Winter war with Finland 1939 1940 results. Finnish war losses

Soviet-Finnish War of 1939–40 (another name is winter war) took place from November 30, 1939 to March 12, 1940.

The formal reason for the hostilities was the so-called Mainil incident - shelling from the Finnish territory of the Soviet border guards in the village of Mainila on the Karelian Isthmus, which occurred, according to the Soviet side, on November 26, 1939. The Finnish side categorically denied any involvement in the shelling. Two days later, on November 28, the USSR denounced the Soviet-Finnish non-aggression pact, concluded in 1932, and on November 30 began hostilities.

The underlying causes of the conflict were based on a number of factors, not the least of which was the fact that in 1918-22 Finland twice attacked the territory of the RSFSR. According to the results of the Tartu Peace Treaty of 1920 and the Moscow Agreement on the adoption of measures to ensure the inviolability of the Soviet-Finnish border of 1922 between the governments of the RSFSR and Finland, the primordially Russian Pecheneg region (Petsamo) and part of the Sredny and Rybachy peninsulas were transferred to Finland.

Despite the fact that in 1932 a non-aggression pact was signed between Finland and the USSR, relations between the two countries were rather tense. In Finland, they feared that sooner or later the Soviet Union, which had strengthened many times since 1922, would want to return its territories, and in the USSR they were afraid that Finland, as in 1919 (when British torpedo boats attacked Kronstadt from Finnish ports), could provide its territory to another hostile country to attack. The situation was aggravated by the fact that the second most important city in the USSR - Leningrad - was only 32 kilometers from the Soviet-Finnish border.

During this period, the activities of the Communist Party were banned in Finland and secret consultations were held with the governments of Poland and the Baltic countries on joint actions in the event of a war with the USSR. In 1939, the USSR signed the Non-Aggression Pact with Germany, also known as the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. In accordance with the secret protocols to it, Finland retreats to the zone of interests of the Soviet Union.

In 1938-39, during lengthy negotiations with Finland, the USSR tried to exchange part of the Karelian Isthmus for twice the area, but less suitable for agricultural use, in Karelia, as well as to transfer the USSR to lease several islands and part of the Hanko Peninsula for military bases. Finland, firstly, did not agree with the size of the territories given to it (not least because of the unwillingness to part with the line of defensive fortifications built in the 30s, also known as the Mannerheim Line (see Fig. and ), and secondly, she tried to achieve the conclusion of a Soviet-Finnish trade agreement and the right to arm the demilitarized Aland Islands.

The negotiations were very difficult and were accompanied by mutual reproaches and accusations (see: ). The last attempt was the proposal of the USSR on October 5, 1939 to conclude a Mutual Assistance Pact with Finland.

Negotiations dragged on and reached an impasse. The parties began to prepare for war.

On October 13-14, 1939, general mobilization was announced in Finland. And two weeks later, on November 3, the troops of the Leningrad Military District and the Red Banner Baltic Fleet received directives to start preparing for hostilities. Newspaper article "Truth" on the same day reported that the Soviet Union intended to ensure its security at any cost. A massive anti-Finnish campaign began in the Soviet press, to which the opposite side immediately responded.

Less than a month remained before the Mainilsky incident, which served as a formal pretext for war.

Most Western and a number of Russian researchers believe that the shelling was a fiction - either it did not exist at all, and there were only allegations from the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, or the shelling was a provocation. Documents confirming this or that version have not been preserved. Finland proposed a joint investigation of the incident, but the Soviet side firmly rejected the proposal.

Immediately after the start of the war, official relations with the Ryti government were terminated, and on December 2, 1939, the USSR signed an agreement on mutual assistance and friendship with the so-called "People's Government of Finland", formed from communists and led by Otto Kuusinen. At the same time, in the USSR, on the basis of the 106th Mountain Rifle Division, began to form "Finnish People's Army" from Finns and Karelians. However, she did not take part in the hostilities and was eventually disbanded, like the Kuusinen government.

The Soviet Union planned to deploy military operations in two main directions - the Karelian Isthmus and north of Lake Ladoga. After a successful breakthrough (or bypassing the line of fortifications from the north), the Red Army got the opportunity to make the most of the advantage in manpower and the overwhelming advantage in technology. In terms of time, the operation had to meet the period from two weeks to a month. The Finnish command, in turn, counted on the stabilization of the front on the Karelian Isthmus and active containment in the northern sector, believing that the army would be able to independently hold the enemy up to six months and then wait for help from Western countries. Both plans turned out to be an illusion: the Soviet Union underestimated the strength of Finland, while Finland placed too much stake on the help of foreign powers and on the reliability of its fortifications.

As already mentioned, by the beginning of hostilities in Finland, general mobilization took place. The USSR, however, decided to confine itself to parts of the LenVO, believing that additional involvement of forces would not be required. At the start of the war, the USSR concentrated 425,640 personnel, 2,876 guns and mortars, 2,289 tanks, and 2,446 aircraft for the operation. They were opposed by 265,000 people, 834 guns, 64 tanks and 270 aircraft.

As part of the Red Army, units of the 7th, 8th, 9th and 14th armies advanced on Finland. The 7th army advanced on the Karelian Isthmus, the 8th - north of Lake Ladoga, the 9th - in Karelia, the 14th - in the Arctic.

The most favorable situation for the USSR developed on the front of the 14th Army, which, interacting with the Northern Fleet, occupied the Rybachy and Sredny peninsulas, the city of Petsamo (Pechenga) and closed Finland's access to the Barents Sea. The 9th Army penetrated the Finnish defenses to a depth of 35-45 km and was stopped (see. ). The 8th Army initially began to successfully move forward, but was also stopped, and part of its forces were surrounded and forced to withdraw. The most difficult and bloody battles unfolded in the sector of the 7th Army, advancing on the Karelian Isthmus. The army was to storm the Mannerheim Line.

As it turned out later, the Soviet side had fragmentary and extremely scarce data about the enemy opposing it on the Karelian Isthmus, and, most importantly, about the line of fortifications. The underestimation of the enemy immediately affected the course of hostilities. The forces allocated to break through the Finnish defenses in this area turned out to be insufficient. By December 12, units of the Red Army, with losses, were able to overcome only the support strip of the Mannerheim Line and stopped. Until the end of December, several desperate attempts to break through were made, but they were not crowned with success. By the end of December, it became obvious that it was pointless to attempt an offensive in this style. There was a relative calm at the front.

Having understood and studied the reasons for the failure in the first period of the war, the Soviet command undertook a serious reorganization of forces and means. Throughout January and early February, there was a significant strengthening of the troops, their saturation with large-caliber artillery capable of fighting fortifications, replenishment of material reserves, and reorganization of units and formations. Methods were developed to deal with defensive structures, mass exercises and training of personnel were carried out, assault groups and detachments were formed, work was carried out to improve the interaction of military branches, to raise morale (see. ).

The USSR learned quickly. To break through the fortified area, the North-Western Front was created under the command of the commander of the 1st rank Timoshenko and a member of the military council of the LenVO Zhdanov. The front included the 7th and 13th armies.

Finland at that moment also carried out measures to increase the combat capability of its own troops. Both captured in battles and new equipment and weapons delivered from abroad, the units received the necessary replenishment.

Both sides were ready for the second round of the fight.

At the same time, fighting in Karelia did not stop.

The most famous in the historiography of the Soviet-Finnish war during that period was the encirclement of the 163rd and 44th rifle divisions of the 9th army near Suomussalmi. From mid-December, the 44th division advanced to help the encircled 163rd division. In the period from January 3 to January 7, 1940, its units were repeatedly surrounded, but, despite the difficult situation, they continued to fight, having superiority in technical equipment over the Finns. In conditions of constant fighting, in a rapidly changing situation, the division command misjudged the situation and gave the order to leave the encirclement in groups, leaving behind heavy equipment. This only made the situation worse. Parts of the division still managed to break out of the encirclement, but with heavy losses ... Subsequently, the division commander Vinogradov, the regimental commissar Pakhomenko and the chief of staff Volkov, who left the division at the most difficult moment, were sentenced by a military tribunal to capital punishment and shot in front of the ranks.

It is also worth noting that since the end of December, the Finns have been trying to counterattack on the Karelian Isthmus in order to disrupt the preparations for a new Soviet offensive. Counterattacks were not successful and were repulsed.

On February 11, 1940, after a massive multi-day artillery preparation, the Red Army, together with units of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet and the Ladoga military flotilla, launched a new offensive. The main blow fell on the Karelian Isthmus. Within three days, the troops of the 7th Army broke through the first line of defense of the Finns and introduced tank formations into the breakthrough. On February 17, the Finnish troops, by order of the command, retreated to the second lane due to the threat of encirclement.

On February 21, the 7th Army reached the second line of defense, and the 13th Army - to the main line north of Muolaa. On February 28, both armies of the Northwestern Front launched an offensive along the entire length of the Karelian Isthmus. Finnish troops retreated, putting up fierce resistance. In an attempt to stop the advancing units of the Red Army, the Finns opened the floodgates of the Saimaa Canal, but this did not help either: on March 13, Soviet troops entered Vyborg.

