“Everyone is afraid of a repetition of those events. Why bad relations between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan

The situation in Central Asia remains very difficult in terms of ensuring regional stability and security. Territorial and other related interstate contradictions began to manifest themselves after the collapse of the USSR and are still far from being resolved.

In relations between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, one of the main knots of contradictions is the problem of border demarcation. Along the entire perimeter of the Uzbek-Kyrgyz border, which is about 1300 km long, there are, according to various estimates, from 70 to 100 disputed sections. Today, only those sections are delimited where the border runs along mountain ranges and those valleys where there were no significant disagreements. Particular disputes are caused by sections of the borders that pass through waterways, such as canals, rivers and reservoirs, where not only issues of territorial delimitation are affected, but also the solution of water management problems.

And yet, the toughest controversy is being waged in relation to a number of sections of the Ferghana Valley. Today in the south of Kyrgyzstan there are 75 disputed areas, which are gradually coming under the influence of Uzbekistan. In addition, on the territory of Kyrgyzstan there are two Uzbek enclaves numbering, according to various sources, from 40 to 50 thousand people. In turn, there is a Kyrgyz enclave in Uzbekistan with a population of about 600 people. At the same time, all of them are deprived of direct access to the territory of their states, which creates significant difficulties for their population. The parties have repeatedly tried to solve this problem, but their approaches to its solution differ significantly.

The Uzbek leadership is making attempts to conclude an agreement with its Kyrgyz counterparts on the exchange of territories. However, the Kyrgyz side considers the proposed options unacceptable, since their implementation will almost completely cut off two regions of the country - Leilek and Batken - from the rest of the state. The solution of this issue is also complicated by the fact that in one of these enclaves (Sokh) oil fields have been discovered, in respect of which attempts to forcibly seize both sides have recently been observed. Moreover, Uzbekistan, taking advantage of the presence of more powerful armed forces, is building up its military contingent on the borders with Kyrgyzstan and in the Sokh enclave itself.

It should be noted that recently a new factor, which appeared during the “color revolution” in Kyrgyzstan in the spring of 2005, may intervene in the solution of this problem. It is known that the total Uzbek population in Kyrgyzstan is about 700 thousand people. At the same time, the Uzbek diaspora mainly occupies the rebellious Osh and Jalalabad regions in the south of the country. Its representatives, using the corruption of local officials, seek to occupy key positions in a number of sectors of the economy (trade, agriculture and the service sector), as well as in local governments.

Organizations appeared, whose leaders began to put forward demands for a mandatory quota for Uzbeks in parliament and state authorities, for the need to legislate the post of governor of the Osh region and the mayor of the city of Osh for people of Uzbek nationality. Therefore, with the onset of unrest, they went to aggravate the situation in order to achieve their goals.

Considering Tashkent's claims to some territories of Kyrgyzstan, as well as nationalist sentiments in the Uzbek diaspora and similar sentiments among the extremist-minded part of the inhabitants of Kyrgyzstan, it can be concluded that these circumstances can become a big problem for regional security and stability. This was fully confirmed during the May and June 2010 riots in the cities of Osh and Jalalabad, which resulted in more than 2,000 dead and wounded and about 100,000 refugees from among the Uzbek population.

The second significant knot of interstate contradictions between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan is associated with different views on the causes of the spread of terrorism in the region, as well as ways and methods of combating it. The invasion of the militants of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan into the south of Kyrgyzstan in 1999 sharply complicated relations between Tashkent and Bishkek. During the Batken events, the President of Uzbekistan accused Bishkek of the fact that “the bandits have not just crossed the border of Kyrgyzstan, but have been quietly running from Tajikistan through Kyrgyzstan to Uzbekistan for two years now. Hence these bandit attacks, tons of explosives that were found in Kokand, Andijan and Namangan. All this was transported through the territory of Kyrgyzstan.”

The Kyrgyz authorities, for their part, say that Tashkent's repressive actions against religious figures and Islamic organizations in the early and mid-1990s provoked a strong reaction and contributed to the formation of an armed opposition, which it now has to fight.

At the same time, it should be noted that in its anti-terrorist struggle, the leadership of Uzbekistan often resorts to forceful methods, contrary to the opinion of its neighbors. Thus, the Uzbek military mined some territories of Kyrgyzstan and the gorges around the enclaves of Sokh and Shakhi-Mardan, which led to human casualties among local residents, and also caused significant damage to livestock. Only thanks to the persistent demands of Kyrgyzstan and international organizations, the demining work was carried out by Uzbek specialists. The issue of payment of material compensation for the damage caused by the Uzbek side was ignored.

In addition to the above, there are problems in relations between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan in the field of economic cooperation, including the joint use of the region's water resources.

