Dead or alive: militants confirmed the death of the IS leader, the Pentagon did not. Who is Al-Baghdadi? Let's fan the world fire
10.03.2016 - 4:00
The wife of the mysterious leader of the ISIS group, the self-proclaimed “Caliph of all Muslims” Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, left him. And she literally left - she fled from ISIS-controlled territory. This news sheds some light on the personal life of the man who heads the most sinister terrorist group of our time.
Nevertheless, very little is still known about al-Baghdadi’s personality, not only among citizens of Western countries, but also among the citizens of the caliphate itself. Lenta.ru studied the facts of the biography of the leader of world jihadism and tried to understand how a ruthless extremist grew from a quiet child.
Childlike steps of the future caliph
The future caliph Ibrahim Awwad Ibrahim al-Badri was born in the Iraqi city of Samarra, north of Baghdad, in 1971. Power in the country then belonged to the pan-Arab secularist left-wing Baath party.
Ibrahim's father, Awwad, was actively involved in the religious life of the community and taught at the local mosque. It was there that his son took his first steps as a theologian: he gathered the neighborhood boys, and they read the Koran together. It is said that Ibrahim was a quiet child and spent a lot of time honing his skill in reciting religious texts.
The Baathists did not actively encourage the spread of religion, but they did not fight it either. Some of Ibrahim's relatives even joined the ranks of the ruling party. Two of the future caliph's uncles worked in President Saddam Hussein's intelligence services; one of his brothers was an officer in Saddam's army, and another brother died in the Iraq-Iran war. Ibrahim himself was too young at the beginning of the conflict to take part in it.
Among Ibrahim’s relatives there were also supporters of Salafist ideas - according to some sources, his father was also a Salafist. The secular regime of Saddam Hussein tried to limit the influence of radicals and attract them to its side, for which purpose the Saddam University of Islamic Sciences was opened in Baghdad in 1989.
Since 1993, the Iraqi leader began a “return to faith campaign”: nightclubs were closed in the country, public consumption of alcohol was prohibited, and Sharia rules were introduced to a limited extent (for example, hands were cut off for theft).
Over the course of several years, Saddam Hussein donated 28 liters of his own blood to write a copy of the Koran placed in one of the mosques in the capital.
In the photo: Saddam Hussein encouraged the cult of his personality and feared the strengthening of radical Islamists - he saw them as the main threat to his power.
From lawyer to extremist
When the time came to decide on higher education, Ibrahim al-Badri tried to enter the Faculty of Law at Baghdad University, but his poor knowledge of English and unimportant grades let him down.
As a result, he went to the Faculty of Theology, and then entered the University of Islamic Sciences, where he received a master's degree in qiraats (schools for public recitation of the Koran).
While studying for a master's degree, at the insistence of his uncle, Ibrahim joined the ranks of the Muslim Brotherhood. This supranational Islamist organization advocated the creation of religious Islamic states, but in most countries its followers chose cautious tactics and did not support armed struggle with the authorities.
Al-Badri such ideas seemed too soft - he called their followers people of words, not deeds, and the future caliph quickly joined the most radical members of the organization.
After receiving his master's degree in 2000, al-Badri settled in a small apartment in a poor area of Baghdad, next to a mosque. In four years, he managed to change two wives and become the father of six children.
The future leader of ISIS made a living by teaching children to read the Koran and calling the faithful to prayer. There was a football club at the mosque, and al-Badri played so successfully that he earned the nickname “our Messi” among local residents.
He also supervised Islamic piety: for example, according to neighbors, having once seen men and women dancing together at a wedding, Ibrahim decisively demanded an end to the disgrace.
Jihad Academy
In 2004, al-Badri was arrested by the Americans - he went to visit a friend who was wanted. The future caliph ended up in the Camp Bucca filtration camp, where the occupation administration kept suspicious Iraqis.
They were not prohibited from performing religious rituals, and the future caliph skillfully took advantage of this: he gave lectures on religion, conducted Friday prayers and gave instructions to the captives in accordance with his interpretation of Islam.
Prisoners said that Camp Bucca had become a veritable academy for jihadism.
“Teach him, instill an ideology and show him the further path, so that at the time of liberation he becomes a blazing flame,” - this is how one of the former prisoners described the strategy of Islamic theologians inside the filtration camp in relation to each new arrival.
In the photo: Prisoners of Camp Bucca during a collective prayer.
The guards identified potential leaders, tried to separate the nascent terrorist cells into different cells, but failed to discern the future Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in the quiet and inconspicuous Ibrahim al-Badri.
“He was a bad guy, but he wasn’t the worst of the worst,” says former Camp Bucca guard Sergeant Kenneth King.
According to him, al-Badri was not even transferred to the section for dangerous suspects.
Al-Badri was released in 2006.
“Well, guys, see you in New York,” the future caliph said goodbye to the guards.
“It sounded peaceful, like, 'We'll see you when the opportunity arises,'” King admitted.
Career Khalift
After his release, al-Badri contacted al-Qaeda in Iraq* people, who advised him to move to Damascus. In the Syrian capital, he had the opportunity, in addition to working for terrorists, to complete his dissertation.
Then a conflict began in the ranks of the jihadists, which led to the transformation of the Iraqi branch of al-Qaeda into the brutal Islamic State of Iraq.
Al-Badri, who has a serious religious education, came in handy: he was appointed head of the religious direction in the Iraqi “provinces” of the organization.
The caliphate did not have any territory at that time, so Ibrahim was mainly involved in developing a propaganda strategy and making sure that the militants strictly followed religious instructions.
In March 2007, he returned to Baghdad, where he defended his dissertation and became a doctor of Koranic studies. His scientific success attracted the attention of the then leader of the Islamic State of Iraq, Abu Ayyub al-Masri, who made al-Badri head of the Sharia Committee - that is, responsible for all religious work of the terrorist organization.
In 2010, Masri was killed, and ISIS was de facto beheaded. Then Haji Bakr, a former intelligence officer of Saddam Hussein and the chief strategist of the Islamic State of Iraq, came to the aid of the future caliph.
He could not become the leader of the organization - his reputation as a former intelligence officer was compromised, and then Haji Bakr, through manipulation and persuasion, achieved the election of the authoritative theologian al-Badri to the post of temporary leader of the group. Bakr hoped that he could control the new "emir". He partially succeeded - people from Iraqi intelligence during the Hussein era were appointed to key positions.
In 2013, the group began to participate in hostilities in Syria and changed its name to the “Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant” (ISIS), and after the blitzkrieg of the summer of 2014, it shortened it to ISIS.
At the same time, Awwad Ibrahim al-Badri declared himself caliph, finally turning into Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.
“I was appointed to lead you, but I am not the best among you. If you see me acting righteously, follow me. If you see me acting unrighteously, give me advice and guide me. If I disobey Allah, do not listen to me,” he declared in his first public speech as the ruler of a quasi-state.
This was a paraphrase of the statement of the Righteous Caliph Abu Bakr, the first leader of the Muslim community after the death of the Prophet Muhammad.
Companions of Abu Bakr
Little is known about the first two wives of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, with whom he lived until 2004 - he kept them at home and did not show them to the public. The “wife” who escaped at the end of February 2016 is called Diana Kruger; the girl was helped to break free by her two friends. The Iraqi press reported that al-Baghdadi sent a squad of thugs in pursuit of the women, but their search was unsuccessful.
In the caliphate, Diana was responsible for organizing the lives of women: in particular, she formulated the rules of their behavior according to the norms of Sharia and led the women’s “morality police,” whose units ensured that representatives of the fairer sex did not appear in public without the accompaniment of men (husband or male relatives) and in insufficiently modest clothing.
The police acted in accordance with the brutality of the entire ISIS: for example, in January of this year, a Syrian girl was beaten to death for her inappropriate appearance.
Kruger’s work also had a combat component: she headed a full-fledged educational institution in Kirkuk, Iraq, where student students were trained to become suicide bombers. Al-Baghdadi and German Kruger got married in October 2015; What caused the newlyweds’ discord is still unclear.
One of al-Baghdadi's most famous wives was Saja al-Dulaimi, nicknamed the "califessa" for her influence in the jihadist world. The marriage of al-Baghdadi and al-Duleimi was short-lived - it was concluded in 2009 and lasted only three months - but it brought considerable benefits to the caliphate.
After a divorce (Iraqi tribal customs make it quite easy to separate from a wife), she moved with her sister and father to Homs, Syria, where in March 2014 she was captured by troops friendly to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.
Soon, Jabhat al-Nusra* militants exchanged her and 149 other women and children for 13 captured Greek Orthodox nuns.