In parallel with the fighting, there were also battles on the diplomatic front. After the breakthrough of the Mannerheim Line and the entry of Soviet troops into the operational space, the Finnish government understood that there was no chance of continuing the struggle. Therefore, it turned to the USSR with a proposal to start peace negotiations. On March 7, a Finnish delegation arrived in Moscow, and on March 12 a peace treaty was signed.

As a result of the war, the Karelian Isthmus and the large cities of Vyborg and Sortavala, a number of islands in the Gulf of Finland, part of the Finnish territory with the city of Kuolajärvi, part of the Rybachy and Sredny peninsulas went to the USSR. Lake Ladoga became an inland lake of the USSR. The Petsamo (Pechenga) region captured during the fighting was returned to Finland. The USSR leased part of the Khanko (Gangut) peninsula for a period of 30 years to equip a naval base there.

At the same time, the reputation of the Soviet state in the international arena suffered: the USSR was declared an aggressor and expelled from the League of Nations. Mutual distrust between the Western countries and the USSR reached a critical point.

Recommended literature:
1. Irincheev Bair. Forgotten front of Stalin. M.: Yauza, Eksmo, 2008. (Series: Unknown Wars of the XX century.)
2. Soviet-Finnish war 1939-1940 / Comp. P. Petrov, V. Stepakov. SP b .: Polygon, 2003. In 2 volumes.
3. Tanner Väinö. Winter war. Diplomatic confrontation between the Soviet Union and Finland, 1939-1940. Moscow: Tsentrpoligraf, 2003.
4. "Winter War": work on the mistakes (April-May 1940). Materials of the commissions of the Main Military Council of the Red Army on the generalization of the experience of the Finnish campaign / Ed. comp. N. S. Tarkhova. SP b., Summer Garden, 2003.

Tatiana Vorontsova

Combat forces of the parties:

1. Finnish army:

A. Manpower

By the end of November 1939, Finland had concentrated 15 infantry divisions and 7 special brigades near the borders of the USSR.

The land army interacted with and was supported by the Finnish navy and coastal defense forces, as well as the Finnish Air Force. The Navy has 29 warships. In addition, the following were connected to the army's payroll of 337 thousand people as a military force:

The paramilitary formations of the Shutskor and "Lotta Svärd" - 110 thousand people.

Volunteer corps of Swedes, Norwegians and Danes - 11.5 thousand people.

The total number of human forces involved in the war from Finland, counting the repeated replenishment of the army with reservists, ranged from 500 thousand to 600 thousand people.

The 150,000-strong Anglo-French Expeditionary Force to help Finland was also preparing and was supposed to be sent to the front by the end of February - the beginning of March 1940, the arrival of which only thwarted the conclusion of peace.

B. Armament

The Finnish army was well armed, possessed everything necessary. For artillery - 900 mobile guns, 270 combat aircraft, 60 tanks, 29 warships of the Navy.

During the war, Finland was helped by 13 countries that sent her weapons (mostly from England, the USA, France, Sweden). Finland received: 350 aircraft, 1.5 thousand artillery pieces of various calibers, 6 thousand machine guns, 100 thousand rifles, 2.5 million artillery shells, 160 million rounds of ammunition.

90% of the financial aid came from the United States, the rest from European countries, mainly France and Scandinavia.

B. Fortifications

The basis of Finland's military power was unique, impregnable fortifications, the so-called. "Mannerheim Line" with its prefloor, main and rear lanes and defense knots.

The "Mannerheim Line" organically used the features of geography (lake district), geology (granite bedding) and topography (rough terrain, eskers, forest cover, rivers, streams, channels) of Finland, combined with high-tech engineering structures to create a defense line capable of giving multi-layered fire on the advancing enemy (at different levels and at different angles), along with the impenetrability, strength and invulnerability of the fortification belt itself.

The fortification belt had a depth of 90 km. It was preceded by a forefield with various fortifications - ditches, blockages, wire fences, gouges - up to 15-20 km wide. The thickness of the walls and floors of the pillboxes made of reinforced concrete and granite reached 2 m. A forest grew on top of the pillboxes on earthen embankments up to 3 m thick.

On all three lanes of the "Mannerheim Line" there were over 1,000 pillboxes and bunkers, of which 296 were powerful fortresses. All fortifications were connected by a system of trenches, underground passages and were supplied with food and ammunition necessary for a long-term autonomous battle.

The space between the fortifications, as well as the foreground in front of the entire "Mannerheim Line" were literally covered with solid military engineering structures.

The saturation of this area with barriers was expressed by the following indicators: for every square kilometer there were: 0.5 km of wire barriers, 0.5 km of forest debris, 0.9 km of minefields, 0.1 km of scarps, 0.2 km of granite and reinforced concrete gouges. All bridges were mined and prepared for destruction, all roads for damage. On the possible routes of movement of the Soviet troops, huge wolf pits were arranged - funnels 7-10 m deep and 15-20 m in diameter. 200 mines were set for each linear kilometer. Forest blockages reached 250 m in depth.

D. Finnish War Plan:

Using the "Mannerheim Line", pin down the main forces of the Red Army on it and wait for the approach of military assistance from the Western powers, after which, together with the allied forces, go on the offensive, transfer military operations to Soviet territory and capture Karelia and the Kola Peninsula along the White Sea - Onega line lake

E. Directions of hostilities and the command of the Finnish army:

1. In accordance with this operational-strategic plan, the main forces of the Finnish army were concentrated on the Karelian Isthmus: the army of Lieutenant General H.V. Esterman, which consisted of two army corps (since February 19, 1940, the commander was Major General A.E. Heinrichs).

2. To the north of it, on the northwestern coast of Lake Ladoga, on the line Kexholm (Kyakisalmi) - Sortavala - Laymola, there was a group of troops of Major General Paavo Talvela.

3. In Central Karelia, on the front against the Petrozavodsk-Medvezhyegorsk-Reboly line - the army corps of Major General I. Heiskanen (later he was replaced by E. Heglund).

4. In North Karelia - from Kuolajärvi to Suomusalmi (Ukhta direction) - a group of Major General V.E. Tuompo.

5. In the Arctic - from Petsamo to Kandalaksha - the front was occupied by the so-called. Lapland group of Major General K.M. Wallenius.

Marshal K.G. Mannerheim was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the active army of Finland.

Chief of Staff of the Headquarters - Lieutenant General K. L. Ash.

The commander of the Scandinavian volunteer corps is General of the Swedish Army Ernst Linder.

II.Soviet army:

In the fighting on the entire 1500-kilometer Finnish front, by the time the fighting ended, at the climax of the war, 6 armies were engaged - the 7th, 8th, 9th, 13th, 14th, 15th.

The regular strength of the ground forces: 916 thousand people. They include: 52 infantry (rifle) divisions, 5 tank brigades, 16 separate artillery regiments, several separate regiments and brigades of signal and engineering troops.

The ground forces were supported by the ships of the Baltic Fleet. Ladoga military flotilla and the Northern Fleet.

The number of personnel of naval units and formations is over 50 thousand people.

Thus, up to 1 million people of the personnel of the Red Army and the Navy took part in the Soviet-Finnish war, and taking into account the necessary replenishment during the war to replace the dead and wounded, over 1 million people. These troops were armed with:

11266 guns and mortars,

2998 tanks,

3253 combat aircraft.

A. Distribution of forces along the front from north to south:

1. Arctic:

14th Army (two rifle divisions) and the Northern Fleet (three destroyers, a patrol ship, two minesweepers, a submarine brigade - three D-type boats, seven Shch-type boats, six M-type boats). Commander of the 14th Army - Divisional Commander V.A. Frolov. Commander of the Northern Fleet - flagship of the 2nd rank V.N. Thrush.

2. Karelia:

a) North and Central Karelia - 9th Army (three rifle divisions).

Army Commander - Commander M.P. Dukhanov.

b) South Karelia, north of Lake Ladoga, - 8th Army (four rifle divisions).

Army Commander - Divisional Commander I.N. Khabarov.

3. Karelian Isthmus:

7th Army (9 rifle divisions, 1 tank corps, 3 tank brigades, as well as 16 separate artillery regiments, 644 combat aircraft).

Commander of the 7th Army - Commander of the 2nd Rank V.F. Yakovlev.

The 7th Army was supported by the ships of the Baltic Fleet. Commander of the Baltic Fleet - flagship of the 2nd rank V.F. Tributs.

The balance of forces on the Karelian Isthmus was in favor of the Soviet troops: in terms of the number of rifle battalions - 2.5 times, in artillery - 3.5 times, in aviation - 4 times, in tanks - absolute.

Nevertheless, the fortifications and the defense in depth of the entire Karelian Isthmus were such that these forces were not enough not only to break through them, but even to destroy the deep and extremely difficult fortified and, as a rule, absolutely mined forefield during the fighting.

As a result, despite all the efforts and heroism of the Soviet troops, they did not manage to carry out the offensive as successfully and at such a pace as originally intended, because knowledge of the theater of operations did not come until months after the start of the war.

