Shapoval Yu. V. Religious values: religious analysis. The era of post-secularism

Secularism is a theoretical and ideological concept that is becoming more and more popular in Western European countries, especially France and Great Britain. This rather interesting philosophy has become highly politicized over time, and its supporters, to a certain extent, go too far in their rejection of religious views. This current is difficult to assess unambiguously, it has both pluses and minuses, depending on the specific country or region where it has acquired official status.

The main idea of ​​this trend is the thesis that neither the state nor the law should be based on religious concepts. The government and the judiciary should not be guided by the sources of faith in their activities. All organs and institutions must be clearly separated from churches and religious communities, and free from their influence. The source of this concept lies in the historically justified fear of coercion to faith, emanating from the state and its power structures. Therefore, supporters of secularism are doing everything possible to ensure that the authorities and society are neutral about religious issues. Any political activity, from their point of view, cannot be based on the feelings of believers or the dogmas of the church, it must proceed from facts and logic, as well as the interests of various groups of people. The bond between the state and religion in any form is unacceptable.

How did secularism come about?

Many ancient and medieval philosophers stood at the origins of this trend. In particular, the great contribution to its emergence was made by the thinkers of the Enlightenment in France - Diderot, Holbach, La Mettrie) However, the very concept of secularism was formulated only in the nineteenth century, when the theory of the sacredness of power and its divine origin was destroyed as a result of revolutions. Then it was transformed into an ethical doctrine that puts the well-being of man regardless of the principles of faith. In a word, the theory of secularism proposes to concentrate on the problems of this world, while religious thinking is concerned with connection with the sacred and the invisible.

Secularism and atheism

These two phenomena are usually confused, however, despite the fact that there is much in common between them, they still do not coincide. Atheism is primarily an ideological and philosophical doctrine, and secularism has a very strong political component. In addition, not all supporters of the separation of religion from power do not believe in God. Many secularists believe that hard thinking will take away from the church and bring it back into the spiritual realm. After all, this is what the religious community should be doing.

Secularism about the place of the church in society

Many Christian theologians of our time often say that secularism is godlessness in disguise. However, this is an oversimplified thesis. In the struggle between atheism and religion, secularism does not justify either side. Yes, its adherents believe that politics should be independent of faith. But it is not common for them to equate religion with poison or plague, for which radical atheism is famous. This can be seen at least from the fact that secularists believe that the church should occupy a certain place in society. The main thing is that she should not have the power to tell what to do to whom.

The attitude of religious leaders towards secularism

In most cases, representatives of Christian churches are very suspicious and even negative about this phenomenon. They believe that secularism is a concept that aims to oust religion from social existence. Often they motivate this by the fact that in some European countries it is forbidden to publicly demonstrate one's belonging to a particular religious system. Religiosity takes on a more personal and familial character. Thus, secularity becomes the norm, and faith becomes the personal attitude of the individual. Is it good or bad? We note right away that everything here depends on the specific case. For example, in France there are many excesses regarding the ban on wearing Muslim clothing for women (hijab, burkini bathing suit), which often causes outrage among human rights activists.

Religion and Secularism in the Islamic World

Not only Christian, but also Muslim religious leaders are negatively inclined towards secular values ​​and the principle of a clear separation of the community of believers and society. Most modern leaders of the Islamic world believe that since secularism is the idea of ​​building relationships between people without the intervention of God and the sacred, it contradicts the Koran and the message of the Prophet. They especially dislike the idea of ​​building the laws of society not on the basis of Sharia, but on the foundation of secular values. Nevertheless, in the modern Islamic world, the idea of ​​replacing theocracy with a secular state also has many supporters. Türkiye is one such country. Its first president, Kemal Ataturk, even declared that his homeland should not be the land of sheikhs and religious sects. Some Arab states are also following this path. Although the confrontation between modernists and Islamists, especially in recent years, has practically split all Islamic societies.

Secularism in Europe today

Proponents of secularism do not have a single ideological position or model. For example, French secularism in our time is called the specific word "laisite". This model of relations between religious communities and the state is typical only for this country. It is connected with the historical hostility of the society to the Roman Catholic Church. The latter at one time had too much power and turned the people against itself. In addition, this religious community was too clearly opposed to the law on the separation of church and state, since it was deprived of the influence to which it was accustomed. In Germany or the UK, the French model did not take root. But in any case, in European countries, secularism is not an anti-religious philosophy, but practical measures taken by the state to ensure that the influence of communities of believers does not exceed the limits beyond which conflicts and persecution begin.

Secular values

A derivative of this philosophical and political trend was the worldview axiology. These are the so-called secular values ​​or, as they say now, secular humanism. The latter also does not represent any single ideology. Sometimes in their statements they are indistinguishable from atheists. They say that the human right to happiness is opposed to faith in higher powers, and that both these theses are incompatible. Other representatives of this trend put the rights of people as a priority than religious values. They are primarily against censorship and religious prohibitions in scientific research, for the independence of ethics and morality from faith, rationalism as the main criterion for establishing truth. Proponents of secular humanism tend to be skeptical of religious revelation's claims to reality. They also oppose education in this area in childhood, because they believe that this is an imposition of an idea that requires only meaningful consent. But in this regard, secular humanists also differ, because some of them believe that the complete ignorance of young people in the religious field deprives them of the right to cultural heritage.

Secular fundamentalism

Unfortunately, the ideology of secularism gave rise to such a phenomenon. It exists on a par with religious fundamentalism and seemingly opposes it, but in fact it has common roots and values ​​with it. Its adherents are not just skeptical about religion, but want to oust it from the life of society and even destroy it, believing any manifestation of religious thought dangerous for human freedom. At the same time, they are ready to limit and trample on the rights of believers. It can be said that both religious and secular fundamentalism are two versions of the same phenomenon, the cause of which is a lack of understanding of human nature and the desire to solve complex problems with simple methods, regardless of possible consequences and sacrifices.

Humanism focuses on the values ​​and interests of human beings. They exist in both Christian and non-Christian forms. Among the latter, secular humanism is dominant. His credo is "man is the measure of all things". Instead of focusing on human beings, his philosophy is based on human values.

Secular humanists make up a rather motley society. They include existentialists, Marxists, pragmatists, egocentrists, and behaviorists. Although all humanists believe in some form of evolution, Julian Huxley called his belief system "the religion of evolutionary humanism." Corliss Lamont could be called a "cultural humanist". Despite all the differences between them, non-Christian humanists have a common core of beliefs. The latter were formulated in two "Humanist Manifestoes", which reflect the views of a certain coalition of various secular humanists.

Humanist Manifesto I In 1933, a group of thirty-four American humanists promulgated the founding principles of their philosophy in the form of Humanist Manifesto I. Its signatories included: D. Dewey, father of the American pragmatic education system; Edwin A. Burtt, religious philosopher; and R. Lester Mondale, Unitarian priest and brother of the Vice President of the United States Walter Mondale for the Carter presidency (1977 - 1981).

Manifesto statements. In the preamble, the authors define themselves as "religious humanists" and state that the establishment of such a new religion is "one of the main demands of modernity" (Kurtz, Humanist Manifestos). The manifesto consists of fifteen fundamental statements, which read, in particular, the following:

"First: Religious humanists consider the universe to be self-existent and uncreated." This is nontheism, which denies the existence of a Creator who created the Universe or maintains its existence.

"Second: humanism believes that man is part of nature, and that he was formed in the course of an ongoing process." Naturalism and the naturalistic theory of evolution are proclaimed. The supernatural is rejected.

“Third, by adhering to the organic conception of life, humanists come to the conclusion that the traditional dualism of soul and body must be rejected.” People do not have a soul and an intangible component in their being. They are not immortal either. There is no existence after death.

"Fourth: Humanism recognizes that the religious culture and civilization of mankind [...] are the result of gradual development." Further: "An individual born in a particular cultural milieu is basically shaped by that cultural milieu." This implies cultural enolution and cultural relativism. Cultural evolution means that society gradually becomes more advanced and complex; cultural relativism means that a person's personality is largely conditioned by the respective cultural environment.

"Fifth: humanism insists that the nature of the universe, in its modern scientific understanding, excludes any ideas about supernatural or cosmic principles that serve as guarantors for human values." There are no God-given moral values; therefore values ​​are relative and subject to change.

“Sixth: we are convinced that the time for theism, deism, modernism and a number of varieties of “new thinking” has passed.” The creators of the first Manifesto were atheists and agnostics in the traditional sense of those terms. Even beliefs purged of everything supernatural were rejected.

"Seventh: religion consists of such actions, intentions and experiences that are of universal human significance [...] all this, to a certain extent, is a manifestation of a human existence satisfactory to the mind." The point of this statement is to define religion in purely humanistic terms. Religion is something meaningful, interesting or useful to people.

"Eighth: religious humanism considers the full personal realization of a person as the main purpose of his life and strives to achieve such development and self-realization of a person "here and now." The hopes of humanists are limited to this world. "The main purpose of man" is earthly, not heavenly.

"Ninth, instead of the obsolete religious orientation manifested in worship and prayer, the humanist finds expression of his religious feelings in a more meaningful life of the individual and in a collective effort to ensure the public good." Religious feelings turn to the world of nature, personality, society, but not to the spiritual and supernatural world.

"Tenth: It follows that there will no longer be any special, exclusively religious feelings and sentiments of this kind, which have hitherto been associated with belief in the supernatural." In this section, the naturalistic corollary of the previous statements is deduced. Religious spiritual experience must be explained in purely materialistic terms.

"Eleventh: a person will learn to relate to life's difficulties on the basis of his knowledge of their natural and probabilistic causes." Humanists believe that humanistic education will ensure the well-being of society by eliminating the arrogance and fears that come from ignorance.

"Twelfth: believing that religion should bring more and more joy and prosperity, religious humanists aim to develop creativity in a person and promote achievements that make life better." This emphasis on such humanistic values ​​as creativity and achievement betrays the influence of D. Dewey.

"Thirteenth: Religious humanists believe that any organizations and institutions exist for the realization of all the possibilities of human life." Humanists would quickly rebuild religious institutions, rituals, church organization and the activities of parishioners in accordance with their worldview.

"Fourteenth: Humanists are firmly convinced that the existing acquisitive and profit-seeking society has proved inadequate and that radical changes are needed in social methods, in management and in the motivation of people." To replace capitalism, the humanists propose a "socialized and cooperative economic structure of society."

“Fifteenth and last: we declare that humanism will: a) affirm life, not deny it; b) strive to identify life opportunities, and not run away from them; c) try to create favorable living conditions for everyone, and not just for the elite. Pro-socialist sentiments are also expressed in this final declaration, where religious humanism shows its life-affirming aspect.

The humanists who drafted this manifesto declared that "the search for ways to improve life is still the main task of mankind" and that each person "can find within himself the possibilities to achieve this goal." They were optimists about their goals and maximalists in their belief that humanity was capable of achieving them.

Evaluation of the "Humanist Manifesto I". The first "Humanist Manifesto" can be summarized as follows:

1) atheism on the question of the existence of God;

2) naturalism in the question of the possibility of miracles;

3) evolutionism in the question of the origin of man;

4) relativism in the matter of moral values;

5) optimism about the future;

6) socialism in political and economic questions;

7) religiosity in relation to life;

8) humanism in the methods offered to those who seek to achieve the stated goals.

The language of the Manifesto is not just optimistic; they are over-optimistic in their ideas of human perfection. As even the compilers of The Humanist Manifesto II (1973) admitted, "events since then [since 1933] have shown that the previous manifesto was notoriously overoptimistic."

The compilers of the first "Manifesto" diligently avoided in their formulations such words as must and inevitably. However, they could not do without the words will (v. 15) and must (v. 3, 5, 12, 13, 14). Humanists' claims about moral values, which they consider to be the highest, imply that people are obligated to strive for these values. Thus, secular humanists offer, in essence, moral imperatives that they believe people are required to follow.

Some of their moral imperatives seem to be universal, which is implied by the use of words with a rather energetic modality - demand (preamble), must (v. 3, 5, 12, 14), insists (v. 5), there will be no , never (Art. 7, 10, conclusion) and even necessary (Art. 14) - about the defended values. In the preamble, such universal obligations are euphemistically called "enduring values". Likewise, values ​​such as freedom, creativity, and achievement are clearly understood as universal and indisputable.

It should be noted that the religious tone of the first "Manifesto" is quite obvious. The words "religion" and "religious" occur twenty-eight times in it. Its authors consider themselves religious people, would like to preserve religious spiritual experience and even call themselves "religious humanists". Their religion, however, is devoid of the highest personal object of religious feeling.

Humanist Manifesto II. In 1973, 40 years after Humanist Manifesto I was launched, secular humanists from several countries around the world decided it was time to make some urgent changes. The Humanist Manifesto II was signed by Isaac Asimov (Asimov), A. J. Ayer (Ayer), Brand Blanchard (Blanshard), Joseph Fletcher (Fletcher), Anthony ° Flue, Jacques Monod (Monod) and B. F. Skinner.

In the preface, the authors deny that they are expressing a "binding creed", but note that "for today this is our conviction." They recognize their continuity with the former humanists, expressed in the assertion that God, prayer, salvation and Providence are the components of "an unfounded and obsolete faith."

Manifesto statements. The seventeen fundamental statements of the second "Manifesto" are placed under the headings "Religion" (Art. 1-2), "Ethics" (Art. 3-4), "Personality" (Art. 5-6), "Democratic Society" (Art. 7-11) and "The World Community" (vv. 12-17).

“First, religion, in the best sense of the word, is capable of inspiring devotion to the highest ethical ideals. The development of the moral core of the personality and creative imagination is the expression of a truly “spiritual” experience and inspiration.” The authors immediately add that "traditional dogmatic or authoritarian religions [...] are a disservice to the human race." Moreover, the evidence for the existence of the supernatural is supposed to be insufficient. Being "nontheists, we take as a starting point man, not God, nature, not the divine." The authors failed to discover divine Providence. Therefore, they say, “no deity will save us; we have to save ourselves."

"Second: promises of immortal soul salvation and threats of eternal punishment are illusory and harmful." They distract from self-realization and from resistance to injustice. Science refutes the belief in the existence of the soul. "Science asserts that humanity as a species is the product of natural evolutionary forces." Science has not found evidence that life continues after death. It is better for people to strive for well-being in this life, and not in the next.

“Third, we affirm that moral values ​​have their source in human experience. Ethics is autonomous and situational, needing neither theological nor ideological sanctions. Humanists base their value system on human experience, on the "here and now" point. Values ​​have no basis or purpose outside of the individual.

"Fourth: reason and knowledge are the most effective tools that mankind has." Neither faith nor feelings can replace them. Humanists believe that "the controlled application of scientific methods [...] should be further developed in the solution of human problems." The combination of critical thinking and human empathy is the best you can hope for in solving human problems.

"Fifth: the valueless human life and dignity of the individual are fundamental humanistic values." Humanists recognize only as much individual freedom as can be combined with social responsibility. Therefore, personal freedom of choice should be expanded.

"Sixth: In the realm of human sexuality, we believe that intolerance, often cultivated by orthodox religions and puritanical cultures, unreasonably suppresses human sexual behavior." The authors defend the rights to birth control, abortion, divorce, and any form of sexual behavior of adults, subject to their mutual consent. “Except for harming others and inciting them to similar acts, individuals should be free to exercise their sexual inclinations and choose for themselves the lifestyle they choose.”

"Seventh: To more fully ensure the freedom and dignity of the individual, a person in any society must have a full set of civil liberties." This set includes freedom of speech and the press, political democracy, the right to oppose government policies, judicial rights, freedom of religion and organization, the right to artistic expression and scientific research. The right to die with dignity and to resort to euthanasia or suicide must be expanded and protected. Humanists oppose the increasing interference in the privacy of citizens. This detailed list is a register of humanistic values.

"Eighth: We are committed to the ideal of an open and democratic society." All people should have a voice in setting values ​​and goals. "People are more important than the ten commandments, all the rules, prohibitions and regulations." Here is expressed the rejection of that divine moral Law, which is given, for example, in the Ten Commandments.

"Ninth: the separation of church and state and the separation of ideology and state are categorical imperatives." Humanists believe that the state "should not support any particular religious trend with the money of society, nor should it propagate a single ideology."

"Tenth: [...] we need to democratize the economy and judge it by its human-centricity, evaluating results in terms of the public good." This means that the merits of any economic system must be judged on a utilitarian basis.

"Eleventh: the principle of moral equality should be expanded to eliminate all discrimination on the basis of race, sex, religion, age and national origin." The complete eradication of discrimination will lead to a more equitable distribution of social wealth. It is necessary to provide a minimum income for everyone, social assistance to all who need it, and the right to higher education.

“Twelfth: We deplore the division of mankind along the lines of nationality. Human history has reached its turning point, where the best option is to erase the boundaries of national sovereignty and move towards building a global community. This implies supranational political unity while maintaining cultural diversity.

"Thirteenth: such a world community must refrain from resorting to coercion and military force as a method of solving transnational problems." In this article, war is regarded as an absolute evil, and a reduction in military spending is declared a "global imperative".

"Fourteenth: the world community must carry out joint planning for the use of rapidly depleting natural resources [...] and excessive population growth must be controlled by international agreements." For humanists, therefore, one of the moral values ​​is the protection of nature.

"Fifteenth: It is the moral duty of the developed countries to provide [...] wide-ranging technical, agricultural, medical and economic assistance" to the developing countries. This should be done through "an international administration that safeguards human rights".

"Sixteenth: The development of technology is the vital key to human progress." In this article, the authors speak out both against the thoughtless, indiscriminate condemnation of technological progress, and against the use of technological advances to control, manipulate and experiment on people without their consent.

“Seventeenth: we should develop communication and transport lines that cross borders. Border barriers need to be removed.” This article ends with a warning: "We must learn to live together in an open world or die together."

In conclusion, the authors speak out against "terror" and "hatred". They uphold values ​​such as reason and compassion, as well as tolerance, mutual understanding and peaceful negotiations. They call for "the highest commitment [to these values] of which we are capable" and which "transcends [...] church, state, party, class and nationality." From this it is clear that humanists call for the highest devotion to transcendent moral values ​​- that is, religious devotion.

Evaluation of the "Humanist Manifesto II". The second Humanist Manifesto is stronger, more detailed, and less optimistic than Humanist Manifesto I. He is less restrained in his use of ethically charged terms such as should and in his call for supreme devotion. This is indeed a strong, urgent, moral and religious call. This Manifesto, like its predecessor, is characterized by atheism, naturalism, evolutionism, relativism, socialist tendencies, and is just as optimistic in its belief that humanity can save itself. Internationalism in it is manifested much stronger.

Declaration of Secular Humanists. The ideas of secular humanism were also expressed by a third group. The Secular Humanist Declaration, published in the secular humanist journal Free Inquiry, was signed by Asimov, Fletcher, and Skinner, as well as non-signers of the second Manifesto, including the philosophers Sidney Hook and Kai Nielsen.

Statements. The compilers advocate "democratic secular humanism". It is clear from the first paragraph that the humanists see existing religion as their main enemy: “Unfortunately, we are confronted today with a variety of anti-secularist tendencies: the resurgence of dogmatic, authoritarian religions; fundamentalist, literalist and doctrinaire Christianity." In addition, the document contains complaints about “the rapidly growing and uncompromising Muslim clericalism in the Middle East and Asia, the restoration of the orthodox authority of the papal hierarchy in the Roman Catholic Church, nationalist religious Judaism; and the revival of obscurantist religions in Asia". The platform of this group of humanists is:

Freedom of research. “The overriding principle of democratic secular humanism is its commitment to freedom of inquiry. We oppose any tyranny over the human mind, any attempt by ecclesiastical, political, ideological or social institutions to hinder free thought.”

Separation of church from state. “Because of their devotion to the ideas of freedom, secular humanists insist on the principle of separation of church and state.” In their opinion, "any attempt to impose special, the only true ideas about Truth, piety, virtue or justice on the whole society is a violation of the freedom of research."

The ideal of freedom. "As democratic secularists, we consistently uphold the ideal of freedom." In secular humanism, the concept of freedom includes not only freedom of conscience and religion from pressure from ecclesiastical, political and economic forces, but also "true political freedom, democratic decision-making based on the opinion of the majority, and respect for the rights of the minority, and the rule of law."

Ethics based on critical thinking. Ethical deeds should be assessed through critical thinking, and the goal of humanists is to educate "an independent and responsible person, capable of independently choosing his own path in life based on an understanding of human psychology." Although secular humanists formally oppose absolutism in ethics, they believe that "through ethical thinking, objective moral norms are developed, and common ethical values ​​and principles can be identified."

Morality education. “We are convinced that it is necessary to develop the moral aspect of the personality in children and youth [...] therefore it is the duty of the public education system to cultivate such a system of values ​​when educating.” These values ​​include "moral virtue, understanding, and strength of character."

Religious skepticism. “As secular humanists, we maintain a general skepticism towards all claims of the supernatural. While it is true that we recognize the significance of religious experience: it is an experience that changes a person and gives his life a new meaning [... we deny that], such an experience has anything to do with the supernatural. It is argued that there is not enough evidence to support claims that there is some sort of divine purpose for the universe. People are free and responsible for their own destiny, and they cannot expect salvation from any transcendent being.

Intelligence. "We look with concern at the modern crusade of non-secularists against reason and science." Although secular humanists do not believe that reason and science can solve all human problems, they claim that they see no better substitute for the human ability to think.

Science and technology. “We believe that the scientific method, with all its imperfections, still remains the most reliable way to the knowledge of the world. Therefore, we expect from the natural sciences, from the sciences of life, about society and human behavior, knowledge about the universe and the place of man in it.

Evolution. This article in the Declaration deeply deplores the attack of religious fundamentalists on the theory of evolution. Although not considering the theory of evolution as an "infallible principle", secular humanists regard it as "confirmed by such weighty evidence that it would be difficult to deny it." Accordingly, "we are saddened by the efforts of fundamentalists (especially in the United States) to invade the classroom to demand that students be taught creationist theory and include it in biology textbooks" (see Origin of the Universe). Secular humanists see this as a serious threat to both academic freedom and the science education system.

Education. "In our opinion, the education system should play an essential role in the formation of a humanistic, free and democratic society." The aims of education include the transfer of knowledge, preparation for professional activities, education of citizenship and the moral development of students. Secular humanists also envision the more general goal of "a long-term public education and outreach program dedicated to the relevance of a secular worldview to human life."

The declaration ends with the statement that "democratic secular humanism is too important to human civilization to be discarded." Modern orthodox religion is stigmatized as being "against science, against freedom, against man", and it is pointed out that "secular humanism places its hopes in the mind of man, and not in divine guidance." At the very end, regret is expressed about "intolerant sectarian beliefs that sow hatred."

Evaluation of the "Declaration of Secular Humanists". It may seem surprising that this "Declaration" appeared so quickly after the second "Humanist Manifesto" (only eight years later), especially since so many of the same people signed both documents. Much of the content coincides with one of the "Manifestos" or both. In accordance with previous humanist statements, naturalism, evolutionary theory, the ability of mankind to save itself, as well as the general ethical ideals of humanism - freedom, tolerance and critical thinking are preached.