In the photo: Saja al-Duleimi with children during an exchange for Lebanese soldiers.
“Our sister, the wife of Sheikh Abu Bakr, may Allah bless him, was freed by us. We did this because it was our duty,” one of the group’s “emirs” wrote on Twitter at the time.
Abu Bakr himself did not comment on this event.
After her release from captivity, Sajja went with the refugees to Lebanon, but then repeatedly crossed the border of the two countries, hiding jewelry and money received from sponsors of terrorist groups under her burqa.
Without hiding her face under a hijab, she publicly called on women from all over the world to join ISIS, promising them faithful husbands and a decent life. Her image contrasted so much with the typical image of a disenfranchised woman in radical Islamist society that she was called an “honorary man.”
At the beginning of 2015, she was captured for the second time - the Lebanese authorities detained her with her small children (one of them, a five-year-old girl, is her daughter with Abu Bakr) while crossing the border.
Al-Baghdadi again did not comment on this, and al-Duleimi and the child were again released by Jabhat al-Nusra militants: they and 12 other people were exchanged for captured Lebanese soldiers.
It is known that Abu Bakr also considered the captive American social worker Kayla Muller, captured in 2013, to be his “wife” and raped her until she died (according to ISIS, from an American airstrike, according to the US version, from the hands of jihadists).
Along with Mueller, there was a Yazidi girl who managed to escape from ISIS; according to her stories, Abu Bakr had three “official” wives at that time.
The price of a terrorist
The American authorities are promising $10 million for the head of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi: on the State Department website rewardsforjustice he is called by the pseudonym Abu Dua.
ISIS leader killed: Who is Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi
Photos from open sources
If the information about the elimination of one of the most dangerous terrorists in the world turns out to be true, this will be a serious success for the much-criticized Western operation in Syria.
ISIS leader n. At least, Western publications write about this, citing some media outlets affiliated with the terrorist group. According to sketchy information, the terrorist leader was killed during an international coalition airstrike on Raqqa on the fifth day of Ramadan. At the moment, there has been no official confirmation of the death of the militant from the coalition forces. Moreover, one of the coalition generals said that he had seen reports of Baghdadi’s death, but so far no one can confirm this information.
The numerous “killings” of another dangerous terrorist, Osama bin Laden, are still fresh in memory. There have been attempts on his life many times, and journalists have repeatedly reported about the death of the al-Qaeda ideologist, but several times these reports turned out to be premature. The story with Baghdadi also has many contradictions. Earlier it was reported that he was wounded on the Iraqi-Syrian border. Then some sources claimed that al-Baghdadi was killed in Mosul.
News on the topic
If the information about the elimination of one of the most dangerous terrorists in the world turns out to be true, this will be a serious success for the much-criticized Western operation in Syria. After all, the personality of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi is the cornerstone of the shaky structure called ISIS. And it is not known what will happen to this self-proclaimed caliphate after his death.
Ibrahim Awwad Ibrahim Ali Muhammad al-Badri al-Samarrai was born in the vicinity of the city of Samarra (in Iraq) in 1971. In an interview with The Daily Telegraph, al-Baghdadi's peers described him in his youth as "a modest, unimpressive, religious theologian, a man who shunned violence." For more than ten years, until 2004, he lived in a poor area on the western outskirts of Baghdad.
“He was quiet, shy and constantly spent time alone,” al-Baghdadi’s classmate Ahmad Dabash, one of the founders and leaders of the Islamic Army of Iraq, told The Telegraph. “I personally knew every leader of the rebel underground, but I did not know Baghdadi. He was of no interest - he used to say prayers in the mosque, but no one noticed him."
According to US and Iraqi intelligence analysts, al-Baghdadi has a doctorate in Islamic studies from a university in Baghdad. According to other information, he has a doctorate in education.
As al-Baghdadi's acquaintances say, the future leader of the Islamic State loved to play football. “He literally shone on the field, he was our Messi. He played better than anyone,” said a parishioner of the mosque in Mobchi, for whose national team the future Islamist leader played in his youth.
According to official data from the US Department of Defense, al-Baghdadi was detained in 2004 for preparing armed protests against the American contingent in the Arab Republic (a mid-level participant in the anti-American Sunni conspiracy). He was sent to the Bucca concentration camp (20-26 thousand prisoners passed through this camp, was located near the city of Umm Qasr and was named after the firefighter Ronald Bucca who died on September 11, 2001 in New York), and then was taken to a camp near Baghdad. At the end of 2004 he was released.
But, according to the recollections of the commander of Camp Bucca, US Army Colonel Kenneth King, he remembered this man well and is “99% sure” that Abu Bakr left them not in 2004, but right before the camp closed, at the end of the summer of 2009. He was sent by C-17 transport plane to a smaller camp near Baghdad and then released. Abu Bakr was remembered by the colonel for the fact that when leaving the camp he told his guards: “See you in New York,” since he knew that they were from New York and belonged to the 306th Military Police Battalion, which was staffed primarily by former New York City firefighters and police officers.
In 2005, al-Baghdadi represented the al-Qaeda terrorist group in the city of al-Qaim in the western desert of Iraq on the border with Syria.
The cell led by al-Baghdadi was originally part of al-Qaeda, but was subsequently expelled due to conflict with the group's Syrian branch.
In 2013, US Senator John McCain met in the Syrian province of Idlib with leaders of the so-called moderate Syrian opposition. Al-Baghdadi was also among them, as captured in many photographs and videos. Neither McCain nor al-Baghdadi deny this information.
In June 2014, the group gained worldwide fame by taking control of large parts of northern Iraq, including the country's second-largest city Mosul, within a month. On June 29, the creation of a “caliphate” led by al-Baghdadi in the territories of Syria and Iraq under his control was proclaimed. Al-Baghdadi himself proclaimed himself “caliph” under the name Ibrahim, and the Syrian city of Raqqa was declared the capital of the “Islamic State”. Al-Baghdadi, among other things, claimed at the time that he was a descendant of the Prophet Muhammad.
Photos from open sources
Al-Baghdadi's declaration of the creation of a "caliphate" was widely criticized and ridiculed by a number of Islamic theologians and leaders of Islamist organizations competing with ISIS.
On July 5, 2014, al-Baghdadi made his first public speech during Friday prayers at a Mosul mosque, recorded on video and posted online, in which he called on all Muslims in the world to submit to him and join the group's jihad.
Photo of al-Baghdadi taken in 2004 during his detention in the American filtration camp Camp Bucca in the vicinity of the Iraqi city of Umm Qasr Photo from open sources
After Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s speech in Mosul, Iraq, during which the leader of the Islamic State announced the creation of a “caliphate,” photographs of the head of the terrorist organization were scattered around the world. The British newspaper The Independent notes that there are only two photographs where the identity of al-Baghdadi is officially confirmed - one of them is in the possession of the Iraqi government, the other is in American military archives and was taken after the arrest of the militant in 2004. Many photographs appear on social networks that allegedly depict the leader of the Islamic State, but they are almost impossible to confirm, which does not allow us to completely remove the veil of secrecy from the image of the odious militant.
On March 18, 2015, al-Baghdadi was seriously wounded as a result of a strike by Western coalition forces on a convoy of three vehicles on the border of Iraq and Syria; reports also said he died in a hospital in the Syrian city of Raqqa. After this, IS militants swore allegiance to the new “caliph” Abdurrahman Mustafa Al Sheikhlar, who received the nickname Abu Alya al-Afri. According to a later report by The Guardian, al-Baghdadi survived but was paralyzed after being shot in the spine.
On December 7, Iranian media reported that the IS leader moved from Turkey, where he had been recently, to Libya to avoid persecution by Iraqi intelligence.
Back in October 2011, the US State Department officially added al-Baghdadi to the list of particularly dangerous terrorists. Washington has announced a reward of $10 million for the head of the IS leader or for information leading to his capture or liquidation.
On December 9, 2014, al-Baghdadi was ranked second in Time magazine's "Person of the Year" list. The editors of the publication noted the record pace of expansion of IS territories - in two years, al-Baghdadi’s militants managed to capture significant territory in Syria and Iraq.
Interestingly, back in the spring of 2015, it was reported that the leaders of the Islamic State militants in the city of Mosul swore allegiance to the new “caliph” Abu Alya Al-Afri. Then rumors about Baghdadi’s death were refuted, but information about his paralysis appeared. Perhaps now Abdurrahman Mustafa Al Sheikhlar, nicknamed Abu Alya Al-Afri, will become the new leader of the caliphate.