"World Powers in Central Asia", M., 2011, p. 95-98.

In which a significant number of Uzbeks lived, from the early spring of 1990, the informal associations "Adolat" and a little later "Osh-aimagy" (Kirg. Osh-aimagy, Rus. Osh region). The main task of "Adolat" was to preserve and develop the culture, language, traditions of the Uzbek people. The goals and objectives of "Osh-aimagy" - the implementation of constitutional human rights and the provision of land plots for housing construction - mainly united young people of Kyrgyz nationality.

In May 1990, poor young Kyrgyz demanded that they be given the land of the Kolkhoz im. Lenin near the city of Osh. The authorities agreed to comply with this demand. Starting from May 30, on the received field of the collective farm, the Kyrgyz held rallies with demands to remove the first deputy chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Kyrgyz SSR, the former first secretary of the regional party committee, who, in their opinion, did not solve the problem of registration, employment and housing for Kyrgyz youth and contributed to that in the field of trade and services in Osh, mainly people of Uzbek nationality worked.

The Uzbeks, on the other hand, perceived the allocation of land to the Kyrgyz extremely negatively. They also held rallies and adopted an appeal to the leadership of Kyrgyzstan and the region with demands to create Uzbek autonomy in the Osh region, give the Uzbek language the status of one of the state languages, create an Uzbek cultural center, open an Uzbek faculty at the Osh Pedagogical Institute and remove the first secretary of the regional committee, who allegedly protects the interests of only the Kyrgyz population. They demanded a response by June 4th.

From June 1, Uzbeks who rented housing to the Kyrgyz began to evict them, as a result of which more than 1,500 Kyrgyz tenants also began to demand land plots for development. The Kyrgyz also demanded that the authorities give them a final answer on the provision of land before June 4.

However, the republican commission, headed by the chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Kirghiz SSR A. Dzhumagulov, recognized the allocation of land for the development of the collective farm named after. Lenin illegal and for the construction of housing it was decided to allocate other land. Most of the Kyrgyz, in need of building land, and the Uzbeks agreed with this decision, but about 200 representatives of Osh-Aimaga continued to insist on providing them with the land of the Kolkhoz im. Lenin.

Conflict

On June 4, the Kyrgyz and Uzbeks converged on the field of the collective farm. Lenin. About 1.5 thousand Kyrgyz came, Uzbeks - more than 10 thousand. They were separated by police armed with machine guns.

Uzbek youth reportedly tried to break through the police cordon and attack the Kyrgyz, the police began to throw stones and bottles, and two policemen were captured. The police opened fire and, according to some information, 6 Uzbeks were killed (according to other information, wounded). After that, the Uzbek crowd, led by leaders, shouted "Blood for blood!" went to Osh, destroying Kyrgyz houses. From June 4 to June 6, the number of Uzbek rioters increased to 20 thousand due to arrivals from districts and villages and Andijan (Uzbekistan). About 30-40 Uzbeks tried to seize the buildings of the Osh GOVD, SIZO-5, the Department of Internal Affairs of the Osh Oblast Executive Committee, but they failed and the police detained about 35 active rioters.

On the night of June 6-7, the building of the Internal Affairs Directorate and a police squad were shelled in Osh, two police officers were wounded. A crowd of thousands of Uzbeks appeared on the border with the Andijan region of the Uzbek SSR, who came to help the Osh Uzbeks.

On the morning of June 7, there were attacks on the pumping station and the city motor depot, interruptions began in the supply of food and drinking water to the population.

Kyrgyz-Uzbek clashes also took place in other settlements of the Osh region. In the Fergana, Andijan and Namangan regions of the Uzbek SSR, the beatings of the Kirghiz and the burning of their houses began, which caused the flight of the Kirghiz from the territory of Uzbekistan.

The massacre was stopped only by the evening of June 6, when army units were brought into the region. At the cost of enormous efforts by the army and the police, it was possible to avoid the involvement of the population of Uzbekistan in the conflict on the territory of the Kyrgyz SSR. The march of armed Uzbeks from the cities of Namangan and Andijan to Osh was stopped a few dozen kilometers from the city. The crowd overturned police cordons and burned cars; clashes with army units were recorded. Then the main political and religious figures of the Uzbek SSR spoke to the Uzbeks rushing to Kyrgyzstan, which helped to avoid further victims.

Victims

According to the investigative group of the USSR Prosecutor's Office, about 1200 people died in the conflict from the Kyrgyz side in the cities of Uzgen and Osh, as well as in the villages of the Osh region, and from the Uzbek side, according to unofficial data, 10 thousand. Investigators found about 10 thousand episodes of crimes. 1,500 criminal cases were sent to the courts. About 30-35 thousand people took part in the conflict, about 300 people were brought to justice.