Another factor hindering the combat operations of the Soviet troops was the extremely severe winter of 1939/40, with its frosts down to 30-40 degrees.

The lack of experience in warfare in forests and deep snow, the lack of specially trained ski troops and, most importantly, special (rather than standard) winter uniforms - all this reduced the effectiveness of the Red Army.

The course of hostilities

Military operations by their nature fell into two main periods:

First period: From November 30, 1939 to February 10, 1940, i.e. fighting until the breakthrough of the Mannerheim Line.

Second period: From February 11 to March 12, 1940, i.e. combat operations to break through the "Mannerheim Line" itself.

In the first period, the most successful was the advance in the north and in Karelia.

1. The troops of the 14th Army captured the Rybachy and Sredny peninsulas, the cities of Lillahammari and Petsamo in the Pechenga region and closed Finland's exit to the Barents Sea.

2. The troops of the 9th Army wedged into the depths of the enemy defenses for 30-50 km in North and Central Karelia, i.e. slightly, but still went beyond the state border. Further progress could not be ensured due to the complete lack of roads, dense forests, deep snow cover and the complete absence of settlements in this part of Finland.

3. The troops of the 8th Army in South Karelia went deep into enemy territory up to 80 km, but were also forced to suspend the offensive, since some units were surrounded by Finnish mobile ski units of the Shutskor, who were well acquainted with the area.

4. The main front on the Karelian Isthmus in the first period experienced three stages in the development of hostilities:

5. Waging heavy fighting, the 7th Army advanced 5-7 km per day until it approached the "Mannerheim Line", which happened in different sectors of the offensive from 2 to 12 December. During the first two weeks of fighting, the cities of Terioki, Fort Inoniemi, Raivola, Rautu (now Zelenogorsk, Privetninskoye, Roshchino, Orekhovo) were taken.

During the same period, the Baltic Fleet took possession of the islands of Seiskari, Lavansaari, Suursaari (Gogland), Narvi, Soomeri.

In early December 1939, a special group of three divisions (49th, 142nd and 150th) was created as part of the 7th Army under the command of commander V.D. Grendal to break through the river. Taipalenjoki and exit to the rear of the "Mannerheim Line" fortifications.

Despite the crossing of the river and heavy losses in the battles on December 6-8, the Soviet units failed to gain a foothold and develop success. The same thing was revealed during attempts to attack the "Mannerheim Line" on December 9-12, after the entire 7th Army had reached the entire 110-kilometer strip occupied by this line. Due to the huge losses in manpower, heavy fire from pillboxes and bunkers and the impossibility of advancing, operations were suspended on virtually the entire line by the end of December 9, 1939.

The Soviet command decided on a radical restructuring of military operations.

6. The Main Military Council of the Red Army decided to suspend the offensive and carefully prepare to break through the enemy's defensive line. The front went on the defensive. The troops were regrouped. The front section of the 7th Army was reduced from 100 to 43 km. The 13th Army was created on the front of the second half of the "Mannerheim Line", which consisted of a group of commander V.D. Grendal (4 rifle divisions), and then a little later, by the beginning of February 1940, the 15th Army, operating between Lake Ladoga and the Laimola point.

7. A restructuring of command and control and a change of command was carried out.

Firstly, the Active Army was withdrawn from the control of the Leningrad Military District and passed directly under the jurisdiction of the Headquarters of the High Command of the Red Army.

Secondly, the North-Western Front was created on the Karelian Isthmus (date of formation: January 7, 1940).

Front commander: commander of the 1st rank S.K. Timoshenko.

Chief of Staff of the Front: Commander of the 2nd rank I.V. Smorodinov.

Member of the Military Council: A.A. Zhdanov.

Commander of the 7th Army: Commander of the 2nd rank K.A. Meretskov (since December 26, 1939).

Commander of the 8th Army: Commander of the 2nd rank G.M. Stern.

Commander of the 9th Army: Commander V.I. Chuikov.

Commander of the 13th Army: Commander V.D. Grendal (since March 2, 1940 - commander F.A. Parusinov).

Commander of the 14th Army: Divisional Commander V.A. Frolov.

Commander of the 15th Army: Commander of the 2nd rank M.P. Kovalev (since February 12, 1940).

8. The troops of the central group on the Karelian Isthmus (7th Army and the newly created 13th Army) were significantly reorganized and reinforced:

a) 7th Army (12 rifle divisions, 7 RGK artillery regiments, 4 corps artillery regiments, 2 separate artillery divisions, 5 tank brigades, 1 machine gun brigade, 2 separate heavy tank battalions, 10 air regiments).

b) 13th Army (9 rifle divisions, 6 RGK artillery regiments, 3 corps artillery regiments, 2 separate artillery divisions, 1 tank brigade, 2 separate heavy tank battalions, 1 cavalry regiment, 5 air regiments).

9. The main task during this period consisted in the active preparation by the troops of the theater of military operations for the assault on the "Mannerheim Line", as well as in the preparation by the command of the troops of the best conditions for the offensive.

To solve the first task, it was necessary to eliminate all obstacles in the foreground, covertly clear mines for the foreground, make numerous passes in the rubble and wire fences before attacking directly the fortifications of the Mannerheim Line itself. Within a month, the system of the "Mannerheim Line" itself was thoroughly explored, many hidden pillboxes and bunkers were discovered, and their destruction began by methodical daily artillery fire.

Only on the 43-kilometer sector, the 7th Army daily fired up to 12 thousand shells at the enemy.

The destruction of the front line and the depth of the enemy's defense was also caused by aviation. During the preparation for the assault, the bombers carried out over 4 thousand bombings along the front, and the fighters made 3.5 thousand sorties.

10. To prepare the troops themselves for the assault, food was seriously improved, traditional uniforms (Budyonnovka, overcoats, boots) were replaced with earflaps, sheepskin coats, felt boots. The front received 2,500 mobile insulated houses with stoves.

In the near rear, the troops practiced new assault techniques, the front received the latest means for blowing up pillboxes and bunkers, for storming powerful fortifications, new reserves of people, weapons, and ammunition were brought up.

As a result, by the beginning of February 1940, at the front, Soviet troops had double superiority in manpower, triple superiority in artillery firepower, and absolute superiority in tanks and aircraft.

11. The front troops were tasked with breaking through the "Mannerheim Line", defeating the main enemy forces on the Karelian Isthmus and reaching the Kexholm - Antrea - Vyborg line. The general offensive was scheduled for February 11, 1940.

It began with a powerful two-hour artillery preparation at 0800, after which the infantry, supported by tanks and direct-fire artillery, launched an offensive at 1000 and broke through the enemy defenses by the end of the day in a decisive sector and by February 14 wedged into the depth of the line by 7 km, expanding the breakthrough up to 6 km along the front. These successful actions 123 sd. (lieutenant colonel F.F. Alabushev) created the conditions for overcoming the entire "Mannerheim Line". To develop success in the 7th Army, three mobile tank groups were created.

12. The Finnish command pulled up new forces, trying to eliminate the breakthrough and defend an important knot of fortifications. But as a result of 3-day battles and the actions of three divisions, the breakthrough of the 7th Army was expanded to 12 km along the front and 11 km in depth. From the flanks of the breakthrough, two Soviet divisions began to threaten to bypass the Karhulsky knot of resistance, while the neighboring Khottinensky knot had already been taken. This forced the Finnish command to abandon counterattacks and withdraw troops from the main line of fortifications Muolanjärvi - Karhula - Gulf of Finland to the second defensive line, especially since at that time the troops of the 13th Army, whose tanks approached the Muola-Ilves node, also went on the offensive.

Pursuing the enemy, units of the 7th Army reached the main, second, inner line of Finnish fortifications by February 21. This caused great concern to the Finnish command, who understood that one more such breakthrough - and the outcome of the war could be decided.

13. Commander of the troops of the Karelian Isthmus in the Finnish army, Lieutenant-General H.V. Esterman was suspended. On February 19, 1940, Major General A.E. was appointed to his place. Heinrichs, commander of the 3rd Army Corps. Finnish troops tried to firmly gain a foothold on the second, fundamental line. But the Soviet command did not give them time for this. Already on February 28, 1940, a new, even more powerful offensive by the troops of the 7th Army began. The enemy, unable to withstand the blow, began to retreat along the entire front from the river. Vuoksa to the Vyborg Bay. The second line of fortifications was broken through in two days.

On March 1, the bypass of the city of Vyborg began, and on March 2, the troops of the 50th Rifle Corps reached the enemy's rear, inner defense line, and on March 5, the troops of the entire 7th Army surrounded Vyborg.

14. The Finnish command expected that by stubbornly defending the large Vyborg fortified area, which was considered impregnable and in the conditions of the coming spring it had a unique system of flooding the foredfield for 30 km, Finland would be able to drag out the war for at least a month and a half, which would enable England and France to deliver to Finland 150 thousandth expeditionary force. The Finns blew up the locks of the Saimaa Canal and flooded the approaches to Vyborg for tens of kilometers. Lieutenant General K.L., Chief of the Main Staff of the Finnish Army, was appointed Commander of the Vyborg District. Ash, which testified to the confidence of the Finnish command in their forces and the seriousness of their intentions to hold back a long siege of the fortified city.

