the order to increase the combat readiness of the US military to the level of DEFCON-2 (the first and only time in US history).

Meanwhile, in response to Khrushchev's message, the Kremlin received a letter from Kennedy, in which he stated that "the Soviet side broke its promises regarding Cuba and misled him." This time, Khrushchev decided not to go for a confrontation and began to look for possible ways out of the current situation. He announced to the members of the Presidium that "it is impossible to store missiles in Cuba without going to war with the United States." At the meeting, it was decided to offer the Americans to dismantle the missiles in exchange for US guarantees to stop trying to change the state regime in Cuba. Brezhnev, Kosygin, Kozlov, Mikoyan, Ponomarev and Suslov supported Khrushchev. Gromyko and Malinovsky abstained from voting. After the meeting, Khrushchev suddenly turned to the members of the Presidium: “Comrades, let's go to the Bolshoi Theater in the evening. Our people and foreigners will see us, maybe this will calm them down.

Khrushchev's second letter

On the morning of October 26, Nikita Khrushchev began to compose a new, less militant message from Kennedy. In a letter, he offered the Americans the option of dismantling the installed missiles and returning them to the USSR. In exchange, he demanded guarantees that "the United States will not invade Cuba with its troops and will not support any other forces that would intend to invade Cuba." He ended the letter with the famous phrase "You and I should not now pull the ends of the rope on which you tied the knot of war."

Khrushchev wrote this letter alone, without gathering the Presidium. Later, in Washington, there was a version that Khrushchev did not write the second letter, and that a coup d'état might have taken place in the USSR. Others believed that Khrushchev, on the contrary, was looking for help in the fight against hardliners in the ranks of the leadership of the Soviet Armed Forces. The letter arrived at the White House at 10 am. Another condition was conveyed in an open radio address on the morning of October 27, calling for the withdrawal of American missiles from Turkey, in addition to the requirements specified in the letter.

Secret negotiations

On Friday, October 26, at 13:00 Washington time, a message was received from ABC News reporter John Scali that he had been approached with a meeting proposal by Alexander Fomin, the KGB resident in Washington. The meeting took place at the Ocsidental restaurant. Fomin expressed concern about the escalating tensions and suggested that Scali approach his "high-ranking friends in the State Department" with a proposal to find a diplomatic solution. Fomin conveyed an unofficial offer from the Soviet leadership to remove the missiles from Cuba in exchange for refusing to invade Cuba.

The American leadership responded to this proposal by conveying to Fidel Castro through the Brazilian embassy that in the event of the withdrawal of offensive weapons from Cuba, "an invasion would be unlikely."

Balance of power at the time of the crisis - USA

At the time of the crisis, the US had the largest nuclear and conventional arsenal and numerous delivery vehicles.

It was based on the US-based SM-65 Atlas intercontinental ballistic missiles. In 1962, there were 144 such ICBMs carrying 4-megaton W38 warheads. Also available were 62 SM-68 Titan-I ICBMs.

The arsenal of ICBMs was supplemented by the PGM-19 Jupiter IRBM, with a radius of 2400 km. 30 of these missiles were deployed in northern Italy and 15 in Turkey. Also, 60 PGM-17 Thor missiles were deployed in the UK, with similar characteristics.

The basis of the offensive power of the Air Force, in addition to ICBMs, was a huge fleet of strategic bombers - more than 800 B-52 and B-36 intercontinental bombers, over 2500 B-47 strategic bombers and about 150 supersonic B-58s.

To equip them, there was an arsenal of more than 547 AGM-28 Hound Dog supersonic missiles with a radius of up to 1200 km and free-falling nuclear bombs. US Air Force positions in Northern Canada and Greenland allowed for transpolar attacks against deep Soviet rear areas with minimal Soviet opposition.

The Navy had 8 SSBNs with Polaris missiles with a radius of 2000 km and 11 strike aircraft carriers, including the nuclear-powered Enterprise, capable of carrying A-3 strategic nuclear bombers. Also available were SSGNs with Regulus missiles.