Categories:

• Kirghiz SSR
• Interethnic conflicts in Kyrgyzstan
• June 4 events
• June 1990
• 1990 conflicts
• Osh (Kyrgyzstan)
• 1990 in the USSR
• Public order violations
• perestroika
• History of Kyrgyzstan

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Of course, my impressions are very subjective. In addition, I cannot guarantee that in another year they will not change, so far they are very superficial. Nevertheless, I believe that my experience will be useful to readers of the mailing list in some way.

For many residents of Russia, and for Europeans as well, all Muslims look the same. When, somewhere in the world, fanatics blow up civilians or stone listeners of Western music while brandishing the Koran, one inevitably gets the impression that Islam is all aggression. Muslims are afraid because they are different, they live according to some incomprehensible "concepts", and this is alarming. According to my impressions, on the one hand, in Muslim "concepts" a Russian person would find a lot of things that he would like, and on the other hand, Muslims of different countries and peoples are just as different as Europeans. Iranians are different from Arabs, Arabs are different from Uzbeks, Uzbeks are different from Kirghiz. They differ as much as, for example, the Swedes - with the French, and the Spaniards - with the Germans. It’s just that we don’t face these differences every day, so it’s easier for us to unite these peoples under one label “Muslims”. Although this also has its own characteristics: the same sacred text, the Koran, is perceived by different Muslim peoples in their own way. But since this is not a discussion of professional religious scholars, it is better to talk about religious differences in another place and at another time.

Acquaintance of the Muslim civilization with the Russian one is still happening with difficulty. On the one hand, the number of Tajik and Uzbek surnames in crime statistics speaks for itself. On the other hand, in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, and in other former republics of the Soviet Union, coffins with the bodies of compatriots who died in the vastness of Russia are met every month - most often, those who ordered these murders are never found.

Despite my socionic experience, in this essay I deliberately avoided "typing" national mentalities. Perhaps the reader will try to do it himself.

Azerbaijanis

There is a huge Azerbaijani community in St. Petersburg (it seems to me that of the non-Russian residents of St. Petersburg, Azerbaijanis occupy one of the first places - maybe second after the Russians). I also noticed that the older generation of St. Petersburg Azerbaijanis are often friends with Armenians, unless, of course, it comes to discussing the recent war.

The appearance of an Azerbaijani is more European than Asian, except for black curly hair. The figure is rather wide, but not "cabinet-shaped". The corners of the mouth and the tips of the eyebrows are usually lowered.

Azerbaijanis are very similar in character and outwardly to Italians. According to my impressions, Azerbaijanis easily flare up, but just as quickly cool down and are generally not vindictive. At first, I was even surprised how two Azerbaijanis can pour out streams of rage at each other, and a week will pass - they go to visit each other, but not to beat the face, but drink coffee and watch TV together.

Communication between Azerbaijanis resembles a Mexican drama, while the audience willy-nilly become participants in these small dramas.

If we talk about problems, then for me the only problem is the peculiarity of the Azerbaijani mentality: everything is treated very “humanly”. Azerbaijanis somewhere instinctively believe that rules exist only insofar as people do not know how to negotiate, and if you wish, you can even negotiate with nature. Because of this, there is a problem with filling out various kinds of forms and reports - Azerbaijanis usually fill them out carefully, but very informally, and they will definitely miss something, and then they ask: “Well, is it really impossible to do without all this burden?” On the other hand, this feature of Azerbaijanis turns out to be invaluable precisely when it is necessary to negotiate with people informally, unofficially. Moreover, if you want to properly promote yourself or your product, contact an Azerbaijani. I assure you, he will do it in a way that you could never do.

There is one more problem (although - for whom it is a problem, and for whom it is a pleasure): Azerbaijanis spend a lot of time and effort to "look" in the eyes of their neighbors and acquaintances. How this or that is assessed means a lot to an Azerbaijani. It should be borne in mind that in Azerbaijan itself, a person is usually familiar with the whole house, and what kind of car he has, what new suit, where he works, how much he spent on the wedding - he discusses the whole house, or even a quarter, and discusses it for a long time. However, unlike the "new Russians" from the joke, a rare Azerbaijani throws money down the drain. Chic is when you can let your neighbor brag about something big, but "birja dafa" (only once), while you yourself brag about some little thing, but every day.

Uzbeks

Outwardly, Uzbeks are squat, stocky. Facial features are simple, as if carved from stone. Sometimes among the Uzbeks there are tall, lean representatives, but they almost certainly have Iranian or Turkmen roots in the family.

Uzbeks usually do not spread for a long time, they speak briefly and to the point. The people are unemotional, reserved. Among the Uzbeks there are talkative and smiling, but usually the speaker’s smile does not “infect” the entire company of interlocutors, but remains his individual feature (unlike, say, Azerbaijanis or Armenians, who if they laugh, then the whole company laughs with them).