Nevertheless, the "Declaration" has its own differences. The most important aspects of this "Declaration" are precisely those areas in which it differs from previous documents. First, these secular humanists prefer to be called "democratic secular humanists." The emphasis on democratic ideas is visible throughout the text. Secondly, they, unlike the authors of the previous documents, nowhere declare themselves to be religious humanists. This is strange, since the Humanists claimed legal recognition as a religious group, and the U.S. Supreme Court so defined them in Torcasso v. Watkins in 1961. Indeed, this "Declaration" can rightly be characterized as anti-religious, as it particularly criticizes the modern pursuit of a conservative religious faith. The main content of the "Declaration" can, in essence, be seen as a reaction to current trends that oppose secular humanism. Finally, one cannot fail to notice the strange inconsistency that the Declaration advocates the ideal of academic freedom, but at the same time calls for the exclusion of scientific creationism from the school curriculum in the natural sciences.

Common Elements in Secular Humanism. A study of the Humanist Manifestos and the Declaration, along with other works by well-known proponents of secular humanism, reveals its general conceptual core, consisting of at least five theses:

Nonteism is characteristic of all forms of secular humanism. Many humanists completely deny the existence of God, and everyone denies the need for the existence of the Creator of the universe. Thus, secular humanists are united in their opposition to any theistic religion.

An essential feature of humanism is naturalism, which follows from the rejection of theism. Everything in the universe must be explained in terms of the laws of nature alone.

The theory of evolution serves as a way for secular humanists to explain the origin of the world and life. Either the Universe and life in it arose due to the supernatural intervention of the Creator, or a purely naturalistic evolution took place. Nontheists thus have no choice but to defend the theory of evolution.

Secular humanists are united by relativism in ethics, as they have an aversion to absolutes. There are no God-given moral values; a person chooses such values ​​for himself. These norms are subject to change and are relative, being conditioned by situations. Since there is no absolute basis for values ​​in the person of God, there are no absolute values ​​that would be given by God.

The central thesis is the self-sufficiency of man. Not all secular humanists are utopian in their ideas, but all are sure that people are capable of solving their problems without divine help. Not everyone believes that the human race is immortal, but everyone is convinced that the survival of mankind depends on the personal behavior and responsibility of each. Not all of them believe that science and technology are the means to save humanity, but all see human reason and secular education as the only hope for the continued existence of the human race.

Conclusion. Secular humanism is a movement composed mainly of atheists, agnostics and deists. They all deny theism and the existence of the supernatural. All adhere to strictly naturalistic views.

Bibliography:

Ehrenfeld, The Arrogance of Humanism.

N. L. Geisler, Is Man the Measure?

J. Hitchcock, What is Secular Humanism?

C. S. Lewis, The Abolition of Man.

P. Kurtz, ed. Humanist Manifestos I and II.

Ed., "A Secular Humanist Declaration", Free Inquiry.

Schaeffer, Whatever Happened to the Human Race?

Norman L. Geisler. Encyclopedia of Christian Apologetics. Bible for everyone. SPb., 2004. S.282-289.

Norman L. Geisler

Shapoval Yu.V.
Religious values: religious analysis (on the example of Judaism, Christianity, Islam)
In modern secular society, the dominant trend in relation to religious values ​​has become their blurring, misunderstanding of their essence. The processes of profanization, ethization, politicization and commercialization of religion are projected onto religious values, which are reduced to ethical norms of behavior, equated to universal values, and in the worst case, become a means in a political game or an instrument of material enrichment. The manipulation of religious values ​​for their own purposes has become a mass phenomenon, which we observe in the example of extremist organizations using religious slogans, or pseudo-religious organizations that, under the guise of religious values, pursue commercial goals. The postmodern game, which breaks the signifier and the signified, form and content, phenomenon and essence, has drawn religious values ​​into its whirlpool, which become a convenient form for completely non-religious content. Therefore, an adequate definition of religious values ​​is of particular relevance and significance today, which would make it possible to distinguish them from a pseudo-religious surrogate. Accordingly, the purpose of this study is to identify the essence and content of religious values, without which it is impossible to raise the question of their dialogue with secular values.

To achieve this goal, it is important to choose an adequate research path. The logic of our study involves the disclosure of the following aspects. First, it is necessary to identify the main formative principle of religious values, which constitutes them and distinguishes them from other values. This principle will be the criterion of value positing in the religious sphere. Of course, this essential principle will also set the direction of our research. Secondly, the values ​​we are considering are religious, therefore, they should be studied in the context of religion, and not in isolation from it. In our opinion, the reason for the vagueness and uncertainty of the very concept of religious values ​​is the desire to explore their essence and content not in a religious, but in any other context: political, psychological, social, cultural. Thirdly, a more holistic view of religious values, and not just their enumeration, gives, in our opinion, a religious picture of the world, which, of course, is value-colored.

The essential feature of religious values ​​is, first of all, their ontology. P. Sorokin revealed this very well in his concept, characterizing the ideational culture with its fundamental religious values. According to him, “1) reality is understood as not perceived by the senses, non-material, imperishable Being; 2) goals and needs are mostly spiritual; 3) the degree of their satisfaction is the maximum and at the highest level; 4) the way to satisfy or implement them is the voluntary minimization of most physical needs ... ". M. Heidegger also notes the existentiality of religious values, saying that after their overthrow in Western culture, the truth of being became impenetrable, and metaphysics was replaced by the philosophy of subjectivity. The Principle of Being, in contrast to changeable becoming, is fundamental to religious values. The principle of Being in religion is expressed in the existence of God, who is transcendent, unchanging, eternal, derived from him and supported by all being. This is especially clearly expressed in the religions of revelation, which are based on Revelation, in which God reveals himself to people and with his signs, commandments, messages from top to bottom orders all life, including the natural world, and human society, and the life of every person. In Christianity God says "Let there be", in Islam "Be!" and the world is brought into being.

The principle of Being as eternal and unchanging is manifested in that deep connection between the word and being, which is characteristic of religion. The fundamental role of the Word in the creation of being is indicated by the Scriptures. The Gospel of John begins with the words: “In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God” (John 1:1). In the Quran: “He is the One who created the heavens and the earth for the sake of truth. On that day He will say, "Be!" – and it will come true. His Word is truth…” (Quran 6:73). God is the Word and is the Truth indicated in the sacred books. Thus the Word ascends to God and produces the truth of being. Therefore, the naming of things is the revelation of the truth of their being or an indication of this truth.

In this context, it is interesting to turn to the Father of the Church, Gregory of Nyssa, who, in a short work “On what the name and title “Christian” means, affirms the fundamental principle of Being for a religious person. To bear the name "Christian" means to be a Christian, and to be a Christian necessarily implies "imitation of the Divine nature." God is separated from man and the nature of God is inaccessible to human knowledge, but the names of Christ reveal that image of a perfect being that must be followed. Saint Gregory cites such names of Christ as wisdom, truth, goodness, salvation, strength, firmness, peace, purification, and others. The logic of the holy father is as follows: if Christ is also called a stone, then this name requires us to be firm in a virtuous life.

In Islam, we also find the statement about the 99 names of Allah, which he revealed to mankind: “Allah has the most beautiful names. Therefore call on Him through them and leave those who deviate from the truth regarding His names” (Quran 7, 180). For a Muslim, it is necessary that "he has true faith in Allah, maintains a strong relationship with Him, constantly remembers Him and trusts in Him...". All surahs of the Qur'an, except for one, and the words of a Muslim begin with the "remembrance" of the name of Allah - "In the name of Allah, the Gracious and Merciful." Hence, the special position of the Koran, which is the word of Allah, given in revelation to the prophet Muhammad. The deepest connection between the name and being was studied and revealed in their works by Russian thinkers, the name-glorifiers P.A. Florensky, father Sergiy Bulgakov, A.F. Losev. Even the representative of the postmodern J. Derrida turns to this topic at the end of his life in connection with the search for traces of Being in the world.

Thus, the names of God indicate the truth of being and, accordingly, religious values. God is truth, goodness, beauty, wisdom, power, love, light, life, salvation. Everything that belongs to God is valuable and should be imitated.

P. Sorokin, in addition to the principle of Being for religious values, points to the priority of the spiritual. Indeed, especially in the religions of revelation, the divine being does not merge with the sensual, earthly world, but is supersensible, transcendent, spiritual. Consequently, religious values ​​presuppose a certain structure of existence, namely, a metaphysical picture of the world, in which there is a sensual and supersensible world, which is the beginning, foundation and end of the first. In religion, a hierarchy of the world is built, in which the lower material layers are subordinate to the higher spiritual layers. Hierarchy is a step-by-step structure of the world, determined by the degree of closeness to God. Dionysius the Areopagite in his work Corpus Areopagiticum vividly describes this ladder principle of the structure of the world. The purpose of the hierarchy is "possible assimilation to God and union with Him". The love of God for the created world and the love of the world for its Creator, striving for the unity of all being in God, is the basis of order and harmony, hierarchy. Love, which binds and unites the world and God, appears in Dionysius, as in Gregory of Nyssa, as a fundamental ontological principle and, accordingly, the highest value. The principle of hierarchy is refracted in the structure of a person as a body-soul-spiritual being, in which strict subordination of the lower layers to the higher spiritual levels must be observed. Moreover, the hierarchy permeates both the church organization and the heavenly heavenly world itself.

Thus, the principle of Being is the formative of religious values, since here we come to values ​​from God (the fullness of being), and not vice versa. Therefore, religious values ​​rooted in the divine eternal, unchanging and incorruptible being are absolute, eternal and incorruptible. In a situation with “local values”, in which values ​​lose their ontological basis, it is not being that gives value, but values ​​are superimposed on being, being begins to be evaluated by certain criteria: the interests and needs of the subject, national interests, the interests of all mankind and other interests. Of course, all these interests are constantly changing; accordingly, “local values” cannot be described as eternal and unchanging.

For an adequate understanding of religious values, one must turn to religion itself, since all other contexts are external to them. Unfortunately, in the modern humanities, an eclectic approach to religious values ​​has become widespread, according to which they are randomly selected and further adapted to political or any other goals. The path of eclecticism is a very dangerous path, because it leads, for example, to such formations as "political Islam". We are increasingly striving to adapt religion and religious values ​​to the needs of modern man and society, forgetting that, in fact, these values ​​are eternal, and our needs are changeable and transient. Accordingly, human needs should have such an absolute guideline as religious values, and not vice versa.

Based on this, religious values ​​must first be considered on their “internal territory” (M. Bakhtin), that is, in religion, in order to determine the unchanging core of religious tradition, values, and areas where common ground is possible, even a dialogue with secular values.

Religion appears as a relation of man to God, who is the Creator and support of the world. First of all, we note that the religious attitude is essential for a person in the sense that it expresses "the primordial languor of the spirit, the desire to comprehend the incomprehensible, to express the inexpressible, the thirst for the Infinite, love for God" . In this context, religion appears as a phenomenon deeply inherent in man and, therefore, religion will exist as long as man exists. Based on this, the attempts of positivists, in particular O. Comte, to define religion as a certain theological stage in the development of mankind, which will be replaced by a positivist stage, look unjustified. Also unconvincing today is the point of view of Z. Freud, who considered religion a manifestation of infantilism, a stage in the childhood development of mankind, which will be overcome in the future. Our position is close to the point of view of K.G. Jung, in whom religion is rooted in the archetypal unconscious layer of the human psyche, that is, it is deeply inherent in man.

The religious attitude becomes clearer if we go from the very word "religare", which means to connect, connect. In this context, V. Solovyov understands religion: "Religion is the connection of man and the world with the unconditional beginning and center of all things." The meaning and purpose of any religion is the desire for unity with God.

The religious unity of a person with God requires a free search on the part of a person, which implies aspiration and appeal to the object of one's faith. In religion, the whole spiritual-soul-bodily being of a person is turned towards God. This is expressed in the phenomenon of faith. Faith is a state of ultimate interest, capture by the ultimate, the infinite, the unconditional; it is based on the experience of the sacred in the finite. Accordingly, religious experience is fundamental for religion, in which a person experiences God as a Presence (M. Buber), as a spiritual evidence (I.A. Ilyin). In this sense, the definition of P.A. is very accurate. Florensky: "Religion is our life in God and God in us".

A living religious experience is personal, in which a person stands alone before God and bears personal responsibility for his decisions and deeds, for his faith as a whole. S. Kierkegaard pointed out that in a religious sense, a person is important as a unique and inimitable existence, a person as such, and not in his social dimensions. The next important feature of religious experience is the involvement of the whole human being in it. I.A. Ilyin, who was engaged in the study of religious experience, notes: “But it is not enough to see and perceive the divine Subject: one must accept Him with the last depth of the heart, involve the power of consciousness, will and reason in this acceptance and give this experience a fateful force and significance in personal life.” Religious experience is an ontology of human development, as it requires "spiritual self-construction" from him. Religion completely transforms a person, moreover, the old person dies in order for a renewed person to be born - “a new spiritual personality in a person”. The main distinguishing feature of this personality is the “organic integrity of the spirit”, which overcomes internal gaps and splits of faith and reason, heart and mind, mind and contemplation, heart and will, will and conscience, faith and deeds, and many others. Religious experience organizes the chaos of the inner world of a person, builds a hierarchy of a human being. At the head of this hierarchy is the human spirit, to which all other levels are subordinate. A religious person is a whole person who has achieved "inner unity and unity" of all components of a human being.

To summarize the numerous psychological studies of transpersonal experiences in religious experience, we can say that here the deep layers of the human being are actualized, leading it beyond the limits of the limited self-consciousness of the Self to a comprehensive being. C. G. Jung designates these layers with the concept of “archetypal”, and S.L. Frank is a layer of "We". A person takes possession of his instinctive unconscious nature, which is gradually permeated by the spirit and obeys it. The spiritual center becomes decisive and guiding. Therefore, "religion as the reunion of man with God, as the sphere of human development towards God, is the true sphere of spiritual development."

Spiritual strength, spiritual activity and spiritual responsibility become characteristics of human existence. Religion is a great claim to Truth, but also a great responsibility. I.A. Ilyin writes: “This claim obliges; it obliges even more than any other claim. This is a responsibility to oneself, since religious faith determines the whole life of a person and, ultimately, his salvation or death. This is responsibility before God: "The believer is responsible before God for what he believes in his heart, what he confesses with his lips and what he does with deeds." Religious faith makes a person responsible to all other people for the authenticity and sincerity of his faith, for the substantive solidity of faith, for the deeds of his faith. Therefore, a religious attitude is a responsible, binding act.

Of course, as shown above, religious experience is the foundation of religion as a relationship of man to God. However, religious experience, deep and practically inexpressible, must be guided by dogmas approved by the Church, otherwise it would be devoid of reliability and objectivity, it would be "a mixture of true and false, real and illusory, it would be" mysticism "in the bad sense of the word" . For modern secular consciousness, dogmas appear as something abstract, and dogmatic differences between religions as something insignificant, easily overcome. In fact, for religion itself, dogmas are the expression and defense of divinely revealed truth. It is the dogmas that protect the core of faith, outline the circle of faith, the inner territory of religion. Dogmatic statements crystallized, as a rule, in a complex, sometimes dramatic struggle with various kinds of heresies, and represent a "generally valid definition of Truth by the Church" . Dogmas contain an indication of the true path and ways of uniting a person with God in a given religion. Proceeding from this, a dogmatic concession, and even more so a rejection of a dogma for religion, is a betrayal of faith, a betrayal of the Truth, which destroys religion from the inside.

Unlike personal religious experience, dogmatic definitions are the realm of the common faith preserved by the Church. The fullness of the Truth can be preserved only by a single Church, only “the entire “Church people” is able to preserve and fulfill it immaculately, i.e. and reveal that Truth."

V.N. Lossky in his works emphasized the deep connection that exists between religious experience and dogmas developed and preserved by dogmatic theology. He writes: "Nevertheless, spiritual life and dogma, mysticism and theology are inseparably linked in the life of the Church." If this connection weakens or breaks, then the foundations of religion are undermined.

However, it may be objected to us that in such revealed religions as Judaism and Islam there is no dogma and church organization as in Christianity. Indeed, there is no dogma as a principle of faith, approved by the institutional structures of the Church, in particular, Ecumenical or local Councils, in Judaism and Islam. In addition, membership in the Jewish community does not depend on the adoption of dogmatic provisions, but by birth. Often in the writings of Western scholars who compare the Abrahamic religions, Judaism and Islam appear as religions dominated not by orthodoxy, as in Christianity, but by orthopraxy, that is, behavior and the correct observance of rituals. Western researcher B. Louis writes: “The truth of Islam is determined not so much by orthodoxy, but by orthopraxy. What matters is what a Muslim does, not what he believes." In Judaism, priority is also given to human behavior, the fulfillment of God's commandments.

Despite all of the above, in Judaism and Islam there are theological definitions that express the principles of faith, developed by the most authoritative people in the field of religion. The Jewish medieval thinker Maimonides formulated thirteen principles of faith, another medieval rabbi Yosef Albo reduced them to three: faith in God, in the divinity of the Torah, in rewards and punishments. In Islam, such definitions, which form the foundation of faith, are tawhid (monotheism) and the five pillars of Islam. In addition, in Judaism there is a rabbinical tradition dealing with theological problems, and in Islam, kalam and Islamic philosophy. Since the middle of the 8th century, various ideological currents of Islam - Sunnis, Shiites, Kharijites, Mutazilites, Murjiites - have been discussing issues of dogma. First it is a question of power, then directly the problem of faith, then the problem of predestination and controversy about the essence of God and his attributes. A detailed picture of these disputes was presented in their works by Kazakh researchers of Islamic culture and philosophy G.G. Solovyova, G.K. Kurmangalieva, N.L. Seitakhmetova, M.S. Burabaev and others. Using the example of al-Farabi, they showed that medieval Islamic philosophy "expresses Islamic monotheistic religiosity ..." and rationally substantiates the Qur'anic provisions about the unity and uniqueness of God. Thus, Judaism and Islam also contain pillars of faith that express and protect its fundamental foundations.

Thus, religion as a person's attitude to God and the desire for unity with Him implies a deep connection between religious experience and dogmatic definitions kept by the religious community. In unity with religious experience, dogmatics, an important role in man's communication with God belongs to the religious cult, which includes divine services, sacraments, fasts, religious holidays, rituals, and prayers. A religious cult is essentially symbolic, that is, there is a combination of an external visible symbol with an internal spiritual grace that points to divine reality. Thanks to this symbolism, cult actions unite the heavenly and earthly worlds, through their religious community becomes involved in God. It can be said without exaggeration that the meeting of heaven and earth takes place in a religious cult. Therefore, it is impossible to talk about a religious cult, about religious rituals as something external and insignificant for faith, since through it the invisible world becomes present for believers in earthly reality. Accordingly, for the Abrahamic religions, religious worship is of fundamental importance. For example, as the Orthodox theologian Bishop Kallistos (Ware) of Diokleia points out: “The Orthodox approach to religion is essentially a liturgical approach: it implies the inclusion of dogma in the context of worship.” In Islam, five-fold prayer, prayer is one of the pillars of faith, as Muhammad Ali Al-Hashimi writes, “prayer is the pillar of religion, and whoever strengthens this pillar strengthens the religion itself, while leaving it destroys this religion.”

So, religious experience, dogma and religious cult represent the "inner territory" of faith, its fundamental foundations, the rejection of which is tantamount to the rejection of faith. It is important to note that the spiritual development of a person, moral values, the moral dimension that we find in religion and to which secular society addresses today, are the spiritual fruits of this core of religion. As Kazakh researcher A.G. Kosichenko “spiritual development is placed in confessions in the context of the essence of faith…”.

Modern secular humanitarian science, even religious studies, in the study of spiritual and moral values ​​rooted in religion, considers cultural, historical, socio-cultural, socio-political, ethnic aspects, but not religion itself. This methodological approach leads to a distorted picture, according to which individual ideas and values ​​can be pulled out of the religious context and transferred to another sphere, other contexts. For example, medieval Islamic philosophy in Soviet science was studied outside of Islamic dogma, the emphasis was on non-religious factors. At the present stage, scientists need to turn to the position of theologians and religious philosophers, which was very well expressed by V.N. Lossky: “We could never understand the spiritual aspect of any life if we did not take into account the dogmatic teaching underlying it. It is necessary to accept things as they are, and not try to explain the difference in spiritual life in the West and the East by reasons of an ethnic or cultural nature, when it comes to the most important reason - the dogmatic difference. We have given a detailed quote in order to emphasize that a methodological approach is needed that would take into account religion itself, its essential foundations when studying religious phenomena, and not explain religion based on non-religious factors, which also need to be taken into account, but not given priority. No constructive dialogue between secular values ​​and religious values ​​can take place until religion is viewed as an integral phenomenon in the unity of all its aspects: religious experience, dogma, cult, religious ethics and axiology.

Thus, religious values ​​are rooted in religion and it is impossible to reduce them to secular ethics, because outside the relationship of man to God, ethics loses the absolute criterion of good and evil, which is God and always remains at risk of relativization. As we pointed out, all other criteria are relative, since they do not ascend to the eternal unchanging Being, but descend to the becoming of being, constantly changing.

The fundamental religious value arising from the very understanding of religion as a person's desire for unity with God is love. The love of the created world for God and God for the world is the source of all other religious values. Love for one's neighbor, kindness, truth, wisdom, mercy, compassion, generosity, justice, and others are derivatives of this highest value. In religions of revelation, love acts as an ontological principle leading to the unity of all being, love is also the main epistemological principle, since God is revealed only to His loving gaze, love also appears as a great ethical principle. In Judaism, one of the fundamental concepts is the agave as God's love for man. This love is understood through three terms. Chesed as ontological love of the Creator for His creation. Rahamim as the moral love of the Father for his children. Tzedek as a desire to earn the love of God and gain deserved love. In Christianity, love as agape characterizes God himself. Here are the famous words of the apostle John: “Beloved! Let us love one another, because love is from God, and everyone who loves is born of God and knows God. He who does not love does not know God, for God is love” (1 Jn 4:7,8). And in Islam, within the framework of Sufism, love in these three aspects is a fundamental concept, and the Sufis themselves, according to the vivid statement of the Sufi poet Navoi: "They can be called in love with God and His beloved, they can be considered desiring the Lord and desirable for Him" ​​.

Striving to become like God, a person makes love the organizing principle of his life as a whole, in all its aspects, including social. Church Father John Chrysostom writes: “We can become like God if we love everyone, even enemies… If we love Christ, we will not do anything that can offend Him, but we will prove our love by deeds.” This aspect was noted by M. Weber in his sociology of religion, when he showed the relationship between religious ethics, concerned with the salvation of the human soul and the social practice of man. He comes to the conclusion: “The rational elements of religion, its “teaching” - the Indian doctrine of karma, the Calvinist belief in predestination, the Lutheran justification by faith, the Catholic doctrine of the sacraments - have an internal regularity, and arising from the nature of ideas about God and the “picture of the world” rational religious pragmatics of salvation leads, under certain circumstances, to far-reaching consequences in the formation of practical life behavior. We cited this great quotation because it contains an indication of the sphere in which religion, religious values ​​come into contact with the social world, with secular values. This is the area of ​​social ethics, the formation of which is influenced or may be influenced by religious values. For religion, socio-ethical contexts represent an external boundary, peripheral in comparison with the "internal territory". However, life in the world in accordance with religious values ​​is significant for the salvation of the human soul, and, consequently, for religion. Accordingly, we can talk about the economic ethics of religions, about its place in society, about its relationship with the state.

A believer, who is an internally unified and integral person, is called upon to implement religious values ​​in all spheres of his life. They enter into the natural setting of a person's consciousness and predetermine all his actions. Religion is not aimed at aggravating the separation of God and the world, but, on the contrary, bringing them as far as possible to unity, basing everything in God. Religious phenomena themselves are dual, symbolic, that is, they are internally turned to the transcendent world, while externally they are immanent to the earthly world and participate in its life. Of course, religious values ​​are based on a person's attitude to God, but through a religious attitude they are addressed to a specific person who lives in society. In our opinion, the presented understanding of religion and religious values ​​makes possible their dialogue and interaction with secular society, secular values.