The balance of power at the time of the crisis - the USSR

The nuclear arsenal of the USSR was much more modest than the American one. It was based on R-7 missiles, intercontinental, but very imperfect, with a long preparation time and low reliability. There were only 4 starting devices in Plesetsk suitable for a combat launch.

Also, about 25 R-16 missiles, more combat-ready, were put into service. In fact, they formed the basis of the strategic strike forces of the USSR.

In Eastern Europe, there were also about 40 R-21 missiles and 20 medium-range R-12 missiles aimed at industrial centers and ports in Great Britain and France.

The strategic air forces of the USSR were much weaker than the US air force. They were based on about 100 3M and M4 intercontinental bombers, about 1000 Tu-16 strategic bombers. They were armed with cruise missiles with a radius of up to 700 km. The Soviet Navy included Project 658 SSBNs armed with surface-launched 650 km missiles, and Project 611 and Project 629 SSBNs, totaling about 25. These submarines were less advanced than American counterparts, were quite noisy and had surface-launched missiles, which exposed them unmasking.

black saturday

Meanwhile, in Havana, the political situation has heated up to the limit. Castro became aware of the new position of the Soviet Union, and he immediately went to the Soviet embassy. Comandante decided to write a letter to Khrushchev to push him to take more decisive action. Even before Castro had finished the letter and sent it to the Kremlin, the head of the KGB station in Havana informed the First Secretary of the essence of Comandante's message: "According to Fidel Castro, intervention is almost inevitable and will take place in the next 24-72 hours." At the same time, Malinovsky received a report from the commander of the Soviet troops in Cuba, General I. A. Pliev, about the increased activity of American strategic aviation in the Caribbean. Both messages were delivered to Khrushchev's office in the Kremlin at 12 noon, Saturday, October 27th.

It was 5 pm in Moscow when a tropical storm raged in Cuba. One of the air defense units received a message that an American U-2 reconnaissance aircraft was seen approaching Guantanamo Bay. The chief of staff of the S-75 anti-aircraft missile division, Captain Antonets, called Pliev's headquarters for instructions, but he was not there. Major General Leonid Garbuz, deputy commander of the GSVK for combat training, ordered the captain to wait for Pliev to appear. A few minutes later, Antonets called the headquarters again - no one picked up the phone.

When U-2 was already over Cuba, Garbuz himself ran to the headquarters and, without waiting for Pliev, gave the order to destroy the plane. According to other sources, the order to destroy the reconnaissance aircraft could have been given by Pliev's deputy for air defense, Lieutenant General of Aviation Stepan Grechko, or the commander of the 27th Air Defense Division, Colonel Georgy Voronkov. The launch took place at 10:22 local time. U-2 pilot Major Rudolf Anderson died, becoming the only casualty of the confrontation. Around the same time, another U-2 was almost intercepted over Siberia, as General Curtis LeMay, Chief of Staff of the US Air Force, defied an order from the US President to stop all flights over Soviet territory. A few hours later, two US Navy RF-8A Crusader photographic reconnaissance aircraft were fired upon by anti-aircraft guns while flying over Cuba at low altitude. One of them was damaged, but the pair returned safely to base.

Kennedy's military advisers tried to persuade the president to order an invasion of Cuba before Monday, "before it was too late." Kennedy no longer categorically rejected such a development of the situation. However, he did not leave hope for a peaceful resolution. It is generally accepted that "Black Saturday", October 27, 1962, is the day when the world was closest to a global nuclear war.

Permission

On the night of October 27-28, on the instructions of the President, Robert Kennedy again met with the Soviet ambassador in the building of the Ministry of Justice. Kennedy shared with Dobrynin the president's fears that "the situation is about to get out of hand and threaten to give rise to a chain reaction." Robert Kennedy said that his brother was ready to give guarantees of non-aggression and the speedy lifting of the blockade from Cuba. Dobrynin asked Kennedy about the missiles in Turkey. "If this is the only obstacle to reaching the settlement mentioned above, then the president sees no insurmountable difficulties in resolving the issue," Kennedy replied.