The main positive feature of the Uzbeks, which I cannot fail to note, is their innate industriousness. If an Uzbek understood the task, he can be trusted 100%. The main thing here is not to demand from a person to think out, to try to guess the secret train of thought, the subtext: the Uzbeks do not like this very much. Even if an Uzbek is cunning, usually his cunning is not dug deep, but Uzbeks also expect others to not be "wagged" with them.

Uzbeks do not like to “spread their thoughts”. They are like Sherlock Holmes: they know quite well and thoroughly what is connected with their business, and most often they are not interested in everything else. Therefore, to a stranger, an Uzbek may seem limited, stubborn. This impression can persist until it comes to the area where the Uzbek is a specialist. Here you will be surprised to learn that a person knows not just a lot, but a lot and in detail. Knowledge of practical details that are important for the cause is a trait characteristic of very many Uzbeks.

Now about the sad part - about the problem of adaptation of Uzbeks in Russia. For most Uzbeks, the way of life in Russia is fundamentally different from what they are used to. In Uzbekistan, even in cities, people live in small communities, where everyone knows each other, the neighbors' news becomes known to the whole house. On the one hand, mutual assistance is well developed, on the other hand, everyone knows almost everything about everyone, and this, to some extent, restrains people, serves as a moral brake. When an Uzbek gets to a big city in Russia, then if he has no relatives or friends here, this is a severe shock for him. On the one hand, he is a stranger to everyone, there are no communities here, and even Uzbeks somehow communicate less with each other, on the other hand, attention is also lacking, most people treat him indifferently. Among the visiting Uzbeks there are many cultured and intelligent people, but how can you guess this, if in Russia a former university teacher can work behind the counter? Newspapers usually write about crimes committed by people of little culture. A person of not too far-sighted mind from the Uzbek hinterland in the big cities of Russia can “take the roof off” - he may get the false impression that if you steal or do something worse in such a big city, you can easily get lost unnoticed. To be honest, the Russians treat petty offenses with indifference, and the concept of a “database of investigative bodies” does not fit into the head of a former Fergana peasant. I don’t know how it is in other cities, but in St. Petersburg it’s enough to look at the full houses of any district court - and among the names of non-Russian criminals, the majority will turn out to be Uzbek, and mainly for serious crimes.

Patriotic newspapers write a lot about what trouble the Uzbeks represent for Russia. But if you think about it... And who organized the flow of Uzbeks to Russia? Do Uzbeks, Moldavians, Tajiks run our construction sites? Russians arrange Uzbeks for construction! They also take away passports from Uzbeks and force them to live in inhuman conditions. The Uzbek does not know how to conflict. He can be stubborn, maybe even cunning, but his village ingenuity is not the best weapon in a big city, he has to break off over and over again, and he cannot always understand the reasons. But if the Uzbek once breaks through, then it will not seem enough.

Another problem is that the Uzbeks do not yet represent a single nation, although there are certainly similarities between the inhabitants of different regions of Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan was created on the ruins of several former empires - Bukhara, Khiva and Kokand. Local clans are still strong in Uzbekistan, and the language breaks up into regional dialects that are quite different from each other - Fergana (the literary language is based on it), Tashkent, Surkhandarya, Khorezm (he was strongly influenced by Turkmen). In addition to the Uzbek language, other local languages ​​​​are also in use - Karakalpak (close to Kazakh), Uighur (it differs from Uzbek mainly in phonetics, there are few lexical differences) and Tajik (common in Samarkand, Bukhara and its environs - for an Uzbek this language is completely incomprehensible). A significant part of the Uzbeks lives in the north of Tajikistan (Leninabad, Kulyab) and Turkmenistan, as well as in the west of Kyrgyzstan (Osh region). Nevertheless, there are common features in the behavior and customs of Uzbeks from various parts of Uzbekistan, thanks to which I ventured to write here about the “Uzbek mentality”.

Turkmens

Perhaps, of all the inhabitants of Central Asia, the Turkmens are the most beautiful in appearance. And they are very neat in their clothes. I had to see a variety of Turkmens, but almost all of them were dressed very neatly and tastefully. Women love to wear jewelry and choose it very carefully. According to the manner of communication, Turkmens are laconic, polite and very secretive; they are not allowed into their inner world even after a long acquaintance.

The Turkmen language is not easy for residents of other Central Asian republics to understand. There are many common words, but the problem is in pronunciation: Turkmens speak as if a sandstorm is blowing into their mouths.