15. The Soviet command carried out a deep bypass of Vyborg from the north-west with the forces of the 7th Army, part of which was to storm Vyborg from the front. At the same time, the 13th Army advanced on Kexholm and st. Antrea, and the troops of the 8th and 15th armies were advancing in the direction of Laimola,

Part of the troops of the 7th Army (two corps) was preparing to force the Vyborg Bay, since the ice still withstood tanks and artillery, although the Finns, fearing an attack by Soviet troops across the bay, set up ice-hole traps on it, covered with snow.

The offensive of the Soviet troops began on March 2 and continued until March 4. By the morning of March 5, the troops managed to gain a foothold on the western coast of the Vyborg Bay, bypassing the defenses of the fortress. By March 6, this bridgehead was expanded along the front by 40 km and in depth by 1 km.

By March 11, in this area, west of Vyborg, the Red Army troops cut the Vyborg-Helsinki highway, opening the way to the capital of Finland. At the same time, on March 5-8, the troops of the 7th Army, advancing in a northeasterly direction towards Vyborg, also reached the outskirts of the city. On March 11, the Vyborg suburb was captured. On March 12, a frontal assault on the fortress began at 23:00, and on the morning of March 13 (at night) Vyborg was taken.

16. At that time, a peace treaty had already been signed in Moscow, negotiations on which the Finnish government began on February 29, but dragged on for 2 weeks, hoping that Western assistance would come in time, and counting on the fact that the Soviet government that had entered into negotiations would suspend or weaken offensive and then the Finns will be able to show intransigence. Thus, the Finnish position made it necessary to wage war until the last minute and led to huge losses, both on the Soviet and Finnish sides.

Side losses*:

A. Losses of Soviet troops:

From a shabby notebook
Two lines about a boy fighter
What was in the fortieth year
Killed in Finland on the ice.

Lying somehow clumsily
Childishly small body.
Frost pressed the overcoat to the ice,
The hat flew off.
It seemed that the boy was not lying,
And still running
Yes, the ice held the floor ...

In the midst of a great war cruel,
From what - I will not apply my mind -
I feel sorry for that distant fate,
As if dead, alone
Like I'm lying
Frozen, small, dead,
In that war, not famous,
Forgotten, small, lying.

Alexander Tvardovsky

Killed, dead, missing 126,875 people.

Of those killed - 65,384 people.

Wounded, frostbitten, shell-shocked, sick - 265 thousand people.

Of these, 172,203 people. was returned to service.

Prisoners - 5567 people.

Total: the total loss in the troops during the period of hostilities - 391.8 thousand people. or, rounded, 400 thousand people. was lost in 105 days from an army of 1 million people!

B. Losses of Finnish troops:

Killed - 48.3 thousand people. (according to Soviet data - 85 thousand people).

(The Finnish "Blue and White Book" of 1940 indicated a completely underestimated figure of those killed - 24,912 people.)

Wounded - 45 thousand people. (according to Soviet data - 250 thousand people). Prisoners - 806 people.

Thus, the total loss in the Finnish troops during the war is 100 thousand people. out of almost 600 thousand people. called or at least from 500 thousand participating, i.е. 20%, while Soviet losses are 40% of those involved in operations, or, in other words, 2 times higher in percentage terms.

Note:

* In the period from 1990 to 1995, conflicting data appeared in Soviet historical literature and journal publications about the losses of both the Soviet and Finnish armies, and the general trend of these publications was an increasing number of Soviet losses and losses from 1990 to 1995. reduction of Finnish. So, for example, in the articles of M.I. Semiryaga, the number of killed Soviet soldiers was indicated at 53.5 thousand, in the articles of A.M. Noskov, a year later - already 72.5 thousand, and in the articles of P.A. Apothecary in 1995 - 131.5 thousand. As for the Soviet wounded, P.A. The pharmacist more than doubled their number compared to Semiryaga and Noskov - up to 400 thousand people, while the data of the Soviet military archives and Soviet hospitals indicate quite definitely (by name) the figure of 264,908 people.

Baryshnikov V. N. From the Cool Peace to the Winter War: Finland's Eastern Policy in the 1930s. / V. N. Baryshnikov; S. Petersburg. state. university - St. Petersburg: Publishing House of St. Petersburg State University, 1997. - 351 p. - Bibliography: pp. 297-348.

Winter war 1939 - 1940 : [In 2 books] / Ros. acad. Sciences, Inst. history, Finl. ist. about. - M.: Nauka, 1998 Book. 1: Political history / Resp. ed. O. A. Rzheshevsky, O. Vehvilyainen. - 381s.

["Winter War" 1939-1940]: A selection of materials //Rodina. - 1995. - N12. 4. Prokhorov V. Lessons from a forgotten war / V. Prokhorov // New time. - 2005. - N 10.- S. 29-31

Pokhlebkin V.V. Foreign policy of Russia, Russia and the USSR for 1000 years in names, dates, facts. Issue II. Wars and peace treaties. Book 3: Europe in the first half of the 20th century. Directory. M. 1999

Soviet-Finnish war 1939-1940 Reader. Editor-compiler A.E. Taras. Minsk, 1999

Secrets and lessons of the winter war, 1939 - 1940: by doc. declassified arch. / [Ed. - comp. N. L. Volkovsky]. - St. Petersburg. : Polygon, 2000. - 541s. : ill. - (VIB: Military History Library). - Names. decree: p. 517 - 528.

Tanner V. Winter War = The winter war: diplomat. opposition Council. Union and Finland, 1939-1940 / Väinö Tanner; [per. from English. V. D. Kaidalova]. - M. : Tsentrpoligraf, 2003. - 348 p.

Baryshnikov, N. I. Yksin suurvaltaa vastassa : talvisodan poliittinen historia / N. I. Baryshnikov, Ohto Manninen. - Jyvaskyla:, 1997. - 42 p. Chapter from the book: Baryshnikov N.I. She is against a great power. Political history of the winter war. - Helsinki, 1997. Reprint from the book: S. 109 - 184

Gorter-Gronvik, Waling T. Ethnic minorities and warfare at the Arctic front / Waling T. Gorter-Gronvik, Mikhail N. Suprun // Circumpolar journal. - 1999. - Vol.14. - No. 1.

Used materials from the book: Pokhlebkin V.V. Foreign policy of Russia, Russia and the USSR for 1000 years in names, dates, facts. Issue II. Wars and peace treaties. Book 3: Europe in the first half of the 20th century. Directory. M. 1999

Used materials from the book: Soviet-Finnish War 1939-1940. Reader. Editor-compiler A.E. Taras. Minsk, 1999

On November 30, 1939, the Soviet-Finnish war began. This military conflict was preceded by long negotiations over the exchange of territories, which ultimately ended in failure. In the USSR and Russia, this war, for obvious reasons, remains in the shadow of the war with Germany that soon followed, but in Finland it is still the equivalent of our Great Patriotic War.

Although the war remains half-forgotten, heroic films are not made about it, books about it are relatively rare and it is poorly reflected in art (with the exception of the famous song "Take Us, Suomi Beauty"), there are still disputes about the causes of this conflict. What was Stalin counting on when starting this war? Did he want to Sovietize Finland or even include it in the USSR as a separate union republic, or was the Karelian Isthmus and the security of Leningrad his main goals? Can the war be considered successful or, given the ratio of sides and the scale of losses, a failure?

background

In the second half of the 1930s, unusually active diplomatic negotiations were going on in pre-war Europe. All major states were feverishly looking for allies, feeling the approach of a new war. The USSR did not stand aside either, which was forced to negotiate with the capitalists, who, in Marxist dogma, were considered the main enemies. In addition, the events in Germany, where the Nazis came to power, an important part of whose ideology was anti-communism, pushed for active action. The situation was further complicated by the fact that Germany had been the main Soviet trading partner since the early 1920s, when both defeated Germany and the USSR found themselves in international isolation, which brought them closer.

In 1935, the USSR and France signed an agreement on mutual assistance, clearly directed against Germany. It was planned as part of a more global eastern pact, according to which all Eastern European countries, including Germany, were to enter a single system of collective security, which would fix the status quo and make aggression against any of the participants impossible. However, the Germans did not want to tie their hands, the Poles also did not agree, so the pact remained only on paper.

In 1939, shortly before the expiration of the Franco-Soviet treaty, new negotiations began, to which Britain joined. The negotiations took place against the backdrop of the aggressive actions of Germany, which had already taken part of Czechoslovakia for itself, annexed Austria and, apparently, did not plan to stop there. The British and French planned to conclude an alliance treaty with the USSR to contain Hitler. At the same time, the Germans began to make contacts with a proposal to stay away from a future war. Stalin probably felt like a marriageable bride when a whole line of “suitors” lined up for him.