Al-Afri, originally from Taliafar, was a teacher by training, a physics teacher, also studied theology and worked as a driver in a small minibus. Already in the 90s, he became the first preacher of takfiri and jihadist ideology in Taliafar, which he preached secretly, and sometimes openly, in a large market mosque in Taliafar. In 2004, he fled his hometown, pursued by the American occupation authorities, and joined al-Qaeda. He was called the chairman of al-Qaeda's advisory council in Iraq. Like his predecessor, he was captured by the Americans, but after some time was released.
So far, there are only rumors about al-Baghdadi's successor.
Sergey Zviglyanich
Islamist terrorist groups Al-Qaeda, Al-Shabab, Boko-Haram, Taliban - their names are legion. But ISIS remains the most brutal and most dangerous today.
The Islamic State does not enter into negotiations even with the same terrorists hiding behind the banner of the prophet. And it does not participate in competitions for the title of the richest organization in the world - no one knows how much money ISIS has. But experts assure that ISIS’s treasures are countless - these include donations from Islamists from all over the world, oil smuggling, and trafficking in weapons and people.
The cruelty of jihadists is not even the stuff of legends - everything is in the news. Every week their reports about mass executions of dissenters, insufficient believers and dissidents appear online. Journalists looked at the map of ISIS’s actions and tried to figure out how this group managed to gather so many Islamists from all over the world under its banner in a very short time, and who its official leader, who calls himself after the medieval caliph, Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, is.
Unlike the past personification of evil, Bin Laden, his current incarnation, Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, is not yet so widely known. And although the whole world is discussing his recent marriage to a German woman, to this day only one video of him is available on the Internet. He, unlike Bin Laden, does not come from the richest Saudi family, his relatives are not seen in business ties with the White HOUSE administration, he did not destroy the “twin towers”, and is not hiding in inaccessible caves in the mountains with the fascinating name Tora Bora . But he is alive. Meanwhile, while the popularity of Abu Bakr himself is only gaining momentum, the evil that he personifies is already quite real and very popular.
"This Al-Baghdadi appeared as if out of nowhere, and it is not clear whether the United States is hunting for him or not. Look at what weapons are still falling into the hands of Al-Baghdadi's people in Iraq to this day. He has British, Israeli weapons, and no one is attacking. To understand who is behind them, you need to understand who benefits from the virtual destruction of the nation states of Syria and Iraq,” says former US National Security Agency employee Wayne Madson.
The story of how a relatively small militant group of Iraqi Islamists fighting in Syria against Assad under the banner of al-Qaeda, within two years, turned into a powerful structure with ambitions of a new Arab caliphate is vague. The person of Caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi himself raises no less questions. It turned out that eleven years ago he was held in an American prison in Iraq, but then was allegedly released. According to Pentagon officials, he was kept behind bars for no more than a year. However, the former head of this prison claims that Baghdadi spent five years there and was only released in 2009.
“Some believe that this is sufficient evidence that the Americans worked with him, recruited him, and so on. Based on my observations and analysis of what is happening, I can say that, depending on the Americans and on Saudi Arabia, this is all a myth. This myth is spreading mainly the propaganda machine of Iran, which, so to speak, benefits from presenting its opponents as simply hirelings of American imperialism, Israel, Saudi Arabia and so on, but this contradicts the known facts,” believes Heydar Dzhemal, Chairman of the Islamic Committee of Russia.
The rapid transformation of the inconspicuous Islamic activist Ibrahim Al-Badri, released from an American prison, into the leader of the most brutal Islamist military group was accompanied by another process - the emergence of former senior officers of Saddam Hussein's army in the leadership of the organization.
“The fact is that when Saddam’s officers came to power in the ISIS group, they purged the previous leadership. It’s a difficult question who purged whom, either the Americans, or these Saddam guys themselves, but, in general, the former leadership of ISIS was destroyed. And the person who, in fact, is behind the creation of the ISIS group was a former officer of Saddam, who is known as Haji Bakr, he died in January 2014. But, nevertheless, he managed to create this group, he managed to create it. ISIS, and he found this Al Baghdadi, he pulled him out of there, elevated him and brought him into the shura, into the council of commanders, that is, the main management link of the entire group,” says political scientist, expert on the Middle East Anatoly Nesmiyan.
A photograph taken in Syria when the current caliph was still little known. He's in the second row, to the left of Senator McCain. At that time, some unanimity still reigned among the fighters against the regime of Bashar al-Assad. All of them were generously funded by Washington, their armed forces, recognized by the Americans as moderate, trained at military bases in Jordan and Turkey. It is noteworthy that the future caliph of the bloodthirsty “Islamic State,” who had not yet grown a beard, was considered quite a handshake then some three years ago. Analysts who are inclined to believe that Americans are behind the actions of ISIS to this day are convinced: the sharply increased importance of ISIS, the conflict with al-Qaeda, represented in Syria by the Al-Nusra Front, the replacement of the struggle against Assad with the struggle for influence within the ranks of the opposition and, ultimately, ISIS's summer invasion of Iraq are all the result of serious divisions within the White House and on Capitol Hill.
"The United States has several political goals in this region. One of the most significant is a reshuffle of forces in the Middle East. This is carried out through massacres, not by US forces, but in this case, by the forces of the non-governmental army of the Islamic caliph ISIS. But there is another one the political line of a certain group led by Senator McCain. This group seeks, first of all, the overthrow of the Assad regime. Senator McCain is not only an American senator and the head of the opposition, but also a high-level functionary in the US government. Therefore, it is very difficult to reliably establish who is subordinate to whom. in this matter, the conflict between these two directions is not a conflict of interests, but a conflict of priorities. Either rebuild the entire Middle East first, or still overthrow Assad. The existence of these two political strategies is obvious,” says French political scientist and orientalist Thierry Meyssan.
It must be admitted that there are indeed many strange things associated with ISIS. Saudi Arabia, whose representatives at one time provided covert support to this formation, is now forced to strengthen its border in this direction, not without reason fearing an imminent attack. It is known that relations between Riyadh and Washington have recently been far from ideal. In addition, since the triumphant entry of Caliph Al Baghdadi’s troops into Iraq, the United States and Iran, at least in this direction, unexpectedly turned from bitter enemies into allies, bringing Obama closer to the desired solution to the problem of the Iranian nuclear project. Iraq itself, without the direct participation of the Americans, was de facto divided into three parts. So, filming the terrible atrocities committed by Islamic State militants is clearly not enough to conclude that American policy in the Middle East has failed.
16 December 2014, 17:37 Authors: Translation: Arseny Varshavsky, Dima Smirnov, based on materials from Newsweek
Newsweek studied the fate of world terrorist No. 1. Read our translation.
On those rare occasions when ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi appeared in public, his entourage resembled something between a president and a thieves' authority. “When he entered, the mobile connection disappeared,” says a 29-year-old resident of Syria - he asked to be mentioned in an interview only as Abu Ali - the man recalls the only time al-Baghdadi entered the mosque. “Armed guards have cordoned off the area. The women were sent upstairs to the women's prayer service. Everyone was warned that nothing was allowed to be photographed or videotaped. A terribly nervous atmosphere."
“What made it (the atmosphere more nervous) was when Baghdadi finally appeared, dressed in black from head to toe... The security shouted: “Allahu Akbar! Allah Akbar!" Everyone became even more scared,” says Ali. “Then the guards forced us to swear allegiance to him. Even after Baghdadi left, none of us were allowed to leave the mosque for the next half hour.”
In his hometown of Samarra, which lies in the Sunni Triangle north of Baghdad, al-Baghdadi (real name Ibrahim Awwad Ibrahim Ali al-Badri) is remembered differently. In his hometown he was considered “a very quiet person,” says former neighbor Tariq Hamid. “He was peaceful. He didn't like talking for a long time."
Friends of the leader of ISIS, whose caliphate now controls parts of Iraq and Syria, say al-Baghdadi grew up diligent, pious and calm. He was an introvert without many friends.
Hamid remembers him as a boy on a bicycle, wearing the usual Iraqi men's clothing (dijdasha), with a small white headdress on his head. “He always had religious or other books in the trunk of his bicycle, and I never saw him in trousers or a shirt, unlike most of the guys in Samarra... Thin beard; and he never hung out in a cafe. He had only a narrow circle of acquaintances from the mosque.”
It is believed that Abu Bakr was born in 1971 in Samarra. He grew up in Al-Jibria, a lower middle class area that was under the control of the Albu Badri and Albu Baz tribes. The area was also bombed by the US following the 2003 invasion in an attempt to root out insurgents and terrorist cells.