If we talk about problems... It seems to me that the "father of the nation" Saparmurat Turkmenbashi is not an accidental phenomenon, but very organic for the Turkmen mentality. The Turkmens have a very hierarchical society, the order of the elder (by age or position in the community) is a law that must be followed immediately, without thinking. Material well-being is a very great value for a Turkmen, but apart from things, perhaps, the “average statistical Turkmen” is not interested in anything. Turkmen women are reputed to be jealous and quick-tempered. If the Turkmen are your employees, then you need to keep in mind one problem: Turkmens are very proud. Therefore, they rarely admit that they did not understand something, and this misunderstanding is revealed at the most inopportune moment - when the job has already been done and the train has left. For the same reason, telling a Turkmen that he doesn't know how to do something is obviously a hopeless task. And it is just as hopeless to ask a Turkmen whether he can cope with something or not, because to say “I can’t cope” means losing face for him. Instead, you need to ask targeted questions related to knowing the details, and you need to explain using very illustrative examples: most Turkmens have concrete, not abstract thinking.

At the same time, it should be noted that Turkmens are very scrupulous about their reputation. Turkmens are extremely rare among criminals and offenders in Russia. Their community is very close, almost everyone knows each other, mutual assistance is very well developed (the elder takes care of the younger, the younger unquestioningly obeys the elder). If a Turkmen ends up in a Russian court, it is usually only for violating the passport and visa regime.

Kyrgyz

Many Turkic peoples in appearance combine both Caucasoid and Mongoloid features, and the farther to the west, the more Caucasoid. But if the Azerbaijanis are almost complete Caucasians, then the Kyrgyz, on the contrary, for the most part, are classical Mongoloids, often chubby, short, but dense.

The Kirghiz are very balanced, they rarely lose their temper. Despite all the differences in mentality, they adapt well in the Russian environment. The Kyrgyz are characterized by something like Buddhist indifference: if trouble happened, then it should have happened. The Kyrgyz usually prefer not to say a firm "yes" or "no", but "we'll see": circumstances may turn out differently. In case of disagreement, they prefer not to conflict, but to put the matter on the brakes.

The Uzbeks are very critical of the Kyrgyz, they consider them lazy and cunning. A Kyrgyz woman I know told me that there is a proverb in Uzbekistan: "Don't sleep too long - you'll become a Kyrgyz." In the south of Kyrgyzstan, in the Osh region, many Uzbeks live, and the local Kyrgyz are mostly bilingual. But neighborhood is not only a cultural exchange, but also a division of land (and there are not enough fertile lands in Central Asia). On the other hand, rather close historical and cultural ties exist between the Kyrgyz and Kazakhs (the latter were also called "Kyrgyz" until the 1930s), although the Kyrgyz and Kazakhs do not always understand each other by ear, the Kyrgyz and Kazakh languages ​​are relatives, but not close, but "second cousins". Tajiks and Kyrgyz, as it seemed to me, do not experience much interest in each other. But the Kyrgyz easily find a common language with the Uighurs.

The Kirghiz are inquisitive by nature and absorb new things rather quickly. The experience of life between large states developed among the Kirghiz the art of externally adapting to the environment, while internally remaining themselves. Perhaps this is why they are known as "cunning". On the other hand, no one wants to die. In history, there were many peoples who died because of their excessive straightforwardness. The fact that the small Kyrgyz people managed to survive despite the genocide, organized first by the tsarist government, then by the Bolsheviks along with the Chinese, is a great achievement.

Nevertheless, the Kyrgyz "cunning" must be taken into account when working with them. It should be borne in mind that if one or another Kyrgyz flatters, crumbles in your address with flowery phrases, constantly repeats “you are my boss”, then behind this there is probably a desire to unobtrusively dump the main burden of problems on the boss: you are the boss, you know how to do everything, and I am a small person, so you can deal with this.

(end to follow)

In Kyrgyzstan, there was a major inter-ethnic conflict between the Kyrgyz and Uzbeks, called Osh.

The south of Kyrgyzstan (Osh, Jalal-Abad and Batken regions) occupies the southwestern part of the Ferghana Valley. There has always been a tight knot of various problems, contradictions and conflicts, potential sources of which were the underdevelopment of economic infrastructure, limited land and water resources, mass unemployment, and religious extremism.

The national-territorial demarcation in the 1920s radically changed the political situation of the Ferghana Valley: it was divided between Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan; in each republic, a mixed, multinational population continued to live. Two Uzbek enclaves remained on the territory of Kyrgyzstan - Sokh and Shakhimardan, numbering approximately 40 to 50 thousand people, as well as the Tajik enclaves Chorku and Vorukh. In turn, in Uzbekistan there is a Kyrgyz enclave - the village of Barak, belonging to the Ak-Tash rural administration of the Kara-Suu district of the Osh region.