In addition, religion carries out its mission in a certain cultural and historical world and in relation to a person who is the bearer of a cultural tradition. Although religion is not limited to any form of culture, it is often "the leaven of too many and different cultures" or even civilization. Religious values ​​are organically woven into the fabric of the national culture of a people or a number of peoples in the event of a civilization. Religion becomes a culture-forming factor, the guardian of national traditions, the soul of national culture. The classic of religious studies M. Müller believed that there is a "close connection between language, religion and nationality." In history, we observe the relationship, mutual influence, interaction of national and religious values. Religion has an impact on culture, but culture also has an impact on religion, although the “inner territory” of religion that we have designated remains unchanged. As a result, religion acquires special features. For example, Islam in Kazakhstan is different from Islam in the Arabian Peninsula, where it originated, or Russian Orthodoxy is different from Greek Orthodoxy.

Thus, having considered religious values ​​in the context of religion itself as a relationship of man to God, we came to the conclusion that the determining factor in this respect is the desire for unity with God, which is expressed by love in the ontological, epistemological and moral sense. Love appears in religion as the highest value. In terms of the possibility of interaction between religion, religious values ​​and secular values, we have identified in religion as a holistic phenomenon the “inner territory”, the fundamental foundations of faith that cannot be changed. This includes, firstly, religious experience as a living relationship - the meeting of man with God, the space of dialogue between man and God. Secondly, dogmatic definitions expressing and protecting the foundation of faith. Thirdly, the religious cult through which the religious community establishes its relationship with God. These relationships are mediated symbolically through objects of worship, divine services, and liturgy. The cult side is essential for every religion, "for religion should allow the believer to see the "holy" - which is achieved by cult actions" . In addition to this unchanging core, religion has external boundaries where dialogue and interaction with secular values ​​are quite possible. This is the social aspect of the existence of religion, such as social ethics. In addition, the cultural and historical aspect of religion, within which interaction with the culture of a particular people is carried out.

The religious picture of the world presupposes, first of all, an understanding of the beginning of the world, its nature, and existential status. In the religions of the Abrahamic tradition, the creation of the world by God “out of nothing” (ex nihilo), that is, creationism, is affirmed. It should be noted that in the religions under consideration, the creation of the world by God from nothing is not just one of the statements, but a dogma of faith, without revealing which it is impossible to understand the essence of religion. All the talk that the natural science discoveries of evolution, the Big Bang refute the creation of the world by God, are absurd, since religion speaks of creation in the phenomenological plane. This means that its goal is not to reveal the laws of the development of the Universe, but to show the meaning and meaning of the entire existing Universe and especially human life. For religion, it is important not just the fact of the existence of the world, but the possibility of its meaningful existence.

Let's take a closer look at the creation of the world. At the beginning of the world was God, nothing existed outside of God, God created everything - time, space, matter, the world as a whole, man. Further, creation is an act of the Divine will, and not an outpouring of the Divine essence. As the Russian religious philosopher V.N. Lossky: “Creation is a free act, a gift act of God. For a Divine being, it is not conditioned by any "internal necessity"". The freedom of God called to life all being, endowed it with such qualities as order, purposefulness, love. Thus, the world is defined as created, dependent on God, the world does not have its own foundation, for the created world the constitutive relation is the relation to God, without which it is reduced to nothing (nihilo). Hans Küng, one of the leading theologians of our time, very correctly expressed the meaning of the dogma about creation: “Creation “out of nothing” is a philosophical and theological expression, meaning that the world and man, as well as space and time, owe their existence only to God alone and to no other reason ... The Bible expresses the conviction that the world is fundamentally dependent on God as the Creator and maintainer of all being and always remains in such dependence. In the Quran, this idea is expressed not only through the creation of the world by Allah (khalq), but also through the power of Allah (amr, malakut) over the existing world: “To him belongs what is in heaven, and what is on earth, and what is between them, and whatever is under the ground” (Quran 20:6). Researcher M.B. Piotrovsky emphasizes: “This power continues what was started during creation, it constantly supports the movement of the stars, the flow of water, the birth of fruits, animals and people.” Religion places a person, starting from creation, in a life-meaning space, gives a life-meaning basis for his existence. Therefore, it is not necessary to focus on the parallels between natural scientific discoveries and the Holy Books (the Bible Koran), to look for scientifically provable truths in them. Here again we quote the words of Hans Küng: "The interpretation of the Bible should not find a grain of scientifically proven, but necessary for faith and life." The physicist Werner Heisenberg believed that the symbolic language of religion is “a language that allows one to somehow talk about that interconnection of the world whole, guessed behind the phenomena, without which we could not develop any ethics and any morality” [Cit. according to 23, p.149]. The creation of the world by God affirms the foundation of the values ​​of everything that exists and the meaning of everything that exists.

In this context, the Eastern Church Fathers interpret the words of St. John the Theologian: "In the beginning was the Word" (John 1:1). In the beginning was the Word - the Logos, and the Word is the manifestation, the revelation of the Father, that is, the Son of God - the hypostasis of the Most Holy Trinity. In fact, the Word-Logos-Son of God give meaning to all being. This finds expression in Christian Orthodox theology, where the belief prevails that each creature has its own logos - "essential meaning", and Logos - "the meaning of meanings". The Eastern Fathers of the Church used the “ideas” of Plato, but overcame the dualism inherent in his concept, as well as the position of Western Christian theology, coming from Augustine of the Blessed, that ideas are the thoughts of God, are contained in the very existence of God as determining the essence and cause of all created things. The Greek Fathers of the Church believed that His essence exceeded ideas, the ideas of all things are contained in His will, and not in the Divine essence itself. Thus, Orthodox theology affirms the novelty and originality of the created world, which is not just a bad copy of God. Ideas here are the living word of God, the expression of His creative will, they designate the mode of participation of the created being in the Divine energies. The logos of a thing is the norm of its existence and the path to its transformation. In everything that has been said, it is important for us to constantly emphasize the meaningfulness and value of being in religions. Accordingly, the next most important concept that characterizes religion is teleology, that is, orientation towards purpose and meaning.

The very steps of creation - Six Days indicate its purpose and meaning. As rightly noted by V.N. Lossky: “These six days are symbols of the days of our week - more hierarchical than chronological. Separating from each other the elements created simultaneously on the first day, they define the concentric circles of being, in the center of which stands a person, as their potential completion. The same idea is expressed by the modern researcher of theological problems A. Nesteruk, speaking of "the possibility of establishing the meaning of creation, laid down by God in his plan for salvation." That is, the history of man's salvation through the incarnation of the Logos in Christ and the resurrection of Christ was originally an element of the Divine plan. Thus, the creation of the world is deeply connected with the creation of man and the event of the incarnation of the Son of God. Moreover, from the beginning of the creation of the world, the eschatological perspective of everything that happens is clearly visible - the direction towards the end. Creation is already an eschatological act, then the incarnation of the Son (Word) of God gives the vector of movement of the entire historical process towards the establishment of the Kingdom of God, which means in the Christian religion the achievement of unity with God by involving all creation in the process of deification. We also find an eschatological orientation in the Qur'an, in which "references to creation also serve as a kind of confirmation of the possibility of the coming judgment, when all people will be resurrected and appear before Allah, their creator and judge" . Consequently, eschatology is the next fundamental characteristic of religion as a relationship of man to God.

Summarizing all the above, we formulate the following conclusions. The dogma about the creation of the world by God out of nothing asserts the following. The first is the transcendence and at the same time the immanence of God in the world. After all, God created the world and in Him the world draws its foundation. The second is the order and unity of creation, and most importantly, the value of everything created, all things. Here the value of all created matter is affirmed, which cannot be destroyed with impunity. God Himself created it and said it was good. Accordingly, when we find in the Bible that God placed the earth at the disposal of man and proclaimed “fill the earth, and subdue it, and have dominion…” (Gen. 1:28), it does not mean to exploit the earth, but to cultivate and care for it. To "rule" over animals means to bear responsibility for them, and to "name" animals means to understand their essence. Our position on the creation of the world coincides with the point of view of the modern theologian G. Küng: “Faith in creation does not add anything to the ability to manage the world, which has been infinitely enriched by natural science; this belief does not provide any natural scientific information. But faith in creation gives a person - especially in the era of rapidly occurring scientific, economic, cultural and political revolutions leading to a departure from one's roots and loss of orientation - the ability to navigate the world. It allows man to discover meaning in life and in the process of evolution, it can give him a measure for his activities and the last guarantees in this vast, boundless universe. The main conclusion from the dogma about creation is that man and the world have meaning and value, they are not chaos, not nothing, but the creations of God. This statement defines the ethics of man's relationship to the world. Firstly, to respect people as equals to us before God, and secondly, to respect and protect the rest of the non-human world. Belief in God the Creator allows us to accept our responsibility for other people and the world around us, because a person is the “viceroy of Allah” (Quran 2: 30), his deputy on earth. The third fundamental conclusion from the dogma of creation is the dignity of man. Man is the image and likeness of God, he is placed above all other creations as a manager.

Let us turn to the doctrine of man in Judaism, Christianity and Islam. These religions created the theology of man. A few remarks must first be made. As noted by the Orthodox theologian P. Evdokimov, in order to adequately understand the doctrine of man in Christianity, it is necessary to abandon the dualism of soul and body and the thesis of their conflict. These religions consider a person as a multi-level, hierarchical, but integral being, uniting all the plans and elements of a person in the spirit. The conflict that accompanies human existence is transferred to a completely different perspective, namely “the thought of the Creator, His desires oppose the desires of the creature, holiness to the sinful state, the norm to perversion, freedom to necessity” . Thus, the central problem of religious anthropology is human freedom.

The beginning of the religious doctrine of man is the creation of man by God. That is, God sets the nature of man. In the Old Testament, in the book of Genesis, God created man on the sixth day in his own image and likeness and said that “very good” was created. In the Jewish spiritual tradition of the Haggadah, part of the Talmud, the creation of man is described in this way: “From all ends of the earth, dust particles flew together, particles of that dust into which the Lord breathed a life-giving principle, a living and immortal soul” (Sang., 38). Man is created in the image and likeness of God. In the very creation of man lies his dual nature: the body consists of "the dust of the earth" and the soul that God breathed into man. The word "Adam" on the one hand is derived from the word "adama" - earth (human body). On the other hand, from the word "Adame" - "I become like" God, this embodies the supernatural principle of man. Thus, man is twofold: an immortal soul and a mortal body.

Christianity continues this line and the central position of this religion is the postulate - man is the image and likeness of God. The Eastern Orthodox tradition of Christianity emphasizes the divine element of human nature - the image of God. In short, the Image of God is the divine in man. The eastern father of the church, Saint Athanasius the Great, emphasizes the ontological nature of communion with the deity, and creation means communion. From this originates the ability of a person to know God, which is understood as knowledge-initiation. The Holy Father Gregory of Nyssa noted: “For the first dispensation of man was in imitation of the likeness of God…”. He points to the god-likeness of the human soul, which can be compared to a mirror reflecting the Prototype. Gregory of Nyssa goes further in revealing this concept. The image of God points us to the level of the unknowable hidden in man – the mystery of man. This mysterious ability of a person to freely define himself, to make a choice, to make any decision, based on himself, is freedom. The Divine Personality is free and man as an image and likeness is a person and freedom. Gregory of Nyssa writes: “... he was the image and likeness of the Force that reigns over everything that exists, and therefore, in his free will, he had a similarity with freely ruling over everything, not obeying any external necessity, but acting at his own discretion, as it seems to him better and arbitrarily choosing what he pleases” [Cit. according to 28, p.196]. On the whole, if we sum up patristic theology, we can come to the following conclusion. An image is not a part of a person, but the totality of a person. The image is expressed in the hierarchical structure of a person with his spiritual life in the center, with the priority of the spiritual. In Judaism and Islam, the Law prohibits the creation of man-made images, since the image is understood dynamically and realistically. The image evokes the real presence of the person it represents.

The image is the objective basis of the human being, it means "to be created in the image." But there is also a similarity that leads to the need to act, to exist in the image. The image appears and acts through subjective similarity. This position is explained by St. Gregory Palamas: it is unstable ... and after the fall we rejected the likeness, but did not lose being in the image” [Cit. according to 26, p.123]. Thus, the thesis of "man as the image and likeness of God" leads us to an understanding of the human person in religion. Christianity uses the terms prosopon and hypostasis to reveal the concept of personality. Both terms designate a person, but emphasize different aspects. Prosopon is the self-consciousness of man, which follows natural evolution. Hypostasis, on the contrary, expresses the openness, the aspiration of a human being beyond its own limits - towards God. Personality is a combination of body-soul-spirit, the center, the life principle of which is hypostasis. In this sense, the secret of personality lies in its overcoming of itself, in transcending towards God.

Hypostasis points us to the incomprehensible depth of the human personality, in which the meeting with God takes place. Orthodoxy speaks of union with God, which leads to the deification of man, to the God-man. Sufism as a mystical tradition of Islam affirms the possibility of merging with the Divine. This depth is indicated by the symbol of the heart. In particular, Abu Hamid al-Ghazali writes: “If the heart becomes pure, then perhaps the Truth will appear to it ...” The heart is a place of divine dwelling, an organ of God-knowledge as communion with God. A person is determined by the content of his heart. Love for God can dwell in the heart, or a person can say “there is no God” in the depths of his heart. Therefore, the heart is not just the emotional center of a human being, it is the focus of all the faculties of the human spirit. The heart has a hierarchical primacy in the structure of a human being.

So, religious anthropology considers a person as an integral, hierarchical being with a center - the heart, which brings together all the abilities of the human spirit. Hierarchy always implies subordination. Accordingly, in the religious worldview, priority is given to spiritual layers, to which the spiritual and bodily layers must be subordinated. At the same time, the value of the body and soul is not rejected, on the contrary, the Apostle Paul reminds us that “the body is the Temple of God”, and Muhammad in the hadith speaks of the need to take care of one's own body. The question is what will become the content of the human heart, how will a person be guided by love for God or love for himself. This is already the result of his choice.

Man as a god-like being, as a personality - a divine person is constituted by freedom. Therefore, the central theme of religious anthropology, regardless of the forms of religion, is always the freedom of man. But, not just an abstract concept of human freedom, but in the aspect of the relationship of human will to God's will. Accordingly, the next position of religious anthropology is the fall of man, the theme of sin, which goes to the problem of the origin of evil in the world - theodicy. On the one hand, a person in a religious worldview is an ontologically rooted being, rooted in a Higher reality that surpasses him. The relation of human existence to this Highest value gives the person himself dignity and enduring value. On the other hand, religious anthropology points to the damaged nature of man, due to the fall. If initially, as the image and likeness of God, a person is an ontologically rooted holistic being, then a sinful person is a person who has lost his integrity, a fragmented person, closed on his own self, “disorder, chaos, a mixture of ontological layers” dominates in him.

The religious understanding of freedom comes from two premises: on the one hand, from the recognition of the dignity of man, on the other hand, from the recognition of his sinfulness. When the philosopher E. Levinas explores the originality of the Jewish spiritual tradition, he comes to the conclusion about the “difficult freedom” of a person in Judaism. Firstly, Judaism as a monotheistic religion takes a person out of the power of the magical, sacred, which dominated a person and predetermined his life activity. As E. Levinas notes: “The sacred that envelops and takes me away is violence.” Judaism as a monotheistic religion affirms the independence of man and the possibility of a personal relationship with God, "face to face". Throughout the Tanakh, the Hebrew Bible, God is talking to people, and people are talking to God. Thus, between God and people, a dialogic relationship is formed, which is a form of true communication. To communicate, according to E. Levinas, means to see the face of another, and to see a face means to assert yourself personally, because a face is not just a collection of physiognomic details, but a new dimension of a human being. In this dimension, "the being is not simply closed in its form: it opens, affirms itself in depth and reveals itself in this openness in a certain way personal." For M. Buber, the "I - You" relationship is the basis of true communication, in which the other is understood not as an object, but as a unique, irreplaceable existence. The relationship with the Other as "I - You" leads to the folding of a person's self-consciousness.

The same point of view is shared by A. Men. He notes that after the Torah was given to Moses: “From now on, the history of religion will not only be the history of longing, longing and searching, but will become the history of the Testament,

S.D. Lebedev

Belgorod 2003

The attempt of a comparative analysis of the secular and religious cultural systems undertaken in this work requires a rather serious preliminary study of the conceptual apparatus, which was carried out by us in the previous work. Below we present its most important methodological provisions.

1. From the point of view of the system-sociological view of culture, its interpretation as social knowledge seems to be the most adequate, since it is social knowledge that is the system-forming aspect of culture, considered in the mode of its real social functioning.

2. Culture is characterized by system properties. As the main systemic properties of culture, the properties of a “large system”, an open and dissipative system, and a self-organizing system should be noted. The system properties of culture (social knowledge) are explained from the standpoint of the nuclear-spherical approach, which considers the system as a dialectical unity of its constituent nuclear and peripheral spheres.

3. The nature of the phenomenon as a "large system" implies an uneven distribution of structural links in it. From the standpoint of the nuclear-spherical approach, structural bonds are concentrated mainly in the core of the system, from where they spread to a greater or lesser extent to the periphery of the system. Some generally recognized universal concept acts as the core of social knowledge, while its periphery is represented by the structures of everyday and special meanings derived from them. This core reflects some priority sphere of objective reality for the subject (“reality-value”) and, thus, forms the structure of the relevance of his “life world”. The universal concept, which is the potential core of social knowledge, performs ideological functions in society.

4. The core of the system assumes the presence of constitutional and dynamic substructures in it. The stable constitutional part of the socio-cognitive core is formed by conceptualizations of an axiological nature (values), while its changeable dynamic part is formed by epistemological values ​​(representations).

5. The openness of the system of social knowledge is manifested in the ability of its conceptual core to “exchange meanings” with the external environment. The dissipation of social knowledge lies in the conceptual assimilation, legitimization by its nuclear structure of "additional" semantic aspects inherent in peripheral structures, and the dispersion (entropy) of those semantic aspects that are not consistent with its "nuclear concept". Self-organization of social knowledge involves the formation of a peripheral substructure of its systemic conceptual core, uniting around it the periphery of "private" meanings through their socio-cultural sanctioning - legitimization.

6. As an attractor of social knowledge, we tend to see the influence of the ideals organizing and guiding it. The ideal is understood as an integral socio-cognitive structure, which is the semantic quintessence of the system of social knowledge. Three levels are distinguished in the structure of the ideal: the level of rational manifestations (ideologies), the level of prevailing methods of justification (type of rationality) and the level of the original way of experiencing the subject of being (basic myth).

7. The role of the backbone factor of culture is the balance of ideals and stereotypes, which ensures the synergy of the development of culture as a whole, preventing it from overstepping the brink of eclecticism. This balance, apparently, is maintained in the depths of social consciousness and psychology, mainly at the level of civilizational and national self-identification of people and groups.

The next step in theoretical research is a comparative analysis of the socio-cognitive foundations of secular and religious cultural systems in order to clarify their common properties and specifics.

The concepts of secular and religious. Before talking about the specifics of religious and secular cultures in terms of their socio-cognitive content, it is necessary to clarify the semantic content of the categorical concepts for our study “secular” and “religious”.

The concept of "religious" is derived from the concept of "religion". As for the latter, the modern scientific literature presents a number of significantly different definitions of religion, depending on the specifics of the discipline of religion, from the point of view of which religion is considered in each specific case. As in the case of the concept of "culture", these definitions are extremely difficult to reduce to one universal definition. For this reason, we will confine ourselves for the time being to an abstract definition of "religious" as directly related to religion, in order to concretize it a little later, in relation to the specifics of the subject and method of our research.

As for the concept of "secular", its scientific definition seems to be a rather difficult task. According to V.I. Dahl, in Russian “secular” means “to the light (world) in various meanings related, earthly, worldly, vain; or civil. Secular power, opposite spiritual... clergy, white, not monastic, opposite black. Secular pleasures, noisy, sensual. In special religious studies, sociological and philosophical publications (including dictionaries and reference books), as a rule, there is no subject analysis of the concept of “secular”. When it comes to the secular, the authors usually confine themselves to an intuitive interpretation of this concept, without translating it into a rational-logical plane.

Definitely in this regard, we can say the following: a) the concept of "secular" (as well as its synonym - the concept of "secular") is almost always used as a pair of opposition in relation to the concept of "religious"; b) this concept is defined mainly negatively, starting from the concept of "religious" according to the principle "from the contrary"; c) the content of this concept is quite complex and internally contradictory, since it covers, depending on the context, a fairly wide range of heterogeneous phenomena.

Thus, there are reasons to assert that the semantic content of the “secular” is based on the definition of its specific relationship to the “religious”.

Without going into the subtleties of etymological and philosophical analysis, the consideration of which is beyond the scope of this work, we note that in general, in the context of European social thought of the XYIII-XX centuries. there are three main interpretations of the essence of the secular, differing in the degree of their "rigidity":

A) secular as counter-religious. Assumes an explicit or hidden ideological opposition to secular religion. According to this interpretation, only the content that is associated with the active denial of religious content and the approval of its alternatives can be classified as “secular”. This interpretation originates in the period of the formation and establishment of secular culture, when the latter fought to defend its existence and the right to autonomy from religious interpretations of reality that restrained, and sometimes blocked its development. An example of a classical situation, which is characterized by this interpretation of the secular, is given by the ideocratic Soviet society with its total ideology of atheism, when, according to Academician L.N. Mitrokhin, “secular and religious worldviews were considered as “light” and “darkness”, as two mutually exclusive views of the world, isomorphic to the “socialism-capitalism” counterposition, expressed by the principle “who is not with us is against us” .

B) secular as non-religious. This is a softened and broader interpretation of the concept of "secular", which does not imply the obligatory presence of an active counter-religious moment in its content, but retains the principle of distancing from religion. It represents a kind of liberalized version of the interpretation of the secular as counter-religious. In accordance with this interpretation, only that content can be classified as “secular” that in the same context cannot be attributed to “religious”, and vice versa.

C) secular as areligious. This is the broadest and ideologically neutral, but more radical from a philosophical point of view, interpretation of the principle of secularism. It presupposes the independence of the secular principle from religion. In the light of this interpretation, “secular” can be attributed to the content that is characterized not so much by the objective absence or subjective denial of the property of religiosity, as by the property of “secularism” as a kind of positive quality.

It should be noted that the above definitions imply not only "quantitative", but also qualitative differences in the corresponding versions of the concept of "secular". The first two of them are based on an excess of subjective, ideological perception of the "religious-secular" relationship. The consequence of this is the objective dependence of the meaning of the concept of "secular", interpreted in this context, from the meaning of the concept of "religious", its ontological "secondary" in relation to the religious. “Secular”, firstly, acts here as a derivative of “religious”, and secondly, it carries a predominantly negative semantic load.

Unlike the first two definitions, the third definition suggests a more detached and unbiased and, therefore, more objective, philosophical and scientific approach to the relationship between the secular and the religious. In the context of this approach, “secularism” acquires its own meaning, which implies the absence of a negative dependence on religion. It should be noted that, in essence, only the last interpretation puts the concepts of “religious” and “secular” on an equal footing, since it assumes that the secular has its own, autonomous ontological foundation, not reducible to the ontological foundation of the religious. Proceeding from this, this interpretation communicates its own positive content to the secular to the greatest extent, without making this content dependent on the content of the religious plan. Accordingly, in the context of this interpretation, this or that phenomenon can be characterized as secular, regardless of whether it is at the same time religious, and vice versa. In other words, this interpretation of the secular suggests the possibility of combining the properties of religiosity and secularity. To what extent and under what conditions such a combination is possible is a question requiring special study, which will be the subject of the next chapter of this monograph.