Stalin did not trust any of the potential allies, however, the British and French wanted the USSR to fight on their side, which caused Stalin to fear that in the end it would be mainly the USSR that would fight, and the Germans promised a whole bunch of gifts just for the USSR to stay aside, which was much more in line with the aspirations of Stalin himself (let the damned capitalists fight each other).

In addition, negotiations with Britain and France stalled due to the Poles' refusal to allow Soviet troops to pass through their territory in the event of war (which was inevitable in a European war). In the end, the USSR decided to stay out of the war by signing a non-aggression pact with the Germans.

Negotiations with the Finns

Against the backdrop of all these diplomatic maneuvers, long negotiations began with the Finns. In 1938, the USSR offered the Finns to allow it to establish a military base on the island of Hogland. The Soviet side was afraid of the possibility of a German strike from Finland and offered the Finns an agreement on mutual assistance, and also gave guarantees that the USSR would stand up for Finland in the event of aggression from the Germans.

However, the Finns at that time adhered to strict neutrality (according to the laws in force, it was forbidden to join any alliances and place military bases on their territory) and feared that such agreements would drag them into an unpleasant story or, which is good, bring them to war. Although the USSR offered to conclude the treaty in secret, so that no one would know about it, the Finns did not agree.

The second round of negotiations began in 1939. This time, the USSR wanted to rent a group of islands in the Gulf of Finland in order to strengthen the defense of Leningrad from the sea. Negotiations also ended in vain.

The third round began in October 1939, after the conclusion of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact and the outbreak of World War II, when all the leading European powers were distracted by the war and the USSR had a free hand to a large extent. This time the USSR offered to arrange an exchange of territories. In exchange for the Karelian Isthmus and a group of islands in the Gulf of Finland, the USSR offered to give up very large territories of Eastern Karelia, even larger than those given by the Finns.

True, it is worth considering one fact: the Karelian Isthmus was a highly developed territory in terms of infrastructure, where the second largest Finnish city of Vyborg was located and a tenth of the Finnish population lived, but the lands offered by the USSR in Karelia were, although large, but completely undeveloped and there were no there was nothing but woods. So the exchange was, to put it mildly, not quite equivalent.

The Finns agreed to give up the islands, but they could not afford to give up the Karelian Isthmus, which was not only a developed territory with a large population, but also the Mannerheim defensive line was located there, around which the entire Finnish defensive strategy was based. The USSR, on the contrary, was primarily interested in the isthmus, since this would allow moving the border from Leningrad at least a few tens of kilometers. At that time, there were about 30 kilometers between the Finnish border and the outskirts of Leningrad.

Mainil incident

Negotiations ended without results on 9 November. And already on November 26, an incident occurred near the border village of Mainila, which was used as a pretext for starting a war. According to the Soviet side, an artillery shell flew from Finnish territory to Soviet territory, which killed three Soviet soldiers and a commander.

Molotov immediately sent a formidable demand to the Finns to withdraw their troops from the border by 20-25 kilometers. The Finns, on the other hand, stated that, according to the results of the investigation, it turned out that no one from the Finnish side fired and, probably, we are talking about some kind of accident on the Soviet side. The Finns responded by suggesting that both sides withdraw their troops from the border and conduct a joint investigation into the incident.

The next day, Molotov sent a note to the Finns accusing them of perfidy and hostility, and announced the rupture of the Soviet-Finnish non-aggression pact. Two days later, diplomatic relations were severed and the Soviet troops went on the offensive.

At present, most researchers believe that the incident was organized by the Soviet side in order to obtain a casus belli for an attack on Finland. In any case, it is clear that the incident was only a pretext.

War

The main direction for the strike of the Soviet troops was the Karelian Isthmus, which was protected by a line of fortifications. This was the most suitable direction for a massive strike, which also made it possible to use tanks, which the Red Army had in abundance. It was planned to break through the defenses with a powerful blow, capture Vyborg and head towards Helsinki. A secondary direction was Central Karelia, where massive hostilities were complicated by the undeveloped territory. The third blow was delivered from the northern direction.

The first month of the war was a real disaster for the Soviet army. It was disorganized, disoriented, chaos and misunderstanding of the situation reigned in the headquarters. On the Karelian Isthmus, the army managed to advance several kilometers in a month, after which the soldiers ran into the Mannerheim line and were unable to overcome it, since the army simply did not have heavy artillery.

In Central Karelia, things were even worse. The local forest areas opened wide scope for partisan tactics, for which the Soviet divisions were not ready. Small detachments of Finns attacked columns of Soviet troops moving along the roads, after which they quickly left and lay in forest caches. Road mining was also actively used, because of which the Soviet troops suffered significant losses.

Further complicating the situation was the fact that the Soviet troops had insufficient camouflage coats and the soldiers were a convenient target for Finnish snipers in winter conditions. At the same time, the Finns used camouflage, which made them invisible.

The 163rd Soviet division was advancing in the Karelian direction, the task of which was to reach the city of Oulu, which would cut Finland in two. The shortest direction between the Soviet border and the coast of the Gulf of Bothnia was specially chosen for the offensive. In the area of ​​​​the village of Suomussalmi, the division was surrounded. Only the 44th division, which had arrived at the front, reinforced by a tank brigade, was sent to help her.

The 44th division moved along the Raat road, stretching for 30 kilometers. After waiting for the division to stretch out, the Finns defeated the Soviet division, which had a significant numerical superiority. Barriers were placed on the road from the north and south, which blocked the division in a narrow and well-shootable area, after which, by the forces of small detachments, the division was dissected on the road into several mini-"boilers".

As a result, the division suffered heavy losses in killed, wounded, frostbite and prisoners, lost almost all equipment and heavy weapons, and the division command, which got out of the encirclement, was shot by the verdict of the Soviet tribunal. Soon, several more divisions were surrounded in this way, which managed to escape from the encirclement, suffering huge losses and losing most of the equipment. The most notable example is the 18th Division, which was surrounded in South Lemetti. Only one and a half thousand people managed to break out of the encirclement, with a regular strength of the division of 15 thousand. The command of the division was also shot by the Soviet tribunal.

The offensive in Karelia failed. Only in the northern direction did the Soviet troops act more or less successfully and were able to cut off the enemy from access to the Barents Sea.

Finnish Democratic Republic

Almost immediately after the start of the war in the border town of Terioki, occupied by the Red Army, the so-called. the government of the Finnish Democratic Republic, which consisted of high-ranking communist figures of Finnish nationality who lived in the USSR. The USSR immediately recognized this government as the only official one and even concluded a mutual assistance agreement with it, according to which all the pre-war requirements of the USSR regarding the exchange of territories and the organization of military bases were fulfilled.

The formation of the Finnish People's Army also began, which was planned to include soldiers of Finnish and Karelian nationalities. However, during the retreat, the Finns evacuated all their inhabitants, and they had to replenish it at the expense of soldiers of the corresponding nationalities who were already serving in the Soviet army, of which there were not very many.

At first, the government was often featured in the press, but the failures on the battlefields and the unexpectedly stubborn resistance of the Finns led to the prolongation of the war, which was clearly not included in the original plans of the Soviet leadership. Since the end of December, the government of the Finnish Democratic Republic has been mentioned less and less in the press, and since mid-January they no longer remember it, the USSR again recognizes the one that remained in Helsinki as the official government.

End of the war

In January 1940, active hostilities were not conducted due to severe frosts. The Red Army brought heavy artillery to the Karelian Isthmus to overcome the defensive fortifications of the Finnish army.

In early February, the general offensive of the Soviet army began. This time it was accompanied by artillery preparation and was much better thought out, which made it easier for the attackers. By the end of the month, the first few lines of defense were broken through, and in early March, Soviet troops approached Vyborg.

The original plan of the Finns was to hold back the Soviet troops for as long as possible and wait for help from England and France. However, no help came from them. Under these conditions, the further continuation of resistance was fraught with the loss of independence, so the Finns went to negotiations.

On March 12, a peace treaty was signed in Moscow, which satisfied almost all the pre-war requirements of the Soviet side.

What did Stalin want to achieve?

Until now, there is no unequivocal answer to the question, what were the goals of Stalin in this war. Was he really interested in moving the Soviet-Finnish border from Leningrad for a hundred kilometers, or did he count on the Sovietization of Finland? In favor of the first version is the fact that in the peace treaty Stalin made the main emphasis on this. The creation of the government of the Finnish Democratic Republic headed by Otto Kuusinen speaks in favor of the second version.

For almost 80 years, disputes have been going on about this, but, most likely, Stalin had both a minimum program, which included only territorial demands in order to move the border from Leningrad, and a maximum program, which provided for the Sovietization of Finland in the event of a favorable combination of circumstances. However, the maximum program was quickly withdrawn due to the unfavorable course of the war. In addition to the fact that the Finns stubbornly resisted, they also evacuated the civilian population in the places of the offensive of the Soviet army, and Soviet propagandists had practically no opportunity to work with the Finnish population.