Since ancient times, the flat areas of the Fergana Valley were occupied by sedentary farmers (mainly Uzbeks), and in the mountains and foothills in the auls lived the Kirghiz - nomadic cattle breeders. Settled farmers are the founders of a number of cities, including Osh and Uzgen. Historically, there were very few Kyrgyz living in these cities.

Since the mid-1960s, the Kyrgyz began to move from the mountain villages to the plains and populate the cities and countryside around the cities, but in the late 1980s, in the cities of Osh and Uzgen, the Uzbeks significantly outnumbered the Kyrgyz.

The policy of perestroika and glasnost in the second half of the 1980s gave rise to the rise of national self-consciousness of both the Kyrgyz and the Uzbeks. At the same time, socio-economic problems have become aggravated, and the shortage of land plots for housing construction has become especially sensitive. As a rule, land was demanded by people from the countryside - ethnic Kyrgyz who moved to Frunze (Bishkek) and Osh. The legislation of the USSR forbade the allocation of land for individual development in the capitals of the Union republics. The dissatisfaction of the Kyrgyz student and working youth living in Frunze grew. Throughout the spring of 1990, rallies of Kyrgyz youth were held in the capital of Kyrgyzstan, demanding land. In the suburbs of the capital, attempts to seize land plots did not stop.

In Osh, since the early spring of 1990, the informal Uzbek association "Adolat" ("Justice") and the Kyrgyz public organization "Osh aimagy" ("Osh region") became more active, which set the task of providing people with land plots for building houses.

In May, a group of Uzbek aksakals from the Jalal-Abad region appealed to the leadership of the USSR (Chairman of the Council of Nationalities of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR Rafik Nishanov, First Secretary of the Communist Party of Kyrgyzstan Absamat Masaliev, etc.) with a demand to grant autonomy to the Uzbek population of southern Kyrgyzstan. The appeal indicated that the indigenous population of the region is actually Uzbeks, whose number in the region is about 560 thousand people; in the Osh region, in the zone of compact residence, the Uzbek population is more than 50%.

Among the Uzbeks, dissatisfaction was compounded by the fact that the vast majority of the leading cadres were of Kyrgyz nationality.

At the rally of the Kyrgyz, which took place in Osh on May 27, its participants actually delivered an ultimatum to the authorities. They demanded that they be handed over 32 hectares of cotton fields of the Lenin collective farm, which mainly employed Uzbeks. This requirement was granted by the government officials.

In the Uzbek community, this decision was perceived as an insult. The Uzbeks gathered their own rally, at which they also put forward demands to the authorities: the creation of Uzbek autonomy and the granting of state status to the Uzbek language.

Those Uzbeks who rented housing to the Kyrgyz in Osh began to massively get rid of tenants. This only contributed to the incitement of the conflict, especially since the people evicted from their apartments (and, according to some reports, there were more than 1.5 thousand of them) also joined the demands to transfer land for construction.

On May 31, the authorities acknowledged that the decision to transfer 32 hectares of collective farm land was illegal. However, this could no longer affect the development of the situation: numerous rallies were held on both sides.

On June 4, about 1.5 thousand Kyrgyz and more than 10 thousand Uzbeks converged on the field of the disputed collective farm. The opposing rallies were separated only by a rare chain of police officers armed with machine guns. From the crowd, they began to throw stones and bottles at them, there were attempts to break through the cordon. As a result, the police officers opened fire to kill.

Angry crowds moved in different directions into the city, setting fire to cars and beating up representatives of the "hostile" nationality who got in the way. A group of several dozen people attacked the building of the Osh GOVD. The police, again using weapons, beat off the attack.

After that, mass pogroms, arsons and killings of Uzbeks began in Osh. Unrest swept the city of Uzgen and rural areas, the majority of whose population was Kyrgyz. The most violent character took the clashes in Uzgen - the regional center, which was also a place of compact residence of the Uzbeks. On the morning of June 5, mass fights began there between the Kyrgyz and Uzbeks, and the advantage was on the side of the latter. In a few hours, hundreds of Kyrgyz were beaten, representatives of the Kyrgyz community began to leave the city. However, by noon, organized armed groups of Kyrgyz from nearby villages began to arrive in the city. They became organizers and participants in numerous pogroms, arsons, robberies and murders.

Support groups from the neighboring Namangan, Fergana and Andijan regions of the Uzbek SSR arrived to help the Uzbek side.

On June 6, 1990, units of the Soviet army were introduced into the settlements engulfed by unrest, which managed to master the situation. The march of armed Uzbeks from the cities of Namangan and Andijan to Osh was stopped a few dozen kilometers from the city.

According to the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Kyrgyz SSR and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the former USSR, during the riots of 1990, 305 people were killed, 1371 people were injured, including 1071 people were hospitalized, 573 houses were burned, including 74 state institutions, 89 cars, 426 robberies and robberies were committed .