The third approach has clear conceptual advantages over the first two. First, it seems to be the most objective, since it is the furthest away from the ideological scheme of the rigid dual opposition. Secondly, he does not exclude, but potentially includes the first two approaches as his private moments. According to him, the secular may be antagonistic to the religious or exclude religiosity, but not necessarily and not always. Finally, thirdly, it is most consistent with the nature of the modern socio-cultural situation, when the boundaries of secular and religious are often blurred and conditional. Therefore, in the future, we will take the third definition as the basis for the concept of "secular", which implies the interpretation of the secular as an areligious principle independent of religion.

In this regard, such an important concept for the sociology of religion as secularization requires comments.

Based on the concept of the secular that we have adopted, which presupposes its substantial character, secularization has two sides: “negative” – the exclusion from human life and the destruction of religious spiritual and cultural content, and “positive” – the filling of human life with autonomous, non-religious, actually secular content. Within the framework of the first or second interpretation of the relationship between the secular and the religious (see above), both of these sides of the secularization process seem to be rigidly interconnected and practically indistinguishable: how much “remains” from the religious content of culture, how much “arrives” in its secular sphere, and vice versa. If we adhere to the third interpretation, then these two sides of secularization seem to be connected very flexibly and indirectly. The accumulation and complication or the destruction and simplification of secular cultural content may not affect the religious content, and under certain conditions it may cause in the sphere of the latter not only the opposite, but also a similar effect. The same is true for the reverse situation. In other words, secular and religious culture can develop not only competitively, but also “in parallel” and even synergistically.

In this system of coordinates, the religious and the secular form autonomous, largely parallel socio-cognitive spaces in culture. So, for example, a simple, “mechanical” replacement of secular semantic content with religious content does not necessarily imply the progress of the religious wing of culture, since the displacement or destruction of secular semantic structures in itself does not yet cause the development, growth and complication of an array of knowledge of a religious nature. This requires additional factors. In the same way, the development of a secular body of social knowledge does not yet mean the “automatic” displacement of religious socio-cognitive structures from the public consciousness, but allows, to one degree or another, the possibility of their synthesis with secular structures. The development of one creates only one of the prerequisites for the displacement and degradation of the other, and this prerequisite can “work” in the opposite direction if the second culture can respond to the challenge by integrating the best properties of the first.

Thus, if we understand the secular as “religious” and, accordingly, consider the secular cultural content as essentially independent and not related to religion, then secularization appears before us as a complex two-way process, far from unambiguous from a religious or counter-religious point of view.

In order to fill these schemes with real content in relation to the process of secular-religious interaction, one should take into account the fundamental difference in the socio-cognitive organization of religious and secular cultures. We believe that this difference is based on the principle of structural and content asymmetry of religious and secular cultural systems. Next, we will sequentially consider its content and structural aspects.

Content asymmetry of religious and secular cultures. If “religious” and “secular” are considered not as a designation of abstract entities, but as alternative predicates of culture, then culture, being classified as religious or secular, must, one way or another, be determined through some qualitative characteristics of the main content of culture - in this case, through the qualitative characteristics of social knowledge.

static aspect. The initial key to understanding the specifics of religious and secular cultures is provided by the categories of "sacred" and "profane".

The category of "sacred" (sacred) together with its opposition - the category of "worldly" (profane) is one of the most important content-functional constants of culture. Its significance is exceptionally great, since outside the categories of "sacred - profane" and the corresponding hierarchical differentiation of cultural content, the very existence of culture becomes problematic. Here the proverb “a holy place is never empty” is quite fair. As M. Eliade points out, “sacred and profane are two ways of being in the world, two situations of existence accepted by man in the course of history… the sacred and profane ways of existence testify to the difference in the position occupied by man in the Cosmos.” At the same time, “the sacred manifests itself as a reality of a completely different order, different from the “natural” reality ... it manifests itself, is revealed as something completely different from the mundane” .

It should be noted that in classical religious literature (R. Otto, M. Eliade), as can be seen from the above quotation, the sacred is often approached and even identified with the concept of the supernatural. However, in reality, the meaning of these two concepts is significantly different. “The supernatural and the sacred,” P. Berger rightly notes, “are closely related phenomena, historically it can be assumed that the experience of the second is rooted in the experience of the first. But it is analytically important to distinguish between these two kinds of experience. One can imagine their relationship as two intersecting, but not coinciding circles of human experience (Italics mine - S.L.) ” .

As for the "supernatural", in terms of content, it, apparently, is also a constant of culture, since not one of the known cultures of the past and present has ever done and does not do without any ideas about the supernatural. However, the constant nature of the supernatural does not apply to its functional side: in functional terms, the supernatural can act in culture both as a sacred one and perform other, less significant cultural functions - for example, serve as a theme of folklore creativity, act as a subject of philosophical research, etc.

“Empirically speaking,” Berger writes in this connection, “what is usually called religion includes a set of attitudes, beliefs and actions associated with two types of experience - the experience of the supernatural and the experience of the sacred” .

Proceeding from this, the "life world" of the ideal type of religious culture is characterized as predominantly supersensible and superrational, and the "life world" of the ideal type of secular culture is characterized as predominantly sensory-rational. Consequently, the main "fabric" of the culture of a religious nature is formed by knowledge of the transcendent, otherworldly and beyond, while the "fabric" of a secular culture is knowledge of the "earthly", predominantly material existence.

However, within culture as a "large", dissipative and self-organizing system, there is a differentiation into the nuclear and peripheral spheres. Therefore, since the sacred can be defined as some supreme value (supervalue), crowning the axiological hierarchy of culture and giving its sanction to all other values, it is legitimate to correlate this key difference, first of all, with the nuclear socio-cognitive structures of religious and secular cultures. It is the core of religious culture that corresponds to the area of ​​the supernatural, while the core of secular culture corresponds to the area of ​​the “natural”. As for the periphery, in its objective dimension it is the same for both cultures and refers mainly to the sphere of "earthly" reality.

Thus, the core concept of social knowledge is always correlated with some priority sphere of the realities of the "life world" of the social subject and implies the presence in the objective dimension of this "life world" of quite real and specific (rather than conditional and illusory) values.

In accordance with the definition of P. Berger and taking into account what has been said, by "religious culture" we will further mean, first of all, a universal social-cognitive education, the main content (conceptual core) of which is focused on those realities of the "life world" that combine properties of the supernatural and sacred. Consequently, in contrast to it, secular culture in its main content should be oriented either to those realities that are not associated with the supernatural, or those that are not associated with the sacred. The latter option does not exist, since the sacred, by definition, has a place in any culture. Thus, secular culture can be defined primarily as a culture that is not focused on the priority of the supernatural.

Based on the foregoing, it is legitimate to use the following “working” definitions to designate the corresponding versions of culture:

Religious culture is a type of culture in which supernatural reality acts as sacred (sacred); in such a culture, the sacred is either itself characterized by supernatural properties, or implies direct sanction from some supernatural principle;

Secular culture is a type of culture in which the sacred (sacred) § does not have the properties of the supernatural and does not necessarily require the sanction of the supernatural, based on an alternative ontological and socio-cognitive basis.

Thus, both the supernatural and the sacred are present in the socio-cognitive dimension of almost every really existing culture. At the same time, the content-functional combination of the supernatural and the sacred is a "variable value". The categories "sacred - worldly" and "supernatural - sensual" are characterized not by a constant, but by a variable ratio. This is expressed in the fact that secular culture, “bracketing” the reality of the supernatural, introduces a substantial hierarchy into the context of the sensual reality itself. The content of the category of the sacred in different cultural contexts varies: this role can be played by both the supernatural and the “natural” principle (which, of course, is subjectively given certain qualities of the supernatural). In other words, the objective and corresponding socio-cognitive content, which in culture has the status of sacred, can be both supernatural (religious) and other (secular) in nature. In the first case, we are talking about religious culture, in the second - about secular culture.

In accordance with the nature of priority reality, culture develops "organs of cognition" adequate to this latter. The properties of "reality-value" determine the nature of the ways of its comprehension (the nature of rationality in culture) and, indirectly, the content and structure of the social knowledge that reflects it. The converse statement is equally true: the methods of comprehension of reality and the social knowledge accumulated in their line, if they are sufficiently adequate, are always oriented towards this sphere of reality and coherent with it. Cognitive representations will reflect the properties of priority reality, imperatives will follow from it, and values ​​will be directly or indirectly correlated with it.

All of the above allows us to correlate (in the first approximation) a typical religious culture with the ideational culture of P.A. Sorokin, and a typical secular culture - with a sensual culture. As for the idealistic (integral) culture, from our point of view, it should be considered as a cultural system that combines the properties of religious and secular.

Proceeding from this, the fundamental feature of religious culture is that it comprehends not one, but two substantially different layers of being: the supernatural, transcendent, on the one hand, and the sensual, material, "earthly" - on the other hand. Without this synthesis with the "worldly" beginning, religion will not be able to become itself, i.e. a system of transcendental values ​​and meanings that actually operates and determines the life of a social subject. However, there is no real paradox here. There is a kind of ontological “gap” between the transcendental and “terrestrial” spheres of reality - they do not pass into each other smoothly, but abruptly, abruptly, and there are practically no intermediate diffuse zones between them. Therefore, the main, central problem of any religion has always been the definition of the principle of correlating the transcendental change of being (the “Heaven”) revealed to it with the usual “worldly” dimension of being (the “earth”). In itself, the sacred attitude of religion, which performs the function of the "hard core" of the religious system, is cognitively highly specialized - in the sense that it is focused on the "social construction" of the reality of a transcendent, absolute order, while the reality of the material-ideal plane remains on the periphery. and beyond his field of vision.

Meanwhile, objectively, this sphere of reality in no way loses its relevance in religious culture. Life itself imperiously requires religion to resolve a number of issues that are formally far from purely religious interests - about the attitude to the family, the state, the economy, creativity, everyday life, etc. Religious feeling and religious thought can resolve these questions in the negative, i.e. in the key of "escape from the world", but they cannot get around them. Therefore, religion most often does not so much reinvent its life world, building it “from scratch”, as it reinterprets in a new key the already established cultural values ​​and ideas that it finds “in place”, in the socio-cultural environment in which it is affirmed. Although, of course, this does not exclude genuine meaning-creation as a generation in the semantic channel of a given religion of qualitatively new values ​​and knowledge.

From the point of view of secular culture, taken as a principle, religious reality itself is irrelevant, since secular culture is not oriented towards it and does not have the possibility of an adequate judgment about the sphere of supernatural realities. Its "life world" is represented almost exclusively by the "earthly" reality of the material-ideal plan, in which such a culture seeks and finds for itself both the sacred and the mundane.

Thus, the substantive aspect of the asymmetry of secular and religious cultures lies in the fact that the focus of secular culture is the reality of one type - the material-ideal reality of a natural property, while religious culture focuses on realities of different types - supernatural and natural, trying to transfer between them a conceptual "bridge" linking both into a single system of relations.

Structural asymmetry of religious and secular cultures. Universal and multiverse principles of self-organization of social knowledge. If we translate the arguments about the relationship between Sorokin's types of cultural systems and the religious-secular alternative into the "plane" of the cultural ideal, then in this regard, the most important moment for us is the fact that as the religious (transcendental) orientation intensifies in a culture, the "index idealization” – and, on the contrary, as culture reorients itself towards the sensory world, this indicator decreases. This is manifested at all three levels of the cultural ideal as a socio-cognitive formation.

At the conceptual, ideological and ideological level, the ideational nature of culture presupposes the totality of the "life world" of the subject, the commonality of ideological principles, protected by the unshakable authority of tradition. The weakening of idealism and the growth of sensuality introduces a moment of pluralism into culture (since the same “facts” can confirm different concepts) and, as a result, a conflict of interpretations.

At the level of the prevailing methods of substantiation and logical conceptualization (the level of the type of rationality), the ideational nature of culture presupposes an exceptionally high role and "proportion" of synthetic methods of comprehending the truth, the main of which is mystical intuition. And, on the contrary, as the sensory orientation of culture intensifies, the role and “specific weight” of analytical, differentiating methods of cognition also grow in it.

Finally, at the level of the basic myth of a culture, its ideational nature presupposes the unity of the fundamental aspects of the worldview and worldview of all subjects-bearers of a given culture. A decrease in the level of idealization of culture gradually shifts the “focus of public consent” from the sphere of sacred beliefs to the sphere of rational reasoning and then to the sphere of empirical facts, and therefore the deep foundations of the ideal are recognized, in the end, as a “private affair” of the group or / and the individual (the principle “ freedom of conscience"). Unity is achieved to a large extent in an external, conventional way (“social contract”).

Therefore, it can be stated that religious reality, comprehended mainly through mystical intuition, has a “monistic” character in the limit, while the reality of a material property, comprehended mainly by the senses, in the limit, on the contrary, has a “pluralistic” character.

All this suggests that the principles of self-organization themselves, which determine the architectonics of the system core and, accordingly, the general nature of the structure of social knowledge underlying secular and religious cultures, are significantly different. This difference we have designated by the term "structural asymmetry" of religious and secular cultural systems. According to the concept of structural asymmetry, social knowledge, which forms the basis of religious culture, tends to self-organize according to the "classical" principle of the semantic (symbolic) universe. As for social knowledge, which forms the basis of secular culture, its self-organization is carried out according to the principle, in a certain sense, the opposite of universality. The latter can be designated as the principle of semantic (symbolic) multiverse. The universe and multiversum, therefore, act as ideal types of religious and secular cultures, or, in other words, the ultimate attractors that form these types of cultural systems.

The cultural system, formed "under the sign" of religion, is ideally monocentric. Her "life world" is total. Such a culture gravitates in the limit towards a single initial and final supervalue, which is some intuitively-mystically comprehended transcendental reality. P.A. Florensky, characterizing culture in general from the theological standpoint, actually gave an excellent example of the definition of religious culture proper: “kultura is that which is permanently split off from the cult, as it were, the germination of the cult, its shoots, its lateral stems. Shrines are the primary creation of man; cultural values ​​are derivatives of the cult, like the exfoliating husk of the cult, like the dry skin of a bulbous plant. This principle is expressed as consistently and logically as possible in classical monotheism, where all cultural values ​​and meanings ultimately come down to the initial and final existential unity - God: "I am the beginning and the end, alpha and omega." The hierarchy of values ​​here is completely absorbed by the religious sacred attitude, due to which all categories of such a culture eventually converge at one point and, thus, the entire socio-cognitive system of religious culture is formed according to the principle of the classical pyramid. From this follows the totality of mature religious cultures: in their context, everything - in any case, all more or less important moments of human life - should, if possible, be correlated with the supervalue of God (or another sacred supernatural principle), and receive divine sanction.

On the contrary, secular culture gravitates towards a polycentric system-structural organization. This means that a single universal supervalue in the image and likeness of the religious supervalue is initially weakened or completely absent in it. According to H. Cox, “the values ​​of a secularized person are desacralized, devoid of any claim to unconditional and final significance (italics mine - S.L.). Now values ​​are just what some social group at a certain time and in a certain place considers good. These are no longer values, but rather assessments. The same should be attributed not only to values, but also to other integrative socio-cognitive structures. This makes the system of secular culture more flexible and, in a sense, more viable in the dynamic conditions of today's rapidly changing world. Secular culture will retain its structure even if, for one reason or another, its content changes significantly - for example, if the traditional modernist values ​​of reason and scientific technology are replaced by quasi-religious values ​​of magic and mysticism. It can be said about secular culture that ideally it does not have a single content center common to its entire socio-cognitive space. Therefore, in its substantive aspect, the systemic core of secular culture presupposes the coexistence of several or even many complementary centers, each of which specializes in understanding and social regulation of a certain area of ​​socio-cultural life. At the same time, none of these spheres can claim the status of some kind of absolute or priority, legitimizing other spheres. Therefore, the hierarchy of secular cultural values ​​proper does not form a single pyramid, unless we are talking about a totalitarian system of culture.

The foregoing explains why religious culture is characterized by the fact that each religion and denomination forms its own cultural system, distinct from others and opposed to all other denominations. And, on the contrary, why, in the context of secular culture, the most diverse, sometimes contradictory worldviews and ideologies are combined into a common system, being, as it were, many and by and large equivalent variants of one specific type of attitude to reality.

The second characteristic of the ideal secular culture, which fundamentally distinguishes it from the ideal religious culture, is its diffuse character. A typical religious cultural system is, by and large, static and has fairly clear boundaries. If necessary, it is relatively easy to trace where the boundary lies, for example, between Christian and Islamic cultures. Secular culture is characterized by relative “transparency of borders” and dynamism: the supervalues ​​of its constituent ideologies and worldviews constantly collide, intersect, “shuffle”, and none of them, as a rule, captures the entire secular cultural space entirely. An ideal secular culture, in comparison with a religious one, resembles a boiling cauldron, where there is nothing absolutely stable, everything is amorphous and, by and large, potentially equivalent. In its "pure" version - i.e. in the absence of all even indirect influences from ideational supervalues, secular culture would look like a kaleidoscope of an infinite number of infinitely different subcultures, demonstrating the most bizarre combinations of values ​​and knowledge, but extremely unstable.

A close similarity to such a limiting state of cultural space is the modern discourse of postmodernism. A clear trend towards it is also shown by the real state of the secular culture of Western countries. Modern Western culture is vividly illustrated by the passage of J. Habermas, according to which today “the communication structures of the public, dominated by the mass media and absorbed by them, are so oriented towards the passive, entertaining and privatized use of information that coherent, i.e. holistic, patterns of interpretation ( at least of medium range) simply cannot form anymore. The once integral cultural space of Western civilization, therefore, is becoming more and more differentiated and diversified, breaking up into a pluralistic set of opinions and judgments.

Nevertheless, the “pendulum of culture” is steadily shifting, and there comes a moment when the intermediate stage, regardless of its integral or eclectic nature, passes into the third, “sensory” phase of socio-cultural development. This type of cultural supersystem is the most familiar and familiar to us, since it is to this type (more precisely, to its descending, “overripe” phase) that Sorokin refers the Euro-American civilization of the 20th century. Its clear sign is the rapid secularization as a “retreat” of total religious systems and the growth and development of the autonomous enclaves of a “worldly” character that emerged at the previous stage. Secular norms and institutions become decisive in public life. The slogan of this culture is "Here and now!" Its cornerstones are empirical science, technology, secular ideology and "human, too human", in the words of F. Nietzsche, ethical and legal norms.

This pathos of "sensual" culture determines a new direction in the search for the initial and final truth, which is now seen on the earthly paths of scientific knowledge of the "physical and biological properties of reality." Stimulated by this fundamentally idealistic (and somewhere in the depths even ideational) impulse, sensory science reaches previously unthinkable heights and scales, becoming the highest and best achievement, a kind of “face” of sensory-type culture. The same applies to the field of engineering and technology. At the same time, in the sphere of scientific thought itself, there are latent processes of strengthening the pragmatic, utilitarian aspect, the growth of the value of “usefulness” and the decrease in the value of “truth”, which, ultimately, leads it to a general crisis. A similar fate befalls morality, art, public authority, law and other important areas of sensory culture. Ultimately, the cultural supersystem based on the sensory principle gives way to a culture of the "ideational" type, and the cycle, if it is not interrupted, begins anew.

Thus, the scheme of the Sorokin cycle can be interpreted as follows:

Ideational (religious) culture - emphasis on the monistic reality of the supernatural - defining influence of a simple attractor - "dogmatic imperative" of social knowledge - socio-cognitive monocentrism;

Sensual (secular) culture – § emphasis on the pluralistic reality of the material world – defining influence of a strange attractor – “heretical imperative” of social knowledge – socio-cognitive polycentrism;

Idealistic (integral) culture§ - a combination of monistic and pluralistic properties of reality - the equilibrium of simple and strange attractors - a balanced state of social knowledge - a hierarchy of social cognitive centers: a common center in combination with several "specialized" centers subordinate to it.

The logic of the development of secular culture. Differences of cultural systems are "concentrated" mainly at the level of their core elements, which we consider as "centering" their ideologies. At the same time, ideology is understood quite broadly; thus, it “can be fixed in the form of one systematized teaching, as is the case, for example, in the case of great religions and Marxism-Leninism, or it can remain unsystematized, scattered over numerous and heterogeneous texts in such a way that it can be presented in the form of a single systematized teaching. seems to be a very difficult matter, as is the case, for example, in modern Western countries. Mixed options between these extremes are possible.

Accordingly, in religious culture, the core of the system of social knowledge forms a complex of sacred texts of that religion, which is accepted by the social subject as a culture-forming base. As far as secular culture is concerned, the situation here is not so unambiguous. Some secular cultures have a similar core. This applies, first of all, to socio-cultural systems of an “ideocratic” nature, where the canon of the dominant socio-political ideology (which, as Paul Tillich has shown, can be considered as a quasi-religious entity) acts in this capacity. Such a secular culture is characterized by a pronounced sacred core and tends to be “mono-stylistic”, in accordance with the terminology of L.G. Ionina, type of culture.

In a pluralistic secular culture, there is no obvious core of this kind. However, from our point of view, this is not a sufficient reason to declare a secular culture of a pluralistic type a fundamentally non-systemic entity, as L.G. Ionin, and thereby equate it with a loosely integrated conglomerate of worldly culture. Rather, on the contrary, it should be considered as a system of a more complex type than the “classical” monocentric system. It has its own logic of development, which, as we will try to show below, is by no means reduced to a simple disintegration and return of the cultural system to a mundane (everyday) state.

Secular and mundane. In this regard, a demarcation line should be drawn between the concepts of "secular" and "worldly". These terms in everyday life and in science are most often used as synonyms. In some cases, this can be justified, but not always, since, from the point of view of our theoretical model, the semantic fields of the corresponding concepts intersect, but do not coincide. In the light of our concept, what is common in the nature of worldly and secular cultures is the identity of the “life world” corresponding to them, the primary zone of relevance (i.e., “reality-value”) of which is formed by the realities of the “earthly”, material-ideal plan, and the realities supernatural, religious-mystical plan are forced out into zones of relative or complete irrelevance.

The fundamental difference between secular and secular cultures is rooted in the fact that, at the level of the socio-cognitive dimension, secular culture, taken as an ideal type, is characterized by a weak degree of integration. It does not have an immanent nuclear structure that conceptually integrates it as a systemic whole, and its unity is based only on tradition. Accordingly, “simply worldly” culture will be characterized as a rather amorphous set of certain meanings, united in the consciousness of a social subject mainly “mechanically” and capable of functioning autonomously, without any religious or other legitimization. An objective prerequisite for the existence of this type of culture is the well-known fragmentation, particularity of social institutions, as mentioned above. On the contrary, secular culture is characterized by the presence of such a nuclear structure and therefore has the properties of a system, although, as already mentioned, a system of a special type. As a system, it is characterized by significant resistance to external influences and a sufficiently developed cultural self-awareness. From an evolutionary perspective, the difference between secular and secular cultures can be seen as the degree of maturity of a certain cultural type, as a difference between successive stages in the process of cultural self-organization.

In the light of socio-cognitive methodology, these concepts acquire the following content:

Worldly § culture is the sum of everyday and specialized social knowledge derived from it, taken in its autonomous being;

Secular culture is a systemic socio-cognitive education that integrates worldly knowledge on the basis of a universal concept immanent to the “world” (i.e., does not have a supernatural content).