Stalin himself explained the need for war in April 1940 at a meeting with the commanders of the Red Army: “Did the government and the party do the right thing in declaring war on Finland? Could the war have been avoided? It seems to me that it was impossible. It was impossible to do without war. The war was necessary, since peace negotiations with Finland did not produce results, and the security of Leningrad had to be ensured unconditionally. There, in the West, the three biggest powers are at each other's throats; when is the question of Leningrad to be decided, if not in such conditions, when our hands are busy and we have a favorable situation in order to hit them at that moment”?

The results of the war

The USSR achieved most of its goals, but this came at a great cost. The USSR suffered huge losses, much larger than the Finnish army. The figures in various sources differ (about 100 thousand killed, died from wounds and frostbite and missing), but everyone agrees that the Soviet army lost a significantly larger number of soldiers killed, missing and frostbite than the Finnish.

The prestige of the Red Army was undermined. By the beginning of the war, the huge Soviet army not only outnumbered the Finnish one many times over, but was also much better armed. The Red Army had three times more artillery, 9 times more aircraft and 88 times more tanks. At the same time, the Red Army not only failed to take full advantage of its advantages, but also suffered a number of crushing defeats at the initial stage of the war.

The course of hostilities was closely followed both in Germany and in Britain, and they were surprised by the inept actions of the army. It is believed that it was precisely as a result of the war with Finland that Hitler was finally convinced that an attack on the USSR was possible, since the Red Army was extremely weak on the battlefield. In Britain, they also decided that the army was weakened by the purges of officers and were glad that they did not draw the USSR into allied relations.

Reasons for failure

In Soviet times, the main failures of the army were associated with the Mannerheim Line, which was so well fortified that it was practically impregnable. However, in reality this was a very big exaggeration. A significant part of the defensive line was made up of wood-and-earth fortifications or old structures made of low-quality concrete that were outdated for 20 years.

On the eve of the war, the defensive line was fortified with several “millionaire” pillboxes (so they were called because the construction of each fortification cost a million Finnish marks), but it still was not impregnable. As practice has shown, with competent preparation and support of aviation and artillery, even a much more advanced defense line can be broken through, as happened with the French Maginot line.

In fact, the failures were explained by a number of blunders of the command, both higher and people on the ground:

1. underestimation of the enemy. The Soviet command was sure that the Finns would not even bring to war and would accept Soviet demands. And when the war began, the USSR was sure that victory was a matter of a few weeks. The Red Army had too much advantage both in personal strength and in firepower;

2. disorganization of the army. The command staff of the Red Army was largely replaced a year before the war as a result of mass purges in the ranks of the military. Some of the new commanders simply did not meet the necessary requirements, but even talented commanders had not yet had time to gain experience in commanding large military units. Confusion and chaos reigned in the units, especially in the conditions of the outbreak of war;

3. insufficient elaboration of offensive plans. In the USSR, they were in a hurry to quickly resolve the issue with the Finnish border, while Germany, France and Britain were still fighting in the West, so the preparations for the offensive were carried out in a hurry. The Soviet plan called for the main attack on the Mannerheim Line, with virtually no intelligence on the line. The troops had only extremely approximate and schematic plans for defensive fortifications, and later it turned out that they did not correspond to reality at all. In fact, the first assaults on the line were carried out blindly, in addition, light artillery did not cause serious damage to the defensive fortifications, and heavy howitzers, which at first were practically absent in the advancing troops, had to be brought up to destroy them. Under these conditions, all attempts to storm turned into huge losses. Only in January 1940 did normal preparations for a breakthrough begin: assault groups were formed to suppress and capture firing points, aviation was involved in photographing the fortifications, which finally made it possible to obtain plans for defensive lines and develop a competent breakthrough plan;

4. The Red Army was not sufficiently prepared to conduct combat operations in a specific area in the winter. There were not enough camouflage robes, not even warm uniforms. All this goodness lay in warehouses and began to arrive in parts only in the second half of December, when it became clear that the war was beginning to take on a protracted character. By the beginning of the war, there was not a single unit of combat skiers in the Red Army, which were used with great success by the Finns. The submachine guns, which turned out to be very effective in rough terrain, were generally absent in the Red Army. Shortly before the war, the PPD (Degtyarev submachine gun) was withdrawn from service, as it was planned to replace it with more modern and advanced weapons, but they did not wait for the new weapon, and the old PPD went into warehouses;

5. the Finns enjoyed all the advantages of the terrain with great success. Soviet divisions, stuffed to capacity with equipment, were forced to move along the roads and practically could not operate in the forest. The Finns, who had almost no equipment, waited until the clumsy Soviet divisions stretched out along the road for several kilometers and, blocking the road, launched simultaneous strikes in several directions at once, cutting the divisions into separate parts. Locked in a narrow space, Soviet soldiers became easy targets for Finnish skiers and snipers. It was possible to break out of the encirclement, but this led to huge losses of equipment that had to be abandoned on the road;

6. the Finns used the scorched earth tactics, but they did it competently. The entire population was evacuated in advance from the areas that were to be occupied by parts of the Red Army, all property was also taken out, and the deserted settlements were destroyed or mined. This had a demoralizing effect on the Soviet soldiers, to whom propaganda explained that they were going to liberate brother-workers and peasants from the unbearable oppression and bullying of the Finnish White Guard, but instead of crowds of joyful peasants and workers welcoming the liberators, they met only ashes and mined ruins.

However, despite all the shortcomings, the Red Army demonstrated the ability to improve and learn from their own mistakes right in the course of the war. The unsuccessful start of the war contributed to the fact that things were already taken up in a normal way, and in the second stage the army became much more organized and efficient. At the same time, some mistakes were repeated again a year later, when the war with Germany began, which also developed extremely unsuccessfully in the first months.

Evgeny Antonyuk
Historian

The Soviet-Finnish War of 1939-1940 (Soviet-Finnish War, known in Finland as the Winter War) is an armed conflict between the USSR and Finland from November 30, 1939 to March 12, 1940.

Its reason was the desire of the Soviet leadership to move the Finnish border away from Leningrad (now St. Petersburg) in order to strengthen the security of the northwestern borders of the USSR, and the refusal of the Finnish side to do this. The Soviet government asked to lease parts of the Hanko peninsula and some islands in the Gulf of Finland in exchange for a large area of ​​Soviet territory in Karelia, followed by the conclusion of a mutual assistance agreement.

The Finnish government believed that the acceptance of Soviet demands would weaken the strategic position of the state, lead to the loss of neutrality by Finland and its subordination to the USSR. The Soviet leadership, in turn, did not want to give up its demands, which, in its opinion, were necessary to ensure the security of Leningrad.

The Soviet-Finnish border on the Karelian Isthmus (Western Karelia) was only 32 kilometers from Leningrad, the largest center of Soviet industry and the second largest city in the country.

The reason for the start of the Soviet-Finnish war was the so-called Mainil incident. According to the Soviet version, on November 26, 1939, at 15.45, Finnish artillery in the Mainila area fired seven shells at the positions of the 68th Infantry Regiment on Soviet territory. Allegedly, three Red Army soldiers and one junior commander were killed. On the same day, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the USSR addressed a note of protest to the government of Finland and demanded the withdrawal of Finnish troops from the border by 20-25 kilometers.

The Finnish government denied the shelling of Soviet territory and proposed that not only Finnish, but also Soviet troops be withdrawn 25 kilometers from the border. This formally equal demand was unrealistic, because then the Soviet troops would have to be withdrawn from Leningrad.

On November 29, 1939, the Finnish envoy in Moscow was presented with a note about the severance of diplomatic relations between the USSR and Finland. On November 30, at 8 o'clock in the morning, the troops of the Leningrad Front received an order to cross the border with Finland. On the same day, Finnish President Kyösti Kallio declared war on the USSR.

During the "perestroika" several versions of the Mainilsky incident became known. According to one of them, the shelling of the positions of the 68th regiment was carried out by a secret NKVD unit. According to another, there was no shooting at all, and in the 68th regiment on November 26 there were neither killed nor wounded. There were other versions that did not receive documentary confirmation.

From the very beginning of the war, the advantage in forces was on the side of the USSR. The Soviet command concentrated 21 rifle divisions, one tank corps, three separate tank brigades (a total of 425 thousand people, about 1.6 thousand guns, 1476 tanks and about 1200 aircraft) near the border with Finland. To support the ground forces, it was planned to attract about 500 aircraft and more than 200 ships from the Northern and Baltic fleets. 40% of Soviet forces were deployed on the Karelian Isthmus.

The grouping of Finnish troops had about 300 thousand people, 768 guns, 26 tanks, 114 aircraft and 14 warships. The Finnish command concentrated 42% of its forces on the Karelian Isthmus, deploying the Isthmus Army there. The rest of the troops covered separate areas from the Barents Sea to Lake Ladoga.

The main defense line of Finland was the "Mannerheim Line" - unique, impregnable fortifications. The main architect of the Mannerheim line was nature itself. Its flanks rested on the Gulf of Finland and Lake Ladoga. The coast of the Gulf of Finland was covered by large-caliber coastal batteries, and in the Taipale region on the shores of Lake Ladoga, reinforced concrete forts with eight 120- and 152-mm coastal guns were created.