Al-Baghdadi's family was not rich, but two of his uncles worked in Saddam Hussein's security detail. This meant some kind of status and connections, which gave a certain respect or even fear in society. “He was from a poor but intelligent family,” recalls Hashem, a translator who knew his family. “He was very reserved...he went to the mosque, studied, read books, and that’s it.”
Al-Baghdadi grew up just a mile from the 10th-century shrine of Imam Hassan al-Shakri, one of the most sacred sites for Shiites and also an important monument for Sunnis in Samarra. If ISIS sources are to be believed, faith played a big role in al-Baghdadi's life. Another Samarra resident, Yessir Fahmy, says that al-Baghdadi spent much of his childhood in religious studies: “Ibrahim, like most of his family, was a devout Muslim.”
But London-based Iraqi analyst with the Iraq Institute of Economic Reform, Sajjad Jiyad, says he has not seen any conclusive evidence of his religious fervor. "I would be surprised if he was a religious man; most Iraqis who became jihadists were secular Ba'athists before 2003," Jiyad explains.
In addition to religion, as his neighbors say, al-Baghdadi loved sports, mainly football, which he played in the yard near his house. “He rarely lost his temper during a match, even if you hit him or got angry,” recalls Hamid. "He was a great defender."
ISIS websites indicate that in the past, al-Baghdadi studied the Quran in the mosques of Samarra and Hadit - the traditions, actions and sayings of the Prophet Muhammad. One neighbor says al-Baghdadi was looked after by two prominent clerics: Sheikh Subni al-Saarai and Sheikh Adnan al-Amin.
There is controversy over al-Baghdadi's work as a cleric. Some sources say that he preached in a mosque in Samarra, others in Baghdad. But Jiyad claims that this information is highly dubious, and ISIS is creating it for the image of al-Baghdadi.
Most believe that after high school, like most young men during Saddam's reign, he would have served in the Iraqi Army. During this time, he could be taught the basics of military tactics and proper handling of weapons.
At the age of 18, al-Baghdadi traveled to Baghdad for the first time to study. The depth of his knowledge is also a matter of debate. Some, like Hamid, believe that he achieved the degree of professor in religious sciences. It was not possible to clarify this information with family members. “Most of the relatives left Samarra, afraid of being associated with him,” says Fahmy. “Ibrahim left in 2003 to study in Baghdad. His nephew was arrested last year by Iraqi law enforcement. When the last members of his family went to Baghdad to negotiate his release, they were also arrested.”
As far as Fahmy knows, al-Baghdadi has not been in Samarra since 2003.
Prisoners pray at the American prison camp Camp Bucca, Iraq.
LinkedInfor terrorists
The origins of al-Baghdadi's brutal behavior are the bloodshed that began after the US invasion of Iraq to overthrow Saddam Hussein. American troops entered central Baghdad on April 9, 2003. Soon after, the country fell into anarchy. Saddam and his supporters immediately fled - some headed to villages near the Sunni Triangle, others moved to Syria. Sunni insurgents who remained in Iraq began to attack American military bases.
It is believed that al-Baghdadi helped create the terrorist group Jaish Ahl al Sunna wal Jama'a. In 2004 or 2005 - the exact year is unknown, as is all information about al-Baghdadi - he was captured by American troops, presumably during a large-scale manhunt to capture an associate of the Jordanian terrorist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Al-Zarqawi, the leader of al-Qaeda's Iraqi cell who was responsible for numerous bombings and deaths, was killed by US troops in 2006.
After his arrest, al-Baghdadi was imprisoned at Camp Bucca prison in northern Iraq, near the city of Umm Qasr, where former Abu Ghraib prisoners were also held. Al-Baghdadi was listed as a “civilian internee,” meaning he had ties to the terrorist group but was not convicted of committing terrorist acts.
It is unknown exactly how long al-Baghdadi spent at Camp Bucca. Some US military leaders who worked at the prison recall that al-Baghdadi was there between 2006 and 2007. Others say he was in prison from 2006-2009. Syrian activist Abu Ibrahim al-Raqqawi says al-Baghdadi was imprisoned between January 2004 and December 2006. Middle East Forum researcher Aymen Jawad al-Tamimi says because al-Baghdadi was involved in terrorist groups in 2005, he should were released at the end of 2004.
Whether he sat for a year or two, al-Baghdadi made good use of that time. At the time, Camp Bucca was a summer camp for aspiring terrorists. While under the supervision of American guards, the prisoners interacted with each other, exchanged information and combat tactics, and made important contacts for future operations. They drew inspiration from the torture at Abu Ghraib prison, the success of al-Zarqawi and divisions within the Sunnis. Historian Jeremy Suri has described Camp Bucca as a "virtual university for terrorists."
“Camp Bucca was a place where many jihadists met each other, and many former Baathists became radicalized and associated with Islamist groups,” writes Aaron Land, editor of the website SyrianCrisis. “So many ISIS leaders have passed through this prison.”
According to Jiyad, it is unlikely that al-Baghdidi was actively involved in insurgency before the US invasion of Iraq, and Camp Bucca was his starting point. "A rebel career must have been a good opportunity for him," he says. One of the people al-Baghdadi met at Camp Bucca was Taha Sobhi Falaha, also known as Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, an ISIS spokesman.
After his release from Camp Bucca, al-Baghdadi continued his insurgency. In 2006, an umbrella organization of terrorist groups including al-Qaeda formed the Islamic State in Iraq. In May 2010, he was appointed leader of this organization.
From the very beginning, IS had broad ambitions and its agenda was different from that of al-Qaeda. IS has abandoned the use of the al-Qaeda flag, choosing a different one.
According to the news resource al-Monitor, the split occurred as a result of gradually growing disagreements between al-Qaeda leaders in Afghanistan, as well as the search for other sources of funding for the organization. “Then, in mid-2013, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi announced the creation of the Islamic State of Iraq and Sham (now known as ISIS) and refused to carry out orders from Ayman al-Zawahiri, the leader of al-Qaeda. Al-Zawahiri wanted ISIS to operate only in Iraq and for Jabat al-Nusra to be al-Qaeda's representative in Syria."
A former ISIS member who defected from the group and identified himself as "Hussein" says he was with al-Baghdadi during the breakdown in relations between him and the al-Nursa organization, which is based in Syria and collaborates with al-Qaeda. He recalls the paranoia and mistrust that reigned during their meetings, which took place somewhere on the border between Syria and Turkey. “Al-Baghdadi met them in a trailer near the Turkish border,” he says. “He only introduced himself to high-ranking executives. He didn't introduce himself to junior bosses. But what’s interesting is that when he was in a large group, no one could say with certainty that he was the one in the room. Al-Baghdadi wanted to confuse others."
Al-Baghdadi relied heavily on the advice of the late Haji Bakr, the top ISIS leader and former Iraqi army officer who was killed in January 2014, Hussein said. Hussein believes his death was a big blow to al-Baghdadi: “Haji Bakr improved al-Baghdadi's image - he was preparing him for prominent membership in ISIS. But to be honest, the real leader who ruled in the shadows was Haji Bakr.” Al-Baghdadi still relies on dedicated military experts. He met many of them at Cap Bucca.
Quiet paranoid
Little is known about al-Baghdadi's personal life, other than that he is "violent in relationships and quiet in life," Jiyad says. “His behavior and activities are explained by paranoia.”
Most mentions of al-Baghdadi on social media do not provide complete information about him, and they rarely contain information about his activities and personality. ISIS-affiliated social media largely references al-Baghdadi when urging new users to pledge allegiance to the caliph.
Al-Baghdadi changes his location frequently, crossing the poorly guarded border between Iraq and Syria, and may live either in or near Raqqa. Jiyad says that before he fled to Syria with ISIS around 2010, al-Baghdadi likely lived in Baghdad and Mosul. “Very few people met him in those days, and those who saw him wore a mask,” says Jiyad. “His predecessors and peers were killed as a result of denunciations and actions of the special services. However, I also think that between 2010 and 2014 he managed to improve his religious knowledge and was able to create a mystical image around himself.”
Lebanese officials said they arrested al-Baghdadi's daughter and ex-wife in early December, although the exact relationship with him remains unclear. The Iraqi Interior Ministry, citing a source from its department's intelligence group, states that al-Baghdadi has two wives - Asma Fawzi Mohammad al-Dulaimi and Israa Rajab Mahal al-Kwasi.
In public, al-Baghdadi wears a scarf over his face and does not allow photographs or videos of him to be circulated, unlike leaders of other terrorist groups, including al-Qaeda. In old photographs taken in prison in 2004, he looks like "an ambitious terrorist, not a caliph."