Thus, we consider the symbolic multiverse as the “ideal type” of secular culture, and the symbolic universe as the “ideal type” of religious culture (in reality, both are represented by a wide range of intermediate states).

The development of secular culture and secularization. Based on the foregoing, it can be argued that, in accordance with the laws of sociocultural dynamics, P.A. Sorokin, secular culture logically goes through a series of successive stages of development. First, it experiences a kind of "incubation period" of its evolution in the bosom of religious culture (ideational period). This refers to the stage of the so-called. "active-ideational" culture. Then, having taken shape and emerging from the latent state, for some time it is in a state of symbiosis with it, supplementing and balancing religious values ​​and ideas with values ​​and ideas “from this world” (integral period). Finally, left to itself, it gradually evolves towards more and more mundane, material and utilitarian values ​​and ideals and, in the end, degrades (sensory period) and reintegrates under the auspices of new, again fundamentally religious values.

Here we should recall the concept of the famous American sociologist of religion G.P. Becker, who singled out two main types of secular society: a “principled” secular society, which is characterized by the fact that it still retains, with certain reservations, the sacred nature of its principles (i.e., it relies on some generally significant sacral socio-cognitive core - S.L. .), and an "extremely secular" society, recognizing the instrumental effectiveness of actions as the only limitation. If we present these socio-cultural types as two phases of the logical development of secular culture, this concept is quite consistent with the hypothesis of the cyclic (self-oscillating) mode of cultural evolution of Sorokin-Bransky.

This evolutionary logic, in our opinion, testifies not only to the relative “moral instability” of secular culture, which is often emphasized by religious authors, but also to the greater internal dynamism of secular culture, due to which, firstly, it is able to adapt to the most diverse value-worldview systems, acting as a nuclear ideological concept, and, secondly, is able to independently change them. It should be noted, however, that "in a free state" the vector of these changes, ultimately, is directed towards the reduction of values ​​to the sensual sphere and their complete relativization. In its essence, secular culture is kaleidoscopic, and this property of it manifests itself the brighter and more directly, the more the formative action of the religious attractor of its development weakens and becomes clouded, and the action of the secular attractor itself strengthens and becomes more “pure”.

The change from the cultural era of religious culture to the cultural era of secular culture is usually denoted by the term "secularization". Different researchers put different meanings into this concept. So, T. Parsons defines it as “the fact that any body, oriented more culturally than socially, has lost its legitimate power to prescribe values ​​to society and monitor the mandatory observance of norms; in this sense, it can be said that society has undergone secularization. Values ​​are still rooted in religious soil. But religion is organized in a pluralistic and private way. From the point of view of P. Berger, “under secularization we understand the process of liberation of certain spheres of society and culture from the domination of religious institutions and symbols. If we are talking about institutions and societies related to the recent history of the West, then here, of course, secularization is manifested in the loss by the Christian church of areas that were previously under its control or influence: in the separation of church and state, in the expropriation of church land holdings, in the liberation of the education system. from the authority of church authorities. But if we are talking about culture and symbols, then secularization means something more than a socio-structural process. It influences the totality of cultural life and ideas. It can be seen in the decline of the role of religious themes in art, philosophy and literature, and, most importantly, in the development of science as an autonomous, purely secular view of the world. Moreover, in this case, we mean that the process of secularization also has a subjective side. Just as there is a secularization of society and culture, there is also a secularization of consciousness. Simply put, this means that the modern West is producing more and more individuals who, in their relation to the world and to themselves, do not use religious interpretations. According to H. Cox, "now" secularization "means the disappearance of the indispensable religious conditionality of the symbols on which culture is built" . D. Bell believes that “During the development and differentiation of modern society - we call this process secularization - the social world of religion has been reduced; more and more religion turned into a personal conviction, which was admitted or rejected, but not in the sense of fate, but as a matter of will, reason or something else ... When this succeeds, the religious way of understanding the world becomes ethical and aesthetic - and inevitably weak and anemic » . Modern domestic religious studies understand secularization as “a social and mental process, as a result of which the most important spheres of public life, culture and human consciousness are freed from the power of institutions and symbols of religion ... in which various areas of human life are no longer experienced as sacred, but begin to be perceived as independent in relation to to the norms and institutions of religion".

Modern and postmodern as stages of cultural secularization. In the light of our methodological approach, secularization is not only and, perhaps, not so much the “diminution” and displacement of religious culture from public life, but the growth, development and establishment of secular culture in the society. Researchers who have studied the processes of socio-cultural secularization often associate them with such concepts as "multiplication of choice", relativization, and disintegration. The motive of diversification, the disintegration of the whole and the absolute into the plural and the relative can be traced in various theories and ideas about the secularization process.

In the scientific literature, secularization is considered in close connection with another, more general socio-cultural process - modernization. At the same time, in recent decades, more and more talk about the onset of the next stage of cultural development, called "postmodern". At the same time, the attitude of the latter to secularization is debatable. Nevertheless, we are inclined to believe that the processes of culture secularization and, on the other hand, the processes of its modernization-postmodernization are extremely close in a number of key parameters, and that there are grounds for considering them in the closest connection with each other.

In a comparative perspective, the "cultural projects" of modernity and postmodernity are characterized by the following features.

1) Constructivism as an artificial creation of cultural "metadiscourses" of human social existence; as noted by L.V. Skvortsov, “the culture of Modern (New Time) considered the objective hierarchy of things created by man that make up the artificial world, and the established social hierarchy”;

2) Unification of the symbols and realities of the "life world", based on strict "monism", formalization and unambiguity (homogeneity) of their socio-cognitive interpretations;

3) "Disenchantment" of the world; according to the definition of M. Weber, this term means “increasing intellectualization and rationalization”, meaning “knowledge of this or belief that a person can always find out this (the conditions of his life - S.L.) as soon as he wants, that there is no mysterious and unpredictable forces interfering in his life, that he can - in principle - by rational calculation, master all things";

4) Objectification of subjective reality, understood as "realization", embodiment in real social space and time of various ideal "projects";

5) Subjectivity, understood in the sense of the cult of human reason and rationality as the last instance of truth and values; it proceeds from "individualistic rationalism, which does not accept the established system of metaphysics and is ready to change the hypothesis if new facts and experience do not fit into the old scheme."

Postmodern:

1) Deconstruction; as Yu.N. Davydov, the concept of "deconstruction" is a key concept of the ideology of postmodernity - the philosophical currents of postmodernism. Deconstruction is manifested in the falsification and overthrow of any "metadiscourses" - i.e. ultimately, any structures of meanings that generalize and integrate social knowledge, resulting in the progressive disintegration of the cultural whole;

2) The ambiguity of the symbols and realities of the "life world", the pluralism of their interpretations; it is “a culture of diversity that does not have a single center and a preferred meaning, when meanings are created in the course of action, and all created meanings are equal in status”;

3) The growth of esotericism - the so-called. "new opacity" ("new obscurity", "new darkness"); this is due to the fact that the postmodern paradigm “acts in principle against rational constructions as limiting the freedom of the human “I”;

4) "Virtualization" of reality; the term "virtualization" in this case denotes the subjective imparting to the realities of the "life world" of the properties of spatial inversion, temporal reversibility and arbitrariness of their structure-forming parameters;

5) Elimination of the subject; This process is based on the “massovization” of consciousness, leading to the substitution of personality by individuality, “face” (R. Guardini) and, ultimately, to the dissolution of human individuality in the impersonal “collective”, “unconscious”, “transcendent”, etc. P.

Thus, the characteristic properties of the cultural situations of modernity and postmodernity make it possible to see that modernity, in comparison with postmodernity, retains, as it were, a number of essential features inherent in premodernist (traditional, religious) cultures. At the same time, it already contains potential postmodern intentions, thus being, as it were, an intermediate, transitional stage from the “classical” traditional (religious) culture to postmodern culture. “The paradox of modernity,” A. Panarin notes in this regard, “is that in sociocultural and psychological terms it feeds on traditionalism, requires a certain set of traditional virtues ... bourgeois society really owes its success to the arsenal of disciplining pre-bourgeois culture, personified by the patriarchal family, the church and the army."

From the above schematic comparison of modernity and postmodernity, one can see that it is the latter that more closely matches the ideal type of secular culture that we have described above. At the same time, traditional religious culture cannot immediately move to a postmodern state - this requires an intermediate phase, the function of which is performed by modernity. In the light of our approach, proceeding from the existence of a self-oscillating rhythm of cultural development, which is due to the dynamic "pulsating" combination of integrating and differentiating attractors, postmodernity seems to be a natural stage in the development of a secular cultural situation that is replacing modernity. Thus, the full cycle of change of integrating and differentiating attractors is described by the triad "religious culture - modern - postmodern".

Proceeding from this, we consider the socio-cultural development of society at the stage of the prevailing influence of the differentiating attractor as a movement from the state of traditional culture through the culture of modernity to the state of postmodernity, which corresponds to the progressive transformation of a religious-type culture into a secular-type culture. Thus, secularization proceeds in two stages, associated with the progressive devaluation and erosion of the “big” ideas underlying the culture. The first (modernist) stage is associated with the destruction of the socio-cognitive correlate of the supernatural in culture. The second (postmodern) stage is the destruction of the socio-cognitive correlate of the sacred (sacred).

The historical logic of secularization in Western culture. Thus, based on the Sorokin-Bransky cyclic model of sociocultural dynamics, the cultural periods of modernity and postmodernity in Western (Euro-American) civilizational history can be represented as two successive stages of a single global process of cultural secularization. Western culture, which has formed the “classical” model of secularization during the last centuries of its development, can serve as an example of the most pure and consistent evolution of a cultural system under the influence of a differentiating development attractor. A detailed and thorough analysis of this process is the subject of a separate special study on the philosophy of culture, which is beyond the scope and content of this work. Below we will give an extremely general and schematic sketch reconstructing the main stages of this process.

Traditional culture. The "original" religious Christian culture, inherited by Europe from the period of the Middle Ages, is, as is typical of a mature religious culture, total in nature. This is expressed as follows. According to the outstanding Russian medieval historian A.Ya. Gurevich, faith in God “was not a hypothesis at all for a medieval person, but a postulate, an urgent need for his entire vision of the world and moral consciousness, he was unable to explain the world and navigate in it. That was - for the people of the Middle Ages - the highest truth, around which all their ideas and ideas were grouped, the truth with which their cultural and social values ​​\u200b\u200bwere correlated, the ultimate regulatory principle of the entire picture of the world of the era (italics mine - S.L.) ". According to another well-known medievalist, philosopher of culture R. Guardini, in this culture “As a whole, and in each of its elements, it (the world) is the image of God. The rank and value of every being is determined by the degree to which it reflects God. Various areas of existence are correlated with each other and form the order of being: inanimate, vegetative, animal. In man and his life, the whole universe is reassembled in order to unfold a new order: the order of the microcosm in the fullness of its steps and significances.

The system of social knowledge taking shape under the influence of this ideal formed such a world that "was small, understandable and conveniently surveyed" to such an extent that "it was pleasant and easy to look around and reproduce it as a whole - all without a trace" . Such a system of social knowledge, corresponding to the classical medieval and, more broadly, to the traditional religious cultural cosmos, is an example of the purest and most typical symbolic universe with its monocentrism, cultural monostylism, and an integrative ideal common to the entire society.

This socio-cognitive system determined the life situation of Western European civilization for almost ten centuries (from the YI to the XIY centuries inclusive). Then, for reasons, the analysis of which is not included in the objectives of this study, this holistic, basically religious, culture enters a period of radical transformations and, as a system-forming factor of society, gradually gives way to a new type of culture - secular culture, which has reached maturity in the period of modernity.

Modern culture. “Historically, the beginning of modernity is usually identified with the industrial revolution (singling out of the economic system), the emergence (or isolating) of the bourgeois-democratic state, with the bourgeois Enlightenment and the beginning of the natural sciences characteristic of the New Age” . However, modernization is based on a fundamental shift in the structures of the "life world" of the cultural system, which began several centuries earlier. As a result of this shift, as Z. Bauman writes, “approximately by the end of the 17th century. in Western Europe... a harmonious and coherent picture of the world began to crumble (in England, this process occurred in the period after the reign of Elizabeth I). Since the number of people who do not fit neatly into any of the established cells of the “divine chain of being” (and, consequently, the volume of those efforts that were made to attribute them to strictly defined, carefully guarded positions), increased sharply, since, naturally, the pace of legislative activity, in particular, codes were adopted that regulate even those areas of life that have been left to themselves since time immemorial (italics mine - S.L.); in addition, special bodies were created to supervise, supervise and protect the rules, to prevent violations and neutralize criminals. Social differences and inequalities have become the subject of analysis, deliberate planning and goal setting, and, finally, conscious, organized and specialized efforts (emphasis mine - S.L.) ” .

Here we see a number of key moments of the fundamental transformation of the "life world" of Western European culture, which consists in the emergence of qualitatively new zones of relevance for the culture of the religious type. As P. Berger figuratively put it in this connection, in the process of this transformation “the hidden backbone of “society” was exposed, and a special world of motives and forces appeared to the gaze, which cannot be explained within the framework of the official interpretation of social reality” . Secular (worldly) realities acted as these motives and forces, such as: new social categories of people, a more complicated system of social differences and inequalities, and new legal relations corresponding to all this, etc. These aspects of social reality did not fit into the framework of the categories of traditional religious culture, but at the same time they urgently demanded comprehension, an urgent "emission of meanings" that would cover the conceptual deficit of existing social knowledge. All these realities, which until then had been found within the boundaries of the zone of relative or even complete irrelevance of medieval cultural universes and did not represent an independent “reality-value” in the eyes of society, suddenly acquire paramount vital significance for it. They powerfully invade the hitherto unshakable hierarchy of semantic meanings and begin to threaten the very existence of the cultural cosmos of civilization, shaped by the realities of the "life world" of the Middle Ages.

The comprehension and legitimization of new subject-object aspects from the standpoint of the sacred core of culture with the aim of integrating them into the traditional symbolic universe for some time gives a "linear effect". New realities are more or less successfully incorporated into the old "life world". However, there comes a time when new wine tears old wineskins. Intermediate semantic subuniversums - legal, political, humanitarian, natural sciences, etc., growing at the expense of more and more legitimations, gradually gain autonomy. They no longer fit objectively or subjectively into the "life world" of a medieval person, who was "not only very cramped, but also very monotonous, despite the apparent diversity." And from that moment on, the development of the entire system of social knowledge turns onto a different path, acquiring a non-linear, from the standpoint of the traditional universe, character.

The main difference between the new evolutionary stage of the development of culture and its development in the previous phase of the cycle is the fundamental diversification of the socio-cognitive (semantic) core of culture. It is this property that Jurgen Habermas, following M. Weber, considers the defining feature of modernity:

“According to Weber, cultural modernity is characterized by the fact that the substantial mind, expressed in religious and metaphysical images of the world, is divided into three moments, which can only be formally (through argumentative justification) kept together (my italics - S.L.). Since the images of the world disintegrated and traditional problems could now be interpreted only from the specific point of view of truth, normative correctness, authenticity (or beauty), that is, they could be discussed as questions of knowledge, justice and taste, Modern times came to isolating the value areas of science, morality and art. » .

This division of a single and integral core of the original universal culture into three autonomous and mutually “opaque”, although by inertia still retaining the stylistic unity of the symbolic subuniverse, was finally formalized and fixed (legitimized) in the philosophy of the Enlightenment. It marked the beginning of an irreversible process of further qualitative fragmentation of the cultural space. However, for at least another two centuries in Europe, the action of the new (secular) attractor of cultural evolution is balanced by the counteraction of the old (religious) attractor. This manifests itself not only at the external, superficial level in the form of maintaining the authority and formal priority of religion in all major spheres of human life, but also at the internal level of underlying socio-cultural processes. As rightly noted in this regard by A.S. Panarin, "Modernism was at war with religious faith, but its idols - progress, equality, freedom - in themselves testified to the transformed forms of religious faith and religious inspiration" .

Hence the duality and the well-known "inconsistency" of the cultural situation of modernity: throwing a radical challenge to the traditions of the past, at the same time, it does not completely deny the principle of traditions as such and actively forms its own traditionality. Although stylistic pluralism is already being laid and ripening in the bowels of the modernist tradition, cultural universals still dominate each new style. Therefore, although the "life worlds" of various subjects of modern culture acquire a certain "opacity" for the subjects-carriers of other "life worlds", this is not so much due to cultural esotericism (the complexity and "exoticism" of the corresponding structures of symbols), which has not yet had time to develop, how much due to another factor, which can be called "social esotericism". The latter is based on a complex of social filters that regulate the social selection of strangers by each subject for their "assimilation" (socialization) or rejection (segregation). The fragmentation and the emergence of new socio-cognitive enclaves retain their status as "subuniversums" of a single universe of knowledge, since they still remain within the boundaries of some comprehensive cultural tradition.

Thus, in general, the secular culture of modernity, as well as classical religious culture, is based on a pyramidal-type cognitive structure, crowned with the supervalue of some sacred relationship and involving the integration of legitimizing and legitimizing cognitive structures in the form of a total “meta-narrative” . At the same time, this sacred relationship is no longer unconditional, but artificial, "socially constructed", conventional. "The culture of Modern (New Time) considered the objective hierarchy of man-made things that make up the artificial world, and the established social hierarchy" . This circumstance potentially relativizes it, actually transferring the historical arrows of cultural evolution to the path of a differentiating attractor. Therefore, the era of modernity is actually a compromise between the weakening ideational values, ideas and imperatives of traditional culture and the sensual relativism of postmodernity ripening in its depths.

Postmodern culture. In the end, at a certain historical moment, the unstable balance of modernity is violated. In the realm of ideals, a decisive, cardinal shift takes place in the direction of strengthening the influence of the secular attractor, and culture passes into a state called postmodernity. From this moment, from the point of view of the concept we are developing, the second and ultimate stage in the development of the secular cultural system begins. At this stage, culture is gradually and steadily losing the unity of tradition, which is dissociated to the state of a mosaic aggregate of diverse lifestyles. "Metanarratives" fall apart into separate elements, the connection of which with each other is more and more deconstructed. At its extreme point, the postmodern dehierarchization of culture seeks to achieve the absolute limit of the “divisibility” of cultural space. In practice, this means moving to the edge beyond which it becomes impossible to represent and support culture of any kind of sociality, since culture in this state is no longer able to produce either adequate knowledge, or any serious and stable values ​​and corresponding to them sufficiently strong values. imperatives of social action.

The achievement of such a state by culture means the impossibility of its further existence in real social space and in real historical time. According to the cyclical principle of Sorokin-Bransky, one of two things must happen upon reaching or in view of the imminent historical prospects of such a disintegration of the cultural system. Either the social system will cease to exist together with culture, or it will radically change its “cultural program”, and a gradually increasing process of cultural and, as a result, social integration will come into play. However, in any case, the trend of cultural differentiation should reach a point where there is a real threat to the existence of society.

The specificity of the backbone factor in religious and secular cultures. In accordance with the synergetic view of the cultural system, the “alpha and omega” of the specifics of religious and secular cultural systems should be sought in the features of their backbone factor, which, in turn, are closely related to the type of dominant ideal characteristic of each of them.

When comparing the three main cultural types considered above (traditional, modernist and postmodernist), the fundamental difference between their basic mythologems is striking. As mentioned above, the traditional religious culture relied on the idea of ​​the absolute and, therefore, the obligatory nature of the values ​​of the hierarchy of the Universe, and the culture of modernity believed that the hierarchy of things created by man and an artificially established social hierarchy. As for the postmodern culture, it "considers the choice of the individual in this particular situation as the initial basis of value ideas" . What ideal can correspond to each of them?

The dominant type of the ideal of traditional (respective religious) culture has been studied quite well. Its classical conceptual expression in Christian culture is the idea of ​​the Heavenly (God's) City, the imperfect reflection of which is the Earthly City. The dominant type of the ideal of modernist culture is very close in this regard to the ideal of traditional culture, with the difference that the "seat" of the sacred in it as a whole is transferred "to the earth", to the sphere of idealistic values, such as: progress, enlightenment, science, religion. , philosophy, humanism, state, etc. This is due to a fundamental change at the level of patterns of rationality, which change from mystical-intuitive to logical-rational and aesthetic.

The dominant type of the ideal of postmodern secular culture, corresponding to the imperative of “absolute choice” or, in the words of P. Berger, “heretical imperative”, has been studied less and therefore deserves more detailed consideration here.

The unique feature of this culture is that, according to J. Habermas, “The fragmented everyday consciousness of leisured consumers prevents the formation of a classical type of ideology, but it has itself become the dominant form of ideology (italics mine - S.L.)” . This contradiction is constitutive of the postmodern cultural situation. As G. Rohrmoser notes, “all postmodernist currents are in favor of the release of pluralism. And they do it with the same total pretension that the ideologists used to make in their projects of unity. But today pluralism, the denial of unity, means about the same as omnivorousness. Omnivorousness implies that now anarchism is becoming the style-forming, so to speak, principle of life cultures. If you ask what actually stands behind the principle of the infinite diversity of life cultures, which we today glorify as a further development of freedom, then it should be noted: all this is nothing but the anarchization of culture (my italics - S.L.). … now anarchism is the founding principle according to which we practice freedom – in the political, social, cultural and religious spheres – as a pluralization of lifestyles.”

The “living world” of postmodern society and man at first glance seems chaotic and unsystematic, since no positive idea is obviously capable of acting here as a “common semantic denominator”. However, this chaos and lack of system have a fundamental, "directed" character, have their own logic and meaning. All this indicates that there must be a certain meta-ideologeme that paradoxically "centers" this centrifugal tendency itself, giving the highest sanction to just this type of cultural creativity.

In postmodern culture, as mentioned above, the classical socio-cognitive core, based on a single positive ideal, is gradually dissolving, and the core functions seem to take over a certain set of unwritten rules and ideas, which are characterized by what they carry in mostly "negative" content. The general principle of this non-classical "meta-ideology" is the radical rejection of any meta-ideology. This principle can manifest itself in different ways, both in constructive and destructive ideological forms: in non-violation of the freedom of another to think and act according to one’s own mind (the ideology of tolerance), in skepticism, nihilism, ideological relativism, etc. Accordingly, the dominant ideal of postmodern culture can be characterized as a "radical-pluralistic" ideal: any views, principles and worldviews are accepted here as "private", conditional and "one of many". This noticeably undermines the "passionarity" of specific styles and the ideologies that center them, but at the same time frees up a huge amount of creative energy to "design" a huge number of the latter, replacing each other in an ever accelerating and growing stream.

The philosophers of the postmodern direction came closest to defining the system-forming factor of a “radically secular” culture. Summing up their research, Yu.N. Davydov notes that “postmodernism is already “by definition” nothing more than the final self-affirmation of a person in his hopeless finiteness - in front of the (tightly closed from him) face of the “absolute “Height”, some anonymous “Almighty”: transcendental impersonality, which therefore and above all persons that she was denied in her own person (my italics - S.L.). "The Almighty", who, according to the statement of J. Derrida, turns out to be "on the other side of the height". This is, so to speak, ideationalism with the opposite sign, suggesting not just a passive entropy of the ideational potentials of the cultural system to the zero level of some “pure” everyday life, but an active “social construction” of culture in the key of ever greater dispersal, diversification of its nuclear structure. Logically, it is precisely such a worldview that can inspire the cultural creativity of postmodernity, the main guideline of which is the arbitrariness of individual and “post-individual” choice. Behind the modernist “heretical imperative” and the postmodernist imperative of life as a game and game as life that replaces it, stands, in poetic words, “The shadow that has neither face nor name.”