The next morning, a message came to the Kremlin from Kennedy stating: “1) You agree to withdraw your weapons systems from Cuba under the appropriate supervision of UN representatives, and also take steps, subject to appropriate security measures, to stop the supply of such weapons systems to Cuba. 2) We, for our part, will agree - provided that a system of adequate measures is created with the help of the UN to ensure the fulfillment of these obligations - a) quickly lift the blockade measures introduced at the moment and b) give guarantees of non-aggression against Cuba. I am sure that other states of the Western Hemisphere will be ready to do the same.” Not a word was said about Jupiter missiles in Turkey.

At noon, Khrushchev gathered the Presidium at his dacha in Novo-Ogaryovo. At the meeting, a letter from Washington was being discussed, when a man entered the hall and asked Khrushchev's assistant Oleg Troyanovsky to answer the phone: Dobrynin was calling from Washington. He conveyed to Troyanovsky the essence of his conversation with Robert Kennedy and expressed his fear that the US President was under strong pressure from Pentagon officials. Dobrynin transmitted word for word the words of the brother of the President of the United States: “We must receive an answer from the Kremlin today, on Sunday. There is very little time left to resolve the problem.” Troyanovsky returned to the hall and read out to the audience what he managed to write down in his notebook while listening to Dobrynin's report. Khrushchev immediately invited the stenographer and began to dictate consent. He also dictated two confidential letters personally to Kennedy. In one, he confirmed the fact that Robert Kennedy's message reached Moscow. In the second, that he regards this message as an agreement to the USSR's condition for the withdrawal of Soviet missiles from Cuba - to remove missiles from Turkey.

Fearing any "surprises" and disruption of negotiations, Khrushchev forbade Pliev to use anti-aircraft weapons against American aircraft. He also ordered the return to airfields of all Soviet aircraft patrolling the Caribbean. For greater certainty, it was decided to broadcast the first letter on the radio so that it would reach Washington as soon as possible. An hour before the broadcast of Nikita Khrushchev's message (16:00 Moscow time), Malinovsky sent an order to Pliev to begin dismantling the R-12 launch pads.

The dismantling of Soviet rocket launchers, their loading onto ships and their withdrawal from Cuba took 3 weeks. Convinced that the Soviet Union had removed the missiles, President Kennedy on November 20 gave the order to end the blockade of Cuba. A few months later, American missiles were also withdrawn from Turkey, as "obsolete."

Effects

The peaceful resolution of the crisis did not satisfy everyone. It became a diplomatic embarrassment for Khrushchev and the Soviet Union, who seemed to be backing down on a situation they themselves had created. Khrushchev's removal a few years later can be partly attributed to irritation in the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU regarding concessions to the United States made by Khrushchev and his inept leadership that led to the crisis.

The Cuban communist leadership regarded the compromise as a betrayal by the Soviet Union, since the decision that ended the crisis was made solely by Khrushchev and Kennedy.

Some US military leaders were also dissatisfied with the result. Thus, the commander of the US Air Force, General LeMay, called the refusal to attack Cuba "the worst defeat in our history."

At the end of the crisis, analysts from the Soviet and American intelligence agencies proposed establishing a direct telephone line between Washington and Moscow (the so-called "red telephone"), so that in case of crisis, the leaders of the superpowers would be able to immediately contact each other, and not use the telegraph.

Historical meaning

The crisis was a turning point in the nuclear race and the Cold War. The beginning of international detente was laid. In Western countries, an anti-war movement began, which peaked in the 1960s-1970s. In the USSR, voices also began to be heard calling for limiting the nuclear arms race and strengthening the role of society in political decision-making.

It is impossible to state unequivocally whether the removal of missiles from Cuba was a victory or defeat for the Soviet Union. On the one hand, the plan conceived by Khrushchev in May 1962 was not carried through to the end, and Soviet missiles could no longer ensure the security of Cuba. On the other hand, Khrushchev obtained from the US leadership guarantees of non-aggression on Cuba, which, despite Castro's fears, were observed and are observed to this day. A few months later, the American missiles in Turkey, which had provoked Khrushchev into placing weapons in Cuba, were also dismantled. In the end, thanks to technological progress in rocket science, there was no need to deploy nuclear weapons in Cuba and in the Western Hemisphere in general, since a few years later the Soviet Union created missiles capable of reaching any city and military facility in the United States directly from the territory of the USSR.