Jiyad, who transcribed al-Baghdadi's audio recordings, says they provide insight into his views on, for example, Jabat al-Nursa and al-Qaeda. “He positions himself as the most important and treats organizations outside Iraq with a degree of contempt.”
Al-Baghdadi appears to relish his role as "the world's top terrorist, the heir to Osama bin Laden," Jiyad says.
“If you take away all the mysticism and grandeur, the ‘caliph’ turns into an ordinary person who took advantage of his opportunity,” notes Jiyad. “He is no different from the hundreds of other Iraqis who tried to destroy the new Iraq. He could become an unknown terrorist or a brutal criminal. And now he is in the center of world attention.”
Selection by Najib Ben Abdel Kader@abounour2006
Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi is a real person, however, this is just a nickname or pseudonym. The same applies to everyone around him. There is not a single member of the Al-Baghdadi Council whose last name or first name is real.
And Al-Baghdadi is 100% Iraqi. No other nationality is accepted because... he doesn't trust anyone.
The number of members of Al-Baghdadi's Military Council increases and decreases, ranging from 8 to 13 people.
Al-Baghdadi's Military Council is headed by three former members of Saddam's army, former Ba'athists. The main one is Colonel General Haji Bakr, an officer in Saddam’s Ba’athist army.
Who is Haji Bakr? What is his relationship with al-Baghdadi and when did it begin?
Tweets from 12/14/2013
As already mentioned, the Al-Baghdadi Military Council is headed by three people, the main one of whom is a former Baathist officer, a General Staff colonel named Haji Bakr. Colonel Haji Bakr joined the State of Iraq at a time when the State of Iraq was headed by Abu Omar Al-Baghdadi. Haji Bakr was at that time a simple member of a military organization who offered his services in the military field, his experience of serving in the Baathist army to the Al-Baghdadi organization. Colonel Haji was known for his loyalty to the Baath Party. He was the highest-ranking military leader in the inner circle of Abu Omar Al-Baghdadi, with whom he was not previously acquainted. However, through intermediaries associated with Abu Omar Al-Baghdadi and Abu Hafs Al-Muhajer, he was accepted into the inner circle, with the condition that he would connect the organization with the army leadership and provide valuable information about it.
Colonel General Staff was close to the leadership of the state of Iraq as a military adviser to Abu Omar Al-Baghdadi and Abu Hafs Al-Muhajer. Colonel General Haji Bakr provided the leadership with information and plans of a military nature and, through communications, connected him with the former military leadership of the Baath Party. The leadership of the state of Iraq brought Colonel Haji closer and closer to them, and in just a few weeks they recognized in him a significant storehouse of military and managerial experience. The strange thing is that the current leader, Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, was not yet a member of the organization's leadership, such as Abu Omar Al-Baghdadi. Until the death of the latter, Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi was a member of the organization not included in its leadership. He lived in the west of Iraq, and more specifically in the province of Al-Anbar, and even more precisely in Fellujah.
Haji Bakr remained in the leadership as an adviser to Al-Baghdadi and Al-Muhajer for about 50 days, when a disaster struck the state of Iraq - both Al-Baghdadi and Al-Muhajer were killed by a shell. Colonel Haji Bakr was not injured. At one moment, both leaders, who were the largest and most prominent leaders of the state of Iraq, died. The leadership positions were vacant. Then Haji was appreciated by everyone. Haji Bakr had a friend - a colonel named Mazin Nahir. Haji Bakr often visited Abu Omar Al-Baghdadi, accompanied by him, either presenting Mazin as an unofficial member collaborating with the organization, or as a trusted agent, introduced into the ranks of supporters of the regime, who would not like to be exposed either as part of the organization’s leadership or on its meetings after the murder of two leaders. Colonel Haji Bakr informed his associates and the leadership of the organization that he had sworn allegiance to the new emir of the state of Iraq, Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi. This news came as a surprise to everyone.
Application: Abu Hamza Al-Muhajer, who accompanied Abu Omar Al-Baghdadi, is an Egyptian named Abdel Munim Azzeddin Badauwi, whose last two nicknames, before joining Al-Baghdadi, (Abu Omar) were: 1) Abu Ayyub; 2) Abu Hafs.
Tweets from 12/15/2013
When, during a special meeting, one hour after the death of the leader of Al-Baghdadi (the First) and Al-Muhajer, Colonel Abu Bakr invited Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi to become emir and Abu Bakr expressed his concerns to him, Colonel Haji Bakr reassured him by promising help and support from the rear, which pleased both Al-Baghdadi himself and those from his circle who had been with him from the very beginning of his leadership activities.
A new stage in the history of the state of Iraq has begun, called the period of dual leadership - one leader, Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi - in plain sight, and a shadow leader - Colonel General Haji Bakr. The activities of the state of Iraq began to proceed in an atmosphere of fear of the presence in the state (organization) of a person endowed with extraordinary powers - Haji Bakr, very close to the emir. The image of a beardless colonel, always at the right hand of Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, caused misunderstanding among members of the state (organization), which both leaders, Al-Baghdadi and the colonel, felt.
From the first weeks, the colonel began to grow a beard and change his image and manner of communication. None of the members of the organization had any questions for the leadership, since a question is a doubt, and doubt is a split in the ranks, which one way or another can lead to bloodshed and the liquidation of the organization. None of the members of the organization knew the colonel before Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi came to its leadership. After about two months, Colonel Haji Bakr began to hold special meetings with Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi in order to prepare the structure of the new state. Their first agreement was the creation of two apparatuses: an apparatus to prevent a split in the state and protect it from within by creating security units that eliminate everyone who poses a danger to the existence of the organization, and an apparatus to ensure the flow of material resources to the state.
First: security apparatus.
The first steps to ensure security were that Colonel of the General Staff Haji Bakr recommended that the parade leader Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi avoid personal meetings with the heads of regional units in order not to be subject to their influence or instructions, but to convey to them the orders of the emir through the leadership formed by the colonel Advisory Council. Subsequently, Colonel Haji Bakr became a necessary person for Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, with whom he never parted; he became, as it were, his personal minister, a real shadow leader of the organization.
The second step in creating a security agency was the formation of disparate units engaged in liquidation and secret killings, formed by the colonel initially with 20 people, and then, over the course of several months, increased to a hundred people.
Orders for these units came only directly from senior management. They were not subordinate to any of the regional emirs. The selection of personnel in them took place on the basis of the colonel’s personal acquaintances from among his especially trusted colleagues from his former activities during the collapsed Iraqi Baathist regime. The task of these units was the secret liquidation of those suspected of secessionist activities or opposition to the State of Iraq, including the liquidation of warlords and Sharia judges.
At the same time, orders for their liquidation did not pass through the organizational structures of state leaders, bypassing them. At the head of these units, the colonel put his former colleague, a former officer named Abu Sawfan Rifai. Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi felt safe and was inflamed with a feeling of gratitude towards Colonel Haji Bakr. He began to consider him the person he needed. Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi even felt that he could not remain head of the organization without Colonel Haji Bakr, who, thanks to his experience in the army, serves as the acting minister of defense and head of the security services.
Second:
The State of Iraq, under the leadership of its former leader Abu Omar Al-Baghdadi, has taken serious steps to attract large financial resources based on:
1) Confiscation of the financial resources of all Shiites, Christian minorities, Druze, as well as all those collaborating with the Assad regime, even Sunnis;
2) Appropriation of state oil fields, state energy and fuel facilities, enterprises and any financial resources;
3) All companies that have contracts with the ruling regime, be it maintenance companies, housing and communal services companies, gas stations, communications companies. All of them were considered partners of the ruling regime. The owners of those that were not completely under their control received threats of murder and bombing of company facilities or stores they owned if they refused to pay the monthly tax. And they paid it, fearing for their property.
4) Roadblocks were placed along long highways, charging heavy vehicle drivers fees that sometimes amounted to $200.
The state of Iraq, under the leadership of Abu Bakr and the colonel, concentrated very significant financial resources, due to which the amount of wages and payments for participation in hostilities was increased. With increasing financial opportunities among Iraqis, the attractiveness of joining and commitment to the State has increased significantly. The financial apparatus of the state of Iraq was created. It is surprising that Colonel Haji Bakr himself became its leader, combining the duties of the military leader of the state. Five managers were assigned to him. During this period, the colonel established a group of consultants, the composition of which was appointed by the Advisory Council of the State of Iraq from seven to thirteen people, of which not a single one was non-Iraqi.