This absolute separation of the sacred “image” from earthly reality, from man and from the world in both senses of the word, ultimately makes it impossible either spontaneous emergence or purposeful social construction of any stable semantic hierarchy of earthly existence. However, by itself, it is not able to stop cultural creativity as such, and as a result, the latter gradually degenerates into what one of the modern Russian philosophers of culture called "magic games on a horizontal plane." The quality and depth here are increasingly inferior to the quantity and volume of produced social knowledge, with all the ensuing consequences for the culture itself, society and the individual.

Historical logic of postmodernization in Western culture.

Summarizing, we can single out several main modes of secularization of culture in line with its movement from the traditional (religious) state through modernity to postmodernity. We will present them in the order in which they flow from one another.

1. Diversification of culture. On the one hand, there is a “disintegration of the metadiscourse”, when almost all “big ideas” that perform the function of the supporting structures of the universe in traditional and modernist cultures are subjected to resolute skepticism and denial. On the other hand, liberation from their total semantics initiates the processes of cultural creativity at the "cellular" level. From the common cultural cosmos, more and more new “subuniverses” are constantly distinguished, associated with professions, hobbies, “informal” communication of people, etc., and the degree of autonomy of these life worlds from the “big” societal universe and the degree of their mutual “opacity” (esotericism) is increasing all the time. There is both intensive and - mainly - extensive growth of the array of social knowledge. In contrast to the cumulative growth characteristic of the previous phases (extensive in traditional and intensive in modernist culture), here it “explodes” in all directions at once.

2. Increasing relativization of cultural meanings (styles, ideals, ideologies). Due to diversification, the culture comes into an unstable state. The hierarchy of meanings that previously stabilized cultural dynamics is collapsing, as a result of which they all receive “equal opportunities”. According to A. Toffler, “subcultures multiply at an ever-increasing pace and die one by one to make room for more and more new subcultures. There is a certain metabolic process going on in the circulation of the society, and it is accelerating in the same way that other aspects of social interaction are accelerating.

3. The situation of "excess culture". As a result of relativization, a situation arises of "overproduction" and excessive accumulation of the cultural mass. There are much more cultural meanings, styles and forms than they can be claimed and "digested" by the existing structures of sociality. Ultimately, this leads to the fact that the flow of cultural content blocks, loosens, blurs and relativizes social foundations. The process moves to a more fundamental level of "hard" social facts.

4. Diversification and relativization of the main social subject - the bearer of culture. Similar processes are initiated at the level of social interactions. The traditional society is characterized by "fixed" classes, consecrated by the authority of religion, and stable corporations that make them up. Modern societies form equally global "classes" and their stable groups, which differ in occupation and property status. Now they are dissociated. In their place, a huge number of relatively small groups appear, emerging randomly and spontaneously, demonstrating an unprecedented qualitative diversity of life styles. They become more and more relativized, the group is reduced to the individual, who remains the last stable "support" of the representative process. Logically, this should be followed by the stage of diversification of the subject at the personal level and the extinction of culture and society.

In accordance with the degree of differentiation (diversification) of the socio-cultural system under the influence of a secular, differentiating attractor of its development, we distinguish three conditional forms of secular culture corresponding to different stages of the logical evolution of postmodernity: "early", "mature" and "late" postmodern. Schematically, these stages correspond to three stages of consistent diversification of the array of social knowledge: diversification at the societal level; diversification at the group level; diversification at the individual level.

A general sketch of the three stages of cultural postmodernization as "ideal types" is offered below.

1) "Early" postmodern. We associate its beginning with the moment when the unity of tradition inherent in the culture of modernity on the scale of society is eroded, and the cultural style becomes the main systemic "unit" of culture. At this stage in the development of secular culture, the main subjects of cultural representation are social groups formed on the basis of style, the number of which is constantly growing. Each such group, "professing" its own style, creates its own original subculture. Nevertheless, cultural styles, despite the sharp increase in their number, mainly retain their connection with the original way of life of a person. The boundaries of each style coincide with the boundaries of the "life world" and, accordingly, with the boundaries of the specific socio-cognitive universe of a particular social group. Thus, in the context of early postmodernity, style represents the real, and not the virtual, "life world" of its bearers and is perceived by them as a Durkheimian social fact, as a given, as an objective "life form". Therefore, each cultural style in the context of the early postmodern, as it were, reproduces the "modern in miniature", based not so much on the arbitrary setting of the subject's consciousness, but on the objective conditions of his life. The “early postmodern” is a kind of continuation of the modernist “cultural program”, differing from it mainly in the “extensive”, quantitative increase in stylistic diversity.

In accordance with the process of stylistic diversification of culture, there is a diversification of the social knowledge underlying it. In place of a single semantic universe gravitating towards totality, a pluralistic structure is formed from many autonomous enclaves that are in very ambiguous relationships with each other. "In advanced industrial societies, with their enormous economic surpluses that allow vast numbers of individuals to devote all their time to even the most obscure pursuits, competition between many meaningful sub-universes becomes the normal state of affairs." At the same time, this competition is, as a rule, much softer than the competition inherent in the total class ideologies of modernity. We attribute this to the latent growth in social psychology of a sense of the relativity of extremely multiplied versions of social knowledge. “Probably,” Berger and Lukman note in this regard, “the latter also have some ideological functions, but the direct conflict between ideologies here ... has been replaced by varying degrees of tolerance and even cooperation.”

In this regard, the authors who speak today about the “end of ideology” are right in the sense that modern (postmodern) society no longer generates and, apparently, is not able to generate the “great ideology” characteristic of the socio-cultural situation of modernity. Rather, it tends to give rise to many “small” (in terms of subject matter, social-scale and socio-temporal) ideologies, each of which occupies its own niche in the socio-cultural space and does not claim a universal and absolute status.

However, stylistic pluralism in the conditions of early postmodernity does not yet mean equality between different versions of reality. Thus, “…most modern societies are pluralistic. This means that they have a certain central universe, which is taken for granted as such, and various partial universes (italics mine - S.L.), coexisting with each other and in a state of mutual adaptation. The mentioned "central universe" occupies this place not only because of its quantitative predominance over the rest; on the contrary, its very quantitative predominance is due to the fact that it accumulates and preserves a complex of socio-cognitive cultural universals (values, norms, worldviews, symbolic structures, etc.) inherited by culture from the modern era and linking individual subcultures into an integral structure. Consequently, the conditional stage of development of secular culture, designated by us as early postmodern, is characterized by "parallel" coexistence in the common socio-cultural space of many very heterogeneous "life worlds". These "life worlds" exist within a variety of cultural styles and their corresponding versions of social knowledge, separated by fairly rigid social "partitions". However, their very “parallel” coexistence is supported by the still remaining core of cultural universals, with which none of the new stylistic subcultures completely breaks.

Thus, the secular culture of the early postmodern corresponds to a qualitatively new stage of socio-cultural diversification, which involves the establishment of a polystylistic nature of the cultural space of society. As such, it is characterized by the "parallel" existence of a sufficiently large number of life styles and their corresponding autonomous symbolic universes. These latter still by inertia retain a number of cultural universals as a "common denominator", but they are already losing a single sacred core in the sense in which it is characteristic of religious culture and secular culture of the modern period. In fact, early modern culture is a transitional type from the social-cognitive universe to the social-cognitive multiverse.

2) Mature postmodern. At this stage in the development of secular culture, the process of fragmentation of the socio-cultural space moves to the next qualitative level. It is here, in our opinion, that the main social subject of cultural representation becomes not so much a group as an individual. Group connections retain their significance, but they become more and more mobile and short-term, more and more “soft” and, as a result, more and more conditional. Increasing social mobility and the technical possibilities of communication make the transition of a person from group to group and, accordingly, from culture to culture, more frequent and easier.

A characteristic, if not defining, feature of mature postmodernity is the growing external contradiction between two trends: the growth of cultural esotericism and the relativization of the socio-cognitive content of styles and ideologies.

On the one hand, mature postmodernity is characterized by the development of a trend that emerged even on the eve of modernity. It lies in the fact that private, special areas of social knowledge, growing and becoming more complex, are increasingly separated both from each other and from the “initial” meanings of everyday life. Ultimately, the spontaneous processes of cultural self-organization going on in them turn these expert sub-universes into autonomous universes localized within the corresponding social (primarily professional) groups. “The increasing number and complexity of these subuniverses make them more and more incomprehensible to non-specialists. They become esoteric enclaves, "hermetically sealed" (in the sense that they are associated mainly with the Hermetic system of secret knowledge) to all but those initiated into these secrets. In connection with the growing independence of subuniverses, special problems of legitimation arise for both the initiated and the uninitiated,” P. Berger and T. Lukman note. Here, group esotericism moves from a predominantly social to a proper cultural status, when the various cultural codes lose their mutual coherence.

On the other hand, at the stage of mature postmodernity, social knowledge is being relativized. It is associated with the depreciation of the content of the life style. At one time, this phenomenon was given considerable attention by A. Toffler. “As we move towards super-industrialism,” he notes, “we are finding people adopting and discarding lifestyles at a rate that could have robbed people of previous generations of solid ground. The lifestyle itself also becomes temporary. The reason for this phenomenon is, according to L.G. Ionina, that “style and man have become separated. As a result of the stylistic differentiation of modern culture, the world of styles, that is, the world of expressive possibilities, became objectified, acquired an existence independent of man, lost its original connection with the certainty of life, the certainty of the expressed content (italics mine - S.L.) ". In other words, now the real way of life of its social bearer and the corresponding constant “subuniverse” of social knowledge are no longer behind the style. The style is increasingly breaking away from its socio-institutional and socio-cognitive roots, gradually turning into a rather superficial complex of symbols that is relatively easy to assimilate and just as easy to change to another.

Thus, at this stage of the secularization of culture, it becomes not only possible, but also a common phenomenon, the successive change of several cultural styles throughout the individual biography of a person. Ultimately, this leads to the fact that style in its original meaning of a constant “form of life” is actually replaced by stylization - “playing with style”, which itself becomes a kind of life style on a fairly wide social scale. One of the brightest manifestations of cultural stylization is the practice of the so-called. cultural dramatizations (L.G. Ionin), which arises at the stage of early postmodernity. In the context of mature postmodernity, such dramatizations turn for their participants into a successive change over the course of an individual biography of a number of different, arbitrarily chosen "life worlds". In addition, at the level of individual consciousness and lifestyle of the “postmodern man”, a special life practice of “juggling styles” is spreading, which finally turn into alienated and generally accessible stereotypical mental “masks”. We can say that J. Huizinga's "playing man" turns into a new variety at the second stage of postmodernization - "playing man".

Both processes, for all their external inconsistency, have common roots. They are associated with the rapid erosion of cultural universals, the set of which is becoming less and less defined and interpreted more and more arbitrarily. Now “no one really knows what to expect from a ruler, a parent, a cultured person, or who should be considered sexually normal. In each case, numerous experts are turned to for clarification…” . In our opinion, it is at the stage of mature postmodernity that the final transition from the “principled” secular society to the “extremely secular” society of G.P. takes place. Becker.

All these processes give rise to a dramatic situation when different versions of social knowledge systematically collide in the mind of one and the same social subject. One of them always comes from the "original" way of life, and the other is associated with the next resocialization of the individual in the context of the next artificially cultivated style. As Berger and Lukman rightly point out, the "sub-worlds" internalized in the process of secondary socialization are mostly partial realities (Italics mine - S.L.), in contrast to the "basic world" acquired in the process of primary socialization. For this reason, they cannot completely displace and restructure the basic "life world" of a person, but they are quite capable of "shattering" it. With a frequent change in cultural identification, the initial matrix of sociality, assimilated by a person in the process of his upbringing in childhood, inevitably occurs. Therefore, the natural result of the redefinition of styles, which has become a regular practice and has taken on a mass scale, is the mutual depreciation and relativization of all cognitive universes included in this process, including primary ones. This situation is extremely accurately illustrated by the words of the American sociologist Harvey Cox: “a secular person is aware that the symbols through which he perceives the world, and the system of values ​​by which he is guided when making decisions, are generated by specific historical events and are therefore limited and partial” .

Here we come to a fundamental moment in the evolution of secular culture, when the postmodern wins in it "completely and finally." The growth of esotericism, which was previously restrained and neutralized by the core of cultural universals, in the conditions of a shortage of the latter threatens with anomie and the collapse of social ties. However, the postmodern finds a kind of non-traditional, paradoxical way to solve this problem. In a mature postmodern situation, the social system includes a kind of emergency mechanism for compensating centrifugal processes. She does not try (with the exception of rare cases) to fight esotericism, opposing it with positive cultural universals that are rapidly relativizing, but, on the contrary, in every way supports and stimulates the processes of “social construction” of new and new styles through the “factory of styles” - the media.

The search for one's own style (and, accordingly, the search for simple and stable definitions of reality) is a natural socio-psychological reaction of a person to an excessively enlarged and more complicated "life world". However, the very mass practice of stylistic redefinition (especially repeated) relativizes any styles and any socio-cognitive concepts. Treating them as unconditional foundations is becoming increasingly difficult and, finally, impossible. Such a relative state of consciousness, which is spreading on a massive scale, from our point of view, is one of the main reasons for the spread of skepticism and nihilism, when any “generalizing” meanings that integrate everyday life are no longer taken seriously. In turn, skeptical and nihilistic social moods further strengthen the tendency towards erosion of all the still remaining “common denominators” left over from the former core of the socio-cognitive universe. The result is a "crisis of overproduction" and a radical devaluation of any ideas and ideologies. The quality of the latter is finally replaced by quantity, and the effect of stability is achieved by a constant change of unstable "support points".

Thus, the mature postmodern embodies the multiversal principle of self-organization of culture in its most developed and vivid form. This is a “serious”, authentic postmodern, which, according to L.K. Zybailova and V.A. Shapinsky, still "does not issue a license for chaotization, but presents a wide range of differentiations" . However, he is already showing signs of the coming decline and degradation of secular culture. The hierarchy of cognitive subuniverses is leveled; the common sacred core of values, knowledge and behavioral imperatives is completely eroded. The only counterbalance that prevents the seemingly inevitable fragmentation of society is the relativization of any generalizing meanings, which, in the end, lose all "passionarity". As K. Manheim noted, “the secularization of social forces contributed to a greater diversity of human experience, the introduction of the ideas of spontaneity and experimentalism into the minds, as well as the constant process of reassessment of values. Ultimately, however, this great diversity of experience, and the fact that competing value systems canceled each other out, led to the neutralization of values ​​altogether. As a result, Western culture found itself in a situation where “truths are scattered across many universes of discourses, they are no longer amenable to hierarchization”, and only due to the inertia of traditional modernist thinking “in each of these discourses we persistently seek insights that could convince everyone” .

3) Late postmodern. This is a hypothetical stage in the development of secular culture, not yet reached by any of the modern societies. At this stage, the diversification of the cultural and social space should presumably reach its limit, turning into its destruction. The action of the differentiating attractor here is practically not balanced by any significant integration on the scale of society. At this stage, according to P.A. Sorokin, “the sensual supersystem of our culture will more and more resemble a “place of cultural dumping”, filled with a disorderly mass of elements devoid of unity and individuality. Turned into such a bazaar, it will become a victim of random forces that make it more of a "historical object" than a self-governing and living subject.

Here, the boundaries between cultural styles and their corresponding socio-cognitive universes, already conditional and mobile, are completely blurred. The state of culture corresponding to the late postmodern suggests the apotheosis of ambiguity. However, this ambiguity, due to the fact that any stable hierarchization of meanings is objectively impossible, turns into its opposite - a state of semantic leveling. At the stage of late postmodernity, a one-time combination at the level of both mass and individual consciousness of incommensurable meanings characteristic of different cultural styles and cognitive systems becomes the norm. It can be said that the process of fragmentation of the social subject here passes to the sub-individual level, destroying now all sorts of stable foundations for its cultural self-identification. The distinction between individual and mass consciousness is practically erased.

Thus, the late postmodern is the last logical stage of the disintegration of the semantic core of culture, which extends to its everyday periphery. At this stage, even the instrumental, technological effectiveness of actions becomes problematic - the last "common denominator" that ensures their sociality. "Postmodern propaganda of ambiguity - that knowledge that evades the verdicts of experience, testifies to the last, final stage of the process of secularization." As a result of the “mixing of languages” of social knowledge on a societal scale, a stylistic and cognitive leveling of the “life world” occurs, its, in the words of Konstantin Leontiev, “secondary mixing simplification”. Here, individual and mass consciousness becomes no longer able to adequately reflect reality, since its “organ of reflection” - the system of social knowledge and social rationality - is practically deconstructed. In its ultimate form, this state is identical to the “schizophrenization of consciousness”, when absolutely incompatible and mutually exclusive (incoherent) meanings can be simultaneously present in it. Postmodern, having reached the third stage of its development, which represents its logical conclusion, actually represents the beginning of the end of culture, society and personality.

So, according to our concept, the process of culture secularization involves several main phases, which are characterized by a different ratio of the power of influence on culture of the integrating ("religious") and differentiating ("secular") attractors. This ratio develops in the direction of weakening the first and strengthening the second. These phases of secularization correspond to different levels of self-organization of secular culture: the initial increase in cognitive diversity and, as a result, the complication of the socio-cultural system (which corresponds to the conditional stages of modernity and early postmodernity) in the future, through the “culminating phase” of mature postmodernity, passes into its opposite - in the simplification and leveling of culture (late postmodern). The first and second stages are characterized by a quantitative increase in the array of social knowledge, which, in general, i.e. within the framework of the cultural system at all levels of the social subject - from the societal to the individual-personal - still retains the properties of the universe, although differentiating processes are gaining strength. At the third stage, conventionally designated by us as “mature postmodern”, a radical qualitative transformation takes place, during which secular culture clearly reveals the properties of a pluralistic polycentric formation “embedded” in it. This is due to the fundamental change in the system-forming factor of culture. Here, the universe of social knowledge finally turns into a multiverse, the cultural and ideological core of which is falsified, turning into an "anti-core". Finally, the fourth stage marks a kind of "thermal death" of culture as a result of the complete de-hierarchization of the social knowledge underlying it, destroying not only ideological, but also everyday conceptual structures. Here, the preservation of society and the individual is possible only with a radical renewal of the "cultural program".

Specifics of Russian secular culture. Nevertheless, it seems to us that the “classical” (linear) model of cultural secularization outlined above is not the only one, and in relation to other, “non-Western” socio-cultural conditions, it is necessary to develop alternative models. This also applies to Russia, whose specificity in this area, in our opinion, manifests itself quite strongly. In this regard, it is of interest to compare the "cultural matrices" of Russian and modern Western societies. An example of this kind of comparative analysis in the context of the study of Soviet civilization is presented, in particular, in the works of the Russian political scientist and historian S.G. Kara-Murza.

Soviet society (resp. Russian culture of the Soviet period) is defined by this researcher as traditional and, in this regard, “ideocratic”. Ideocratic society, as S.G. Kara-Murza, is "a complex, hierarchically constructed structure that rests on several sacred, unshakable ideas-symbols and on authority relations" . Such a culture has a huge spiritual potential, but in its own way it is very vulnerable, since the loss of respect for authorities and symbols means death for it. For example, if the enemy succeeds in instilling “viruses” that destroy them into these ideas (as happened with late Soviet society), then his victory is assured. Relations of domination through violence cannot by themselves save such a socio-cultural system, since the violence itself in it "must be legitimized by the same ideas-symbols" .

On the contrary, the Western, or "civilian" society, in comparison with the traditional one, has a fundamentally changed cultural matrix. It is characterized as a society “consisting of atoms-individuals, connected by innumerable strings of their interests. This society is simple and inseparable, like mold, like a colony of bacteria. Accordingly, blows to some points (ideas, meanings) do not produce much damage to the whole, only “local holes and breaks” are formed. On the other hand, this fabric hardly endures "molecular" blows to the interests of everyone (for example, economic difficulties). Thus, for the internal stability of society, sacred ideas and beliefs are not required here, “you just need to control the “fan of desires” of the entire colony in such a way that there are no large social blocks with incompatible, opposite desires” . With this task, according to S.G. Kara-Murza, in modern Western society, consciousness manipulation technologies are successfully coping.

In this regard, Western society at the present stage of development naturally gives rise to a completely new type of culture in history - mosaic. “If earlier, in the era of humanitarian culture, the body of knowledge and ideas was an ordered, hierarchically constructed whole, possessing a “skeleton” of basic objects, main themes and “eternal questions”, now, in modern society, culture has crumbled into a mosaic of random, poorly related and poorly structured concepts. A society that lives in the flow of such a culture is sometimes called a "democracy of noise."

The quintessence of the fundamental difference between the Russian and Western (Euro-American) socio-cultural systems formulated here can be expressed, speaking in Sorokin's language, through the concept of a measure of the ideality of culture. Apparently, the "ideational reserves" of Russian culture, due to its historical and genetic features, differ significantly from the corresponding indicators of Western cultures. In connection with the "neo-traditionalist" nature of our social structure, Russian culture can be characterized in terms of P.A. Sorokin as "more ideational" in comparison with the culture of the Western type. This determines both our inclination towards ideocracy and the predominance of the collectivist mentality over the individualistic, as well as the much greater conservatism and traditionalism inherent in Russian civilization compared to the Western civilization of the New and especially the Newest Age.

Several conclusions follow from these considerations. Firstly, the “democracy of noise”, or mosaic culture, which is one of the main manifestations of the culture of a mature postmodern, is a natural and logical phase in the development of the Western socio-cultural system. This is consistent with the conclusions we made in the course of the previous analysis. Secondly, for the domestic socio-cultural system, incl. and at the present stage of its development, this condition is not only not natural, but also deeply contraindicated, because. incompatible with the Russian "cultural code". Thirdly, proceeding from this, the Russian version of cultural secularization - in this case, postmodernization - must differ significantly from the Western one.

Logically, postmodernism in Russia suggests two possibilities:

or destruction§ of the cultural and ideological core with further progressive destruction of the entire socio-cultural system as such,

or a change in the basic ideological concept (as happened after the revolution of 1917) to one that is more in line with the requirements of the moment. In this case, this implies a greater scope for style diversification on the periphery of the system with sufficient immunity against it of the system core.

The second option is possible provided that the new core can integrate and "tame" the postmodern impulses of cultural development, legitimizing the growth of diversity in the semantic horizon of unity. Only in this way, having established a “one-way connection” between the stable core and the intensively differentiating periphery of social knowledge, it is possible to direct these impulses in a socially constructive, or at least safe, channel for a sufficiently long historical period.

Accordingly, the differentiating ideal should not replace the integrating ideal, as happens in the West, but be incorporated into it. The integrative cultural ideal, therefore, must use for its strengthening the energy of the opposite process (differentiation), it must, to use the term of sailing, "go close-hauled", against the wind, using the opposite direction of the carrying current. In other words, our culture must find a way to a fundamentally new degree of synthesis of the integrating and differentiating attractors of cultural development and begin to function in the mode of integration and differentiation at the same time. This fundamental synthesis of tradition and modernity is possible and constitutes the global mission of Russian civilization at the present stage of world development.

Diagnosis of the state of the socio-cultural system in Russia. In the light of what has been said, it seems to us that modern (post-Soviet) Russian society is going through a state that, in the light of the above reasoning, can be designated as “catastrophic postmodern”. Our current socio-cultural sphere is characterized by a number of essential features of postmodernity, which arose as a result or consequence of the catastrophic changes that occurred to the country in the 1990s. These phenomena are analyzed and summarized, in particular, in the works of N. Kozin, A.V. Mironov and I.F. Kefeli. These include:

1) “the ideological decentering of consciousness, which, living in the forms of its objectification, on this basis decenters and chaoticizes the entire fabric of Russian sociality. As a result, it turns out to be nothing: in it everything becomes possible, because the consciousness that lives and objectifies itself in Russia does not experience any value and semantic restrictions.