Epilogue

In 1992, it was confirmed that by the time the crisis broke out, Soviet units in Cuba had received nuclear warheads for tactical and strategic missiles, as well as nuclear bombs for Il-28 medium-range bombers, totaling 162 units. General Gribkov, who participated in the work of the Soviet headquarters of the operation, said that the commander of the Soviet units in Cuba, General Pliev, had the authority to use them in the event of a full-scale US invasion of Cuba.

The short duration of the Cuban Missile Crisis and the extensive documentation of both sides' decision-making make it an excellent case study for the analysis of government decision-making processes. In The Essence of the Solution by Graham Allison and Phillip Zelikow. PhilipD.Zelikow) use the crisis to illustrate different approaches to the analysis of the actions of the state. The intensity and scope of the crisis also provides excellent material for drama, as illustrated by the film "Thirteen Days" by the American director R. Donaldson. The Cuban Missile Crisis was also one of the main themes of the 2003 Oscar-winning documentary The Fog of War: Eleven Lessons from the Life of Robert S. McNamara.

In October 2002, McNamara and Arthur Schlesinger, along with other guests of honor, participated in a meeting with Castro in Cuba to further investigate the crisis and release declassified documents. At this conference, it became clear that the world was much closer to a nuclear confrontation than previously thought. So, it is possible that only the common sense of the senior assistant to the captain of the Soviet submarine B-59 (project 641) Vasily Arkhipov prevented a full-scale conflict.

Caribbean crisis in art

• Thirteen Days is a film by Roger Donaldson. RogerDonaldson) (2000)
• "Fog of War" The Fog of War: Eleven Lessons from the Life of Robert S. McNamara) is a film by Eroll Maurice. Errol Morris) (2003).
• ((In 2004 the Japanese firm Konami released a cult video game set against the backdrop of the Cuban Missile Crisis*))

The Caribbean Crisis is a critical level confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union over the Soviet deployment of nuclear missiles in Cuba in October 1962. It is called the "October Crisis" by the Cuban people, and the "Cuban Missile Crisis" by the US.On the eve of the crisis, in 1961, the United States deployed medium-range missiles in Turkey, which by their presence posed a threat to the western part of the Soviet Union and were able to "cover" Moscow and key industrial centers. An adequate response to this was the R-12 medium-range missiles deployed by the Soviet leadership on the territory of Cuba.
The immediate onset of the crisis occurred on October 14, 1962. On this day, the U-2 reconnaissance aircraft of the US Air Force, during the next flight over Cuban territory, detected the presence of Soviet R-12 medium-range missiles on the outskirts of the village of San Cristobal. US President John F. Kennedy urgently set up a special Executive Committee to look for possible solutions to this problem. Initially, the meetings of the executive committee were secret, but then, on October 22, the American president informed his people about the presence of Soviet "offensive weapons" on Cuban territory. As a result, a blockade of Cuba was declared.
Initially, the Soviet leadership denied the presence of Soviet nuclear weapons on the island of Cuba. Then he had to convince the United States of the deterrent nature of the presence of missiles on the island. Photographs of the rockets were presented on October 25 during a meeting of the UN Security Council.
At the executive committee, there was a rather serious discussion of the use of force in resolving the problem. In addition, the initiators of such measures urged John F. Kennedy to start a massive bombardment of Cuban territory as quickly as possible. But during the next flight of the U-2, the readiness of several missiles for launch was established, so such actions would definitely lead to war.
The US President took an initiative in relation to the Soviet Union to dismantle the installed missiles and return Soviet ships heading to Cuba in exchange for providing guarantees of non-aggression on the Cuban island, as well as not overthrowing the regime of Fidel Castro. The Soviet leadership responded by offering to withdraw American missiles from Turkey. As a result, the countries came to an agreement and on October 28, the dismantling of Soviet missiles began, ending on November 20, after which the Cuban blockade was lifted.The Cuban Missile Crisis lasted 13 days and was of great historical significance. During it, all of humanity was on the verge of self-destruction, and as a result of its resolution, international tension began to defuse.