Now I would like to receive answers from the State of Iraq to the following questions:
– How did the idea of forming the state of Iraq and the Levante come about? Who put forward the idea of al-Baghdadi's redeployment to Syria three weeks before it was officially announced and where did he live all this time?
– Why did he rush to announce his redeployment and why did he choose the Turkish border as his place of residence before the announcement of the redeployment? Why did he choose mobile iron trailers near refugee camps as his place of residence?
– What threat did he make against Abu Muhajir Al-Jolani before the announcement of the creation of the state and what, at his request, should Al-Jolani or Jabhat al-Nusra do or not do on the issue of its dissolution?
There is a photograph of Al-Baghdadi with his advisers, taken on the border with Turkey a week before the announcement of the creation of the state of Iraq and the Levant and the dissolution of Jabhat al-Nusra.
Tweets from 12/17/2013
With the outbreak of the Syrian revolution, the eyes of the state of Iraq and the Levant turned to Syria, especially the eyes of members of the organization of non-Iraqi origin, and especially those from Syria. Colonel Haji Bakr was frightened by the possibility of infiltration by members of the State of Iraq and its leadership, who, being its members, were looking for ways to create division in its ranks, and could choose Syria as a loophole to escape from the state.
Colonel Haji Bakr advised Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi to leaders at all levels to abandon all thoughts of moving to Syria. Anyone who goes to Syria will be considered a schismatic and a renegade. Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi made such an appeal, which contained threats. The reason for this was clear - the situation was unclear and it was necessary to abstain. Ferment began within the ranks of the members of the state of Iraq, which could lead to splits, vacillations and uncontrolled flight of its members, especially non-Iraqis, to Syria. The colonel proposed forming a group of non-Iraqis that would be sent to Syria under the command of a Syrian, with a ban on any non-Iraqi leader being part of the group. In this he saw an opportunity to save the state of Iraq from splitting.
The new leadership in Syria will attract non-Iraqi as well as foreign supporters. The Jabhet al-Nusra organization was formed, which began to develop under the leadership of Abu Muhajir Al-Jolani. The name of the organization and its authority began to gain strength. The name of Abu Muhajir Al-Jolani has acquired international resonance. Many mujahideen from the Persian Gulf region, Tunisia, Libya, Morocco, Algeria, Europe and Yemen began to join Jabhat al-Nusra at an alarming rate and in large numbers. This strengthening of Jabhat al-Nusra began to cause fear among the colonel and Al-Baghdadi, since in the ranks of Jabhat al-Nusra there is no loyalty either to the state of Iraq or to Al-Baghdadi personally. Colonel Haji Bakr was frightened by the strengthening of Jabhat al-Nusra and Al-Jolani, which threatened Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi and the state of Iraq with losing their role in the process as a whole. Therefore, Haji Bakr called on Al-Baghdadi to order Al-Jolani to announce on the radio that Jabhat al-Nusra was officially a subdivision of the State of Iraq under the leadership of Al-Baghdadi. Al-Jolyani promised to think about it, however, he delayed his answer in every possible way.
Days passed, but there was still no statement. Al-Baghdadi sent Al-Jolani a reminder containing reprimands and reproaches, to which he responded with further promises to consult with his circle of Mujahideen and scientists. Al-Jolani sent a letter to Al-Baghdadi, in which, to the great disappointment of the colonel, he noted that such a statement, in the opinion of all members of the Advisory Council, would not be in the interests of the revolution. Al-Baghdadi was also angry. They, under the guise of Mujahideen and advisers to Al-Baghdadi's wing, sent spies in order to, being among Al-Jolani's associates, monitor his movements, so that he did not give orders and enter into an alliance with anyone.
This fact greatly worried Al-Jolani, as it limited his freedom of movement and action. He began to speak to his entourage with restrained compliments to the state of Iraq and Al-Baghdadi, which only further increased suspicions against him. He felt that he would be eliminated. His feelings of anxiety and fear for his life increased significantly when the United States called for Jabhat al-Nusra to be added to the list of terrorist organizations and Al-Jolani himself to the list of most wanted persons.
Al-Jolani had a chance to hide from the people sent by Al-Baghdadi to spy on him, isolating himself among a limited closed circle of people he personally selected. The US designation of Jabhat al-Nusra as a terrorist organization, and of Al-Jolani himself as one of Syria's most wanted men, has heightened Colonel Haji Bakr's and al-Baghdadi's fears and concerns about Jabhat al-Nusra's competition with the state.
Abu Muhajer Al-Jolani was a smart politician who tried to maintain moderation and instill peace in Al-Baghdadi's soul. However, the fears of the colonel and Al-Baghdadi exceeded all the reassurances coming from Al-Jolani, which forced the colonel to think about further steps to join Jabhat al-Nusra to the state of Iraq. Colonel Haji Bakr advised Al-Baghdadi to send Al-Jolani an order to carry out a military action against the leadership of the Free Army during a meeting in Turkey in order to inflict maximum damage on the leadership of the Free Army.
Al-Baghdadi sent a letter to Al-Jolani with instructions to carry out two explosions, the first in Turkey and the second in Syria, the targets of which would be the places of greatest concentration of Free Army leaders. Such actions were justified by the need to prevent future contacts and rapprochement with the United States and to eliminate them before the situation in Syria worsens, preventing their popularity from growing among the people. The names of the leaders of the Free Army who were subject to liquidation were identified (we have a list of these names). These orders were communicated to the senior leaders of Jabhat al-Nusra and their units. A meeting of Jabhat al-Nusra took place.
The giant's order was unanimously rejected. A detailed response was sent to Al-Baghdadi, stating that Jabhat al-Nusra and its Advisory Council reject this order because they are Muslims, and also do not consider it possible to hold such events in Turkey, which is a significant state that provides significant support for the revolution . Carrying out the action will disrupt the development of the jihadist movement and that Jabhat al-Nusra knows better, since it is closest to these processes. This caused even greater anger between General Staff Colonel Haji Bakr and Al-Baghdadi, who considered this fact a blatant disobedience.
The colonel and al-Baghdadi sent a harsh letter to al-Jolani, in which he was given a choice: either carry out the order or dissolve Jabhat al-Nusra and form a new organization. Al-Jolani delayed his answer. The Colonel and Al-Baghdadi were waiting for an answer, which was always delayed. Al-Jolani expressed deliberate disregard for the instructions since the ultimatum had expired. Al-Baghdadi sent his envoy to meet with Al-Jolani to listen to his explanations. Al-Jolani tried to avoid this meeting, citing certain circumstances.
The wait for the meeting dragged on, and Al-Baghdadi's envoy returned empty-handed. Al-Baghdadi sensed real danger. He felt that Jabhat al-Nusra considered itself a larger force than the state of Iraq and was beyond its control. The colonel proposed the following to Al-Baghdadi: he would send the heads of Iraqi units with the task of holding meetings with the regional leaders of Jabhat al-Nusra for the purpose of espionage and testing their moods, giving them the idea of dissolving Jabhat al-Nusra and looking at their reaction, and at the same time finding out the degree of popularity of Al -Baghdadi in their midst. This was actually accomplished.
The Colonel and Al-Baghdadi sent ten Iraqis to Jabhat al-Nusra, who spent ten days among the Mujahideen. During this time, they held meetings with the Mujahideen and some influential figures in Jabhat al-Nusra, especially with people from Saudi Arabia. The results of these meetings were mixed. Reaction ranged from support for the idea to rejection. There was a large layer that supported common Islamic aspirations and dreams of creating a state from Iraq to Syria under a single leadership, most of whose representatives were represented by newly joined Jabhat al-Nusra, who had previously encountered the leadership of Jabhat al-Nusra, which prohibited and punished any manifestations apostasy.
There were also those who met their demise at the hands of Jabhat al-Nusra for inciting apostasy, or were severely punished for it. Any entity strives to provide its members with maximum freedom, and Jabhat al-Nusra has imprisoned, persecuted and disarmed some of its members for spreading ideas of apostasy. Among those imprisoned by the verdict of Jabhat al-Nusra were: Tunisians Abu Ritaj Al-Susi, Abu Omar Al-Ibadi, Moroccans Abu Damdam Al-Husni, Abu Hajjaj Al-Nawari, Saudi Arabian Abu Bakr Omar Al-Qahtani.
The Saudi Abu Bakr Omar Al-Qahtani, who was punished by Jabhat al-Nusra, had his weapons confiscated and was punished three times for spreading inflammatory apostate ideas. He was on the side of the violators of the foundations of Jabhat al-Nusra. He sided with a group of individuals punished by Jabhat al-Nusra on suspicion of supporting al-Baghdadi, which resonated with Jabhat al-Nusra. This Saudi subsequently became the chairman of the Sharia court of the state of Al-Baghdadi and the first renegade.