The Decree of the Council of Nationalities of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of September 26, 1990 "On the events in the Osh region of the Kyrgyz SSR", adopted on the basis of the work of the deputy group, stated that "the events in the Osh region of the Kyrgyz SSR were the result of major miscalculations in the national and personnel policy; neglect educational work among the population; unresolved acute economic and social problems; numerous facts of violation of social justice. The first leaders of the Kirghiz SSR, as well as the region, did not learn lessons from the interethnic clashes that had previously taken place in the republic, showed carelessness and short-sightedness in assessing the situation about the activation of nationalist elements and imminent conflict, did not take measures to prevent it.

The material was prepared on the basis of information from open sources

The conflict between the Kyrgyz and Uzbek communities in the south of Kyrgyzstan dates back to the time of the development of the territories of Central Asia by the Russian Empire. In the southern regions of Kyrgyzstan, the Kyrgyz and Uzbeks living in the neighborhood mutually regard the other side as newcomers, and themselves as the indigenous population.

The Uzbek population traditionally leads a settled way of life, is engaged in agriculture and trade, is reluctant to enter universities, does not seek to work in the public service, in law enforcement agencies. At the same time, the Kyrgyz population of the cities of Osh and Jalal-Abad is represented mainly by immigrants from mountain villages, or their descendants. Many of them receive higher education, willingly enter the public service.

Thus, the two national communities - the Kyrgyz and the Uzbeks - are undergoing social and property division: the Uzbeks rarely receive higher education, however, they control trade and business, they strive for compact living in the rich Uzbek neighborhoods "mahallas", mainly in their own homes; Kyrgyz occupy the majority of administrative positions at all levels, in law enforcement agencies, but with absolute dominance in state structures, they have lower incomes, and many ethnic Kyrgyz are in the position of "lumpen". Property division is a constant irritant in relations between the two peoples.

Ethnic Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan predominantly live in the following areas:

1) Osh region: Osh city, Uzgen, Karasuu, Aravan and Nookat;

2) Jalal-Abad region: Jalal-Abad, Nooken, Bazarkorgon and Suzak;

3) Batken region: Isfana city, Kyzyl-Kiya. In places densely populated by Uzbeks, one can notice a fairly wide use of the Uzbek language.

The confrontation between the Kyrgyz and Uzbeks periodically resulted in inter-ethnic clashes, the most massive ones happened in 1961 and 1990.

According to the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the KSSR and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the former USSR, during the riots of 1990, 305 people died, 1371 people were injured, including 1071 people. were hospitalized, 573 houses were burned, including 74 state offices, 89 cars, 426 robberies and robberies were committed.

After the “Osh events” of 1990, the authorities of the republic did not take preventive measures to prevent the recurrence of such events. The conflict was simply frozen, and a ban was actually imposed on conversations or discussions about interethnic relations.

Ethnic tensions between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks were noted in 2004 in connection with the adoption of the Law “On the State Language”, which, according to the Uzbek diaspora, allowed the authorities to oust national minorities from government bodies, and also in 2006 in connection with the demands of ethnic Uzbeks about giving the Uzbek language official status and greater representation of ethnic minorities in the economic and political spheres of the country.

In 2007 there were 7 interethnic conflicts. Of these, 2 conflicts in Batken region, 3 conflicts in Jalal-Abad region, 2 conflicts in Osh region. The most pressing issue was the reduction of hours in the subject "Uzbek language and literature" by increasing the number of hours "Kyrgyz language" in Uzbek schools.

The years 2008-2009 were characterized by systematic conflict situations among the youth of Uzbek and Kyrgyz nationality (Osh city, Aktam village, Ala-Bukinsky district, Jalal-Abad city, Isfana city, Leilek district, Kyzyl-Dzhar village, Aksy district /n, Bazar Korgon, Jalalabad region, etc.). Local authorities tried to hush up and not reflect the conflicts over the confrontation between the Kyrgyz and Uzbeks of the Kyrgyz Republic. However, the Russian media and online publications covered the incidents in full detail. Media of Uzbekistan also widely covered such events and severely criticized the leadership of the Kyrgyz Republic.

By June 2010, problem areas had formed in Kyrgyzstan, which spurred the start of the conflict:

Unsettled issues of language policy: the development of the state language, the status of the Uzbek language.

– Dissatisfaction of Uzbeks with representation in government bodies.

- The use by nationalists of issues of interethnic relations in order to obtain political dividends, capital in the interests of developing their own business.

- A large number of Uzbeks are not integrated into the socio-political life of the country, but go to illegal religious and political organizations.

– State power does not prevent or preempt inter-ethnic conflicts, but fights the consequences of these conflicts.