2) “the proclamation of the absolute relativity and even virtuality of any hierarchy and any values, even moral ones. Moreover, - notes N. Kozin, - in the field of culture in general, an attempt was made to turn and turn values ​​into anti-values, and anti-values ​​into basic, hitherto "hidden" values.

3) "The breaking of the old ideological foundations by no means meant the establishment of a new, more progressive and adequate social reality of the ideological doctrine." As a result, on the contrary, a situation of “ideological absurdity or, to use physical analogies, an ideological vacuum” reigned. ... Public consciousness, being deprived of ideology and ideological imperatives, turns into a rushing consciousness, into a consciousness "without a rudder and without sails" in the space of its own history.

4) "Loss of moral, political, ideological guidelines ... deformation of value attitudes towards goodness, truth, justice, honor, dignity, etc. Ideological disorientation has become a mass phenomenon, especially among the youth."

5) “the rupture of a single spiritual space and the loss of national consensus on basic values ​​that have become the subject of public controversy and have lost the status of “absolute guidelines” .

6) “So, there is confusion in the minds, in the public consciousness, the loss of ideological guidelines, the search for ideological renewal. The situation is further complicated by the fact that the spiritual disorientation of the population of our country, political and ideological disappointment and apathy are associated with the unexpectedly rapid collapse of another social myth - this time the anti-communist, "liberal-democratic" one.

These characteristics, which today have become a "common place" for publications on the socio-political and cultural situation in Russia, give a certain reason to consider this situation postmodernist. At the same time, unlike the “natural” and steadily developing Western postmodernity, this postmodernity is extreme, since it is not the result of the gradual evolution of the cultural and ideological core of Russian society, but the result of its sharp, largely artificial breakdown.

With regard to the "classical" model of socio-cultural postmodernization, the current situation in Russia does not fit into any typological scheme, since it combines the features of all three stages of postmodernity, as well as traditional and modernist society. However, in a number of respects it is closest to the "early postmodern" type.

Firstly, in the socio-projective terms, it represents a kind of intermediate state between the socio-cultural situation of modernity (Soviet society, from which we are “leaving” today) and mature postmodernity (Western societies, to which the “post-Soviet project” of Russia’s development is oriented ).

Secondly, there are good reasons to believe that, for all the chaotic nature of the processes taking place on the surface, the very cultural matrix of Russian civilization as such has undergone only partial erosion. This is evidenced by the very urgent need of Russian society for a common idea that would consolidate and stabilize it, which today does not raise doubts among researchers of various political orientations.

In this regard, modern Russian postmodernity in the form in which it has taken place in recent years is fundamentally unstable, while Western postmodernity, on the contrary, is “linear”, progressive and, as such, must exhaust itself in the process of development, reach its logical completion. This implies completely different types of fundamental needs of the Russian and Western civilizational socio-cultural systems at the stage of their "post-modernization". The Western system, which has completely fallen into the mainstream of the “strange attractor”, has developed its own unique stabilization mechanisms in the conditions of a stable non-equilibrium of the progressive evolution of postmodernity. The Russian system, on the other hand, must adapt to the latter in a different way, preserving the “core” and entering a new level and way of synthesizing order and chaos. To paraphrase a well-known saying, we can say that in this case, "what is great for a German is death for a Russian."

Thus, simplifying the situation to a certain extent, we can say that the socio-cultural situation in Russia at the end of the 20th - beginning of the 21st century is an intermediate type between the original traditionalist version of modernity (“Soviet project”) and the mature postmodernity that characterizes modern Western societies. . Structurally, it is closest to the “early postmodern”, the phase of which Western culture passed in the 40-70s. XX century. However, unlike the Western one, the current Russian postmodern is non-classical in nature, which is expressed in its catastrophic nature and the “non-linear” dynamics of its development.

Conclusion. So, summarizing the content of this chapter, we focus on the following key points:

1. The concepts of "secular" and "religious" in the generally accepted discourse form a paired bundle, while "secular" can be understood in three ways: as counter-religious, as non-religious and as religious.

2. Of the three main interpretations of the “secular”, the most objective, conceptually “capacious” and more relevant to the modern socio-cultural situation is the last one, which interprets the “secular” as a religious principle. This interpretation assumes that secular culture has its own, autonomous content, which is not derived from religion and is not associated with it.

3. The socio-cognitive content of religious and secular cultures reflects the theory of socio-cultural dynamics of P.A. Sorokin, in the light of which religious culture corresponds to the priority of supernatural reality and the corresponding structures of knowledge, and secular culture corresponds to the priority of sensual reality and the corresponding structures of knowledge.

4. Secular and religious cultures are characterized in relation to each other by a structural and content asymmetry. In terms of content, the conceptual core of religious culture is focused on the relationship between supernatural and sensual reality (with the unconditional priority of the former), while the core of secular culture is almost completely focused on the sensual world. Structurally, religious culture gravitates toward a universal (pyramidal) culture, while secular culture gravitates toward a multiverse model of self-organization.

5. In the dynamics of the historical process at its different levels, there is a cyclic change in the dominance of religious and secular cultures, subject to a self-oscillatory regime, which is associated with the alternation of the determining influence of the integrating and differentiating attractors of social knowledge. The latter are social (cultural) ideals.

6. The system-forming factor of secular culture is the balance of "analytical" and "synthetic" ideals, with the influence of the former predominating. An important role here is played by the imperative of "radical plurality", which, as the secularization (postmodernization) of culture manifests itself more and more clearly. The corresponding type of ideal is based on the experience of sacred being as a “transcendent impersonality”, absolutely cut off from man and the world, which creates for man a subjective situation of hopeless finitude.

7. In its "classical" (Western) version, the secular cultural system naturally passes through two main stages, corresponding to the periods of modernity and postmodernity. At the same time, the latter, in turn, can be logically divided into "early", "mature" and "late" postmodern, in accordance with the degree and nature of socio-cultural diversification. The first is characterized by a combination and struggle of system-forming factors of an integrating and differentiating type, “by inertia” preserving a common sacred core. The second is marked by the victory of the ideal of "radical plurality" and represents the highest flowering of postmodernity as a culture of diversity of choice. Finally, the third represents a hypothetical stage of the decline and decay of the cultural system due to the erosion of society and the individual.

8. Modern Russian society is going through a phase that, in the light of the above typology, is closest to the state of "early postmodernity", which is an intermediate state between the socio-cultural situation of modernity and mature postmodernity. At the same time, unlike the “natural” and sustainable Western postmodernity, our modern postmodernity is extreme, fundamentally unstable and reversible. This is due to the “increased idealization” of Russian culture compared to the culture of Western civilization, due to which the ideocratic form is its natural state, and postmodernization tendencies must be compensated by the universal cultural core of the classical type.

Bibliography

For the preparation of this work, materials from the site http://www.prlink.ru/ were used.

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RELIGION IN THE PERIOD OF MODERN AS A NEW AXIS TIME:

Secularization or new religious forms?

Instead of directly discussing the problem of secularization, I will begin by analyzing the general model of the relationship between religion and the modern era. This model is based on a comparative analysis of oral religions, religions of antiquity, religions of salvation and transformations of religion associated with the modern period. Secularization itself is not the subject of this paper, but if we approach correctly, then we should appreciate the scope of secularization without being drawn into the controversy and emotions that this thesis has caused over the past thirty years. Most of this work will thus be devoted to an analysis of the relationship between religion and modernity.. Art Nouveau is characterized as a new axial period, an overview of global analyzes of religious implications in the modern period is given, a model of analysis and some religious forms typical of modernity are presented, and empirical illustrations are provided. In doing so, we will test our findings as they relate to secularization and compare them with data obtained in 1981 and 1990 by the World Values ​​(WVSs) program and in 1991 by the International Social Survey (ISSP) program - studies on religion .

Obviously, our conclusions depend in part on the ways in which we define modernity, religion, and secularization. Without wishing to enter into a debate on these issues, I will explain my definitions in order to clarify my approach and indicate the limits of my analysis. With regard to religion, I understand it in the most general sense as a group, organization or institution that considers itself religious. As a result, "secular religions" are excluded, which does not save us from identifying the religious dimension represented in such ideologies. More precisely, I will consider as "religious" any practice of faith that appeals to a supra-empirical reality, i.e. to a reality that transcends the objective boundaries of nature and man and provides what is a symbolic relationship between man and this reality. The term "objective" is used in the sense of the scientific approach that characterizes the position of the social sciences. This definition of religion allows us to touch upon "parallel beliefs" that are now gaining in importance (telepathy, astrology, fortune telling, spiritualism, cosmic consciousness or cosmic energies, death experience, etc.). They appeal to a supra-empirical reality and can be considered religious if they include a symbolic relationship with a person, which in the case of spiritualism, but not in the case of astrology, can be interpreted as para-religious. With regard to secularization, Peter Berger's (1967) definition seems to me the most relevant for our purposes. I operationalize it by identifying two thresholds of secularization: (1) autonomization in relation to religious authority while maintaining the significance of religious symbols; (2) rejection of religious symbols.

Art Nouveau as a new axial period

Some historians and philosophers have stressed the key role that certain periods in history played in the development of techniques, political structures, or worldviews that determined the foreground of subsequent centuries or millennia, until they, in turn, were challenged, then shifted or changed. and included in new systems. “A person, as it were, sets off four times from a new foundation,” wrote Karl Jaspers (1954). This has been happening since the Neolithic era, from early civilizations, from the rise of great empires and from modernity. Each of these pivotal turns produced a general reshaping of the “symbolic field”, to use Pierre Bourdieu’s term, and a great religious upheaval that caused these destructions, redefinitions and creations. . Each period eventually led to new religious configurations, respectively: oral agrarian religions, religions of antiquity, religions of salvation (world religions), modern changes. Of the ancient religions, only Judaism and Hinduism survived from the preceding axial time, significantly changing, but at the same time retaining typically archaic pre-universalist features (at least by the modern period): a large number of prohibitions, important domestic rituals, inheritance of religion by origin . We can concede that modernity also presents the greatest challenge to existing religions, as well as a potential source of religious innovation, especially if these positions are radicalized and generalized, as Giddens (1991) insists. In addition, the thesis of modernity as a new axial turn allows us to consider more long-term effects: it provides an opportunity for comparative analysis and offers an interpretation that explains not only the decline of religiosity, but also its revival, mutations and innovations.

The concept of "axial time" was used to describe a certain historical period: the emergence of universalism, philosophy, great religions, the birth of science (Jaspers, 1954; Bella, 1976; Eisenstadt, 1986; Hick, 1989). Especially it refers to the period of 6-5 centuries BC. BC, which was a key stage in this process (Deutoisaiah, the era of Pericles, Upanishads, Jainism, Buddha, Confucius, Lao Tzu), the fruit of which are Christianity and Islam. This time is seen as "pivotal" because we continue to be its heirs, especially through world religions. However, there is no reason why we should not also consider the Neolithic period, early civilizations, great empires and modernity as the same axial eras, since they are also marked by a general reformulation of collective ideas. Therefore, our definition of "axial time" (or axial period) will include these four epochs. Axial time is at first something like a quick change from one image to another; it is characterized by a decisive stage of crisis and shifts in thought that lead to a reshaping of the symbolic field, creating a new period of stability. These critical phases vary in duration, from a millennium for universalism (from the 6th century BC to the advent of Islam), for example, to millennia for the Neolithic period (from its appearance to its final expansion and triumph).

Jaspers, who essentially regards modernity as a new axial period, considered this turn carried out by modernity in the 19th century as a harbinger of a possible "second axial period" (1954). He hesitated because globalization was not yet so widespread when he first wrote about it in 1949, although we may assume that this is the case today. Jaspers associated modernity with four fundamental features: modern science and technology, the passion for freedom, the emergence of the masses on the historical stage (nationalism, democracy, socialism, social movements) and globalization. We think it appropriate to add to this list the priority of reason (an item Jaspers implicitly included in these four features), the development of capitalism, and functional differentiation (the rise of the modern state and the Parsonian and Lookmanian concept of differentiation of spheres of activity in society).

A similar concept of axial time has not been used by sociologists to analyze modernity. However, Arpad Szakolczai and Laszlo Fustos (1996) refer to the idea of ​​"axial time" and use the concept of "axial moment" in cases that they find relevant to their study. They define the concept as follows: “A pivotal moment occurs whenever there is a global collapse of the established order of things, including the political system, the social order of everyday life and the system of beliefs, as well as - a very rare event - a grandiose spiritual revival ... Such a period took place at the beginning of our era (the collapse of the Roman Republic and the rise of Christianity), in the 5th-7th centuries (the collapse of the Roman Empire and the rise of Islam), in the 15th-16th centuries (the decline of the Middle Ages, the Renaissance and Protestantism) and, finally, expressed itself in two main stages of the collapse of the politics of absolutism and the traditional European social order: Enlightenment and socialism. Thus, what they have chosen to define the concept of "axial moment" corresponds to the key phases of what happens within the framework of axial time. For example, the rise of Christianity and Islam are the two key phases of the previous axial time (universalism), while the 15th and 16th centuries, the Enlightenment and socialism (or more precisely, the rise of industrial society) are the three key phases of modernity. However, I am convinced that it is legitimate to use the term "axial moment" to define such phases within the framework of the axial period.

Therefore, although in a very schematic form, we can carry out the periodization of modernity. It begins with such a pivotal moment of the 15th and 16th centuries, which is not only the beginning of what historians call the “modern period”, but also the beginning of modern science, the birth of capitalism and the bourgeoisie. But modernity only becomes a major phenomenon at the end of this period with the advent of the Enlightenment, with the English and especially the American and French revolutions, with the birth of the scientific method and scientific thinking, and with the birth of industry (the second axial moment). The third axial moment would include the development and triumph of industrial society and capitalism (19th-mid-20th centuries), first in England, and then throughout Europe and North America, the development of socialism, the creation of nation-states, the spread of nationalism and colonialism until its collapse after two world wars, and, finally, liberation from colonial oppression, globalization and in the West, the triumph of democracy, the society of abundance and the welfare state. Modern is also associated with the Cold War and the threat of nuclear conflict. The 1960s are often seen as a turning point: the beginning of the so-called post-industrial, post-Fordian, information society and the beginning of the moral revolution. From that moment on, the third sector, non-material factors of production (information, communication and knowledge) becomes dominant. New technologies (computers and electronics) are becoming more important, and the family is becoming less and less traditional. On top of that, globalization is coming to an end, the middle class is becoming more powerful, new social movements are emerging (feminism, regionalism, ecology, etc.) and, finally, communism is defeated.

Are we still in the era of modernity or postmodernity? I share the opinion of Anthony Giddens (1991), who wrote that "we are rather than entering a period of postmodernity, but one in which the consequences of modernity are becoming more radical and universal than before." Indeed, those features that are supposed to define postmodernity are far from those fundamental features that characterize the axial turn, but they could constitute a new “axial moment” (according to Szakolczai), which could be explained in terms of a generalized, radicalized and reflexed modernity. . The criterion of postmodernity is the "discrediting of great narratives": great religions, great ideologies (nationalism, communism, fascism) and the ideology of endless progress. But this only allows us to separate ourselves from the previous phase (pivotal moment) of modernity and, moreover, is partially refuted by new forms of nationalism and religious fundamentalism. The relativization of science and technology is not new, but it is clearly expanding as the extremes and dangers of their prior development become ever more threatening (nuclear threat and environmental pollution). This could be extended and shown that other traits attributed to postmodernity are logical extensions of those of modernity: like the nuclear threat and environmental pollution, the detraditionalization of the lifeworld, anti-authoritarian rebellion, hedonism, new social movements, and, above all, individualization. The same statement is true when stating a partial turn towards certain traditions (although modernity generally prevails over tradition) or an increased call for local identities, which is a reaction against globalization. Therefore, I agree with Beckford's (1996) criticism of the postmodern concept.

Despite all this, I remain open to the hypothesis that we might be at the forefront of some form of postmodernity, at least in the depths of a new moment of modernity, because the risk of irreparable pollution of the environment and, above all, of a nuclear catastrophe is the most dramatic and a radical fate that we can only imagine, as the very survival of human forms is at stake. This is truly a brand new feature. Moreover, if we consider modernity as a new axial period, then we cannot know at what stage of this process we are, especially since modernity entails permanent changes, even at an accelerated pace, so it cannot end with a stabilization phase, as it was before. So it could be some sort of permanent transition. In any case, since the axial rotation is something like the replacement of one image by another, in which old forms can coexist with new ones for centuries or be preserved by adapting them to themselves, it would be very difficult to separate the decline of modernity from the birth of postmodernity, despite the fact that we are in this shift. Today we do not have the necessary distance to solve this problem, but in any case, whether we are in postmodern, late modern, hypermodern, or anywhere else, this does not change anything related to our method of analysis.

GLOBAL ANALYSIS AND RELIGIOUS FEATURES

IN THE PERIOD OF MODERN

Of course, it is not a new world religion that has a large-scale distribution. So far, the most obvious novelty of the modern symbolic landscape is the fruit of a secular worldview (science, ideology, ethics, human rights, etc.). However, we are also seeing fundamental changes in the religious landscape and may be in a burgeoning phase of evolution. What will we get from a global analysis of modernity as a new stage in the religious history of mankind and from an analysis that considers the modernist challenge of religion as a whole?

Jaspers (1954) limited himself to brief but noteworthy notes: “If the help of transcendence somehow manifests itself,” he predicts about the victorious modernity, “it is only for a free person through his autonomy.” “A person who is internally free does not give his faith a clearly expressed universal content ... creating already by this fact alone new opportunities for a free faith that does not require a firm definition, which at the same time retains all its seriousness and immutability.” Such a faith, he adds, "has hitherto not met with sympathy in the mass of the population" and "has been despised by the functionaries of a dogmatic, doctrinaire and institutionalized faith." But "it is therefore most likely for our time that there will be a revival of a reformed biblical religion." In doing so, Jaspers emphasizes a desire for freedom that fits best with contemporary remarks about individualization, but it also makes interesting predictions about fundamentalism and evangelism. In addition, Jaspers' own beliefs represent a radical demythologization: he did not believe in divine revelation, nor in the incarnation and resurrection of Jesus, whom he regarded only as a spiritual principle. But he was convinced that the transcendent is present in a person and should be discovered in him, especially through the value of life and the need for improvement. Thus, we would say that Jaspers added the two most possible characteristics of religion in the period of modernity, namely, with regard to new forms of monism and world-orientation (this-worldliness).

Joseph M. Kitagawa (1967) highlights three interrelated features: the human being as center, world-oriented soteriology, and the search for freedom (more than maintaining order), which are directly related to those identified by Jaspers. He specifically recalls that "all traditional religions have sought to negatively evaluate phenomenal existence and to establish another realm of reality", which was more important, and that "in this life, man was thought of as a prisoner or temporary lodger", yearning for heaven or nirvana, which would deliver him from suffering, sin, imperfection and finitude. “In this respect, a radical revolution has taken place in the thinking of modern man, which consists in the fact that he no longer takes seriously the existence of another realm of reality. You can be sure that people still use terms such as heaven, pure land, nirvana, and the kingdom of God. These terms have only a symbolic meaning for the modern mentality .., [for which] only the phenomenal world has a real order of existence, and the receptacle of meaning is life here and now ... "Religion is now forced to" look for the meaning of human destiny in this world - in culture , society and the human person" in order to provide a human vocation, which is determined by the soteriologies rooted in this world.

According to Belle (1976), “the center of change lies in the collapse of dualism, which has been crucial to all historical religions... There is simply no room now for the hierarchical dualistic religious symbol systems of the classical historical type. This should not be interpreted as a turn towards primitive monism: it was not the notion of one world that displaced the notion of duality, but rather the notion of indefinite plurality displaced the notion of a simple dual structure... Beyond the 96% of Americans who profess to believe in God,” adds he, “there are many examples of significant interpretations that leave Tillich, Bultmann, Bonhoeffer far behind ... The dualistic worldview, of course, persists in the minds of many pious people, but just as there are many others who carry out complex and often pseudoscientific rationalizations in order to bring your beliefs, with their proven validity, into some kind of cognitive harmony with the era of the 20th century.” He explains that this is due to science and individualization, which destroy the distance between the earthly and the heavenly, the human and the divine, the laity and the clergy.

This reminds us of Kitagawa's reflections, while the emphasis on individualization reminds us of Jaspers' reflections. “The symbolization of the human relation to the ultimate conditions of its existence,” notes Bella, “is no longer the monopoly of any group that declares itself religious, . . .not only are any commitments to doctrinal orthodoxy being abolished by the cutting edge of modern culture, but even any established position is called into question in the process of giving meaning to man and his position, . . One might almost be inclined to see in Thomas Paine's "My mind is my church" or in Thomas Jefferson's "I am my own sect" a typical expression of a religious organization in the near future." He adds: "Each individual must make his own final decisions, and the most the church can do is to create favorable conditions for this without imposing a list of ready-made answers on him," realizing that he will have "open and elastic patterns of participation." So we can also talk about elasticity and variability. Bella sees modern man as "a dynamic and multidimensional self, capable within certain limits of continuous self-transformation and capable again within certain limits of remaking the world, including the very symbolic forms with which he deals in the world, ... with a growing awareness that they are symbolic, and that man is ultimately responsible for the choice of these symbolic forms." In addition, he notes that "the search for adequate standards of action, which is at the same time a search for personal maturity and social embeddedness, is in itself the heart of the modern search for salvation", which are world-oriented in nature. He concludes that the analysis of contemporary man as secular and non-religious is essentially wrong and that the contemporary situation does indeed "open up unprecedented opportunities for creative innovation in every area of ​​human action".

Analyzing "modern religious attitudes", Hajime Nakamura (1986) highlights similar features, with the exception of the collapse of dualism. He also deepens the concept of humanism and defines new features: a movement towards equality, a more open approach to the masses and a secular trend (which brings us back to the Jaspersian emergence of the masses), as well as pluralism. His analysis spans Asia and Japan, providing evidence that the same forms of modernity are also emerging in the East. He notes "the condemnation of religious formalism and the emphasis on inner piety", which includes pure heart, pure spirit, pure faith, anti-ritualistic and anti-magical attitudes, referring not only to the Reformation, but also to Hinduism (from Ramananda, Kabir to Ramakrishna), Sikhism (Nanak) and Zen Buddhism (especially Shinran, who has been compared to Luther). However, it also highlights the typically modernist search for authenticity that we can add to the painted picture.

He speaks of world-orientedness in the same terms as Kitagawa, emphasizing the "turn to world-orientedness" and the "rising popularity of worldly activity and professional ethics", as well as the rejection of monasticism not only in Protestantism, but also in Hinduism, Sikhism and Buddhism (Suzuki Shosan showed that criticism of monasticism also took place in the Buddha). He is close to Kitagawa's position on the "changing appreciation of man... man posited as the highest value and the emphasis on human love" and hence, he adds, a new religious emphasis on "service to people". More than any other writer, he develops ideas about "the expanding secular trend of religion (secular roles, clergy marriages, etc.)", "evolving appeal to the masses (use of the national language, service to the people, etc.)" and " a growing movement for equality and against discrimination" in both secular and religious forms that we can relate to Jaspers's ideas of freedom and the emergence of the masses. We can also meet all these trends in the East. In addition, he emphasizes the development of ideas about the equivalence of any religion, i.e. recognition of pluralism, which is a typical global effect of modernity. Curiously, he shows how all of these changes emphasize the positive and humanistic aspects of religion, including the value of physicality through the abandonment of the fear of damnation or asceticism, and, as a result, the increasing value of the human person. All this again activates interest in religious moral norms. But he adds that all these changes are more heralded in the West.