Two weeks after al-Baghdadi announced the dissolution of Jabhat al-Nusra, ten of al-Baghdadi's spies returned to Iraq with a vague picture of the level of support among Jabhat al-Nusra members for its dissolution and re-subordination to a single state. Colonel Haji Bakr invited Al-Baghdadi not to make any decision regarding the dissolution of Jabhat al-Nusra, but to go with him in order to personally understand the situation on the spot, since the announcement of the creation of the state of Iraq and Syria during the absence of Al-Baghdadi in Syria was not capable of inspiring and leading the masses.
People would like to see Al-Baghdadi, and his physical presence would be an effective factor. Al-Baghdadi agreed with the colonel's opinion and sent people to prepare a secretive and safe place. After these people got in touch, a safe place was determined on the Turkish border, his redeployment was prepared, accompanied by his personal envoy and colleague in the leadership of the organization, Colonel General Staff Haji Bakr and only three other people. What did Al-Baghdadi do when he arrived in Turkey and where exactly did he live? How many days did he spend there before announcing the dissolution of Jabhat al-Nusra?
Part 2
Tweets from 12/18/2013
When did Al-Baghdadi appear in Syria? How was the dissolution of Jabhat al-Nusra announced? What does the Saudi officer Bender Al-Shaalian have to do with the formation of Al-Baghdadi's new state?
Al-Baghdadi, the colonel and their entourage arrived in Syria three weeks before the announcement of the dissolution of Jabhat al-Nusra, after which they immediately went to a secret location on the Turkish border. The following was prepared for Al-Baghdadi: iron mobile trailers near the Syrian refugee camp - the safest place for him and the farthest from prying eyes. Al-Baghdadi and his companions lived in these trailers, where Al-Baghdadi met with regional leaders of Jabhat al-Nusra, urging them to recognize their leadership.
Al-Baghdadi decided not to reveal to them the disagreements and conflicts taking place between him and Al-Jolani, explaining to them that the essence of the idea is common leadership in the name of common interests and to everyone's satisfaction, and that everyone, both the leadership and the Sharia To advisers, this choice in favor of bringing Jabhat al-Nusra under the wing of the state seems correct. It's just a matter of returning one of the branches of the organization to its basics. This is a purely organizational issue.
Al-Baghdadi's meetings with influential members of Jabhat al-Nusra took place in two versions, the first of which was when a prominent Jabhat al-Nusra figure met and talked with him in private, being personally acquainted with him, and the second, when a low-ranking leader did not have a personal one-on-one meeting with him, but met with him in the presence of about ten people, one of whom said that Al-Baghdadi was present among these ten and heard your answers.
They call for unity of ranks and the creation of a single organization. It will happen very soon. They gave advice on how to achieve cohesion and unity, talked about how dangerous the enemies and vacillations in the ranks were, that Al-Jolani was silent, that there were no disagreements or differences between him and Al-Baghdadi. Upon learning of Al-Baghdadi's arrival in Syria and his meetings with influential people from the leadership of Jabhat al-Nusra, Al-Jolani was extremely angry.
Jabhat al-Nusra's leadership was concerned, foreshadowing al-Baghdadi's next steps. Al-Baghdadi extended an invitation to Al-Jolani for an urgent meeting. Al-Jolani refused the meeting. He became aware of Al-Baghdadi's anger and the possibility of his assassination. He refrained from the meeting, surrounding himself with heavy security. Al-Baghdadi was unable to establish the exact location of Al-Jolani, and he sent a message to Al-Jolani, informing him of the imminent dissolution of Jabhat al-Nusra, demanding that he make a personal statement in the interests of maintaining unity. Al-Jolani responded with an even more sincere and frank letter, pointing out that the annexation of Jabhat al-Nusra into the state of Al-Baghdadi would be a fatal mistake and would lead to the tearing to shreds of the popularity and authority gained by Jabhat al-Nusra among the Syrian jihadists , and that the people of Syria categorically reject such a decision, advising Al-Baghdadi to return to Iraq, leaving Jabhat al-Nusra alone.
Colonel Haji Bakr advised Al-Baghdadi to issue a statement on the dissolution of Jabhat al-Nusra on his own behalf, but not to issue a statement about the resignation of Al-Jolani, since he may yet return after the end of the crisis in relations. The colonel asked to delay the statement until a combat battalion could be formed in Syria from among defectors from Jabhat al-Nusra, capable of becoming the core of Al-Baghdadi’s security after his statement.
Colonel Haji Bakr summoned the leaders of Jabhat al-Nusra loyal to him and agreed with them that they, from among their subordinates, would form a guard battalion that would guarantee the success of the statement, spreading the news about it among supporters of Jabhat al-Nusra. In three days, the colonel managed to prepare the commanders, who had about one thousand fighters under his command, and secretly notify them of the time of the release of the statement on the dissolution of Jabhat al-Nusra.
The day before the announcement, the colonel notified all other leaders of Jabhat al-Nusra about the presence of Emir Al-Baghdadi in Syria, so that they were ready to accept the dissolution and submit to him, swearing allegiance to him during this period as part of the declaration of the dissolution of Jabhat al-Nusra and formation of the state of Iraq and Syria. The hour “zero” (the hour of declaration) has arrived. It was greeted with approval by the leaders, with whom an agreement had been reached in advance. They expressed their pleasure at solving problems. Leaders and Shariah judges were elected from among the members of Jabhat al-Nusra, who were supposed to meet with Al-Baghdadi to confirm them in office, so that, upon returning to their subordinates, they could tell them about their meeting and conversation with Al -Baghdadi.
Colonel Haji Bakr warned Al-Baghdadi that the current period is very decisive and security measures should be relaxed when organizing personal meetings with Jabhat al-Nusra supporters to take the oath, so that people feel freer, especially after the entire previous period, Al-Jolani violated the oath given to them. So that senior leaders and Shariah judges can feel the difference when they see a person more prominent than them, namely Al-Baghdadi. This will be a great psychological factor and must be carried out.
After the release of the Statement, Jabhat al-Nusra split into three parts. Part of it, and this is almost half of the composition, joined Al-Baghdadi. The other part, which is a quarter of the composition, remained neutral, and the last quarter remained with Al-Jolani. Al-Baghdadi felt the threat posed by the neutral or hostile half that did not align with him. The colonel sent an angry message to Al-Jolani, in which he suggested that he either join Al-Baghdadi or accept death, since his actions, according to Khariji, constitute open disobedience, and, according to Islamic Sharia law, deserve death. Al-Jolani did not receive the message, because he changed his place of residence and his headquarters.
Members of his staff were informed of the nature of this message. The colonel, on behalf of Al-Baghdadi, began sending his representatives to all the governing bodies of units that were not aligned with Al-Baghdadi with threats, calling them fugitives and declaring that everything they have belongs to the state, and they must swear allegiance to it, or disarm , it is safe to leave the country. They have no third choice.
Colonel Haji Bakr demanded that defectors from Jabhat al-Nusra give up the names of influential individuals from the forces not aligned with al-Baghdadi in order to bribe or intimidate them. At this time, the name of the former Saudi officer Bender Al-Shaalian, who had been on good terms with the state of Al-Baghdadi since the time of the first Al-Baghdadi, began to appear. Bandar Al-Shaalian played an important role during two periods: the first - the state of Iraq before Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, and the second - the period of Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi. Bender Al-Shaalian was among the influential persons of the state of Iraq before Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi.
He was one of the commanders of a military unit in Iraq. Then he returned to Saudi Arabia, and a new state was formed under the leadership of Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, with whom Bender maintained good ties. However, only for this period did he turn away from the path destined for him. He was constantly in contact with the state of Iraq and supported it in every possible way both before and after the dissolution of Jabhat al-Nusra. He accomplished his task of establishing acquaintances and connections between influential figures of Jabhat al-Nusra and al-Baghdadi.
Al-Shaalian's first act was to introduce Al-Baghdadi to Abu Bakr Omar Al-Qahtani. He believed that the Saudi Arabian flag would influence the Mujahideen. It was a rare chance for Saudi Arabian Abu Bakr Omar Al-Qahtani to transform himself from an inmate of Al-Jolani prisons into a visitor of Al-Baghdadi. Al-Qahtani was summoned to meet with Al-Baghdadi and Colonel Haji Bakr, where he immediately pledged allegiance to them, expressing his readiness to influence and lure Jabhat al-Nusra supporters, especially the Saudis.