The Mannerheim Line had a frontal width of 135 kilometers, a depth of up to 95 kilometers and consisted of a support strip (depth 15-60 kilometers), a main strip (depth 7-10 kilometers), a second strip 2-15 kilometers away from the main one, and the rear (Vyborg) line of defense. Over two thousand long-term firing structures (DOS) and wood-earth firing structures (DZOS) were erected, which were combined into strong points of 2-3 DOS and 3-5 DZOS each, and the latter - into resistance nodes (3-4 point). The main line of defense consisted of 25 nodes of resistance, numbering 280 DOS and 800 DZOS. The strongholds were defended by permanent garrisons (from a company to a battalion in each). Between the strongholds and nodes of resistance were positions for field troops. The strongholds and positions of the field troops were covered by anti-tank and anti-personnel barriers. Only in the security zone, 220 kilometers of wire barriers in 15-45 rows, 200 kilometers of forest debris, 80 kilometers of granite gouges up to 12 rows, anti-tank ditches, scarps (anti-tank walls) and numerous minefields were created.

All fortifications were connected by a system of trenches, underground passages and were supplied with food and ammunition necessary for a long-term autonomous battle.

On November 30, 1939, after a long artillery preparation, Soviet troops crossed the border with Finland and launched an offensive on the front from the Barents Sea to the Gulf of Finland. In 10-13 days, they overcame the zone of operational barriers in certain directions and reached the main strip of the Mannerheim Line. For more than two weeks, unsuccessful attempts to break through it continued.

At the end of December, the Soviet command decided to stop further offensive on the Karelian Isthmus and begin systematic preparations for breaking through the Mannerheim Line.

The front went on the defensive. The troops were regrouped. The North-Western Front was created on the Karelian Isthmus. Troops have been replenished. As a result, the Soviet troops deployed against Finland numbered more than 1.3 million people, 1.5 thousand tanks, 3.5 thousand guns, and three thousand aircraft. The Finnish side by the beginning of February 1940 had 600 thousand people, 600 guns and 350 aircraft.

On February 11, 1940, the assault on the fortifications on the Karelian Isthmus resumed - the troops of the North-Western Front, after 2-3 hours of artillery preparation, went on the offensive.

Having broken through two lines of defense, on February 28, Soviet troops reached the third. They broke the resistance of the enemy, forced him to start a retreat along the entire front and, developing the offensive, captured the Vyborg grouping of Finnish troops from the northeast, captured most of Vyborg, crossed the Vyborg Bay, bypassed the Vyborg fortified area from the northwest, cut the highway to Helsinki.

The fall of the "Mannerheim Line" and the defeat of the main grouping of Finnish troops put the enemy in a difficult position. Under these conditions, Finland turned to the Soviet government with a request for peace.

On the night of March 13, 1940, a peace treaty was signed in Moscow, according to which Finland ceded about a tenth of its territory to the USSR and pledged not to participate in coalitions hostile to the USSR. On March 13, hostilities ceased.

In accordance with the agreement, the border on the Karelian Isthmus was moved away from Leningrad by 120-130 kilometers. The entire Karelian Isthmus with Vyborg, the Vyborg Bay with islands, the western and northern shores of Lake Ladoga, a number of islands in the Gulf of Finland, part of the Rybachy and Sredny peninsulas went to the Soviet Union. The Hanko Peninsula and the sea area around it were leased by the USSR for 30 years. This improved the position of the Baltic Fleet.

As a result of the Soviet-Finnish war, the main strategic goal pursued by the Soviet leadership was achieved - to secure the northwestern border. However, the international position of the Soviet Union worsened: it was expelled from the League of Nations, relations with England and France worsened, and an anti-Soviet campaign was launched in the West.

The losses of the Soviet troops in the war amounted to: irretrievable - about 130 thousand people, sanitary - about 265 thousand people. Irretrievable losses of the Finnish troops - about 23 thousand people, sanitary - over 43 thousand people.

WINTER WAR. HOW IT WAS

1. Evacuation in October 1939 of the inhabitants of the border areas deep into Finland.

2. Delegation of Finland at the talks in Moscow. October 1939 “We will not make any concessions to the USSR and will fight at all costs, as England, America and Sweden promised to support us” - Errko, Minister of Foreign Affairs.

3. The engineering unit of the White Finns is sent to the installation of gouges. Karelian isthmus. Autumn 1939.

4. Junior sergeant of the Finnish army. October - November 1939. Karelian isthmus. The countdown to the last days of the world has begun.

5.Tank BT-5 on one of the streets of Leningrad. Finland Station area

6. Official announcement of the start of hostilities.

6. The first day of the war: the 20th heavy tank brigade receives a combat mission.

8. American volunteers sail from New York on December 12, 1939 to fight in Finland with the Russians.

9. The Suomi submachine gun is the Finnish miracle weapon of Aimo Lahti, a self-taught engineer. one of the best gunsmiths of his time. Trophy "Suomi" was very much appreciated.

10. Rally of conscripts in Naryan-Mar.

11. Getmanenko Mikhail Nikitich. Captain. Died of wounds 12/13/1939 Karelian Isthmus

12. The Mannerheim line began to be built in 1918, with Finland gaining independence.

13. The Mannerheim Line crossed the entire Karelian Isthmus.

14. View of the bunker of the Mannerheim Line from the side of the advancing Soviet troops.

15. The losses of the dashing Finnish tank destroyers reached 70%, but they also burned the tanks in order.

16. A subversive anti-tank charge and a Molotov cocktail.

Assembly at the front.

19. Soviet armored cars on the march. Karelian isthmus.

13. White Finns at the captured flamethrower tank. January 1940

14. Karelian Isthmus. January 1940 Red Army units move to the front.

Intelligence service. Three left, two returned. Artist Aukusti Tukhka.

15. Spruce spread wide In the snow, as in dressing gowns, stand.
Sat down on the edge of the deep In the snow White Finns detachment.

Finnish pilots and aircraft technicians near the French Moran-Saulnier MS.406 fighter. In December 1939 - April 1940, the Finnish Air Force received: from England - 22 of the most modern twin-engine Bristol-Blenheim bombers, 42 Gloucester Gladiators and 10 Hurricanes; from the USA - 38 "Brewster-B-239"; from France - 30 "Moran-Saulnier"; from Italy - 32 Fiats. The newest Soviet fighter of that period, the I-16, lost to them at a speed of about 100 km, and they easily overtook and burned the main SB bomber.

Dinner of the Red Army soldiers in a front-line situation.

View from the bunker to the barbed wire and minefields, 1940

Acoustic air defense locator of the White Finns.

Snowmobiles of the White Finns. The swastika has been used by them to designate military equipment since 1918.

From a letter found on a dead Red Army soldier. “... You write to me if I need some kind of package or money order. To be frank, money is useless here, you can’t buy anything here with it, and parcels go too slowly. We live here in snow and cold, around only swamps and lakes. You also wrote that you started selling my stuff - for obvious reasons. But it still hurt me, as if I didn't exist anymore. You probably have the feeling that we are not destined to see each other again, or you will only see me as a cripple ... "

In total, during the 105 days of the war, "poor" white-Finland issued more than two hundred (!) Different leaflets. There were leaflets addressed specifically to Ukrainians and the peoples of the Caucasus.

Leaflet addressed to Soviet pilots.

English volunteers came to fight the Russians.

The feat of the head of the outpost Shmagrin, 12/27/1939 Artist V.A. Tokarev.

Heroic defense of the garrison. Artist V.E. Pamfilov.

The battle of thirteen border guards with a sabotage detachment of the White Finns on the night of January 24-25 at the border in the Murmansk region. The last message of the signalman Alexander Spekov, who blew himself up with a grenade along with the enemies: “I am fighting alone, the cartridges are running out.”

The tank fires at a long-term firing point.

Road to Raate. January 1940

Frozen Red Army soldiers. Road to Raate. December 1939

White Finns pose with a frozen Red Army soldier.

Downed bomber DB-2. The war in the air, having dispelled blissful illusions, was extremely difficult for the Red Army Air Force. Short daylight hours, difficult weather conditions, poor training of the bulk of the flight crew leveled the number of Soviet aircraft.

Finnish wolves from Russian bears. Stalin's sledgehammer "B-4" against the Mannerheim Line.

View of the height 38.2 taken from the Finns, on which the pillbox was located. Photo by Petrov RGAKFD

The White Finns fought hard, stubbornly and skillfully. In conditions of complete hopelessness to the last bullet. Breaking such an army is EXPENSIVE.

Red Army soldiers inspect the armored dome on the pillbox taken.

The Red Army soldiers inspect the taken bunker.

Commander of the 20th heavy tank brigade Borzilov (left) congratulates the soldiers and commanders who were awarded orders and medals. January 1940.

The attack of the sabotage detachment of the White Finns on the rear warehouse of the Red Army.

"The bombardment of the White Finnish station". Artist Alexander Mizin, 1940

The only tank battle on February 26, when the White Finns tried to recapture the Honkaniemi stop. Despite the presence of brand new British Vickers tanks and numerical superiority, they eventually lost 14 vehicles and retreated. There were no losses on the Soviet side.