- The incompetence of law enforcement agencies in dealing with interethnic conflicts leads to incitement of interethnic hatred.

- The absence of a clear, coordinated state policy in the field of interethnic relations affects the work of all structures involved in the process of regulating interethnic relations.

As a result of the coup d'état that took place in Bishkek in April 2010, an interim government was formed in the country, and a crisis of power emerged, which was especially felt in the south of the country. The overthrown President Bakiyev returned to his ancestral village of Teyit, without exception, all the political forces of Kyrgyzstan perked up, sensing the opportunity to gain benefits either from the ensuing anarchy or from the upcoming redistribution of power.

The Uzbek diaspora in Kyrgyzstan also saw an opportunity to use the vacuum of power to satisfy their long-standing demands: granting the Uzbek language official status, obtaining proportional representation of the country's Uzbek population in the legislative and administrative bodies of the republic, and possibly autonomous status.

The Bakiyev clan, seeking to regain the lost power, hoped to take revenge on Yugestrany. For these purposes, the Bakiyevs allegedly chose the path of destabilizing the situation in the region in order to demoralize the Provisional Government and deprive it of leverage in Osh and Jalal-Abad. According to some reports, the Bakiyevs hoped to split the South of the country from the North.

Under these conditions, the Uzbek card acquired a special weight for all parties: representatives of the Provisional Government were ready to promise the Uzbek diaspora the satisfaction of certain demands in exchange for support in the struggle for power; Bakiyev saw an opportunity to use the Uzbek factor to destabilize the situation in the South.

At the request of the Vice Minister of the Provisional Government, Azimbek Beknazarov, organized Uzbek youth participated in the expulsion of Bakiyev's militants from the Jalal-Abad administration building. Uzbek militants burned the ancestral home of Kurmanbek Bakiyev, which was painfully received by the Kyrgyz population. The Kyrgyz yurt and the flag of Kyrgyzstan, symbols of the Kyrgyz statehood, burned down in the fire.

In conditions of high politicization of society, domestic clashes and quarrels between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks began to acquire a political character. In mid-May, the Kyrgyz burned down two Uzbek houses, the conflict was gaining momentum, more and more moving from the political to the inter-ethnic plane.

Kyrgyz sources indicate that on June 10, 2010, the Uzbek diaspora was the first to start active operations, which looks plausible. In the course of clashes with Bakiyev's militants, the Uzbek youth rallied, leaders were determined among them. In the course of three days, residents of the cities of Osh and Jalal-Abad (mostly areas densely populated by Uzbeks and Kyrgyz) were involved in the conflict.

After the first bloody night, information about what was happening in Osh quickly spread throughout Kyrgyzstan, Kyrgyz youth from the surrounding villages rushed to Osh, the police often supported the militants, according to some information, the military issued weapons to the Kyrgyz militants on receipt. Uzbek sources indicate that the military participated in the fighting on the side of the Kyrgyz militants, including numerous sources talking about the use of armored vehicles by the attackers.

What the Uzbek communities initially perceived as some kind of extreme form of political struggle for their rights turned into a bloody battle between the two ethnic groups, and ultimately resulted in the beating of the Uzbek population of Osh and Jalal-Abad. At the same time, representatives of other nationalities - Russians, Tatars, Koreans, Dungans, Kazakhs - were excluded from the conflict, and became victims only by chance.

Large-scale damage was inflicted on Uzbek regions, more than a thousand houses, shops, restaurants and cafes were looted and then burned. There are examples of severe abuse and torture on both sides. The presence of mobile phones and built-in video cameras allowed the militants to quickly receive information about what was happening in Osh or Jalal-Abad during the riots, and after the end of the conflict, the surviving residents to exchange video reports about the atrocities of the opposing side. Such information is now available in a variety of mobile devices among the population. Often these are chilling videos, and most of these shots are exchanged by young people. The Uzbek diaspora in the south of Kyrgyzstan estimates its losses at 1-2 thousand people.

During the days of unrest, the Provisional Government announced a partial mobilization. The militias who arrived in Osh found themselves in cramped conditions: there was no water, food, electricity, or gas in the city. For four days the city was under siege.

On the second day, the riots spread to Jalal-Abad. The Kyrgyz youth destroyed and burned the Kyrgyz-Uzbek University, as well as several blocks of densely populated Uzbeks.

A mass exodus of residents began from the south of Kyrgyzstan: 80 thousand refugees crossed the border with Uzbekistan, citizens of non-Uzbek and non-Kyrgyz nationality could take their families to Bishkek. Detachments of Kyrgyz and Uzbeks, blocking the Osh-Bishkek highway, freely let cars of citizens of nationalities who did not participate in the conflict pass.