Al-Qahtani was not previously known among the leadership of the state of Iraq, and Saudi Arabia duly directed his actions to influence the remaining members of Jabhat al-Nusra. Al-Qahtani began a new stage with his transformation from an illegal military prisoner of Jabhat al-Nusra into a close associate of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.
Part 3
It became known to Haji Bakr and Al-Baghdadi that Al-Jolani was not going to follow their call for the dissolution of Jabhat al-Nusra and that he was likely to make a public statement about his refusal to comply. Colonel Haji Bakr suggested that Al-Baghdadi immediately form a security group with two tasks: the first is to seize all the weapons depots of Jabhat al-Nusra, and immediately liquidate everyone who opposes this so that Jabhat al-Nusra does not have any weapons left, no ammunition for people to leave Jabhat al-Nusra, scatter and join the state of Iraq.
The first task was solved with great success. A group of Mujahideen Jabhat al-Nusra - warehouse guards who refused to hand over the warehouses they were guarding - was eliminated. The second task was even more decisive: the formation of a security group designed to eliminate the leadership of Jabhat al-Nusra, starting with Al-Jolani himself, the most influential Sharia lawyers, including Al-Muhajir Al-Qahtani.
Colonel Haji Bakr formed a group with the task of carrying out liquidations and murders consisting of fifty people under the command of a former Iraqi officer, which was supposed to, firstly: determine the location of the leadership of Jabhat al-Nusra, and, secondly: organize surveillance of all of them movements and eliminate them using cars with explosives attached under their bottoms, the detonation of which is carried out using a clock mechanism.
A search was carried out for Al-Jolani, his movements were investigated, and some of his former associates were arrested to ascertain his movements. However, the place where he was hiding could not be found. Then the group of Colonel Haji Bakr established surveillance of the main Sharia lawyer of Jabhat al-Nusra Al-Muhajer Al-Qahtani.
Colonel Haji Bakr was informed of his whereabouts and all his movements. However, it was also reported that Al-Muhajer Al-Qahtani does not go anywhere without being accompanied by two guards and has never been seen alone. Then an order was given to liquidate him along with those accompanying him.
Al-Muhajera Al-Qahtani is used to being accompanied in his car by two people, the first of whom is Abu Haws An-Najdi Omar Al-Muhaysani and the second is Abu Omar Al-Jazrawi, called Abdul Aziz Al-Othman. The liquidation team of Colonel Haji Bakr planted an explosive device in the car of Al-Muhajer and his companions. The car went in the direction of one of the positions occupied by Jabhat al-Nusra. On the way, the target of the liquidation, Al-Qahtani, got out of the car to meet with one of the members of Jabhat al-Nusra at one of his command posts, and asked his entourage to wait for him in the car.
At this time, the car with those accompanying it was blown up. Allah protected Al-Qahtani. He realized that he was the target of the action. After making sure that both of his companions were killed, he disappeared, fearing the presence of a safety ambush. Colonel Haji Baku was informed of the death of Al-Qahtani and his entourage, Al-Baghdadi was also informed that the second person in Jabhat al-Nusra had been secretly eliminated.
The news of the death of Al-Qahtani circulated among the state of Iraq for the whole day, until, from conversations among supporters of Jabhat al-Nusra, it became known that he was alive and well and that the action was a failure. Colonel Haji Bakr demanded an urgent convening of an emergency meeting of the leadership of the liquidation group, during which he sharply criticized them, saying that this unsuccessful operation would make it impossible to conduct similar operations for many months.
Al-Jolani's refusal to disband Jabhat al-Nusra has remained the main threat to Al-Baghdadi and Colonel Haji Bakr since they took charge of the state of Iraq. The colonel demanded that Al-Baghdadi provide a solution to the problem within his competence. Al-Baghdadi expressed to him his fears that Al-Jolani might resort to the help of Al-Zawahiri to escalate the conflict situation. This is what actually happened. Al-Jolani managed to strengthen his position with the help of three people, one of whom was a Saudi commander, and the other two were Syrians (we have their names).
Al-Zawahiri asked not to rush and to search for a fundamental solution to the problem. Al-Zawahiri sent a message to Al-Qaeda's Yemen chief Nasser Al-Wahishi asking for mediation before he made a final statement embarrassing Al-Qaeda. Al-Wahishi sent a written message to Al-Jolani and Al-Baghdadi, to which Al-Baghdadi did not respond. Al-Jolani's response to Al-Wahishi's message was word for word his justifications given to Al-Baghdadi himself and, subsequently, Az-Zawahiri that Al-Baghdadi's participation was the worst mistake of the Syrian revolution.
Al-Wahishi informed Al-Zawahiri of the failure of his mediation and that a solution must be reached by Al-Zawahiri himself in his personal statement. Al-Baghdadi, after receiving a message from Al-Wahishi, felt that the problem was becoming more complicated. Al-Baghdadi was in a difficult psychological state at that time, and Colonel Haji Bakr advised him on how to maintain commitment, strength and perseverance.
Kuwaiti Hamid Hamd al-Ali met with Al-Jolani to offer him his mediation role in defusing the conflict. Al-Jolani expressed to him his thoughts and commitment to thoughts regarding the danger of Al-Baghdadi's presence in Syria. Kuwaiti Al-Ali found Al-Jolani's arguments in favor of his commitment to Al-Nusra convincing, and also agreed that the existence of a state called the State of the Levant led by Al-Baghdadi was a gross political and legal mistake.
Kuwaiti Al-Ali, through one of the sharia leaders close to Al-Baghdadi, Abu Ali Al-Anbari, demanded a meeting with Al-Baghdadi. Such a meeting took place. The meeting was recorded. During the meeting, Al-Baghdadi and the colonel expressed their commitment to the state of Iraq and the Levant, and the Kuwaiti stated the importance of unity and resolution of the conflict situation. In short, an agreement was reached between them on the following: wait to see what Az-Zawahiri says in his speech to the media.
Colonel Haji Bakr expressed uncertainty about Az-Zawahiri's removal. Al-Baghdadi asked him to calm down. After the departure of the Kuwaiti Al-Ali, the colonel reproached Al-Baghdadi for linking the fate of their state with Az-Zawahiri, who sent Nasser Al-Wahishi on a mediation mission. Colonel Haji Bakr demanded that Al-Baghdadi withdraw from Az-Zawahiri in order to put an end to Jabhat al-Nusra and al-Jolani, their leadership and to dissolve Al-Nusra even from a legal point of view. The colonel began to take steps in many directions at once:
- firstly, to intensify the role of the liquidation unit;
- secondly, to act among Sharia lawyers, recruiting them from among influential muftis with the obligatory oath to Al-Baghdadi;
- thirdly, increased recruitment through the media on the Internet with the glorification of Al-Baghdadi and his state, posting reports on operations carried out and their confirmations, and publishing calls directed against Al-Nusra and his leadership.
The liquidation group continued to operate. However, she changed her tactics, moving from using plastid to using highly trained snipers. She again returned to the search for iconic figures and leaders, and began to carry out recruitment among the Sharia lawyers of Jabhat al-Nusra with the involvement of the Iraqis Abu Al-Anbari and Abu Yahya and the Saudi Abu Bakr Omar Al-Qahtani. The two Iraqis were tasked with recruiting supporters from the Maghreb and Levant countries, while the Saudi Al-Qahtani was tasked with recruiting Saudis and people from the Gulf countries.
Al-Qahtani worked day and night to issue fatwas about the need to swear allegiance to Al-Baghdadi, and even established connections with influential circles in Saudi Arabia, the Persian Gulf and the Maghreb. But all this did not bring results. He then went to meet with Sharia jihadist lawyers to persuade them to pledge allegiance to Al-Baghdadi. He had a meeting with the Saudi Othman Al-Nazih and convinced him to side with the state of Iraq, which was victoriously announced by Abu Ali Al-Ansari.
Al-Anbari was the most prominent sharia authority in the state of Al-Baghdadi, however, he was an Iraqi. Al-Anbari asked to meet with the Saudi Othman in order to find out the extent of his influence, but discovered exactly the opposite of what Al-Qahtani told him about him. Al-Anbari reported to Al-Baghdadi that Osman al-Nazih was not suitable to be nominated for the role of Sharia leader, since he had weak personal qualities and was not able to conduct a conversation and participate in theological confrontation.
Colonel Haji Bakr and Abu Ali Al-Anbari asked Saudi Arabian Abu Bakr Omar Al-Qahtani to have the fatwas issued on his behalf, telling him that Saudi Sharia authorities would support his commitment to Al-Baghdadi's state.
- ISIS, prohibited V Russia terrorist organization