Ski detachment of the Red Army.

Ski horse. Horse skiers.

“We used Finnish pillboxes to go to hell!” Soldiers of the special purpose engineering detachment on the roof of the Ink6 bunker.

"The Capture of Vyborg by the Red Army", A.A. Blinkov

"Storm of Vyborg", P.P. Sokolov-Skalya

Kuhmo. March 13. The first clock of the world. Meeting recent enemies. In Kuhmo, the White Finns in recent days and even hours of hostilities tried to destroy the encircled Soviet units.

Kuhmo.Saunajärvi. Venal.motti. (3)

12. Residents of Helsinki at the map of the territories that went to the Soviet Union.

In Finnish captivity in 4 camps there were from 5546 to 6116 people. The conditions of their detention were extremely cruel. 39,369 missing points to the scale of executions by the White Finns of seriously wounded, sick and frostbitten Red Army soldiers.

H. Akhmetov: “... I personally saw five cases when in the hospital the seriously wounded were taken out into the corridor behind the screen and they were given a fatal injection. One of the wounded shouted: "Don't carry me, I don't want to die." In the hospital, the killing of wounded Red Army soldiers by infusion of morphine was repeatedly used, so the prisoners of war Terentiev and Blinov were killed. The Finns especially hated the Soviet pilots and mocked them, the seriously wounded were kept without any medical care, which is why many died.- “Soviet-Finnish captivity”, Frolov, p.48.

March 1940 Gryazovets camp of the NKVD (Vologda region). Politruk talks with a group of Finnish prisoners of war. The vast majority of Finnish prisoners of war were kept in the camp (according to various sources, from 883 to 1100). “We would have work and bread, and who will rule the country, it doesn’t matter. Since the government orders to fight, that's why we fight.", - such was the mood of the bulk. And yet, twenty people wished to voluntarily remain in the USSR.

April 20, 1940 Leningraders greet the Soviet soldiers who defeated the Finnish White Guard.

A group of soldiers and commanders of the 210th separate chemical tank battalion awarded orders and medals, March 1940

Such people were in that war. Technicians and pilots of the 13th Fighter Aviation Regiment of the Air Force of the Baltic Fleet. Kingisepp, Kotly airfield, 1939-1940

They died so that we may live...

A New Look

triumphant defeat.

Why hide the victory of the Red Army
in the "winter war"?
Viktor Suvorov's version.

The Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940, called the "winter war", is known as one of the most shameful pages of Soviet military history. The huge Red Army failed to break through the defenses of the Finnish militias for three and a half months, and as a result, the Soviet leadership was forced to agree to a peace treaty with Finland.

Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Finland Marshal Mannerheim - the winner of the "winter war"?

Preparing for War: Stalin's Plans

The Soviet-Finnish war began at the initiative of Moscow. On October 12, 1939, the Soviet government demanded that Finland cede the Karelian Isthmus and the Rybachy Peninsula, hand over all the islands in the Gulf of Finland, and lease the port of Hanko as a naval base on a long-term lease. In exchange, Moscow offered Finland a territory twice as large in size, but not suitable for economic activity and useless in a strategic sense.

A Finnish government delegation arrived in Moscow to discuss territorial disputes...

Otto Kuusinen is Stalin's candidate for the Finnish leaders.

A group of leaders of the Comintern. Standing first on the left - O. Kuusinen

Chronicle of the "winter war"

However, the performance did not work. The Soviet military planned to quickly capture Finland, which did not have a strong army. People's Commissar of Defense "Stalin's eagle" Voroshilov boasted that in six days the Red Army would be in Helsinki.
But already in the first days of the offensive, the Soviet troops ran into stubborn resistance from the Finns.

Finnish rangers are the backbone of Mannerheim's army.

Semyon Timoshenko - leader of the breakthrough of the "Mannerheim Line"

The head of the Finnish delegation announces the signing of a peace treaty with the Soviet Union.

The results of the war: victory or defeat.

So those are the basic facts. Having remembered them, now we can try to analyze the results of the "winter war".
Obviously, as a result of the war, Finland was in a worse position: in March 1940, the Finnish government was forced to make much larger territorial concessions than those demanded by Moscow in October 1939. Thus, at first glance, Finland was defeated.

Marshal Mannerheim managed to defend the independence of Finland.

Adolf Hitler was sure that the "winter war" revealed the weakness of the Red Army.

The historian is at war with... the computer

First of all, Viktor Suvorov decided to simulate on a powerful analytical computer the conditions in which the Red Army fought. He entered the necessary parameters into a special program:

Temperature - up to minus 40 degrees Celsius;
snow cover depth - one and a half meters;
relief - rugged terrain, forests, swamps, lakes
and so on.
And each time the smart computer answered:

IMPOSSIBLE

IMPOSSIBLE
at this temperature;
with such a depth of snow cover;
with such relief
and so on...

The computer refused to simulate the course of the Red Army offensive in the given parameters, recognizing them as unacceptable for conducting offensive operations.
Then Suvorov decided to abandon the simulation of natural conditions and suggested that the computer plan a breakthrough of the "Mannerheim Line" without taking into account climate and relief.
Here it is necessary to explain what the Finnish "Mannerheim Line" was.

Marshal Mannerheim personally oversaw the construction of fortifications on the Soviet-Finnish border.

Main attack direction: Lintura - Viipuri
before the offensive - fire preparation
first explosion: air, epicenter - Kanneljärvi, equivalent - 50 kilotons,
height - 300
second explosion: air, epicenter - Lounatjoki, equivalent ...
third explosion...

But the Red Army did not have nuclear weapons in 1939!
Therefore, Suvorov introduced a new condition into the program: to attack the "Mannerheim Line" without the use of nuclear weapons.
And again the computer peremptorily answered:

Conducting offensive operations
IMPOSSIBLE

A powerful analytical computer recognized the breakthrough of the "Mannerheim Line" in winter conditions without the use of nuclear weapons as IMPOSSIBLE four times, five times, many times ...
But the Red Army made this breakthrough! Even after long battles, even at the cost of huge human casualties - but still in February 1940, the "Russian soldiers", who were mockingly gossip at the Fuhrer's headquarters, did the impossible - they broke through the "Mannerheim Line".
Another thing is that this heroic feat did not make sense, that in general this whole war was an ill-considered adventure generated by the ambitions of Stalin and his parquet "eagles".
But militarily, the "winter war" demonstrated not the weakness, but the power of the Red Army, its ability to carry out even the IMPOSSIBLE order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. This was not understood by Hitler and the company, many military experts did not understand, and modern historians did not understand after them.

Who lost the "winter war"?

However, not all contemporaries agreed with Hitler's assessment of the results of the "winter war". So, the Finns who fought with the Red Army did not laugh at the "Russian soldiers" and did not repeat about the "weakness" of the Soviet troops. When Stalin suggested that they end the war, they very quickly agreed. And not only did they agree, but without long disputes they ceded strategically important territories to the Soviet Union - much larger than Moscow demanded before the war. And the commander-in-chief of the Finnish army, Marshal Mannerheim, spoke with great respect about the Red Army. He considered the Soviet troops modern and efficient and had a high opinion of their fighting qualities:
“Russian soldiers learn quickly, grasp everything on the fly, act without delay, easily obey discipline, are distinguished by courage and sacrifice and are ready to fight to the last bullet, despite the hopelessness of the situation,” the marshal believed.

Mannerheim had the opportunity to see the courage of the soldiers of the Red Army. Marshal at the forefront.

Shortly after the Winter War, the three Baltic states disappeared from the world map.

Soviet historiography
- in the footsteps of Hitler

However, Hitler very soon realized his mistake. Already on August 17, 1941, just a month and a half after the start of the war with the USSR, he told Goebbels:
- We seriously underestimated the Soviet combat readiness and, mainly, the armament of the Soviet army. We had no idea even approximately what the Bolsheviks had at their disposal. That's why it was misjudged...
- Perhaps it is very good that we did not have such an accurate idea of ​​the potential of the Bolsheviks. Otherwise, perhaps, we would have been horrified by the urgent question of the East and the proposed offensive against the Bolsheviks ...
And on September 5, 1941, Goebbels admitted - but only to himself, in his diary:
"... We misjudged the Bolshevik strength of resistance, we had the wrong numbers and based our entire policy on them."

Hitler and Mannerheim in 1942. The Fuhrer has already realized his miscalculation.

References.

• Bullock A. Hitler and Stalin: Life and Power. Per. from English. Smolensk, 1994
• Mary W. Mannerheim - Marshal of Finland. Per. from the Swedish M., 1997
• Picker G. Hitler's Table Talk. Per. with him. Smolensk, 1993
• Rzhevskaya E. Goebbels: Portrait against the backdrop of a diary. M., 1994
• Suvorov V. The Last Republic: Why did the Soviet Union program the Second World War. M., 1998

Read the material in the following issues
ACADEMIC PICKING
on the controversy surrounding the research of Viktor Suvorov