The world has repeatedly found itself on the brink of nuclear war. He was closest to it in November 1962, but then the sanity of the leaders of the great powers helped to avoid disaster. In Soviet and Russian historiography, the crisis is called Caribbean, in American - Cuban.

Who started first?

The answer to this everyday question is unequivocal - the US initiated the crisis. There they perceived "with hostility" the coming to power in Cuba of Fidel Castro and his revolutionaries, although this was an internal affair of Cuba. The American elite was categorically not satisfied with the fall of Cuba from the zone of influence, and even more so with the fact that among the top leaders of Cuba were communists (the legendary Che Guevara and the then very young Raul Castro, the current Cuban leader). When Fidel declared himself a communist in 1960, the United States turned to open confrontation.

Castro's worst enemies were received and supported there, an embargo was imposed on leading Cuban goods, attempts on the life of the Cuban leader began (Fidel Castro is the absolute champion among politicians in the number of assassination attempts, and almost all of them were related to the United States). In 1961, the United States financed and provided equipment for an attempted invasion by a military detachment of Cuban emigrants on Playa Giron.

So Fidel Castro and the USSR, with whom the Cuban leader quickly established friendly relations, had every reason to fear US military interference in Cuban affairs.

Cuban "Anadyr"

This northern name was used to refer to a covert military operation to deliver Soviet ballistic missiles to Cuba. It was held in the summer of 1962 and became the USSR's response not only to the situation in Cuba, but also to the deployment of American nuclear weapons in Turkey.

The operation was coordinated with the Cuban leadership, so that it was carried out in full compliance with international law and the international obligations of the USSR. She was provided with strict secrecy, but still US intelligence was able to get pictures of Soviet missiles on Liberty Island.

Now the Americans have reason to fear – less than 100 km separates Cuba from fashionable Miami in a straight line… The Caribbean crisis has become inevitable.

One step away from war

Soviet diplomacy categorically denied the existence of nuclear weapons in Cuba (and what was it supposed to do?), but the legislative structures and the US military were determined. As early as September 1962, calls were made to resolve the Cuban question by force of arms.

President J.F. Kennedy wisely abandoned the idea of ​​an immediate pinpoint strike on missile bases, but on November 22 he announced a maritime "quarantine" of Cuba in order to prevent new deliveries of nuclear weapons. The action was not very reasonable - firstly, according to the Americans themselves, it was already there, and secondly, the quarantine was just illegal. At that time, a caravan of more than 30 Soviet ships was heading to Cuba. personally forbade their captains to obey the requirements of quarantine and publicly declared that even one shot in the direction of Soviet ships would immediately cause decisive opposition. Approximately the same he said in response to the letter of the American leader. On November 25, the conflict was transferred to the UN rostrum. But that didn't help resolve it.

let's live in peace

November 25 proved to be the busiest day of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Since Khrushchev's letter to Kennedy on November 26, tensions have subsided. Yes, and the American president did not dare to give his ships an order to open fire on the Soviet caravan (he made such actions dependent on his personal order). Overt and covert diplomacy began to work, and the parties finally agreed on mutual concessions. The USSR undertook to take missiles out of Cuba. For this, the United States guaranteed the lifting of the blockade of the island, pledged not to invade it and to remove its nuclear weapons from Turkey.

The great thing about these decisions is that they were almost completely implemented.

Thanks to the reasonable actions of the leadership of the two countries, the world has again moved away from the brink of nuclear war. The Cuban Missile Crisis proved that even complex contentious issues can be resolved peacefully, but only if this is what all parties concerned want.

The peaceful resolution of the Caribbean crisis was a win for all the people of the planet. And this is despite the fact that the United States still continued to illegally infringe on Cuban trade, and in the world, no, no, but they are wondering: did Khrushchev leave a couple of missiles in Cuba, just in case?