Another important global analysis of the relationship between religion and modernity has focused on secularization and highlighting the following features: demonopolization, privatization, world orientation, secularization, decay, associated with the general processes of individualization, rationalization and functional differentiation (Dobbelaere, 1981; Tschannen 1992). Peter Berger (1967) especially emphasized the rise of secular worldviews, subjectivization (individualization) and pluralization. Daniele Hervieu-Leger (1986) talks about destabilization, bricolage, pragmatism, subjectivism. She also emphasizes (1993) the fact that modernity makes secular promises that it cannot keep, especially in its modern deutopian phase, which creates a favorable environment for religious restructuring, especially for those types of religions that are emotional communities that highly value personal experience. Francoise Champion (1993) reveals the priority of the self, world orientation, optimism, an alliance with science, the ethics of love in a "mystical-esoteric shell". Jean-Paul Willaime (1995) shows that the fundamental features of modernity (he mentions systematic reflexivity [referring to Giddens], functional differentiation, individualization, rationalization, globalization and pluralism) could fuel both religious corruption and restoration, the latter especially in the period ultramodern, because it again puts forward the value of traditions, culture, meaning, subjectivity. Lester Kurtz (1995) points to (1) the replacement of religious traditions with rationalism, scientism and individualism; (2) secularization; (3) the revival of traditionalist forms; (4) the production of quasi-religious forms such as civil religions or ideologies; (5) the creation of new forms of religious beliefs and practices through the processes of syncretism. He also points to the fact that pluralism can produce not only relativization but also a religious revival. As for postmodern analysts, they distinguish personal religiosity, bricolage, syncretism, pluralism, subjectivism, probabilism, mobility (Flanagan and Jupp, 1996).

GENERAL MODEL OF RELATIONS BETWEEN RELIGION AND MODERN

So what to do with so many overlapping concepts? While perhaps nothing is missing from such a picture, it does not yet constitute a systematic model of the relationship between religion and modernity. To contribute to such a model, we will first trace the religious implications of each of the hallmarks of modernity: the primacy of reason; science and technology; thirst for freedom; the appearance of the masses; globalization; economic development and modern functional differentiation. We also take into account their combined effects. This will allow us to determine how the four most typical religious consequences for each feature of modernity manifest themselves: decay, adaptation or reinterpretation, conservation and innovation. The sequence of historical action of these factors could explain the religious situation in each country. In the next section, I will focus on some of the new religious characteristics that I have identified: world-oriented, facultative, personal spirituality, de-hierarchization, para-science, pluralization and relativization, mobility and revisitability, loosely organized networks. I will also include some results from the World Value Program (WVS) and the International Social Survey (ISSP) program, not so much to test the model (because it is primarily a historical model and these studies are not intended to test its sociological relevance. ) how much to illustrate it and be prepared for the debate about secularization.

(a) The priority given to reason has become an essential factor of modernity since the moment when reason became a powerful basis not only for the rapid growth of science, but also for individual freedom, the destruction of tradition, the autonomization of the economy and the problematization of the legitimacy of any social order, and, in the first place turn, the monarchy. The concept of truth, introduced by reason, became the rival of religion and tradition. Ernst Troeltsch, following Weber, especially emphasized this feature. The consequences of the dominant role of reason over religion have been, and still are, remarkable and fundamentally ambivalent. In fact, on the one hand, reason could be considered as an emanation of the sacred order or a gift of God and, at least, not conflict with religion, but on the other hand, it could be seen as an effective tool in the fight against religion and religious interpretations of the world. For example, Descartes was convinced that God created man and endowed him with reason, which will lead him back to God, though through faith purified by reason. In contrast, for Diderot, reason clearly showed that religion was one of human inventions. Weber demonstrated that reason had become a factor in the rationalization of religion, and studies of irreligiosity and loss of faith illustrated the anti-religious implications that became highly visible through the influence of atheistic philosophy. We know that neither reason nor science alone can either prove or disprove the existence of God or a supernatural reality. Indeed, reason can provide arguments for both sides. This is where its fundamental ambivalence lies. As a rule, religion was more connected with the order that reason explicitly problematized, and, conversely, everything opposed to the application of reason was connected with religion. Although the opposite is just as true, since religion itself changed itself in relation to the ongoing changes, actually becoming their conductor: demythologization, human rights, redistribution of the respective spheres of competence of religion and science, etc. In this respect, we could say that France and the United States are diametrically opposed.

We do not have enough sociological data on the tangible role of reason and the correlation between reason and religion, since no research has been attempted on such an identification. Karel Dobbelaere and Wolfgang Jagodzinski (1995) compared these elements in relation to the degree of rationalization and the degree of modernization. The demonstration seems somewhat convincing: among the ten countries studied, the less developed countries have the highest levels of religiosity, namely Ireland, followed by Spain and Italy. The most developed countries have a moderate level of religiosity, namely Germany, then France and Sweden. But this would not require confirmation if the analysis did not take into account Luxembourg, Switzerland, Austria, Canada and, first of all, the United States, which appear among the most developed countries, but have a high level of religiosity. In any case, whatever the results, we would be unable to prove more, not only because these indicators are not accurate enough as far as the degree of rationalization is concerned, but also because rationalization itself has fundamentally ambivalent consequences. Therefore, the study of the nature of these relationships requires more accurate indicators. The same duality is characteristic of other factors of modernity, especially science.

(b) Obviously, science must lead to atheism (scientism, materialism) as well as to reinterpretations (demythologization, critical interpretation), fundamentalist reaction (creationism) or innovations (deism, parascientific beliefs). From its origin in ancient Greece to the present day, science, as well as reason, has always been in a dual relationship with religion. Archimedes was convinced that the laws of arithmetic express the principles of the divine order of things. Copernicus marveled at the laws of creation. Believed in God Galileo, Newton. Einstein believed that if the scriptures did not coincide with science, they should only be reinterpreted. On the other hand, Democritus believed that the physical world makes the divine empty. When Napoleon asked the physicist Laplace: "Where is the place of God in your theory?", he replied: "I do not need this hypothesis." Today, the Big Bang can be seen as the last word in explaining the universe and just as easily considered the hand of God. After all, Buddhists believe that atomic theory confirms the philosophy of aggregation. From the very beginning of modernity, the main points of confrontation between science and Christianity were undoubtedly the condemnation of Galileo, Darwinism, positivism and Marxism.

Among the religious innovations driven by science, we would primarily note the concept of an impersonal God, religious movements such as Christian Science, the Church of Scientology, the New Age, and the parasciences: astrology, telepathy, cosmic energies, cosmic waves, aliens, experience experiences of death that are accepted as scientific by most of their followers. Although astrology itself is not a new field of knowledge, its modern interpretations are parascientific in nature. Parascience is a typical modern form of religiosity. The elements extracted from science themselves lead to the development of new spiritual movements such as Human Potential, Scientology, Transcendental Meditation. Such is the belief in convergence with science ("perfect science", "new science"), spirituality in Buddhism in a mystical-esoteric shell, and much in new religious movements (Champion, 1993). In the ultramodern, the relativization of science and technology may seem to favor a turn towards religious traditions, the spread of millenarianism, and the expansion of parascientific salvation, but once again, we do not have enough data to answer this question.

We cannot talk about science without mentioning technology. In revolutionizing the conditions and quality of life that material development entailed (health, food, housing, travel, media, recreation), science and technology contributed to the Copernican revolution, which made world happiness the main goal of existence instead of salvation in the other world. . But neither science nor technology can answer the ultimate questions (Where do we come from? Who are we? What is the meaning of life? Why do we suffer and die?). They are also unable to destroy disease, injustice, torment, misfortune and death. Here again, we note that technology can lead to a rejection of religiosity (materialism, for example), to religious adaptation (world orientation, humanism), to a conservative reaction, or to innovation (UFOs, electrometers in the Church of Scientology). Fundamentalist movements usually adapt modern technology if there is no other way to spread their messages. The appeal to belief systems that raise the importance of this world is the result of a combination of all the factors of modernity.

Despite the paucity of sociological data, we can nonetheless obtain indirect evidence of the impact of science through the question: how the Bible is perceived today (1991, ISSP) with possible answers to it: “The Bible is indeed the word of God and must be taken literally, the word in word/Bible is the word of God, but not everything in it should be taken literally, word for word/Bible is a collection of ancient tales, legends, stories and moral instructions recorded by people / This does not apply to me / I can not choose. We find that 13/40% (respectively) of respondents in Western Europe agree with the first two types of answers (from the highest in Italy - 26/51% to the lowest in Denmark - 6/17%); In the USA - 32/47%; in Russia - 10/16%; in Poland -55/26% (the only country where the first answer option dominates); in Israel 25/26%.(2) With the exception of Poland, the highest percentage of those who chose the first answer were the older generation and those with a low level of education. In addition, this response was most frequent among farmers, working class and lower-middle class (Lambert, 1998).

The World Value program has a question about the perception of the image of God (although it is a less definitive indicator) with different answers: "Personal God" (i.e., a "genuine" Christian answer); "Spiritual or life force" (which may be the source or creator of the universe, energies, the divine basis of creation, cosmic consciousness, etc.); "I don't think there are any forms of spirit, God, life force" (and "don't know", "no answer"). In Western Europe, there are only slightly more people who consider God a "personal God", namely 36%, than those who believe that God is a "spiritual or vital force" - 34% (non-believers make up 11%) (Lambert, 1995 ); in France, respectively, 20% and 32%; in the United States, 69% and 23%, confirming the previously established difference between Europe and the United States. Moreover, 40% of American scientists claim to be religious. The nature of the responses is distributed primarily in accordance with age: in Europe, from the older to the younger generation, the percentage of those who choose the answer "personal God" decreases from 47% to 28%, but in the USA - from 70% to 66%. Similarly, the percentage of believers in the existence of God is decreasing: in Europe - from 41% to 25%, in the USA - from 67% to 57%. (ISSP). According to a 1994 study conducted in France, the birthplace of scientism, only 27% believed in the Judeo-Christian concept of creation (20% in the 18-24 age group) and 49% said they agreed that "as scientific progress, it is increasingly difficult to believe in God” (64% in the age group of 18-24), which shows that the problem is not closed.

(c) The primacy of reason is itself a factor in the quest for freedom, as it allows individual autonomy to face tradition, political power, and religious authority. Individual consciousness and freedom can contribute to the rejection of religion, or the formation of a more personal religion or its restoration through the revival of a collective identity or (especially in the ultramodern) a turn towards bricolage, syncretism, innovation and parallel beliefs. As one would expect, individual choice can lead to any possibility we can imagine, up to religion and the church, so individualization can be seen as a major feature in the changes in value systems in Western Europe.

Protestantism was the first religious expression of the desire for freedom, which became widespread and had revolutionary features for that time: a more personalized faith, the ability for the laity to read the Bible in national languages ​​(as opposed to the Bible in Latin, which was available only to the clergy) and the ability to confess in their sins directly to God. In this new context of denominational pluralism and religious wars, freedom of belief became the first major demand for individual freedom, and for two or three centuries the most pressing. This demand for individual freedom also took the form of economic freedom (freedom of trade and enterprise), general freedom of thought (Enlightenment), and political freedom (democracy, the emergence of the masses). Freedom of thought also led to deism, a natural or civil religion, and allowed for choices beyond religion that were sometimes even more daring. The Roman Catholic Church condemned the French Declaration of the Rights of Man of 1789 and, moreover, condemned freedom of conscience and speech, as well as the principles of separation of church and state. Since modernity won a widespread victory, the Catholic Church eventually recognized this process, although it continues to be critical of it (Second Vatican Council). As is well known, the United States has played a pioneering role not only in regard to religious freedom, but also in regard to religious pluralism and denominational mobility, which can be seen as its logical extension. The thirst for freedom conquered new territories, such as sexuality and family life, but in the process of developing them, it kindled a conflict between permissiveness and traditional ethics and provoked a conservative reaction among the churches.

According to WVS and ISSP, the consequences of individualization in late modernity are ambivalent, although less beneficial for institutionalized religion. A variable such as the "Christian worldview" (WVS) introduced by Dobbelaere, which dwells on the role of God in the meaning of life, suffering and death, shows a negative or very weak correlation with the five criteria of individuation. On the other hand, a variable such as "Christian religiosity", which relies in part on the perception of one's being as religious, and on the ability to find strength and comfort in religion (which actually goes beyond the Christian context), shows a negative correlation with only three of five criteria. However, when we neutralize the effect of age, then this negative correlation weakens, and if we touch on the topics of reincarnation, parallel beliefs and religious liberalism, we get positive correlations that would undoubtedly be associated with everything that gives expression to personal religious responsibility and internal spirituality. Roland Campiche (1992) has shown that individualization is also a fundamental trend in the rethinking of Christianity in Switzerland. We can confirm this using similar data in the case of young people (Lambert, 1993; Lambert and Voye, 1997), and Jacques Janssen also confirmed these ideas in a study of Danish youth (1998). These studies have shown that, especially since the 1960s, with the baby boom generation, church members have become more autonomous in their religious and moral lives. (Roof, 1993; 1995). It is noteworthy, for example, the Roof study, when in 1988 - 1989. 1,400 Americans born between 1946 and 1962 were asked to choose between "Going to church or synagogue is a requirement and an obligation" or "Going to church or synagogue is something I do if it suits my needs" . 76% chose the second position, and this feeling is reflected by 2/3 of those who consider themselves born Christians. This is also true for Catholics.

The contemporary impact of individualization on religious innovation can be illustrated by the spread of religious pluralism, denominational activism, bricolage, and parallel beliefs that are most evident in the post-war generation. In the Roof study mentioned above, for example, 33% remained loyal to the religion they belonged to from birth, 42% left their churches, and 25% returned after a period of absence. Since the parallel beliefs (telepathy, astrology) are completely free, they are not controlled by any institutions or orthodoxy. Therefore, they can be the results of free choice and coexist with Christian beliefs. It is possible that for this reason they are more popular among the younger generation than among older ages. According to ISSP 1991, when asked three questions about parallel beliefs, 34% of those aged 18 to 29 believed (with varying degrees of strength) that "lucky charms bring good luck," while 22 % of those over 60. 39% and 26%, respectively, believed that "foretellers of the future are indeed capable of foreseeing the future." We can also note that among the NRMs, the most successful remain those that are perceived as less hostile to the desire for freedom (such as the New Age movement or others that at least proclaim the development of personal abilities, such as Scientology), in while the more intolerant and closed "cults" are losing their popularity.

Orientations in the direction of permissiveness can be illustrated by relevant studies (WVS). Karel Dobbelaere and Wolfgang Jagodzinski (1995) show a connection between "moral rigidity" (against underage sex, homosexuality, prostitution, abortion, and extramarital affairs) and Christian religiosity. This is the space where the differences between church attendance and religious membership are most pronounced. For example, only 18% of those who go to church agree very weakly with the idea of ​​"complete sexual freedom", compared to 43% of those who hardly ever or never go to church. Corresponding attitude: 4% versus 29% who believe that "marriage is an outdated institution"; 13% versus 49% who accept abortions "when a married couple does not want to have any more children". Similar results occur in the United States, while disregarding differences between groups.

(d) The emergence of the masses on the historical scene (nationalism, democracy, socialism, communism, fascism, social movements) also has a contradictory effect on religion, related to the historical role of the church (support, neutrality or rejection), as noted by David Martin (1978) . Let me just say that nationalism has not played any important role in the evolution of religion because the churches as a whole supported the national demands. Nevertheless, one can point to an example of the resistance of the papacy to the unification of Italy, which was one of the important foundations for Italian anti-clericalism. Countries such as Ireland and Poland, where religion has historically played an important role in the preservation and assertion of national identity, show a high degree of religiosity. The main challenge was made during the transition from monarchical to democratic political systems and, above all, during the rise of socialism and communism. In this sense, the US and France are interesting points of comparison. In the US, the followers of the Protestant Church have historically been a major force in the struggle for human rights. In contrast, in France, the Catholic Church, especially in relation to the ecclesiastical hierarchy, was monarchist and anti-republican until the end of the 19th century. But French Protestants, who had long been literally swamped if not suppressed by Catholicism, preferred democracy and secular principles. This phenomenon can help explain the "war of the two Frances" (clerical/anti-clerical). While socialism and communism have never been influential in the US, they have played an important role in the history of France and in general in Europe have been the basis for opposition between the non-religious and weakly religious left and the more religious right. In addition to this, in the US denominational affiliation was a very important factor in social integration. Although these differences are part of the historical past, their influence can still be seen in terms of levels of religiosity, which varies with class and political preferences. This legacy can be traced throughout Western Europe in the religious differences between the Social Democratic and Christian Democratic parties. Ultimately, late modernity is evidence of the collapse of communism. Religions defeated him in the 20th century. Another consequence of the emergence of the masses is a general de-hierarchization of relations between clergy and laity, a secular trend and the use of national languages ​​(from early Protestantism to the Second Vatican Council).

The rise of new social movements (counterculture, feminism, ecology, peace, regionalism) could renew the importance or hasten the collapse of religion along this scheme of support or hostility. However, this does not seem to be the case, inasmuch as the churches, having little at stake in these areas with a few exceptions (abortions, priestly marriages, female clergymen, etc.), do not take any leading position and give its members the right to choose: even feminism has found its voice in the churches. These movements produce innovative (countercultural movements were one of the main sources of the NRM in the 60s and 70s; ecology was inspired by Spiritual ecology), adaptive (ecology becomes an essential principle for many religions) and, accordingly, reactionary effects ("Moral Majority") .

On a political scale: Left-Center-Right, according to the 1990 WVS Europe, 16% of those who attend church at least once a week, compared to 45% of those who never go to church, identify themselves as left-wing. does not attend or does so very rarely; in the US, these figures are 9% and 28%, respectively. Approximately the same ratio occurs among the youth of the United States, while in the case of young Europeans who attend churches, the number of those who identify themselves as political left rises to 28%. In addition, when we compare WVS data from 1981 with WVS data from 1990, we see that differences in church attendance and religious participation between the upper and lower classes are leveling off. This suggests that the main sources of social antagonism associated with industrial society are dying out. Trade union affiliation is most common among those who do not see themselves as regularly practicing church attendance and religious participation, although this is not the case in the US. With regard to new social movements, we can observe very few, if any, differences between regular practitioners and non-practitioners or even non-religious ones in terms of approval or participation in such movements as "ecology, protection of nature", "non-nuclear energy”, “disarmament”, “human rights”, “women's rights”, “anti-apartheid”, regardless of age (1990, WVS). All this, of course, does not apply to the most religious, who are less involved in women's movements (or in unofficial strikes, or in the occupation of factories and factories, but this is the most rare), but more involved in human rights organizations.

(e) the development of capitalism itself is both a factor in the rise of materialism and in the reinterpretation of religious attitudes towards world orientation. The economy was the first area of ​​activity that promoted the development of autonomy, and it contributed to the development of socialism and communism through proletarianization, which I have already discussed. Although it was in vain, the practice of borrowing and lending for profit was long opposed by the Catholic Church. World-orientedness contributed to the development of non-religious materialism, as well as interpretations of religiosity in terms of professional ethics or world-oriented spirituality, which was beautifully illustrated by Weber. We can observe these two aspects from the very beginning of capitalism to this day. Another impact of capitalism, most evident in the high modern US, is a shift towards market-type religious structures and consumer-type attitudes (Iannaccone, 1992). As for conservative implications, we could use the example of the Amish [a small Protestant community that survives in a number of states (Pennsylvania, Ohio)]. In terms of innovative implications, the same televangelists or the spiritual way of making money as demonstrated by the Church of Scientology are examples. Although more difficult to identify, I could also mention the role of spiritual complementarity that religion can play in an affluent society, but again we are faced with a paucity of empirical evidence on this point.

(f) Functional differentiation implies modern state building, differentiation between the public and private spheres, Lukman's autonomization of spheres of activity. Its first notable consequence was the elimination of the monopoly of religion in education and culture and the legitimation of the sociopolitical order. This would favor the marginalization of church and religion and would keep them from legitimizing the existing order. It would also favor a redefinition of their roles in education, culture, health, social protection, human rights, peace, and so on. and would bring it into line with the more pluralistic context that is characteristic of high modernity (Casanova, 1994; Beckford, 1996). It also produces reactionary consequences, which are manifested in the desire to maintain or stop the power of religion over society (fundamentalist trends). According to Lukman (1977, 1982), modern society is divided into subsystems, each of which has a specific function and relative independence: politics, economics, science, education, law, art, health, family and religion. Religion is a subsystem, which is determined by its spiritual function. Among these subsystems, Luckman also makes a distinction between those that are imposed or prescribed on all members of society. These are areas such as politics, economics, science, education and law, which he qualifies as "professional". And it is the subsystems, such as art and especially religion, that are complementary or "complementary". Finally, he distinguishes between the dual functions of subsystems: their internal (specific) and external function, which he calls "performative" and which denotes the influence of a subsystem on other subsystems in their own territory. The WVS and ISSP studies provide interesting clues for measuring the significance of religion, its impact on individuals, fundamentalist or secularist positions.

(g) Similarly, globalization could increase the radical relativization of religions (to the extent that their truths are incompatible), ensure their meetings and interpenetration at the international level (missions, NRMs, papal visits, etc.), push towards a more pluralistic approach ( all religions are allowed), ecumenism, interreligious dialogues, fundamentalist reaction, innovations (borrowings, bricolage, syncretism). These effects are increasing in the current phase of accelerating globalization and are increasing in influence (Beyer, 1994), especially among young people. In combination with democracy, globalization promotes the diffusion of new religions and NRMs, or provokes defensive and even aggressive reactions (Eastern orthodoxy).

According to the 1981 European Value survey, 25% (17% aged 18-29) thought there was only one true religion; 53% (56% aged 18-29) said all great religions had interesting insights; 14% (19% aged 18-29) said that no religion reveals any truths. In France, the percentage of those who think there is only one true religion fell from half in 1952 to 14% in 1981 (11% aged 18-29). In 1988-89 48% of the baby boom generation agreed that all religions are equally true and good. At the same time, we see a shift in the direction of probabilism, especially among young people: “maybe” (yes or no) responses are just as important as “definitely” responses in establishing the nature of beliefs. Fundamentalist beliefs will be discussed in the last section. A good example of syncretism (or bricolage) is the overlap between resurrection and reincarnation. In 1990, in Europe, according to WVS, about 40% of those who believe in resurrection said that they also believe in reincarnation, and vice versa. For the younger generation, the number rises to 50%. Even the Christian core does not save from this attitude, although according to interviews conducted in France, it turns out that this group presents reincarnation as the resurrection of the body (simultaneously reincarnation), while others prefer to view it as a periodic resurrection.

We can also consider the relationship between these factors. For example, science, by giving priority to reason over the monopoly of religious authority, has been able to create a favorable climate for individual freedom and the emergence of the masses in the historical arena. Science provides implicit empirical patterns that can influence the relevance of personal experience in contemporary religious relationships (pragmatism, inner spirituality). Science and technology have contributed to the development of the economy (providing the basis for its own expansion), to globalization (by creating the most universal forms of activity), to functional differentiation (with the existence of science as one of the differentiated spheres). Thus, they influenced the religious evolution, given these aspects. Although I could go on in this direction, for lack of space let me turn instead to an analysis of some of the newer forms of religion that are most typical of modernity and high modernity.